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Abstract 
The offshore has been the centre of intergovernmental interaction in 
Australia for over twenty-five years yet has remained a neglected topic in 
studies of Australian federalism. This study examines the development 
and implementation of a complex intergovernmental arrangement, the 
Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS), which returned jurisdiction to 
the States from low water mark to three nautical miles offshore following 
the High Court's decision in the Seas and Submerged Lands case of 
December 1975, which upheld Commonwealth jurisdiction from low water 
mark. The OCS was established, after lengthy intergovernmental 
interaction, in 1979 with what were termed "agreed arrangements" 
implemented between 1983 and 1990. 
The most visible element of offshore resource policy in the period 
following the Second World War is the the continual expansion of the 
Commonwealth's interests. To focus solely on this expansion gives a 
limited explanation for the development of intergovernmental agreements 
such as the OCS which reflect the complexities of interaction between the 
Commonwealth and the States. A central concern of this study is to 
examine the factors contributing to the development of the OCS, 
particularly the extent to which State governments were dominant actors in 
the negotiations and in the implementation of the "agreed arrangements". 
The study utilises an analytical framework which allows the examination of 
institutions and processes by which the States have been able to limit, or 
counter, the effective reach of increased Commonwealth constitutional 
power and influence and which act as parameters for intergovernmental 
interaction in this policy area. In structuring relations between the 
Commonwealth and States offshore these parameters not only emphasise 
the significance of a States' constitutional and political bases, but- also 
identify elements of intergovernmental interaction which counter the 
more visible expansion of Commonwealth activity. The OCS is thus an 
outcome -of the evolution (or "ebb and flow") of Australian federalism 
offshore in which the States remain important actors; an evolution shaped 
by the impact of the constitutional division of powers, judicial review of 
jurisdictional disputes, and Australia's responsibilities in relation to the 
emergent international law of the, sea. 
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Introduction 
Australia, like the United States of America and Canada, has 
experienced considerable political turmoil arising from the question of 
jurisdiction over the offshore. In each of these federations conflicts 
have arisen from limited, concurrent or unclear constitutional 
provisions governing offshore resources. This has given rise to 
contending claims between the national and sub-national governments 
regarding sovereignty and jurisdiction offshore; claims given sharper 
focus by the evolving law of the sea: 
In the case of a coastal state with a unitary system of government, 
the issue has been largely one of adapting municipal law to 
• international law concepts. . . . Special problems, however occur 
_ when a coastal state is in a federation. A question then arises as to • 
which entity in the federation should enjoy control or sovereignty 
or even ownership of the territorial sea and the continental 
shelf. 1 
Australia, Canada and the United States of America have resolved this 
question differently although each has borrowed and adapted the legal, 
political and administrative solutions produced in the other 
federations. 2 
1 R. Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore (2nd revised edition) (Melbourne: 
Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria Programme, Law School University of 
Melbourne, 1988): 2. 
2 For example the US and Canadian court decisions were used in the Australian Seas 
2 
The offshore has been the centre of intergovernmental interaction in 
Australia for over twenty-five years yet has remained a relatively 
neglected topic for scholars of Australian federalism. Most analysis has 
been made by constitutional lawyers, with limited treatment by 
political scientists. Not surprisingly, therefore, few political scientists 
have given any attention to the Australian Offshore Constitutional 
Settlement (OCS).3 The OCS, a curiously titled intergovernmental 
and Submerged Lands case, the intergovernmental arrangements for offshore oil and 
gas established by the Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement were influential 
in the structure of the Canada-Nova Scotia Accord, see R. Cullen, Federalism in 
Action: the Australian and Canadian Ofshore Disputes, (Sydney: Federation Press, 
1990). 
3 The struggle over offshore jurisdiction is briefly chronicled in most analyses of the 
Gorton, Whitlam and Fraser goverments; see A. Patience and B. Head, (eds.) From 
Whitlam to Fraser: Reform and Reaction in Australian Politics, (Melbourne: Oxford, 
1979). Specific examination of Australian federalism offshore, including the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement (OCS), from a legal perspective includes B. Opeskin and D. 
Rothwell, "Australia's Territorial Sea: International and Federal Implications of its 
Extension to 12 Miles" Ocean Development and International Law, 22 (1991): 395-431; 
R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: the Australian and Canadian Offshore Disputes, 
(Sydney: Federation Press, 1990); R. Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore (2nd 
revised edition) (Melbourne: Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria Programme, Law 
School, University of Melbourne, 1988); R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Revenue Raising: A Case 
of One Government Too Many?" Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 6, 4 
(1988): 213-247; M. Crommelin, Offshore Mining and Petroleum: Constitutional Issues, 
Papers on Federalism 3 (Melbourne: Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria 
Programme, Law School University of Melbourne, 1983); and J. Waugh, Australian 
Fisheries Law (Melbourne: Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria Programme, Law 
School University of Melbourne, 1988). The OCS is also discussed as part of the "current 
notes" in the Australian Law Journal 53, (1979) and 54, (1980). Analysis of the OCS 
from a political science -perspective includes R.A. Herr and B.W. Davis, "The Impact of 
UNCLOS III on Australian Federalism" International Journal, XLI, 3 (1986): 674-693; 
M. Haward, "Marine Resource Policy In Australia; The Policy Environment, The Policy 
Process and the Issue Community" Maritime Studies, 26 (June 1986): 12-16; M. Haward, 
"The Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement" Marine Policy 13, 4 (October 
1989): 334-348 and M. Haward, "The Offshore" in B. Galligan, 0. Hughes and C. Walsh 
(eds.) Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
1991): 116-132. 
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4 
Emerging after extensive intergovernmental interaction between 1976 
and 1979 the OCS was seen as a "milestone in co-operative 
federalism". 6 As part of the Fraser government's New Federalism 
initiative, the OCS was based on co-operative arrangements between 
the Commonwealth and State governments 7 over the administration 
and management of offshore resources. The announcement of the 
OCS agreement in 1979 was indeed a milestone but much further 
negotiation was needed to complete the agreement. Almost three years 
were to elapse beween the introduction of the Commonwealth's 
complementary legislation into parliament and the proclamation of 
the second and crucial element of this package, the Coastal Waters 
(State Titles) Act 1980, which entrenched the OCS. The "agreed 
arrangements" of the OCS were implemented progressively after this 
legislation was proclaimed, the pace of implementation influenced by 
the election of the Australian Labor Party to power in March 1983. 
Debate over applying the OCS framework in different policy areas 
continued throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
Although questions of offshore sovereignty and jurisdiction retained a 
prime place on the domestic political agenda in Australia in the 1960s 
and 1970s, these questions had emerged as a major issue for nation 
6 Commonwealth of Australia Attorney General's Department Offshore Australia, 
(Canberra: AGPS, 1980): 1. 
7 This study uses the convention of refering to the Australian government as the 
Commonwealth, rather than as national or federal, government. See G. Sawer, 
"Australian Constitutional Law -in Relation to International Relations and 
International Law" in K. Ryan, (ed.) International Law in Australia, (2nd ed.) 
(Sydney: The Australian Institute oflInternational Affairs Sz The Law Book Company, 
1984): 36. The thesis adopts the practice of using "States" when refering to the sub-
national governments of Australia to avoid confusion with references to "coastal states" 
in relation to the international law of the sea, except when original sources used the 
lower case. 
5 
states from the middle of this century. This arose from the related 
pressures of increased interest in exploitation of the resources of 
offshore waters and the emergence of coastal states' claims over the 
adjacent continental shelf. The discovery of substantial oil and gas 
resources in sedimentary basins offshore and the development of 
"distant water fisheries" 8 quickly outstripped the frameworks 
established by customary international law, and raised questions over 
the extent to which a coastal state could, under this customary law, 
claim and enforce jurisdiction over offshore resources. 
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and Coastal States: The Emergence of The Law 
of The Sea 
What has become known as the "law of the sea" emerged from a debate 
beginning in the seventeenth century between Hugo Grotius and John 
Selden. 9 Grotius argued that the sea was mare librium and therefore 
unable to be subject to claims of sovereignty by any state while Selden 
argued that the sea was mare ciausum with a state able to exercise 
dominion over it. A modification of the Grotian doctrine saw the 
emergence of a consensus over the freedom of the "high seas" while 
enabling coastal states to claim sovereignty over adjacent coastal waters 
that could be defended from shore-based fortifications. The limit of 
sovereignty evolved into the "three mile limit" from the effective 
range of such defences. This distance (at the time a standard nautical 
measure of one "marine league") enabled coastal states to regulate 
shipping, customs and immigration:: within what was considered that 
state's territorial sea. 
8 Distant water fisheries are those which take place a considerable distance from the 
home port of the vessels usually on the high sea or within the jurisdiction of foreign 
states. 
9 For a concise description of the work of Grotius and Selden see R. Cullen, Australian 
Federalism Offshore 2nd ed: 6-7. 
6 
Increasing pressure arising from the domestic political interests of 
metropolitan powers and the significance of maritime power in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to attempts to codify a 
"law of the sea" under the auspices of the League of Nations at The 
Hague in the 1930s. Overtaken by events leading to the Second World 
War, the conference at The Hague collapsed before it could achieve 
agreement among parties but served to focus attention on the salience 
of these issues in the immediate post-war period. The law of the sea 
was to emerge as a major issue of international concern when 
President Truman, on behalf of the United States of America, claimed 
national jurisdiction over the resources of its adjacent continental shelf 
in 1945. This proclamation, followed in subsequent years by similar 
moves by other coastal states (including Australia in 1953) led to the 
first international conference on the law of the sea sponsored by the 
United Nations (UNCLOS I) being convened in 1958. This conference 
resulted in four conventions being prepared, all of which which 
entered force by the mid 1960s. 10 
UNCLOS I was followed by two susbsequent conferences - a second, 
inconclusive, conference (UNCLOS II) in 1960 and a third (UNCLOS 
III), held between 1974 and 1982,11 which resulted in a comprehensive 
10 The four conventions were; Convention on the High Seas (which entered force 30 
September 1962); Convention on the Continental Shelf (10 June 1964) Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (10 Sept 1964) and the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (20 March 1966). See R.D. Lumb, 
The Law of the Sea and Australian Offshore Areas 2nd ed (St. Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press, 1978). 
11 A voluminous literature exists on UNCLOS III. The first session of the conference 
began in Caracas Venezuela in 1974 and subsequent sessions were held in Geneva and 
New York. A useful introduction to UNCLOS III, its development and implications is 
7 
treaty being prepared. Australia played a significant role in the 
negotiations over the emergent international law of the sea, 
particularly at UNCLOS 111, 12 with these developments providing a 
backdrop for concurrent issues of domestic politics and 
Commonwealth - State relations between the early 1950s and late 1980s. 
Federalism and Offshore Jurisdiction 
In a federation, new or emergent policy areas such as the offshore" 
establish conflicting jurisdictional claims between the central and sub-
national governments. Such claims can be ignored, leaving an uneasy 
status-quo, but more commonly the contending claims are subjected 
to judicial review by superior courts charged with adjudicating such 
disputes. A third avenue, and one which forms the basis of this study, 
involves the development of agreements between central and sub-
national governments establishing their respective roles and 
responsibilities. It is widely accepted, however, that neither judicial 
nor intergovernmental processes are mutually exclusive. The judicial 
adjudication of the offshore dispute in Australia, for example, arose 
from a calculated political strategy which saw declaratory legislation 
introduced to force the States to challenge its validity. 14 Little analysis 
found in M. H. Norquist, (ed.) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: 
A Commentary, Vol. 1, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoft, 1985). 
12 For a good analysis of Australia's role see K. Ryan, (ed.) International Law in 
Australia, (2nd ed.) (Sydney: The Australian Institufe of International Affairs & The 
Law Book Company,1984). 
13 In simple terms these areas include those not specidally mentioned in the Australian 
constitution. Conflicts over jurisdiction may be resolved by judicial adjudication by the 
High Court; extending existing constitutional provisions, for radio and television 
broadcasting was interpreted to fall under the pro-visions of "postal telegraphic, 
telephonic and other like services"; or by establishing Commonwealth-State 
agreements to co-operate in the administration of the particular area. 
14 The relationship between the process of judicial review and the political outcome of 
such a process is heightened in contentious cases such as the Tasmanian Dam case 
8 
has focused on the nexus between judicial review and federal processes 
such as the negotiation of intergovernmental agreements 15 although, 
as Galligan, Hughes and Walsh note, "Megardless of how judges decide 
hard constitutional cases, the decisions still have to feed back into the 
political system where their impact may be adjusted by political 
negotiation." 16 
Formal disputes over jurisdiction are resolved in Australia (as in the 
United States and Canada) by an independent and entrenched superior 
court responsible for an "authoritative interpretation of the 
constitution and adjudication of jurisdictional disputes". 17 Less study 
has been made of alternative methods of mediating or moderating 
conflicts, 18 or the effect of these alternatives on the federal system. It is 
(Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983), 57, A.L.J.R. 450). The High Court's adherence to 
a doctrine of legalism which "holds that judges interpret the constitution by reading 
the natural sense or plain meaning of its provisions" has, according to Galligan, 
allowed the High Court to establish a particular legitimacy for judicial review. B. 
Galligan, Politics of the High Court, (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1987): 
31. Legalism excludes, by definition, any consideration of the potential impacts of 
judicial decisions. See also H. Gibbs, "Law and Government", Quadrant, VOUV, 10 
(October 1990): 25-29. 
15 See however G. Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts, (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1967), 6; P. H. Russell, "The Supreme Court and Federal 
Provincial Relations: The Political Use of Legal Resources", Canadian Public Policy, 
Xl, 2, (1985): 165-168; and A.R. Lucas, "Harmonization of Federal Provincial 
Environmental Policies: The Changing Legal and Policy Framework" in J. 0. Saunders, 
(ed.) Managing Natural Resources in a Federal State, (Toronto, Carswell, 1985): 34 -35. 
16 B. Galligan, 0. Hughes and C. Walsh, "Introduction" in B. Galligan, 0. Hughes and 
C. Walsh, (eds.) Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy, (Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin,1991): 16. 
17 B. Galligan, Politics of the High Court: A Study of the Judicial Branch of 
Government in Australia: 42. 
18 Chapman, for example sees intergovernmental forums as moderating 
intergovernmental conflicts. See R. J. K. Chapman,"Intergovemmental Forums and The 
Policy Process" in B. Galligan, (ed.) Comparative State Policies, (Melbourne: Longman 
Cheshire, 1988): 104; Wettenhall describes such forums as "lubricating the federal 
9 
likely that the perception of a "zero-sum" outcome of judicial 
adjudication, even if (as shown in the Seas and Submerged Lands case) 
such decisions rarely end intergovernmental interaction, will 
encourage the development of alternative arrangements. Although 
the High Court of Australia has been used by the Commonwealth and 
the States to clarify jurisdiction, in many cases the issue of the writ is 
simply one tactical manoeuvre within a broad strategy in 
Commonwealth State relations. Even members of the High Court 
have reflected on complexities of such strategies; Sir Harry Gibbs, on 
being sworn in as Chief Justice in 1981, commented that "no legal 
proceedings are more futile and unproductive than disputes as to 
jurisdiction". 19 The analysis of interaction between the 
Commonwealth and the States after the question of jurisdiction has 
been resolved by the High Court provides a fruitful area of study of the 
dynamics within a federal system. 
Australian Federalism and the Offshore 
In Australia management of marine resources and the legislative bases 
for such management had, until challenged by an increasingly assertive 
Commonwealth government in the late 1940s and early 1950s, rested 
with the States. Prior to federation the colonies had established their 
own legislation over fisheries and related activities. A vaguely worded 
Commonwealth power relating to fisheries was included in the 
constitution, although in the half-century following federation the 
Commonwealth had limited direct involvement in offshore matters. 
system", see R.Wettenhall "Intergovernmental Agencies: Lubricating a Federal 
System" Current Affairs Bulletin (April 1985): 28-35. 
19 Sir H. Gibbs "Address on Swearing in as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia 
12 February 1981" in J. McMillan, G. Evans, and' H. Storey, Australia's Constitution: 
Time For Change?, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1983): 287. 
10 
The Commonwealth became more active in the 1950s and 1960s with 
the establishment of a Commonwealth fisheries agency and the 
enactment of the Australian Fisheries Act 1952 (Cwth). These 
developments provided the basis for increasing conflict with the States 
over fisheries management as the Commonwealth gradually expanded 
its involvement in the licensing and regulation of fisheries. 
Exploration for oil and gas offshore, beginning in the early 1960s, 
encouraged the Commonwealth to assert a direct role in offshore 
resources management. 
The question of jurisdiction for these activities emerged more 
forcefully in the 1960s and 1970s following increased oil and gas 
exploration offshore. The Commonwealth and States made a 
deliberate attempt to set aside conflicts over jurisdiction which may 
have constrained these developments. An innovative 
intergovernmental agreement and legislative scheme, known as the 
1967 Petroleum Agreement, established an administrative regime for 
offshore petroleum. This agreement accommodated State interests and 
created a revenue sharing arrangement between the Commonwealth 
and the States for royalties derived from offshore oil and gas 
production. This accommodation did not, however, last long. 20 
In 1970 Prime Minister Gorton initiated an abortive attempt to assert 
Commonwealth jurisdiction over offshore resources. Although this 
legislation was not to complete its passage through parliament it acted 
as a spur for legislation introduced in 1973 by the Whitlam-led 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) government. A declaration of 
20 Although the period 1970-1975 was characterised by conflict over jurisdiction 
offshore, the administrative regime established in 1967 remained in place and was in 
effect updated under the OCS. 
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Commonwealth paramountcy in relation to offshore resources made 
through the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cwth) was opposed 
by all State governments but upheld by the High Court. 
In resolving the legal question of jurisdiction the court decision posed 
political problems for the Commonwealth in its dealings with the 
States21 given their strident opposition to the original legislation. The 
political fallout from the Seas and Submerged Lands case was more 
sharply defined as the High Court's decision was released after the 
Whitlam government had been defeated in the December 1975 federal 
election. While the High Court had resolved the issue of jurisdiction 
this solution was politically unpalatable for the States, and problematic 
for the newly elected coalition, led by Malcolm Fraser who had 
campaigned on a platform of a more "co-operative" New 
Federalism. 22 The offshore "problem" would be resolved by including 
what were termed the "seas and submerged lands matters" within the 
ambit of the New Federalism. This study will emphasise that, unlike 
other elements of the New Federalism package, the States were primary 
actors in promoting what later became the OCS. 
21 Except where specifically indicated, this study of Australian federalism offshore 
includes the Northern Territory as a State. The Northern Territory was specifically 
included in the OCS, although formally Northern Territory self government is based on 
Commonwealth legislation and lacks the constitutional independence of the other 
States. Granting of self government to the ACT in May 1989 have meant amendments to 
Commonwealth legislation governing the Jervis Bay Territory so that ACT law applies 
in Jervis Bay. Other Australian territories, such as the Coral Sea Islands, Norfolk, 
Christmas and Cocos Islands and the sub-antarctic Heard and MacDonald Islands, are 
subject to Commonwealth law. 
22  C. Saunders and K. Wiltshire, "Fraser's New Federalism 1975-1980: An Evaluation" 
Australian Journal of Politics and History , 26, 3 (1981): 355-371. 
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Intergovernmental Interaction and the OCS 
That the "settlement" of the long-running dispute over jurisdiction 
offshore hinged on an accommodation between the Commonwealth 
and the States is not unusual given the range of established co-
operative mechanisms or the development of intergovernmental 
arrangements in Australia covering areas as diverse as agriculture or 
road funding. 23 Particular interest arises, however, over 
intergovernmental interaction in this area as it sidestepped the result 
of judicial review in a dispute over jurisdiction. The outcome, in 
Russell's terms, "illustrates both what politicians can and cannot do 
with a court decision favouring their level of government". 24 
In expanding the explanation of why and how the offshore outcome 
emerged, analysis needs to focus on the key features of the federal 
sytem which facilitated such an accommodation between 
Commonwealth and State interests. It follows then that concentrating 
on the increasing influence of the Commonwealth to explain the 
emergence of the OCS is limited, even if (to use Lucas' term) this is 
"the most visible gloss" of Commonwealth - State relations. 25 
Ignoring the influence of the States, or defining away the federal 
division of powers and responsibilites, removes the need to analyse the 
institutional arrangements and processes by which the States interact 
with the Commonwealth.26 
23 For a description of such intergovernmental arrangements see C. Wells,(Saunders) 
Cooperative Federalism In Australia, Unpublished PhD Thesis, (University of 
Melbourne, 1975). 
24 P.H. Russell, "The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations, 166. 
25 A.R. Lucas, "Harmonization of Federal Provincial Environmental Policies: The 
Changing Legal and Policy Framework", 34-35. 
26 B. Galligan, 0. Hughes and C. Walsh, "Introduction". 
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Premises and Proposition 
A central argument of this study is that the Commonwealth's 
legislative and administrative activity concerning the offshore did not 
lead to a decline in State administrative or political responsibilities. 
The constitutional, administrative and political parameters of 
federalism provide resources for the States which in effect limit the 
extent to which the Commonwealth can assert claims for jurisdiction. 
This study tests a proposition that the OCS emerged as a result of the 
States' articulation of these responsibilities and interests to limit the 
reach of reinforcements to the Commonwealth's constitutional head of 
power. Although a relevant counterfactual may be the case where the 
Commonwealth acts unilaterally, it is also arguable that even so 
Commonwealth priorities are subject to, or moderated by, a range of 
intergovernmental institutions and processes. 
Significance and Some Caveats 
As indicated earlier the offshore has been a neglected topic in studies of 
Australian federalism. Although jurisdiction over marine resources 
emerged as a major focus for Commonwealth-State relations following 
the Seas and Submerged Lands case, the nexus between marine affairs 
and Australian federalism has a long, if neglected, history. 27 More 
significantly while the offshore can be considered t he 
intergovernmental issue in the 1970s, offshore resource management 
still retains a major place on the contemporary agendas of various 
intergovernmental forums. Any examination of the OCS must 
therefore place it in the context of what can be described as the 
"evolution" of Australian federalism offshore. 28 
27 Issues arising from desires from the colonies to extend control over fisheries can be 
credited as being an influence on the establishment of (and the only real action taken 
by) the Federal Council of Australasia in the 1880s. 
28  This argument was first introduced in M. Haward, "The Australian Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement" and M. Hawar'd, "Marine Resource Policy in Australia". 
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The contemporary nature of the OCS and the ongoing Commonwealth 
- State negotiations over such matters as oil and gas royalties provide 
particular problems for research, not the least gaining access to 
documentary material. As Richard Simeon noted in his classic study of 
intergovernmental "diplomacy" in Canada; 
[r]esearch on live political issues ... has many pitfalls. Much 
documentation remains hidden to the researcher until long after 
the event.29 
Documents held by Australian [Commonwealth] Archives relating to 
negotiations over the OCS, where available, are generally restricted 
with the "thirty-year" rule in force. The Australian Archives none the 
less provide an invaluable source of material on the broadening of the 
Commonwealth interest in the period following the Second World 
War. A federation has, however, multiple access points for archival 
material. The research for this study was enhanced by the granting of 
unrestricted access to the extensive files on the OCS and other material 
on what were termed "Seas and Submerged Lands Matters" collected by _ 
the Law Department of Tasmania and held by the Archives Office of 
Tasmania (AOT). These files provided a wealth of material on the 
disputes with the Gorton and Whitlam governments - in which 
Tasmania took a lead role - and on the negotiations in the period 1975 - 
79 which led to the OCS. This material on the development of the legal 
and administrative arrangements comprising the OCS has not 
previously been made available. 30 
29 R. Simeon, Federal - Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in 
Canada, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972): 19. 
3° I acknowledge the assistance of the Tasmanian Crown Solicitor, Mr W. Bale and 
Senior Counsel Mr. M. Stoddart in gaining access to this material. In addition I was 
granted unrestricted access to files Mr D. A Lowe; a Minister, Deputy Premier and 
Premier of Tasmania during the 1970s. 
15 
Outline of the Study 
In establishing an analytical framework from which to evaluate the 
premises and proposition offered above, Chapter One outlines a series 
of parameters by which the States have been able to limit, or counter, 
the effective reach of increased Commonwealth constitutional power 
and political influence. These parameters emphasise the significance of 
the States' constitutional and political bases, but also identify elements 
of intergovernmental interaction which counter the more visible 
expansion of Commonwealth activity. 
Charting "the ebb and flow of seashore federalism" 31 in Australia 
forms the basis for Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five. Chapters Two 
and Three examine what may be broadly described as the development 
of offshore resources management and the consolidation of State and 
Commonwealth interests. The articulation of these interests was 
shaped by domestic political imperatives and the emergent 
international "law of the sea". As the conflict over jurisdiction 
offshore heightened in the 1970s, Commonwealth - State relations also 
became more sharply focused. Chapter Four examines the intense 
intergovernmental negotiations in the period leading to the 
introduction of the OCS "agreed arrangements" in 1979. Chapter Five 
examines the implementation of these arrangements between 1980 and 
1990, and the introduction of new areas (such as offshore tourism) 
under the rubric of the OCS. 
Chapter One provides a framework by which the argument that the 
OCS illustrates that the expansion of Commonwealth power offshore 
has not been at the expense of State offshore policy interests can be 
31 This apt phrase is from P. Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM (Ringwood Melbourne: 
Penguin, 1989): 293. 
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assessed. Chapter Six examines the development of the OCS (described 
in Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five) in terms of the parameters for 
intergovernmental interaction identified in Chapter One. While some 
elements of the interaction between the Commonwealth and States 
may be more visible than others, the interrelationship between 
constitutional, political and administrative elements of Australian 
federalism was crucial in reinforcing State interests over the offshore 
and thus influential in the development of the OCS. The conclusion 
evaluates the proposition regarding State interests and responsibilities 
and considers the implications of this study for further research on 
federalism and Australian offshore or marine policy. 
Federalism and the Offshore Constitutional Settlement 
The study of the OCS shows that the accommodation over the offshore 
has developed more as a result of the political power and the resources 
available to the States than the Commonwealth's "success" in judicial 
review of conflicts over jurisdiction. It is therefore too simplistic to 
focus solely on the growth of Commonwealth involvement in offshore 
policy in the period from the SeCond World War,32 even though 
superficially it has been characterised by a pattern of increasing 
Commonwealth involvement since the Second World War. The 
Commonwealth introduced legislation and expanded its 
administrative responsibilities to include fisheries in the 1950s, oil and 
gas in the 1960s, and marine parks, marine conservation and heritage 
in the 1970s. 
32 See M Haward "The Offshore" in B. Galligan, 0. Hughes and C. Walsh (eds.) 
Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991): 116- 
132. 
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More recently, legislation before the Commonwealth parliament in 
early 1990 aimed to extend the Commonwealth's influence over 
marine environment and coastal zone protection by proposing an 
amendment to the Commonwealth's Coastal Waters (State Powers) 
legislation.33 In spite of these Commonwealth initiatives, the OCS has 
entrenched both the Commonwealth and the States' interests reflecting 
the importance of federalism in this policy area. 
33 See Environmental Protection of Coastal Waters (State and Northern Territory 
Powers) Amendment Bill 1990. This Bill was introduced into the Senate by the then 
Independent Senator Irina Dunn, but lapsed with Dunn's retirement following the 1990 
election. 
Chapter One 
Australian Federalism and the Offshore: 
Establishing an Analytic Framework 
The Australian federal system and the study of Australian federalism 
have been reinforced and revitalised by the extensive interaction 
between the Commonwealth and the States over the last three decades. 
This interaction occurred as a result of the Commonwealth's increasing 
involvement in policy areas traditionally seen as the responsibility of 
the States. The increase of "central power in the Australian 
Commonwealth" 1 was seen by some commentators as evidence for 
the inevitable declining role and irrelevance of the States. This study 
shows, however, that an increase in the influence of the 
Commonwealth's legislative and administrative activity (during a 
period of generally expansive High Court judgements broadening the 
reach of its constitutional powers) has not led to a decline in the States' 
administrative responsibilities or their political interests 
The States'., defence of their interests has utilised a complex 
arrangement of intergovernmental institutions and processes which 
ensured that the States remained important and, given their 
I The title of a book by Sir Robert Menzies, comprised of lectures on aspects of 
Australian federalism delivered at the University of Virginia after his retirement as 
Prime Minister, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth, (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia, 1967). 
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administrative expertise, at times pre-eminent entities in the federal 
system. The assertions of Commonwealth power challenging State 
jurisdiction offshore in the early 1970s - a period considered to have 
placed the Australian "federation under strain" 2 - therefore can also 
be seen, almost paradoxically, to have led to increased State power and 
influence.3 
Given that the Commonwealth's interests in a range of policy areas' 
could not be claimed, as in Canada, on the basis of clearly defined and 
exclusive constitutional heads of power, the States have a range of 
constitutional and legal bases from which to respond. In turn the 
Commonwealth, lacking the detailed and extensive bureaucratic 
expertise which has remained a major resource for each of the States, is 
forced to acknowledge the utility of intergovernmental collaboration 
over public policy. Such collaboration provides a solution to problems 
arising from overlapping claims over "policy jurisdiction", 4 and 
makes joint action a logical response in a number of policy areas. 
The Introduction to this thesis has suggested that the development and 
implementation of the Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement 
(OCS) illustrates the interplay between constitutional, political and 
administrative elements of Australian federalism on the establishment 
of intergovernmental arrangements and agreements. While this 
2 G. Sawer, FederatiOn Under Strain: Australia 1972-75, (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1977). 
3 C. Sharman, "Fraser, the States and Federalism", The Australian Quarterly, 52, 
(Autumn 1980): 9-191' See also B. Galligan, "Writing on Australian Federalism: The 
Current State of theArt" Australian Journal of Public Administration XLIII , 2, (June 
1984): 177-186. 
4 This term is used by G.S. Mahler, New Dimensions in Canadian Federalism: 
Canada in Comparative Perspective, (London: Associated University Presses, 1987). 
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dynamic is perhaps most clearly evident in the study of Australian 
federalism offshore - particularly in relation to the OCS - the 
intergovernmental dimension in almost all areas of Australian public 
policy clearly shows the utility of broader application of this analysis. 
This chapter is concerned with establishing a framework from which an 
assessment can be made of the influence of federalism on the 
development of arrangements governing policy towards, and the 
management of, offshore resources. 
Federalism is a key factor in Australian governance 5 yet, with some 
significant exceptions, much of the Australian literature has ignored or 
understated its significance for, or as an explanation of, Australian 
politics and public policy. 6 The traditional emphasis on "the 
hierarchical structure of Australian government . . . at the expense of 
federal processes and from a federal perspective" has left, according to 
Fletcher, "a rich political landscape of government organisation 
virtually untouched". 7 In addition scholarly interest has tended, at 
least until the last decade, to concentrate on what were perceived to be 
the negative effects of federalism8 . In general terms the Australian 
literature has retained a dichotomy between a view of federalism as 
obsolescent, inefficient or supporting inherently conservative political 
5  See also R. J. K. Chapman, "Public Policy, Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations: 
The Federal Factor" Publius 20, 4, (1990): 69-84. 
6  See for example B. Galligan, "Writing on Australian Federalism: The Current State 
of the Art" Australian Journal of Public Administration, XLIII, 2, (June 1984): 177-186; 
R.J. K. Chapman, "Federalism is Alive and Surprisingly Healthy" Australian Journal 
of Public Administration, 49, 1 (March 1990): 83-86; and M. Painter "Review Article - 
Studying Federalism: Perspectives and Prospects" Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 50, 2, (June 1991): 219-221. 
7  C Fletcher, "Rediscovering Australian Federalism by Resurrecting Old Ideas" 
Australian Journal of Political Science, 26, 1, (March 1991): 79. 
8 B. Galligan, "Writing on Australian Federalism": 177. 
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action9 and an alternative perspective concentrating on the benefits 
arising from the diversity and responsiveness of a federal 
arrangement. 1 ° It is the extensive interaction between the constituent 
units of government in Australia which has increased the academic 
interest in the influence of the patterns and processes of 
intergovernmental relations on public policy. 
The emergence of intergovernmental relations as a departure from the 
more classic or formal approaches to federal theory is noted by 
Chapman who argues that "the need for mutuality, reciprocity, 
exchange and co-operation place pressure on formal institutional 
arrangements based on hierarchical and adversarial concepts of 
separated authority." 11 Analysis of intergovernmental interaction in 
areas such as the offshore must therefore incorporate a framework 
which acknowledges these distinctive patterns and processes. A useful 
summary of different normative approaches used to examine the 
"machinery and processes of intergovernmental relations" 12 is 
provided by Norrie, Simeon and Krasnick. They emphasise that these: 
9 See, for example, G. Greenwood, The Future of Australian Federalism, 2nd ed. (St 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1976): G. Maddox, Australian Democracy in 
Theory and Practice, (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1985); W. Brugger and D. Jaensch 
Australian Politics: Theory and Practice,(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985). 
10 see, for example, B. Galligan, (ed.) Australian State Politics (Melbourne: Longman 
Cheshire, 1986); B. Galligan, (ed.) Comparative State Policies (Melbourne: Longman 
Cheshire, 1988); B. Galligan, (ed) Australian Federalism (Melbourne: Longman 
Cheshire, 1989) and J.Holmes and C. Sharman. The Australian Federal System 
(Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1977). 
11 R.J.K. Chapman, "Intergovernmental Forums and the Policy Process" in B. Galligan, 
(ed.) Comparative State Policies, (Melbourne, Longman Cheshire) 1988: 199-121. 
12 K. Morrie, R. Simeon, & Krasnick, M. Federalism and the Economic Union in 
Canada, Vol. 59, Research Studies of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union 
and Development Prospects for Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986):121. 
processes have been labelled in a variety of ways, each of which 
seeks to capture some of its central dimensions. "Executive 
Federalism" emphasises the participants: the ministers and 
officials. . . . "Federal-provincial diplomacy" emphasises the 
parallels between federal-provincial relations and international 
relations. "Cooperative federalism" or "collaborative federalism" 
stresses the sense that public policy. . . is the outcome of the joint 
working of. . . governments and the degree of coordination among 
them. "Competitive federalism" underlines what may be seen as a 
important shift in process, from an emphasis on substantive policy 
concerns (or functional federalism) to an increased concern of 
governmental relations with the articulation of competing visions 
of the very character of the federation. . . . As these varied terms 
suggest, the processes of intergovernmental relations are 
bewilderingly complex and varied. 13 
Rosenthal and Hoefler comment that, while a commonplace in the 
American literature, "Woo much can be made, perhaps, of the 
distinction between "federalism" and "intergovernmental relations" 
since many scholars pass easily from one term to the other". 14 In 
attempting to draw distinctions between federalism and 
intergovernmental relations many studies, according to Rosenthal and 
Hoefler, "fail to deal explicitly with matters related to differences in 
units of analysis and levels of analysis." 15 In attempting to provide a 
synthesis between different approaches Rosenthal and Hoefler state 
that: 
[i]t is our contention that the core units for American federalism 
remain the national and state governments. At the same time, if 
students of federalism and [intergovernmental relations] are to 
engage in constructive dialogue, each must pay greater attention to 
how the structure of relations among core units produces 
constitutional "rules" that affect the behavior of "officials and 
bureaucrats. 16 
13 Ibid: 121-122. 
14 D. B. Rosenthal and J. M. Hoefler, "Competing Approaches to the Study of Americari 
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations", Publius 19 (Winter 1989): 2. 
15 Ibid (original emphasis). 
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Such an observation provides an important insight particularly 
relevant to analysing Commonwealth - State interaction over the 
offshore. The structure of relations arising from the federal division of 
powers is as an important parameter for intergovernmental interaction 
in federal systems as is the more traditional emphasis on constitutional 
autonomy or jurisdiction. 7  Greater attention must be given to the 
relationship between "governments" as an important and defining 
characteristic of interaction within federal systems. The structure of 
relations may be broadened or narrowed in response to external factors 
such as the entry into force of international treaties, as constitutional 
adjudication reinforces the formal constitutional power of the central 
government. Intergovernmental interaction therefore involves a 
consideration of more than heads of power or claims for jurisdiction 
and can include the development of quasi - constitutional 
arrangements which institutionalise collaboration between 
governments and help shape the structure of these relations. 18 
16 Ibid (original emphasis): 3. 
17 The classical federal theory's concentration on constitutional autonomy has also 
been criticised from alternative theoretical bases, including that described as the 
sociological interpretation of federalism. This interpretation argued that "the essence 
of federalism lies not in the institutional or constitutional structure but in society 
itself',- see W.S. Livingston, "A Note on the Nature of Federalism", Political Science 
Quarterly, LXVII, 1, (March, 1952): 81-95, reprinted in A. Wildavsky, (ed.) American 
Federalism in Perspective, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967): 36. The most articulate 
criticism of this approach has been made by Cairns, whose attack on the sociological 
bases of federalism is more strident given the Canadian context of his analysis. Cairns 
argues that 
[f]rom the mid-thirties to the present we have not lacked sociological approaches to 
federalism. The weakness of our understanding lies elsewhere, in a failure to treat 
government with enough seriousness. . . . [F]ederalism at least in the Canadian case, 
is not a function of societies but of the constitution, and more importantly of the 
governments that work the constitution. 
A. C. Cairns, "The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism", Canadian 
Journal of Political Science, X, 4, (December 1977): 698-699. 
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A key issue in the study of intergovernmental relations in a federal 
system is the identification of patterns, and the influence of the 
processes, of negotiation between constituent units and the relationship 
between this interaction and other elements influencing 
intergovernmental outcomes, such as the results of constitutional 
adjudication. Arguing that the States can effectively counter the 
increasing reach of the Commonwealth's power and influence in areas 
such as the offshore highlights the centrality of key parameters of 
Commonwealth - State interaction. The first of these parameters is 
the Australian division of powers which establishes the States as 
legal entities with concurrent constitutional powers and responsibilities 
in a range of areas. A second parameter arises from the fact that the 
States are political as well as legal units. The States can counter the 
expansion of Commonwealth constitutional power occurring 
through judicial review through the politics of Commonwealth-
State relations. A combination of the States' legal and political 
bases establishes a further parameter of intergovernmental interaction: 
the development of intergovernmental institutions. These 
institutions arise from the Commonwealth's need to consult and 
18 Empirical evidence of the tendency for "interdependent " or "co-operative" rather 
than "independent" or "co-ordinate" government action to characterise the operation of 
the federal system led to further criticism on the emphasis on formal autonomy of each 
tier of government. One of the most imaginative of these critiques is the well known 
analogy of the "marble cake" proposed by Grodzins. M.:Grodzins, "The Federal 
System" originally published in Goals for Americans, The. American Assembly, 
Columbia University New York, 1960 reprinted in A. Wildavsky, (ed.) American 
Federalism In Perspective: Introductory Readers in American Politics, (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1967) : 257. For a recent reappraisal of Grodzin's work, and its 
application to Australia see C. Fletcher, "Rediscovering Australian Federalism by 
Resurrecting Old Ideas" Australian Journal of Political Science, 26, 1, (March 1991): 79- 
84. 
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negotiate with the States over the development, implementation or 
coordination of public policy where it does not have exclusive 
constitutional power. 
Areas such as the offshore, which had been the focus of struggles over 
jurisdiction, provide useful bases from which to examine the impact of 
these parameters shaping Commonwealth - State agreements. As 
intergovernmental negotiation giving rise to the OCS took place after 
judicial adjudication of claims to jurisdiction, Russell's argument that 
there are political limits to the use to judicial resources is clearly 
relevant. 19 The study also shows, however, that such judicial 
adjudication outlines the political limits to such negotiations. 
In order to examine the process of intergovernmental interaction 
leading to the OCS and the extent to which this allows the States to 
limit the constitutional gains of the Commonwealth, the various 
elements influencing this interaction need to be explicated. The 
following sections consider each of the main parameters underpinning 
- the process of intergovernmental interaction: the constitutional 
division of powers; the impact of judicial adjudication of disputes over 
jurisdiction; the influence of international treaties on the domestic 
political order; and the establishment of intergovernmental processes 
and institutions. These parameters can be seen as resources to be used 
and/or countered in the more-or-less continuous interaction between 
Commonwealth and State governments in policy areas such as the 
offshore. 
19 P.H. Russell, "The Supreme Court and Federal Provincial Relations: The Political 
Use of Legal Resources", Canadian Public Policy, XI, 2, (1985): 165. 
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The Constitutional Division of Powers 
The Australian constitution provides for a division of powers based on 
the United States model; a limited number of specific powers are 
enumerated for the Commonwealth, the remainder are to be exercised 
concurrently with the unspecified, residual, powers remaining with the 
States. Unlike the Canadian constitution there are no specific lists of 
the powers of the sub-rrational governments, with the result that in 
Australia "most commonwealth powers are concurrent and thus 
exercisable by either the commonwealth or the states". 20 The presence 
of parallel jurisdiction defined by this particular constitutional structure 
means the Commonwealth is unable to unilaterally impose policy 
proposals on the States. Equally, however, the division of powers may 
mean that the States are unable to legislate, regulate or administer areas 
which spill over State boundaries. The constitutional division of 
powers is therefore an important element in establishing and 
maintaining intergovernmental interaction. 
The constitutional base of Commonwealth - State relations is enhanced 
by the simple fact that the Commonwealth cannot unilaterally change 
the constitution nor abolish any of the original States. Thus 
constitutional recognition is fundamental in entrenching this 
interaction. The basis of Commonwealth - State relations extends, 
however, well beyond the limited number of exclusive powers, the 
recognition of the original States or practical issues of constitutional 
amendment. Intergovernmental interaction is enhanced by specific 
provisions within the constitution. The presence of the "reference" and 
20  C. Saunders, "Constitutional and Legal Aspects" in B. Galligan, 0. Hughes, and C. 
Walsh (eds.) Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy (Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin,1991), 39. 
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"request" powers 21 indicates that the drafters of the Australian 
constitution envisaged an evolutionary process where powers could be 
transferred between the Commonwealth and the States as required. 22 
The limited use of these powers (with the request power first used to 
anchor the OCS in 1980) may reflect political rather than constitutional 
imperatives, with the States reluctant to refer powers to the 
Commonwealth for symbolic rather than practical reasons. The 
constitution also includes a provision (Section 51 xxxi) which ensures 
compensation to the States for territory acquired by the 
Commonwealth, further reinforcing the recognition of States' interests 
in the federal system. 
The ability of the States to legislate in a range of areas under their own 
constitutions, which pre-date federation, has led to complex 
administrative and regulatory instruments being established under 
State law.23 These arrangements can reinforce State interests and 
sharpen the conflict with the Commonwealth over jurisdiction 
following the entry of the Commonwealth into areas over which the 
States have established, and longstanding, administrative 
arrangements. Claims for the Commonwealth involvement may be 
driven by arguments concerning the national interest with the 
Commonwealth linking its responsibilities under international law to 
domestic policy. Disputes over jurisdiction are obviously one catalyst 
for negotiations over intergovernmental arrangements although other 
imperatives may give rise to such interaction. For example the fiscal 
dominance of the Commonwealth may mean that the States retain 
21 Section 51 'cavil and Section 51 xxxviii respectively. 
C. Saunders "Constitutional and Legal Aspects": 43. 
23 Good examples, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters, include the 
development of State fisheries legislation and regulations. 
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formal jurisdiction in a particular area but remain dependent on 
financial transfers from the Commonwealth. Intergovernmental 
agreements may be encouraged from States, conscious of the aphorism 
"they who pay the piper call the tune", keen to counter a perceived loss 
in State autonomy as a result of the financial power of the 
Commonwealth. 
It is obvious that claims (or even assumptions) of State autonomy are 
based upon bureaucratic or administrative support for State legislation 
derived from State constitutions. The States develop expertise 
(particularly in gathering data from which to base future decisions) 
which the Commonwealth, entering a new or emergent policy area, 
may lack. As shown in the following chapters the States had substantial 
claims for greater technical capability and resources in areas such as 
fisheries management. State expertise may provide an effective counter 
to the expansion of Commonwealth interests by making the 
Commonwealth dependent on the States for the collection of 
information or even, as in the case of fisheries management, the 
_ 
 
enforcement of Commonwealth laws and regulations. This, together 
with formal constitutional and legal recognition, enables the States to 
claim membership of, and participate in, various intergovernmental 
institutions. 
The constitutional status of Commonwealth and State co-operative 
arrangements where State officials administer Commonwealth laws 
raises several important issues. Much of the commentary on 
Australian constitutional law has identified the vague and "enigmatic" 
nature of the provisions of executive power in the Australian 
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constitution. 24 Zines argues that, in spite of the problems that these 
provisions raise, "[for those who support a degree of co-operative 
federalism, it would be a pity if the Constitution prevented the 
Commonwealth using State officials and governments for its purposes 
or vice-versa."25 Such practices have, however, given rise to concerns 
over the accountability of intergovernmental arrangements. 
Intergovernmental arrangements harmonising Commonwealth and 
State responsibilities may minimise conflict between governments. In 
terms of conflicts between Commonwealth and State laws the 
Constitution includes a specific provision (Section 109) to forestall any 
dispute. Given the concurrent nature of much of the Commonwealth's 
powers this area was a potential source of tension. Commonwealth law 
will prevail if there is an inconsistency between Commonwealth and 
State legislation. The interpretation of the inconsistency provisions of 
Section 109 has broadened greatly in the 1980s following the High 
Court's decision that "inconsistency is created not only when there is 
direct conflict. . . but also when a commonwealth act is construed to 
cover an entire legislative field."26 As Saunders comments: 
24 M. Crommelin, The Commonwealth Executive: A Deliberate Enigma, Papers on 
Federalism 9, Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria Programme (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Law School, 1986). Political scientists, perhaps understandably, 
have-been less concerned with the constitutional implications of Commonwealth-State 
co-operation. 
25 L. Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, 2nd ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 
1987): 241. Zines quotes, however, the doubts expressed by Professor Richardson to . the 
Senate Select Committee on Offshore Petroleum over the legality of arrangements 
where Commonwealth laws are administered solely by State officials responsible only 
to State governments. 
26 Saunders "Constitutional and Legal Aspects": 39. 
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some uncertainty and disruption may be expected whenever the 
Commonwealth moves into a legislative field hitherto occupied 
only by the states. This suggests the need for consultation, and if 
possible co-operation between the levels of government on such 
occasions although tactical considerations may dictate otherwise.27 
The expansion in the interpretation of the reach of Section 109 reflects 
the more or less continual expansion of Commonwealth powers since 
the High Court abandoned what has been termed "the doctrine of 
implied immunities" in 1920. The effect of this expansion has, 
however, been most notable in the 1970s and 1980s through the High 
• Court's interpretation of the external affairs power (Section 51 xxix). 
Where the Commonwealth's domestic policy imperatives have a nexus 
with developments in international law, the High Court has ruled that 
international obligations over-ride State government policy or 
practice.28 
International Law, Treaties and Australian Federalism 
The interpretation of the external affairs power has provided the most 
obvious broadening_ of the reach of Commonwealth constitutional 
heads of power in the 1970s and 1980s. This has influenced 
intergovernmental interaction in two related ways. It has expanded the 
reach of Commonwealth powers in areas, to use Saunders' terms, 
which have been occupied by the States; for example the 
protection of the environment or control of marine ',dilution. The 
external affairs power has also given the Commonwealth major lever 
27 ibid . 
28 For a useful discussion of the impact of international law on Australian federalism 
see H. Collins, "Federalism and Australia's External Relations", The Inaugural Arthur 
Calwell Memorial Lecture, Australian Outlook, 39, 2 (August 1985): 123-126; and H. 
Collins "Federalism, the States and International Affairs: A Political Science 
Perspective" in B. Galligan, (ed.) Australian Federalism, 184-191. 
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in its negotiations with the States. As in most cases the outcomes from 
the use of this leverage are as significant as the impact of the increased 
reach of Commonwealth's powers. Leverage can also be exerted from 
the opposite direction. The States have been able to negotiate 
significant financial compensation from the Commonwealth as a result 
of the political ramifications of their intervention in areas of 
environmental policy. 
The significance of the external affairs power in Commonwealth-State 
relations is derived from the Commonwealth's power to legislate to 
overturn State legislation seen as inconsistent with its obligations 
under international conventions or treaties. This becomes an 
important resource for the Commonwealth in negotiations with the 
States, particularly given the High Court's current interpretation of the 
external affairs power. While the Franklin Dam case is perhaps the 
best known example, many areas of Commonwealth - State relations 
are affected by the extent of Australia's international obligations. 
Discussion in subsequent chapters illustrates the considerable power 
given to the Commonwealth in its negotiations with the States over - 
offshore oil and gas in the mid 1960s following the entry into force of 
the United Nations Conventions on the Continental Shelf and the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 29 More recently the passage of 
domestic legislation to give force to or implement arrangements under 
iitreaties such as the London Dumping Convention and the Treaty of 
• Raratonga (the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty) have had a 
:significant effect on limiting offshore activities undertaken by the 
'States. 
29 To reinforce the use of the external affairs power these conventions were annexed to 
the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973. 
32 
The High Court's decision in the Franklin Dam case is often seen as an 
example of the use of the external affairs power by the Commonwealth 
to intervene in domestic policy or to restrict activities of the States, with 
some commentators claiming that its foreshadowed "the end of 
federalism". 30 Collins notes, however, that the outcome of the Dams 
case resulted in "extraordinary administrative negotiations" as 
Tasmania asserted and gained considerable financial compensation for 
the Commonwealth's action. 31 In spite of the far reaching 
consequences of the Franklin Dam case the High Court's majority 
decision, as could be expected, owed more to precedent than some 
contemporary commentators acknowledged. 32 The impact of 
international conventions on Australian federalism, and domestic 
policy following the Franklin Dam case did, however, focus greater 
attention on the significance of the High Court and the process of 
judicial review. 
30 G. Samuels, 'Me End of Federalism" Current Affairs Bulletin, 56, 1, (August 1984): 
11-19. 
31 H. Collins, "A Political Science Perspective", 186. 
32 G Samuels, 'The End of Federalism". For a more reasoned argument see B. Galligan, 
Politics of the High Court: A Study of the Judicial branch of Government in Australia, 
(St Lucia, University of Queensland Press) 1987. Important precedents for the 
Commonwealth's action in legislating over South West Tasmania were provided by 
Burgess' case in 1936 (R v. Burgess ex parte Henry (1936) 55 C.L.R. 608) and the Seas 
and Submerged Lands case in 1975. The latter case also concerned.the meaning the High 
Court placed on the term "external". Some members of the Court in the Seas and 
Submerged Lands case considered that this power had a spatial .element referring to 
the power to make laws outside the terrestrial boundaries of the Commonwealth. Even 
so, as Zines states, lilt is true that States have some concurrent power in this area .. . if 
its connections with the State are such that it can be described as a law for the peace 
order and good government of the State". L. Zines, The High Court and the 
Constitution: 262. 
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The High Court and Judicial Review 
Competition and conflict over jurisdiction in policy areas such as the 
offshore is bound at some stage to involve adjudication by the High 
Court. An assessment of the role and impact of judicial review in the 
Australian federal system differs between the more limited "black 
letter" legal interpretation - judicial review solely in terms of the formal 
decisions of the High Court - and a more sophisticated argument which 
acknowledges the role of judicial review as part of broader processes of 
intergovernmental interaction. 33 To appreciate the latter approach, in 
essence "the political significance of a particular judgement by the 
Court", Collins urges the analysis of "the aftermath of the decision as 
carefully as the calculations which led to the case and the reasoning 
supporting the judgement".34 
There is no dispute that High Court decisions have had great influence 
in the evolution of Australian federalism although it is the political 
outcomes of these decisions which are more interesting. Unlike its 
companion courts in the United States and Canada the High Court of 
Australia has disassociated itself from the implications of its decisions 
by the adoption of a formal, "legalistic" approach to constitutional 
adjudication. 35 The role of the High Court in constitutional 
adjudication in the past has reflected the almost axiomatic statement 
that the political role and significance of the Court is inversely related to 
33 For a brief critical view of Australian legal scholarship in this area see B. Galligan 
"Introduction" Australian Federalism, and M. Painter "Review Article - Studying 
Federalism: Perspectives and Prospects" Australian Journal of Public Administration, 
50, 2, (June 1991): 219-221. 
34 H. Collins, "A Political Science Perspective", 186. 
35 B. Galligan, Politics of the High Court; 38-39. The Australian High Cdurt does not 
produce advisory opinions "on reference" in the manner of the Canadian Supreme Court; 
nor does it have to interpret a United States style Bill of Rights. 
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the Court's own perception of its influence in the political or public 
policy arenas. The recent decision in the Mabo case36 reinforces the 
view that Iclonstitutional adjudication is not simply a matter of legal 
interpretation ... it is also political decision making of a high profile and 
contentious character. 37 
The definition of legalism and of the limited role of the High Court was 
clearly expressed by Sir Owen Dixon, a former eminent Chief Justice. 
Dixon's address after being sworn in as Chief Justice in 1952 included 
this view of judicial review in Australia: 
Federalism means a demarcation of powers and this casts upon 
the Court a responsibility of deciding whether legislation is within 
the boundaries of allotted powers. Unfortunately that 
responsibility is very widely misunderstood . . . and it is not 
sufficiently recognized that the Court's sole function is to interpret 
a constitutional description of power or restraint upon power and 
say whether a given measure falls on one side of a line drawn 
consequently or on the other. . . . Such a function has led us all I 
think to believe that close adherence to legal reasoning is the only 
way to maintain the confidence of all parties in federal conflicts. It 
may be that the Court is thought to be excessively legalistic. I 
should be sorry to think that it is anything else. There is no other 
safe guide to judicial decisions in great conflicts than a strict and 
complete legalism.38 
36 Mabo v. Queensland, Unreported High Court Judgement 3rd June 1992. 
37 Ibid., 38. For a defence of the court's position see H. Gibbs, "Law and Government" 
Quadrant, XXXIV , 10 (October 1990): 25-29. 
380. Dixon, "Address Upon Taking the Oath of Office in Sydney as Chief Justice of the 
High Court of Australia on 21st April 1952" in Jesting Pilate and Other Papers and 
Addresses, (Melbourne: Law Book Company, 1965). 
Dixon's speech has been often quoted as the definitive statement of the High Court's 
position on legalism, see B. Galligan, Politics of the High Court and S. Gageler, 
"Foundation of Australian Federalism and the Role of Judicial Review . Federal Law 
Review,17, (1987): 175 
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The legalism which has dominated operation of the High Court is 
responsible, according to Galligan, for the success of judicial review 
within the Australian federal system.39 In part this success has arisen 
because the High Court has avoided the political mine-fields of the 
advisory opinion mechanism, so influential in the offshore disputes in 
Canada. 40 Although advisory opinions had been rejected by the High 
Court in the early 1920s, recommendations of a Senate Select 
Committee to alter the Australian constitution to permit their use were 
accepted by the Commonwealth parliament in the early 1980s. 
Commonwealth officials argued that advisory opinions would reduce 
the conflict over disputed jurisdiction. The then Secretary of the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department claimed that the 
challenge to the Seas and Submerged Lands Act: 
could have been avoided at an earlier and no doubt more 
convenient stage if an Advisory Opinion on the validity of the 
basic provisions had been able to be obtained from the High Court. 
In fact the Advisory Opinion given by the Supreme Court in 
Canada on the Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights ... was relied 
upon by the High Court. 41 
Legislation was prepared for this referendum (the Constitution 
Alteration (Advisory Jurisdiction of High Court) Act 1 983) which 
passed both houses but no writ for the referendum was issued and thus 
the proposed referendum lapsed.42 
39 B. Galligan, Politics of the High Court, 41. 
4° See R. Cullen, Federalism in Action The Australian and Canadian Offshore 
Disputes, (Sydney: Federation Press 1990) and M. Haward "Intergovernmental 
Relations and Offshore Resources Policy In Australia and Canada" Australian - 
Canadian Studies, 9, 1&2 (1991): 35-51. 
41  Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Standing Committee on 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs Advisory Opinions by the High Court, 
Parliamentary Paper No 222 (1977): 39. 
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Canadian experience tends to counter the belief that advisory opinions 
would have avoided conflict over jurisiction offshore. Advisory 
opinions have been used in the Canadian system to consider the 
question of offshore jurisdiction (the opinions presented in 1967 and 
1984 by the Canadian Supreme Court concerned with offshore mineral 
rights) yet such actions have still resulted in major federal - provincial 
conflicts. 43 Subsequent events in Canada, particularly the political 
dispute underlaying the Hibernia reference which led to the negotiation 
of the Atlantic Accord after the Supreme Court decision," as well as 
the intergovernmental negotiation over the Nova Scotia Accord show 
that in practice this view may not have been able to be sustained.
• Australian commentators have argued that the issue of advisory 
opinions has been sidestepped by the actions initiated by State 
Attorneys-General to declare Commonwealth legislation invalid. 43 
The High Court's attitude to intergovernmental agreements has 
obvious implications for intergovernmental relations and what the 
Court itself has termed "co-operative federalism". Saunders comments 
that "[s]omewhat unexpectedly, the High Court has developed a greater 
tolerance to the constitutional validity of schemes with an 
intergovernmental flavour". 46 As Sawer has indicated: 
42 See B. Galligan "The 1988 Referendums in Perspective" in B. Galligan and J.R. 
Nethercote, The Constitutional Commission and the 1988 Referendums, (Canberra: 
CRFFR/RA1PA - ANU, 1989): 145. 
43 The implications of these references are discussed in greater detail in later chapters. 
" This provides a useful parallel with the OCS, and is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Four. 
45 j. Crawford, Australian Courts of Law, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1982): 
154. 
46 C. Saunders "Constitutional and Legal Aspects", 44. The High court has been 
reluctant to unravel intergovernmental agreements with the decisions in Re: Duncan 
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High Court decisions have facilitated the development of co-
operative federalism in two ways. . . . ['Me conditional grants 
power, section 96 has been treated as enabling the Federal 
Parliament to set whatever conditions it pleases for a grant - in 
particular, in the Second Uniform Tax Case the court refused to 
imply limitations on the power from the nature of federalism. On 
the other hand, the court stressed in both Uniform Tax Cases that 
section 96 does not enable the federal authorities to use legal 
compulsion on a State to make a grant. The court has also been 
reluctant to treat agreements between the federal and State 
governments as creating rigid legal ties; the assumption is that they 
create 'gentlemen's agreements', disputes about which must be 
settled by negotiation as in the Rail Standardization Case (1962). 47 
In Re: Duncan individual members of the High Court indicated that 
such arrangements are inevitable developments arising from co-
operation between the Commonwealth and the States. Chief Justice 
Gibbs stated: 
[i]t would be an absurd result, for example, if the Commonwealth 
and a State were unable, by complementary legislation to. . . give 
power to a fisheries inspector to act in Australian waters both 
:thin  and beyond territorial limits. . . . There is nothing in the 
decisions of this Court to provide authority for such a restrictive 
view of constitutional power. 48 
If the Court is unlikely to unravel agreements between the 
Commonwealth and States this added impetus c may be given to 
establish such arrangements. The High Court has viewed such 
(Re Duncan: Ex Parte Aust. Iron and Steel Pty Ltd (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 649) and in the 
Port Macdonell case (Port Macdonnell Professional Fishermen's Association Inc v 
South Australia and the Commonwealth, (1989) 63 A.L.J.R. 671) important precedents. 
47 G. Sawer, The Australian Constitution (2nd ed.) (Canberra: Adr'S 1988): 106. 
48 Re Duncan: Ex Parte Aust. Iron and Steel Pty. Ltd. (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 655 (Gibbs). 
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agreements as essential to establish frameworks for co-operative 
policy-making in a federal system,49 or as political arrangements rather 
than "enforceable contracts at law". 50 
While recent studies have drawn attention to the significance of the 
"politics of of the High Court", 51 concentrating on the formal outcome 
of judicial review tends to understate the influence of political 
bargaining that takes place after the Court has brought down its 
decision. It is the political consequences of judicial decisions that 
provide particular interest, and which bring intergovernmental 
interaction into sharp focus.52 Although the process of judicial review 
is well entrenched in Australia the establishment of intergovernmental 
agreements is one means which reduces the extent of, or costs from, 
judicial review. 
In Australia, as in Canada, the dynamics of federalism lie outside the 
decisions of the Courts. Norrie, Simeon and Krasnick emphasise that 
while individual references to the Canadian Supreme Court have 
"greatly affected" both private and government interests "[y]et even 
here decisions are seldom the end of the story, rather they reallocate the 
resources for yet further rounds of negotiation." 53 Examination of the 
offshore emphasises that judicial review, although influential in 
determining (with authority) jurisdiction, is more important in 
49Re Duncan: Ex Parte Aust. Iron and Steel Pty Ltd(1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 649. 
5° South Australia v. Commonwealth (1962) 108 C.L.R. 130. (The Rail 
Standardization case). 
51 See, for example, B. Galligan, Politics of the High&Court. 
52  P.H. Russell, "The Supreme Court and Federal Provincial Relations": 162. 
53 K. Norrie, R. Simeon, & Krasnick, M. Federalism and the Economic Union in 
Canada: 63. 
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establishing boundaries for intergovernmental interaction than in 
resolving jurisdictional disputes. Even in areas such as the offshore, 
where Commonwealth jurisdiction had been upheld by judicial 
adjudication, any outcome will reflect Russell's contention that "the 
level of a government's activity in a given field of policy depends less 
on its constitutional resources than on its will to use the resources it 
has". 54 
The High Court has therefore an important, if somewhat secondary, 
function of setting limits in relation to intergovernmental interaction. 
Legal questions over the status of such arrangements - whether or not 
they are ultra vires - or third party challenges may involve the High 
Court in narrowing the limits of Commonwealth - State relations in a 
particular policy area. 55 The process of judicial review, is none the less 
an important influence on intergovernmental interaction. In 
arbitrating jurisdictional disputes the Court clarifies, but does not 
necessarily finalise, the limits to arrangements between 
Commonwealth and State governments. The constitutional gains to 
one tier of government as a result of the outcomes of judicial review 
may be viewed as a legitimate aspect of intergovernmental interaction; 
evidence from the decisions in the Seas and Submerged Lands56 and 
Franklin Dam57 cases indicates, however, that such adjudication leads 
to a further, more intense, round of intergovernmental bargaining 
involving key intergovernmental institutions. 
54 For a discussion of the role of the Canadian Supreme Court in intergovernmental 
struggles see P. H. Russell, 'The Supreme Court and Federal Provincial Relations: 165. 
N Bankes, "Co-operative Federalism: Third Parties': and Intergovernmental 
Agreements and Arrangements in Canada and Australia", Alberta Law Review, XXIX, 
4 (1991): 792-838. 
56 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337 
57 Commonwealth v.Tasmania (1983), 57 A.L.J.R. 450 
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Intergovernmental Institutions, Processes and Outcomes 
The emergence of intergovernmental arrangements and agreements in 
the wake of the Commonwealth's expanded involvement in a range of 
policy areas reflects the institutions and processes commonly (and at 
times incorrectly) labelled "co-operative federalism" but the emphasis 
on co-operation does not necessarily imply harmony nor consensus. 
Co-operation between the Commonwealth and State governments, 
evident in a .range of areas, is an obvious feature of the Australian 
federal system. The observation of widespread collaboration, and the 
benefits arising from co-operation or joint action in managing problems 
such as spillovers or overlapping jurisdiction, have led to scholars, 
Justices of the High Court and Commonwealth and State politicians 
supporting the intergovernmental interaction subsumed under the 
broad rubric (and sometime rhetoric) of "co-operative federalism." 58 
Saunders concluded her detailed analysis of several intergovernmental 
arrangements in Australia with the view that "whatever the 
assessment of the efficacy or disadvantage of individual co-operative 
schemes, co-operative federalism in some form is necessary, and indeed 
inevitable, in many areas of government activity."59 Co-operative 
federalism may in fact be a shorthand for Rosenthal and Hoefler's 
58 See for example C. Wells, (Saunders) Co-operative Federalism in Australia; G. 
Sawer, Modern Federalism, (London: Watts, 1969) and Cooperative Federalism and 
Responsible Government in Australia, The Fourth Alfred Deakin Lecture (Melbourne: 
Alfred Deakin Lecture Trust,1970) and R. Cranston, "From Co-Operative to Coercive 
Federalism and Back?" Federal Law Review, 10 (1979): 121-142. 
59 C. Wells, (Saunders) Co-operative Federalism in Australia, Unpublished PhD 
Thesis Faculty of Law Melbourne University (1975): 454. Warhurst has argued that 
even "where constitutional authority . . . is divided . . . [policy making] can be 
undertaken in practice only on the basis of joint action between governments", 
"Managing Intergovernmental Relations" in H. Bakvis, and M. Chandler, (eds.) 
Federalism and the Role of the State, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press), 1987: 259. 
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"constitutional rules" emerging from the structure of relations between 
governments. 60 This is clearly an issue in the development of the the 
OCS which, for example, was launched as "a milestone in co-operative 
federalism. Although the OCS undoubtedly established a foundation 
for intergovernmental collaboration based upon the recognition of the 
interests and responsibilities of both the Commonwealth and State 
governments, it did not forestall ongoing intergovernmental conflict 
over fisheries, or prevent conflicts arising over Commonwealth policies 
towards offshore tourism or even coastal zone management. 
In spite of being an important element in the Australian federal 
system, and in fact predating federation, analysis of intergovernmental 
arrangements and processes has only recently emerged as a feature of 
the Australian literature. Little analysis has been made of the basis of 
this collaboration or of the detailed intergovernmental bargaining and 
accommodation leading to these arrangements. Because of the relative 
difficulty of isolating these interactions, 61 which in any one issue may 
incorporate a range of responses - between "disintegrative conflict" and 
"joint policy making" 62 formal agreement is generally accepted as 
6° D. 13. Rosenthal and J. M. Hoefler, "Competing Approaches to the Study of American 
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations", Publius 19 (Winter 1989): 1-23. 
61 A notable exception is C. Wells, (Saunders) Co-operative Federalism in Australia. 
In general the literature has focussed on the complexities of such arrangements. See K. 
Wiltshire, Adminstrative Federalism: Select Documents in Australian 
Intergovernmental Relations, (St.Lucia: University of Queensland Press,1977), 9. 
Sharman has described Australian intergovernmental relations as protean, see 
"Grappling with Proteus - A Survey of Intergovernmental Relations, Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, 53, (1984): 278-295. The research papers produced by 
the Australian Council for Intergovernment Relations (ACIR) reinforce the difficulties 
in examining intergovernmental linkages; see ACIR The Register of Commonwealth-
State Cooperative Arrangements 1985 ACIR Information Paper 10, (ACIR, Hobart, 
1985) and Operational Procedures of Interjurisdictional Ministerial Councils ACIR 
Information Paper 13, (Hobart: Tas Gov't. Printer, 1986). 
evidence of co-operation. 
Co-operation may arise from the need to provide a solution to the 
dilemmas arising from divided jurisdiction and competing claims for 
responsibility in a particular policy area. The material presented in 
later chapters emphasises that "co-operative federalism" is not 
necessarily predicated on a harmonious relationship between 
Commonwealth and the States. As Keohane has stated, co-operation is 
not a synonym for harmony: 
[h]armony refers to a situation in which actors' policies (pursued 
in their own self interest without regard to others) automatically 
facilitate the attainment of other's goals. . . .[C]ooperation and 
harmony are by no means identical and ought not be confused 
with each other. Cooperation requires that the actions of separate 
individuals or organisations - which are not in pre-existent 
harmony - be brought into conformity with one another through 
a process of negotiation.63 
The process of negotiation is a central mechanism to develop and 
maintain the structure of relations between individuals or 
governments. Differences between actors may be apparent during this 
process although, as Sharman has argued, "[Wisharmony itself is only 
dysfunctional in a system typified by imposed rather than negotiated 
solutions."64 The support given to intergovernmental agreements by 
62 A. L. Fritschler and M. Segal "Intergovernmental Relations and Contemporary 
Political Science; Developing an Intergrative Typology", Publius, 1, 2 (Winter 1972): 
95-122. 
63 Although concerned with international relations theory Keohane provides some 
useful insights into the differences between collaboration and co-operation. See R. 
Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy 
(Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press,'1984): 51. 
" C. Sharman, "The Premiers' Conference: Coriunents on Current Dissatisfactions", 
Paper for Workshop on Premiers' Conference CRFFR, ANU 1990. 
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both the Commonwealth and the States shows the efficacy of these 
arrangements in resolving differences arising from divided or 
overlapping responsibility. According to Chapman intergovernmental 
forums are "moderating institutions", reducing the tensions between 
different tiers of government65 but at the same time enhancing the 
emergence of "executive federalism". The dominance of "executive 
federalism" in intergovernmental forums has, in reducing these 
tensions, raised other issues; most notably problems in accountability 
of intergovernmental arrangements. 
Simeon's classic study of intra-nation "diplomacy" illustrated the 
importance of reducing conflict and establishing the basis for 
collaboration. Australian federalism offshore (detailed in following 
chapters) illustrates the utility of Simeon's conceptual framework. 
This perspective reinforces the view that intergovernmental 
negotiations are undertaken by individuals acting as emissaries of 
their "governments" to prepare and conclude agreements or 
treaties.66 In extending this approach Warhurst argues that one of the 
roles of intergovernmental managers is to protect the interests of 
"their" jurisdiction during negotiations over joint action. 67 
Given the importance of individual actors, game theory and 
bargaining provide insights into the procesks of intergovernmental 
negotiations. Bargaining analysis, based on,:an assumption that both 
65 R.J.K. Chapman, "Intergovernmental Forums and the Policy Process" in B. Galligan, 
(ed.) Comparative State Policies, (melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1988): 199-121. 
66 See R. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Public Policy 
in Canada. 
67 J. Warhurst, "Managing Intergovernmental Relations" in H. Bakvis, and M. 
Chandler, (eds.) Federalism and the Role of the State, (Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press), 1987 
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parties see some advantage in entering into negotiations, allows 
consideration of the interplay between actors, 68 and the effect of 
external forces on altering the scope of the bargain. The development 
of intergovernmental agreements accommodating a number of 
different interests can also be seen as taking the form of "moves" 
within a "game" where each set of actors attempt to maximise their 
return from the bargaining table. 
Several practical and methodological issues arise from the attempt to 
apply bargaining analysis and game theory. 69 Sharman, in examining 
Commonwealth - State relations as bargaining, shows how this 
framework can extend analysis of the dynamics of federalism but 
identifies one important limitation posed by the assumptions of 
bargaining analysis - the relative strength of each party to the 
bargain. 70 Rosenthal, similarly, claims that to equate 
68 For example,the options available to each to advance their interests or the 
constraints posed by the ability of other parties to counter or oppose these options. 
69 Game theory "is concerned with the actions of individuals who are conscious that 
their actions affect each other" - E. Rasmussen, An Introduction to Game Theory, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989): 21. These actions can be modelled as simple two person 
zero sum games through to "n-person" non zero- sum games or "cooperative game theory" 
- see P. Ordershook, Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). The latter approach approximates the dynamics of 
intergovernmental interaction. An early attempt to use game theory in the analysis of 
Australian federalism was made by Peachment who argued that game theory provides 
an interesting heuristic framework from which to examine the "patterns of conflict 
resolution in Australian federalism" - A. Peachment, "Patterns of Conflict Resolution in 
Australian Federalism", Politics, 6, 2, (1971): 137-147. Sharman criticised 
Peachment's analysis making the point that its assumption of bilateral relations 
between Commonwealth and a single State (a "two person game") ignored the 
significance of multilateral interaction and provided a superficial treatment of such 
interaction. G. C. Sharman, "The Bargaining Analogy and Federal State Relations" in 
R.M. Burns, G.0 Sharman, G Stevenson, P.Weller and R.F.I Smith, Political and 
Administrative Federalism, Research Monograph No 14 CRFFR, (Canberra: ANU, 
1976): 26. 
G.C. Sharman, "The Bargaining Analogy and Federal State Relations". 
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intergovernmental relations with bargaining obscures the significance 
of several factors including the impact of "anti-bargaining values" 
among intergovernmental actors or how transactions between parties 
may affect the nature of the bargain. Rosenthal also identifies 
problems arising from the existence of "a zone of indifference" in 
much of intergovernmental relations and the indeterminant character 
of such interactions. 71 Bargaining analysis and game theory do, 
however, draw attention to the dynamics of intergovernmental 
relations. 
Another approach to modelling these processes was developed by 
Fritzler and Sega1. 72 Fritschler and Segal claimed that although their 
four-part typology of intergovernmental relations "should be viewed 
as a first step" in a "systematic analysis of both vertical and horizontal 
variations in intergovernmental relations", it none the less "define[d] 
most of the conceivable political relationships within the 
intergovernmental system in a four-fold scheme of interaction". 
7-1 D.B. Rosenthal, "Bargaining- Analysis in Intergovernmental Relations", Publius, 
10,3 (Summer 1980): 33 
72 An early attempt to provide a typology of different intergovernmental interactions 
was made by Fritschler and Segal. The typology "contained four basic types of 
relationships": 
a. Joint policy making 
b. mutual accommodation 
c. Innovative conflict 
d. Disintegrative conflict 
Joint (routine) policy making emphasises "pre-imposed and generally accepted 
procedures"; mutual accommodation; which is "slightly less cooperative is 
characterized by low keyed bargaining and harmonious compromise". Innovative 
conflict "starts with conflict and ends with cooperation" and disintegrative conflict is 
the type which includes ... instances of severe intergovernmental disagreements." A. L. 
Fritschler and M. Segal "Intergovernmental Relations and Contemporary Political 
Science; Developing an Intergrative Typology", Publius, 1, 2 (Winter 1972): 95-122. 
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Fritschler and Segal's typology is less useful in modelling processes or 
dynamics, the situation where an issues may move over time from 
"severe intergovernmental disagreement" to "joint policy making". 
Thus any analytical framework needs to accommodate the range of 
strategies available to the various actors and acknowledge the impact 
of external influences, which, as Rosenthal identifies, can be 
antithetical to bargaining. 73 Placing claims over jurisdiction before 
the High Court may, for example, be a legitimate part of this 
interaction but formal zero-sum outcome of the judicial process has 
little in common with other aspects of bargaining. 
Galligan, Hughes and Walsh provide a useful contribution to the 
understanding of these dynamics by emphasising the importance of 
the extent to which intergovernmental issues are "politicised". This 
allows these issues to be categorised (in Australia at either 
Commonwealth or State level) on a continuum from "low" to "high" 
intergovernmental politics". 74 High intergovernmental politics arise 
over disputed claims to jurisdiction or through issues raised at peak 
intergovernmental forums. At the other end of the continuum are 
those issues "routinised in administrative structures and processes". 75 
73 D.B. Rosenthal, "Bargaining Analysis in Intergovernmental Relations": 7-8. 
74 B. Galligan, 0. Hughes and C. Walsh, "Introduction", in B. Galligan, 0 Hughes and 
C. Walsh, (eds.) Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy: 15. 
75 Ibid: 14. 
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Walsh, (eds.) Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
1991): 15 
This results in a four cell matrix, (see Figure 1:1) and although 
Galligan, Hughes and Walsh do "not ... suggest that there is a standard 
cycle from type 1 high politicisation to less politicised categories" they 
argue that it provides "a simple framework for analysing some 
dimensions of the character and dynamics of intergovernmental 
relations in Australia. 76 They also acknowledge that while "Mertain 
high level political issues of Australian federalism are resolved not by 
means of power assertion, bargaining and accommodation that are 
typical of the normal political process of relations between 
governments, but by independent bodies" 77 such as the High Court. 
Decisions from these independent bodies are, however, adjusted or 
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moderated by the process of Commonwealth - State relations. Galligan 
et a/ consider the offshore as an example of one "issue" 78 which 
indicates the extent of this political adjustment. 
Such adjustment takes place through negotiations between 
Commonwealth and State Ministers and officials with similar policy 
responsibilities. The meetings of officials have had considerable 
impact on the development of intergovernmental agreements and 
resolution of intergovernmental problems as delegated by particular 
councils. The importance of the input from officials, together with 
the centrality of individual Ministers, reinforces Warhurst's 
contention that, notwithstanding the widespread use of the term this 
interaction should properly be seen as the inter-relationships between 
individuals rather than governments. 79 
Given the intergovernmental dimension of much of Australian 
public policy, ministerial councils cover a wide range of issue areas, 
with the resultant intergovernmental machinery particularly 
complex. The inter-meshing of intergovernmental responsibilities 
increases the importance of institutional arrangements which ensures 
that this machinery remains lubricated. 80 In identifying such 
78 In accepting Galligan et a/ insights over intergovernmental dynamics a caveat 
remains over an interpretation of the offshore as a single issue area. This study argues 
that in fact the offshore illustrates the multi-faceted nature of much intergovernmental 
interaction. 
79 J. Warhust "Managing Intergovernmental Relations": 257. The extent to which 
members of ministerial councils or their associated committees are able to make 
decisions binding on their respective governments is an interesting question. Later 
discussion will show that in relation to the OCS, agreements achieved at these 
meetings were adopted by, and seen as binding on, all governments. 
88 R. Wettenhall, "Intergovernmental Agencies: Lubricating a Federal System", 
Current Affairs Bulletin 61, 11, (April 1985): 28-35. 
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arrangements a useful distinction can be drawn between specialist 
central intergovernmental agencies and individuals at either tier of 
government who share membership of policy specific councils and 
associated committees. Such a dichotomy has been used by Warhurst 
in relation to Australia 81 and by Pollard in a study of 
intergovernmental relations in Canada: 
where central agencies responsible for co-ordination of 
intergovernmental relations are more firmly entrenched than in 
Australia, their influence is seen as arising from the uncertainties 
of interdependent policy making. Through their capacity to 
coordinate interaction with other governments in all sectors, 
through their contacts and lines of communications with other 
governments, and through their abilities in developing strategy 
and negotiating, intergovernmental affairs agencies have helped 
governments reduce the uncertainty and to "manage" the 
interface. 82 
In Australia, like Canada, the development of the intergovernmental 
functions of central agencies at the State level derived from 
uncertainties arising from the politics of federalism. In Australia the 
imperatives created by the Whitlam government's - new federalism 
encouraged the development of central agencies at the State level. 
Warhurst considers that these central agencies have had limited 
success in altering the entrenched patterns of interaction between 
Commonwealth and State departments (in Pollard's term "the 
interface") in policy specific areas. The linkages between functional 
departments are described as "rods of iron" whereas in contrast, 
relations between individual departments and the central 
81 J. Warhurst, Central Agencies, Intergovernmental Managers and Australian 
Federal-State Relations, Occasional Paper 29, CRFFR (Canberra: ANU,:1983). 
82 B. Pollard, Managing the Interface: Intergovernmental Affairs Agencies in Canada, 
(Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1986): 109. 
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intergovernmental agency are seen as being quite fragile - "threads of 
gossamer". 83 
The linkages between between the Commonwealth and State Ministers 
reinforce, to use Warhurst's apposite metaphor of rods of iron, 
intergovernmental collaboration, and in turn strengthen established 
ministerial councils. The major study of intergovernmental forums 
undertaken by the Australian Council for Intergovernment Relations 
(ACIR) indicated that ministerial councils have several roles within 
the Australian federation. The ACIR study argued that such bodies had 
"regulatory, advisory, consultative, policy, reviewing, co-ordinating, 
and informing" functions within the Australian political system. 84 
The Premiers' Conference is the most publicised among a multiplicity 
of similar bodies - but at the same time can be seen as the primus inter 
pares of intergovernmental arrangements. Although the Premiers' 
Conference is an important institutional arrangement, it has been 
argued that this conference "can be seen to symbolize the Australian 
federal system - it works after a fashion, but it generates major 
dissatisfactions among the participants". 85 Many of these 
dissatisfactions arise from the relative power of the participants. With 
83 J. Warhurst, Central Agencies, Intergovernmental Managers: 7. 
84 ACIR, Operational Procedures of Inierjurisdictional Ministerial Councils, 
Information paper 13 (Hobart: Government Printer, 1986): 31. 
85 C. Sharman, 'The Premiers' Conference: CO'inments on Current Dissatisfactions". It 
was this dissatisfaction which caused Premiers Goss and Greiner to suggest a far 
reaching reform of such arrangements was needed, a proposal which led to the "Closer 
Partnership" speech of Prime Minister Hawke in July 1990 and the convening of the 
Special Premiers' Conferences in 1990-91. 
11 
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most (but not all) conferences dealing with financial matters 86 the 
Commonwealth has great influence. Notwithstanding the 
Commonwealth's dominance, the conflict (which is at times ritual) 
that is generated at, and by, the Premiers' Conference provides a further 
example of intergovernmental interaction. 
The predominance of the Premiers' Conference arises from the 
political and policy implications of a meeting of "heads of 
government" and the importance of references from these conferences 
for the work of other councils. Almost all policy areas in Australia are 
served by what the ACIR termed "inter-jurisdictional ministerial 
councils." 87 ACIR identified thirty six formal ministerial councils, 
with a further nine meetings of ministers with informal or ad-hoc 
arrangements. 88 By the early 1990s the number of these councils had 
grown to 41, or perhaps 48 if associated forums are included. 89 The 
term "inter-jurisdictional ministerial councils" provides a specific, if 
cumbersome description of the meetings between Ministers of different 
(i.e. Commonwealth and state) jurisdictions. Although these 
86 At times it is difficult to determine where the Premiers Conference ends and the 
Loan Council begins. The establishment of the Council of Australian Governments in 
1992 provides an alternative forum for discussion on non-financial issues. 
87 ACIR, Operational Procedures of Interjurisdictional Ministerial Councils. See also 
R. Wettenhall, "Intergovernmental Agencies:Lubricating a Federal System". 
88 ACIR, Operational Procedures of Interjurisdictional Ministerial CoUilcils,:2. 
89  C. Saunders Federalism Research Centre, Research Advisory Committee Meeting (7 
June 1992), Canberra. See also Weekend Australian August 10-11 1991: 9. 
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ministerial councils follow generally the same institutional structure, 
they vary considerably in terms of their influence. 
Figure 1.2 Establishment of Ministerial Councils 
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A great proportion (seventy per cent) of these councils were established 
in the 1970s and 1980s90 (see Figure 1:2) and institutionalised 
Commonwealth - State relations, and more importantly ensured a 
continued role for the States in policy making, during a period of 
increasing Commonwealth assertiveness in particular policy areas. 91 
The first ministerial council, apart from the Premiers' Conference and 
the constitutionally entrenched Loan Council established' in 1929, was 
the Australian Agricultural Council (AAC) which hacifits first meeting 
in 1934. The AAC can be regarded as the prototype for subsequent 
ACIR, Operational Procedures of Interjurisdictional Ministerial Councils:2 
91 C. Sharman, "Fraser, the States and Federalism"; B. Galligan, "Writing on 
Australian Federalism: The Current State of the Art" and M. Painter, "Australian 
Federalism and the Policy Process: Politics with Extra Vitamins", Politics, 23, 2, 
(November 1988): 57-66. 
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councils. 92 In general, councils established in policy areas ranging 
from education to youth affairs followed the pattern established by the 
AAC in terms of membership, terms of reference, frequency of 
meetings, structure of advisory committees and functions. Each 
ministerial council comprises the appropriate Commonwealth and 
State Ministers, although increasingly specific forums include 
Ministers from Papua New Guinea and New Zealand. 93 
The terms of reference for most councils establish the forum as a 
means for formal consultation and co-ordination between the 
Commonwealth and States over policy. 94 ACIR found that "all but 
two [interjurisdictional ministerial councils] have directly associated, 
and subordinate, standing or advisory committees whose membership 
usually comprises the permanent heads of the departments of the 
ministers participating in the council."95 The ministerial councils 
meet once or twice a year, except when major issues arise which 
deserve more attention. Much of the ongoing work of completing 
matters, providing advice or developing legislation is undertaken by 
the Commonwealth and State officials who meet generally at the same 
time as the Council but have their own ongoing and well defined 
patterns of interaction. The role of officials in the intergovernmental 
machinery cannot be understated; Wiltshire claims that "because of the 
92 R. H. Leach, Interstate Relations in Australia, (Lexington: University of Kentucky 
Press,1965): 50. 
93 Examples include the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG) and the 
Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC). 
94 Ibid. For a more contemporary discussion of these issues see also M. Crommelin, 
"Commonwealth Involvementn in Environment Policy: Past, Present and Future", 
Environment and Planning Law Journal, 4, (June 1987): 103 and R.J.K. Chapman, 
"Intergovernmental Forums and the Policy Process": 105-107. 
95 ACIR, Operational Procedures of Interjurisdictional Ministerial Councils: 23. 
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divisive politics of intergovernmental relations in Canada and 
Australia it is often the public servants which keep the federation 
hanging together."96 
The studies by Leach 97 and ACIR provide important material on the 
influence of officials in intergovernmental relations. Leach surveyed a 
random sample of Commonwealth, State and municipal public 
servants and concluded that "[i]t would appear that Australian public 
servants at all levels found intergovernmental conferences useful, 
although municipal respondents seemed to think they are somewhat 
more matters of ritual or symbol than respondents at the other two 
levels". 98 The ACIR study indicated that Ministers' attitudes towards 
these committees "reveal a certain ambivalence about the degree to 
which the council directs the work of the committee or vice versa." 99 
The technical and standing committees are particularly influential 
given the officials' direct expertise, knowledge and on-going contact 
with particular issues. Co-ordinating advice to Commonwealth and 
State Ministers is therefore an important function of the standing 
committees. In the case of federalism offshore the special committees 
comprising Commonwealth and State Solicitors-Generall°° and the 
96 K. Wiltshire, "Working with Intergovernmental Agreements", Canadian Public 
Administration, 23, 3, (Fall 1980): 354. 
97 R.H. Leach, Perceptions of Federalism by Canadian and Australian Public 
Servants: A Comparative Analysis, Research Monograph 18, CRFFR, (Canberra: 
ANU, 1976). 
R.H. Leach, Perceptions of Federalism by Canadian and Australian Public 
Servants: 75 
99 ACIR, Operational Procedures of Interjurisdictional Ministerial Councils: 24. 
100 The importance of the meetings of Solicitors-General will be highlighted in 
subsequent analysis. The issue of expertise in this case is emphasised by Coper who 
indicates that the Solicitors-General "these days dominate the arguments of 
constitutional cases" M. Coper, The Curious Case of the Callow Crayfish: The New 
Law Relating to Section 92 of the Australian Constitution, Discussion paper 1, 1989-90, 
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standing committees of the Australian Fisheries Council and the 
Australian Minerals and Energy Council provided legal and technical 
advice to the Standing Commitee of Attorneys-General (SCAG) which 
made the OCS possible. 
The role of officials in co-ordinating policy raises several issues, 
including compliance and accountability. To what extent are the 
decisions made at these committees binding on the members of the 
ministerial council or, more importantly, on the governments that 
they represent? A further issue concerns the level of parliamentary 
scrutiny of such decisions. If, as is generally the case, 
intergovernmental agreements are developed to avoid judicial 
adjudication of intergovernmental problems, attempting to hold the 
Ministers, or more problematically officials, accountable for their 
actions may be difficult. 
Ministerial councils may therefore ensure a "lowest common 
denominator" or a "minimal tolerable consensus" 101 forms the basis of 
intergovernmental affairs. Thus the success of these 
intergovernmental forums in managing interjurisdictional policy 
making may be overstated. Chapman has cast doubt on the 
coordinating function of ministerial councils given the problems of 
consensus building and the possibility of unit vetoes. He also questions 
the extent to which ministerial councils can be seen as initiators of 
policy given that actions taken at such councils cannot be implemented 
without reference back to State or Commonwealth cabinets. 102 
(Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library,1989): 6. 
101 ACIR, Operational Procedures of Interjurisdictional Ministerial Councils, 1986 39. 
102 See R.J.K. Chapman, "Intergovernmental Forums and the Policy Process": 108. 
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Kriwoken, in a study of Australian marine conservation policy, shows 
that even where Commonwealth and State ministers agree on policy 
parameters, implementation of agreed measures does not necessarily 
follow. 103 The Premiers' Conference is perhaps an exception to this 
pattern as it is clear that it, with the numbers of public servants and 
advisors present, together with the authority of the State Premier 
within their own cabinet, provides greater scope for agreements to 
stick. For example the calling of a Special Premiers' Conference in 
October 1977 to discuss the offshore issue was of crucial importance in 
the development of the OCS. Similarly the ability of the Special 
Premiers' Conference (SPC) mechanism of 1990-91 to establish an 
agenda for reform of the Australian federal system indicates the 
importance of the Premiers' Conference, although assessment of the 
the long term achievements of the SPC is not yet possible. 
Providing an institutional arrangement in which shared policy 
interests are the organising principle enhanced collaboration while at 
the same time enabling diversity in policy responses. Joint action is 
more probable where such forums exist and, arising from the sharing 
of responsibility between governments, the development of: 
intergovernmental agreements now symbolise the symbiotic 
relationship which exists between the component parts of the ... 
federation..., a symbolism which is, politically, as important as 
their substance.W4 
103  L. K. Kriwoken, "Great Barrier Reef-Marine Park: Intergovernmental Relations", 
Marine Policy, (September 1991): 349-362. 
104 Wiltshire lists thirteen reasons for the establishment of Australian 
intergovernmental agreements: 
(a) to achieve uniformity in the administration of a common functional area; 
(b) to avoid overlapping in the provision of administrative services; 
(c) to respond to vertical imbalance; i.e., to distribute surplus commonwealth 
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The language used to describe arrangements and agreements may 
contribute to this symbolism, 105 and mask substantial disputes or 
conflict among different parties. A range of devices may be used to 
establish these arrangements, with most involving some formal or 
informal intergovernmental agreement, although as Wiltshire 
comments "there is no semblance of any logical pattern nor are there 
any clearly defined models which are followed." 106 His conclusion 
arose from a detailed academic study, although now somewhat 
da ted 1 °7 in which he examined the types of intergovernmental 
funds to needy areas of state government activity; 
(d) to disseminate information nationally; 
(e) to pool resources of governments for more effective administration; 
(0 to apply laws to mobile resources (i.e., ones which transgress state 
boundaries); 
(g) to achieve national solidarity; 
(h) to promote research; 
(i) to exhort the community on a vital issue; 
(j) to achieve complementary action between governments: 
(k) to review national priorities; 
(1) to provide a solution to an otherwise insoluble or unconstitutional problem; 
(m) to spy on other governments or to avoid being left out. 
K. Wiltshire, "Working With Intergovernmental Agreements: the Canadian and 
Australian Experience": 361-362. 
None of Wiltshire's categories are mutually exclusive and indeed the OCS illustrates 
that the desire to solve a "constitutional problem", in this case a decision of the High 
Court, also hinged on "complementary action between governments" to resolve disputes 
over State or Commonwealth "boundaries". K. Wiltshire, "Working With 
Intergovernmental Agreements- The Canadian and Australian Experience": 357. 
105 A prime example is the use of the term "Offshore Constitutional Settlement" when 
the arrangement was neither a constitutional development, nor a settlement of 
intergovernmental tensions. I thank Professor Deil Wright (April 1989) for his useful 
comments on the symbols enshrined in the language of intergovernmental affairs. 
106 K. Wiltshire, Administrative Federalism: 9. 
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agreements in a range of policy areas:108 
Studying intergovernmental agreements in specific, highly 
contentious, policy areas such as the offshore reinforces the importance 
placed on multi-lateral forums such as the Premiers' Conference and 
other ministerial councils in resolving intergovernmental conflicts. 
Australian literature tends to see these councils as important, and 
influential in gaining commitments to, and action for, joint legislative 
or administrative arrangements. Canadian experience tends to 
107 Wiltshire's study undertaken in the 1970s was complemented by the work of the 
short lived Advisory Council for Intergovernment Relations,(ACIR). ACIR, 
established under the Fraser Government's New Federalism policy, was abolished by 
the Hawke Government in 1987. ACIR provided a comprehensive listing of 
intergovermental arrangements in its publication The Register of Commonwealth-
State Cooperative Arrangements 1985, ACIR Information Paper No 10 (Hobart: 
Government Printer, 1985). 
108 The analysis enabled the Wiltshire to propose an inventory of the techniques under 
which these arrangements are established and administrative action is undertaken. 
These include: 
(a) Contracts signed by legal entities such as statutory corporations. 
(b) Formal written agreements for joint action signed by 
(i) the Governor-General and/or Governor 
(ii) the Prime Minister and/or Premier 
(iii) the relevant national and/or State minister; or 
(iv) permanent heads of relevant national and/or State administrative 
organisations 
(c) Memoranda of Understanding signed by any of the above combination of 
signatories 
(d) Constitutions of joint ministerial or administrative bodies 
(e) Charters for joint bodies that have their origin in other intergovernmental 
arrangements 
(f) The wording and occasionally the accompanying schedules of national or State 
Bills 
(g) Simple exchanges of correspondence 
(h) Informal discussions with no documented evidence of arrangements 
(i) Official annual and other reports of joint action. 
Source: K. Wiltshire, Adminstrative Federalism: 9. 
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emphasise an opposing view: 
[t]hroughout the 1970s the traditional mechanisms of ministerial 
and first ministers conferences contributed little in any direct way 
to the resolution of energy and natural resource issues. In the end 
most conflicts were either resolved through bilateral negotiations 
or pre-empted by unilateral action (usually by the federal 
government). 109 
The development of separate intergovernmental accommodations 
with Nova Scotia and Newfoundland over offshore oil and gas is an 
example of bilateral agreements in Canada. The eventual collapse of 
both the Meech Lake Accord 110 and the Charlottetown Accordm in 
Canada illustrates particular problems with, and concerns over the 
legitimacy of, Canadian multilateral executive federalism. 
In Australia, however, it is unlikely that the OCS could have arisen 
without a Special Premiers' Conference referring the matter to the 
SCAG and the special committees of Solicitors-General. A major 
difference between the Canadian experience offshore and the success of 
the OCS relates in part to the multi-faceted, multilateral character of the 
Australian offshore -"problem". This made it difficult, if not 
109 F.J. Fletcher and D.C. Wallace, "Federal-Provincial Relations and the Making of 
Public Policy in Canada: A Review of Case Studies" in R. Simeon, (Research Co-
ordinator) Division of Powers and Public Policy, Research Studies of the Royal 
Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press), 1986. 
110 The Meech Lake Accord was an agreement between the Provincial premiers and 
Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney to enable Quebec to ratify the 1982 patriated 
constitution. Although gaining unanimous agreement at first ministers' conferences the 
Accord collapsed. A substantial Canadian literature has examined the development 
and demise of the Meech Lake Accord. 
111 The Charlottetown Accord arose out of the Canadian government's "Canada Round" 
of constitutional reform proposals of 1991 -92, and was defeated at a popular referendurri 
in October 1992. 
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impossible, to establish a series of bilateral agreements. 112 This in turn 
enhanced the ability of the States to place significant limitations on 
unilateral Commonwealth action, particularly given the opportunity 
offered by the Fraser government's New Federalism. As the empirical 
material presented in following chapters illustrates, the OCS was 
influenced more by State or Commonwealth officials than by the State 
and Commonwealth ministers, although the actions of State Premiers 
such as Sir Charles Court from Western Australia, and Mr Rupert 
Hamer from Victoria in initiating the process of negotiation, and the 
close interest of Prime Minister Fraser in maintaining this process 
cannot be underestimated. In spite of concerns over the operation of 
ministerial councils such intergovernmental forums can be 
particularly influential in providing opportunities for discussions 
outside the often adversarial politics of Commonwealth - State 
relations 
The Politics of Commonwealth State Relations 
It is a truism that federalism enhances the development of a number of 
countervailing forces which are in a constant dynamic._ The 
constitutional division of powers is subject to the processes of judicial 
review; the development of intergovernmental agreements counter 
the disintegrative conflicts emerging from struggles over jurisdiction. 
In the same manner the intergovernmental machinery moderates the 
politics of Commonwealth - State relations. 
112 Chapter Four does indicate, however, that the implementation phase of the OCS 
tended to focus on individual sectors within the settlement. 
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Commonwealth - State relations have long been a permanent item on 
the Australian political agenda, although at times specific political 
conflicts between the Commonwealth and individual State 
governments have emerged to dominate and shape Australian 
federalism. While such conflicts have had a partisan flavour as 
exemplified, for example, by the conflicts in the early 1970s between the 
Queensland National - Liberal coalition government led by Premier 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen and the Whitlam led ALP Commonwealth 
government, a broad brush partisan explanation cannot explain the 
equally savage conflicts between the Tasmanian ALP Premier Eric 
Reece and Whitlam during the same period. A simple partisan 
explanation cannot explain the Fraser government's problems with the 
Bjelke-Petersen government over the management of the Great Barrier 
Reef. 
The partisan thesis is flawed as an explanation of intergovernmental 
conflict or of attitudes to federalism. It is too simplistic to equate the 
ALP as a party committed to centralisation and the anti-Labor parties of 
a stronger commitment to federalism. It_is true that the ALP remained 
suspicious of the limits posed on its _reform agenda by the 
constitution 113 with Party platform maintaining a formal commitment 
to abolish the Senate until 1979. The ALP, emerging at the same time 
as the 1890 constitutional conventions, had no part in drafting the 
Constitution, with the labour movement's opposition to federalism in 
, the 1890s evident through such publications as The Tocsin. 114,  The 
period immediately after federation saw the ALP adapt quickly to the 
113 See for example the 1957 Chifley Memorial Lecture in E.G. Whitlam, 0 n 
Australia's Constitution, (Melbourne: Widescope, 1977). 
114 H. Anderson, (ed.) Tocsin: Radical Arguments against Federation, (Melbourne: 
Drurnmond,1977). 
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federal framework with the first Commonwealth ALP ministry under 
J. C. Watson elected in 1904. The strengthening of the Senate in the 
mid 1960s as a result of the reforms initiated by Senator Murphy as ALP 
Senate Leader and the maturing of the ALP's attitude to federalism in 
the 1980s are examples of the ALP's ability to work within the federal 
system although the events of the November 1975 dismissal of the 
Whitlam government also saw calls for a reform of the constitution. 
The agenda for constitutional reform took an intergovernmental 
flavour under the Whitlam government's ill-fated constitutional 
convention of 1973-74, although this process was initiated by State 
governments in response to criticisms of the Gorton Coalition 
treatment of the States. 115 The Hawke government's half-hearted 
attempt at constitutional change with the 1988 package of referendums 
- soundly rejected by the Australian people - encouraged a non-partisan 
reform process of much greater significance. 
The Hawke government's "practical reconciliation with federalism" 116 
is evidence of the decline in the ALP's criticisms of the constitutional 
framework. Hawke's shift from an espousal of traditional Labor 
orthodoxy regarding the "anachronistic lunacy" of the federal system in 
his 1979 Boyer lectures 117 to his support of the new federalism of 1990 - 
91 is an interesting example of this change. 118 Understanding the 
opportunities afforded by the federal system enabled the Hawke 
115 See M. Haward and G. Smith "What's New about the New Federalism?" 
Australian Journal of Political Science, (November 1992) - Forthcoming. 
116 B. Galligan and D. Mardiste, "Labor's Reconciliation with Federalism" Australian 
Journal of Political Science, 27, 6, (March 1992): 71-86. 
117 R.J. Hawke The Resolution of Conflict, 1979 Boyer Lectures, (Sydney: ABC, 1979). 
118 B. Galligan and D. Mardiste, "Labor's Reconciliation with Federalism". 
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government to work within the constitution which after all did not 
hinder major macro-economic policy objectives. 119 
The reinforcement of the external affairs power in the Franklin Dam 
case enabled the Commonwealth to extend its influence in areas such 
as environmental and heritage protection, although it had to account 
for increasingly assertive (and generally ALP) State governments in 
the mid to late 1980s. This outcome was arguably an inevitable 
response to a continual growth in central power and influence (which 
had begun decades earlier, and had been foreshadowed by Deakin in 
1904120) which reflects the inherent dynamics of federalism. 
Acknowledging such dynamics helps to explain the ALP's 
reconciliation with federalism. Having witnessed an attempt at greater 
central involvement under the Whitlam government's new 
federalism collapse in the face of the opposition from ALP State 
governments (with the politics of Commonwealth - State relations 
cutting across partisan cleavages) the Hawke government undertook a 
more pragmatic approach to the federal arrangement. 
The Liberal Party has retained a longstanding commitment to the 
federal system. However, with some exceptions (in the case of the 
time, energy and determination which followed the Fraser New 
Federalism) 121 this commitment has remained as part of the Liberal 
party's "theology". 122  Menzies, after all, was Prime Minister during 
• : 119 M. Stuchbury's discussion of macroeconmic policy making in a recent review of the 
Hawke government does not mention the States, nor the effects of federalism; see 
"Macroeconomic Policy" in C. Jennert and R.G. Stewart Hawke and Public Policy: 
Consensus and Restructuring, (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1990). 
120 A. Deakin, Federated Australia: Selections of Letters to the Morning Post 1900- 
1910 ed. J.A. LaNauze (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1968). 
121 C. Sharman, "Fraser, the States and Federalism". 
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much of the period where what he described as the growth of "central 
power" occurred, 123 and had played a significant role as counsel for the 
plaintiff in the important Engineers case in 1920. The Liberal Party's 
commitment to federalism was to be reshaped by Gorton who had a 
more assertive view of the Commonwealth's role which, together with 
his attempts at reforming the party, led to internal conflict and his 
replacement as Prime Minister. Intense opposition, for example, 
emerged to Gorton's proposal for greater Commonwealth jurisdiction 
in offshore Australia and in areas such as the Great Barrier Reef. 
From the perspectives of the States the politics of Commonwealth - 
State relations are less important for partisan considerations than for 
the opportunities for opening up alternative arenas in which to 
maintain State interests. Thus this interaction is a way of pressuring 
the Commonwealth on particular issues, where the drama is directed 
back at the State, with State electors rather than the Commonwealth 
being the primary audience. 124 Given the current pattern of fiscal 
federalism and the dependence of the States for grants to fund a range 
of programmes, the Commonwealth will always be the convenient 
target. State Premiers are able to use the politics of intergovernmental 
conflict to their own advantage, with the Commonwealth treatment of 
particular States being a perennial election issue. 125 The politics of 
122 D. Jaensch, 'The Liberal Party" in D. Woodward, A.Parkin and J.Suiluners, (eds.) 
Government, Politics and Power in Australia, 3rd ed. (Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 
1985): 137-152. 
123 See R.G. Menzies Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth. 
124 For discussions on the Premiers' Conference see J. Holmes and C. Sharman The 
Australian Federal System, (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1977): C. Sharman, 
The Premiers Conference: An Essay in Federal-State Interaction, Occasional paper 13 
Political Science Department Research School of the Social Sciences (1977) and C. 
Sharman, 'The Premiers' Conference: Comments on Current Dissatisfactions". 
125 Elections in Queensland in 1974 and Tasmania in 1979 were primarily fought on the 
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Commonwealth - State relations tend to be in stark contrast to the 
other forms of intergovernmental interaction, particularly the 
meetings of Commonwealth and State officials. While the political 
disputes rage it is the intergovernmental machinery which ensures 
joint action, albeit at times what may be felt by some to be "a minimum 
tolerable consensus". This machinery provides an effective foil for the 
conflicts engendered in the politics of Commonwealth - State relations, 
yet like the other parameters of intergovernmental interaction is based 
on the constitutional, political and administrative recognition of State 
interests and responsibilities.. 
The Commonwealth, the States and the Offshore 
The preceding discussion has centered on examining the range of 
arrangements and processes which initiate, limit and facilitate the 
interaction between the Commonwealth and the States. 126 Focusing 
solely on the expansion of Commonwealth power and influence, or on 
the decisions of the High Court, tends to ignore the countervailing 
influences which make these arrangements and processes means for 
• ongoing interaction rather than ends in Commonwealth - State 
relations. It is the countervailing influences arising from the division 
of powers which contribute to what Rosenthal and Hoelfer term the 
"structure of relations" making the States' constitutional and political 
powers and interests a central focus in intergovernmental interaction. 
Commonwealth's treatment of the respective States. 
126 In a recent article Painter considers the effect of the "extra vitamins" introduced by 
federalism, or more specifically by intergovernmental interaction, into the Australian 
policy process. He argued that the effect of these "extra vitamins" could be illustrated 
by Commonwealth government intervention in specific policy areas. See M. Painter, 
"Australian Federalism and the Policy Process: Politics with Extra Vitamins", 
Politics, 23, 2, (November 1988): 57-66. 
66 
Such interaction establishes the States as major actors in any 
intergovernmental arrangement, and act as a foil to interpretations of 
such arrangements as based solely on the perceived expansion of 
Commonwealth jurisdiction. 
Despite expansion of Commonwealth jurisdiction by the High Court 
the States remain significant actors in establishing and implementing 
intergovernmental arrangements over the offshore. The following 
chapter argues that the increased Commonwealth involvement in 
domestic policies associated with the development and exploitation of 
marine resources was closely linked to broader moves to assert 
national jurisdiction over the continental shelf as part of the 
developing international law of the sea. In spite of the 
Commonwealth's primacy in matters of external affairs, 
Commonwealth - State relations over the offshore were both informed 
and constrained by the political and administrative arrangements 
arising from the constitutional separation of responsibilities within 
the Australian federal system. 
Chapter Two 
The Commonwealth, The States, and Offshore Jurisdiction: 
1901 - 1975 
Since 1901 in theory, 1 and from the 1950s in practice, both the 
Commonwealth and each State government have exercised 
jurisdiction, based on concurrent constitutional powers, over 
Australian offshore fisheries. The Commonwealth derives its power 
from Section 51 (x) of the Constitution, while the States' jurisdiction 
over fisheries is linked to the "peace order and good government 
provisions of their constitutions. Jurisdiction over other offshore 
resources such as oil and gas was less clear and, as a result, led to 
contending claims between the Commonwealth and the States. The 
States' argument that jurisdiction over offshore oil and gas rested with 
them was based on an interpretation of the residual powers doctrine 
and their extensive involvement in terrestrial mineral resource 
management. As with the management of fisheries, the States' 
activities in regulating mining predated federation. The extensive 
intergovernmental interaction which has taken place in Australia over 
the offshore (particularly in the 1960s and 1970s) arose from the States' 
• 
t • 
1 Prior to federation a quasi-federal arrangement (the Federal Council of Australasia) 
enabled colonies to claim an extra territorial competence to legislate over fisheries 
beyond the three mile limit. 
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perceiving their interests conflicting with an expansion in 
Commonwealth activity. 
While the struggle over jurisdiction offshore in Australia primarily 
concerned domestic issues this intergovernmental interaction was, 
however, greatly influenced by developments in the United States and 
Canada and the emerging international law of the sea.2 These 
external influences had the effect of altering the relative strengths of 
either the Commonwealth or the States in intergovernmental 
negotiations during this period. The study of Australian federalism 
offshore reinforces Fairley's comment concerning fisheries 
management in Canada: 
Mil this domain the international public law of the ocean also 
governs; it demands both understanding and an adequate 
appreciation before the domestic constitutional issues can be 
properly analysed and decided. More simply, the domestic issue is 
not merely domestic. 3 
The impact of such factors as changes in the law of the sea on domestic 
politics and administration is more readily apparent when they are used 
to challenge existing Commonwealth - State relations. Attempts to 
2 The pattern of Australian intergovernmental interaction over the offshore 
paralleled similar conflicts in the United States and in Canada, although the outcomes 
in each federation reflect the impact of particular domestic political and policy 
imperatives. In both the USA and Canada the Supreme Court has upheld federal power 
offshore over claims from either States or Provinces. The development of international 
conventions over the continental shelf and the emergence of customary international law 
over extended jurisdiction offshore from coastal states emerging from the declaration of 
jurisdiction over fisheries up to 200 miles offshore by Chile, Ecuador and Peru in 1952 
and from the deliberations at UNCLOS I (1958); UNCLOS II (1960) and UNCLOS Ill 
(1974-82). 
3 H. S. Fairley, "Canadian Federalism, Fisheries and the Constitution: External 
Constraints on Internal Ordering" Ottawa Law Review, 12, (1980): 290. 
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expand the reach of Commonwealth's powers offshore by reference to 
developments in the law of the sea, therefore upsetting the division of 
responsibility between Australian governments, may be one source of 
challenge to the status quo. Where jurisdiction is unclear an 
emergent interest by the Commonwealth may be attached to claims 
arising from developments in the international law of the sea, as for 
example in the Commonwealth's increased interest in offshore oil and 
gas. Even where a constitutional power is shared, as in the case of 
fisheries, the development of such international regimes may 
encourage greater Commonwealth interest in expanding its day to day 
responsibilities. 
Intergovernmental relations over offshore areas in Australia can be 
conceptualised as forming four periods in the century to the early 1990s. 
Each of the parameters of the analytic framework in the previous 
chapter emerges as a central feature of one period. Intergovernmental 
interaction between the 1880s and the late 1940s focused on the 
establishment and operation of the constitutional division of powers. 
The second period- - between the early 1950s to 1969 - saw the 
Commonwealth and: State governments consolidate joint action over 
offshore resources through the emergence of intergovernmental 
institutions and processes. 1970 to 1975, the third period, saw the earlier 
accommodation unravel giving a period of conflict characterised by 
divisive political relationships between the Commonwealth and the 
States and eventual judicial. adjudication of the contending claims over 
jurisdiction. The fourth period (1976 to the early 1990s) is characterised 
by on-going intergovernmental negotiation to establish an agreement 
which entrenched joint action in the offshore as well as a recognition of 
concurrent roles and responsibilities.4 
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The Constitutional Division Of Powers Offshore 
Fishing was an important activity in each of the "Australian" colonies 
with each colonial legislature enacting various measures to regulate 
and control the fisheries in adjacent waters following the granting of 
responsible, but limited, self government in the 1850s. Colonial 
fisheries legislation contained some degree of "extra-territorial 
competence" although the reach of this legislation was rarely tested. In 
the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, some conflicts 
emerged between the colonies over the adoption of different 
management practices in similar fisheries - a problem, incidentally, that 
was to bedevil the implementation of the fisheries elements of the OCS 
almost a century later. The major intergovernmental skirmish in the 
1890s was between Victoria and Tasmania over the use of "pots" in the 
"crayfish" or southern rock lobster fishery. 
In Australia it is noteworthy that intergovernmental, or more correctly 
inter-colonial, interaction over control of coastal waters pre-dated 
federation in Australia; the Federal Council of Australasia established, 
albeit in a limited manner, that offshore resources legislation would 
incorporate a "federal framework". Almost a century after the 
intriguing developments by the Federal Council the proclamation of 
the Coastal Waters (State Title's) Act 1980 (Cwth) entrenched the OCS 
and established a robust "sea wall" to stabilise the federal institutions 
and processes in the offshore. Thus the OCS, needs to be placed in 
context as an outcome of intergovernmental interaction arising 
generally from the States' response to assertions of Commonwealth 
4 The continued intergovernmental interaction between 1975 and 1990 is discussed in 
the following chapters. 
71 
constitutional power and political influence in the territorial sea, 
concerns which predate the proclamation of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 1990 (Imp.). 
The exploitation of particular fisheries outside the three mile "cannon 
shot limit" of territorial waters seen as the customary limit of colonial 
legislation raised particular problems for some Australian colonies. 
Concern over the limited competence of Queensland and Western 
Australian colonial fisheries legislation to regulate foreign fishermen in 
the pearl and beche de mer fisheries was resolved by the development 
of legislation under the auspices of the Federal Council of Australasia. 
This legislation indicates that the question of legislative competence 
was the concern of particular colonies although it also reflects an 
ignorance of contemporary British judicial developments concerned 
with jurisdiction in coastal waters, particularly the impact of the 
Franconia case (R. v. Keyn) 5 of 1876. 
The Franconia was a British registered vessel which was involved in a 
collision with a foreign vessel within the customary three mile limit of 
national jurisdiction from the British coast. The loss of life resulting 
from the collision indirectly led to questions of the "extra-territorial 
competence of British legislation and the jurisdiction of British 
courts". 6 Not surprisingly the decision in R. v. Keyn was to have 
5 One of the most concise stiinmaries of the Franconia case was developed by Sir Percy 
Spender in "The Great Barrier Reef: Legal Aspects" in The Future of the Great Barrier 
Reef, (Sydney: Australian Conservation Foundation, 1969). D. P. O'Connell argues that 
"(tJhe law as declared in R. vFKeyn in 1876 seems to have fixed the low water mark as 
the seaward boundary of the realm." "Australian Coastal Jurisdiction" in D. P. 
O'Connell, (ed.) International Law: Australian Essays, (Sydney: The Australian 
Institute of International Affairs/Law Book Company,1965: 249. 
6 P. Spender, "The Great Barrier Reef: Legal Aspects." 
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significant bearing on future legal decisions in Australia and Canada 
through the next one hundred years. The impact of the decision at the 
time was, however, limited as the British parliament enacted the 
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act in 1878; legislation which removed 
problems posed by the decision in R. v Keyn. Thus although the 
Franconia case was (and remains) a key legal decision, its significance is 
debated by commentators. 7 
The regulation of fisheries was one of a series of factors which "had 
brought the colonies - or a majority of them - closer together". 8 In 
1883 the establishment of the Federal Council of Australasia arose in 
response to the emergence of a tentative national sentiment from 
within the "Australian" colonies. These colonies, together with New 
Zealand and Fiji, agreed to explore matters of common concern. A 
convention led to the adoption of a resolution which stated: 
What this Convention, recognizing that the time has not yet 
arrived, at which a complete federal union of the Australasian 
colonies can be attained, but considering that there are many 
matters of general interest with respect to which united action 
would be advantageous, adopts the accompanying draft Bill for the 
7 For example Spender argued that "[T]he reasons on which it is based ... at the barest 
minimum are destructive of any claim by any Australian colony to exploit the seabed of 
whatever could be claimed to have been their territorial waters in 1901." "The Great 
Barrier Reef: Legal Aspects": 31. His interpretation of the Franconia case was not 
universally supported. O'Connell developed an argument supporting the States' 
legislative competence in the territorial sea; that "colonial legislatures had competence 
over territorial waters because they were exercising over them the particular 
jurisdiction necessary for the 'peace, order and gaod government' of the colonies, not 
because the waters were within their boundaries:" "Australian Coastal jurisdiction": 
254. O'Connell was to have considerable influence in preparing opinions for first the 
South Australian and then the Queensland and Tasmanian governments in the 1970s. 
8 R. Else-Mitchell, "The Establishment in 1885 of the Federal Council of Australasia" 
Australian Law Journal, 59 (November 1985): 666. 
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Constitution of A Federal Council, as defining the matters upon 
which such united action is both desirable and practicable at the 
present time.9 
The parliaments of the colonies of Queensland, South Australia, 
Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia and Fiji "adopted addresses to 
the crown praying for enactment of the Federal Council of Australasia 
Bill" in 1884.10 This legislation was passed by the Imperial Parliament 
and assented by Queen Victoria in 1885. With New South Wales (and 
to a lesser extent New Zealand) failing to concur with the views of the 
other colonial parliaments, the ability of the Federal Council "to 
achieve objectives commensurate with the hopes of its framers" was to 
be frustrated. 11 
The Federal Council of Australasia owed much to the energy, foresight 
and practical concerns of the Queensland Premier Sir Samuel 
Griffith, 12 who was later to play an important role in the framing of 
the Australian constitution. Griffith's concerns over the impact of 
foreign fishermen in Queensland waters may explain the provision of 
the Federal Council's fisheries power. The Queensland and Western 
Australian colonial parliaments utilised this provision to extend (or 
perhaps more correctly to claim) colonial legislative competence over 
the beche de mer (trepang) and pearl fisheries outside the three mile 
limit in response to activities by Japanese and Timorese fishermen. 
Else-Mitchell notes the centrality of these issues - in "explaining the 
purpose of the Council to the Premier of New Zealand in a letter dated 
May 20 1885, the Premier of Victoria said that it was to give power to 
9 Ibid. 667. 
10 ibid . 
11 ibid . 
12  Ibid. 666. See also B.W. Davis, "The Federal Council of 1886: Catalyst Towards 
Australian Nationhood" mimeo, Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration 
Tasmanian Division, 4th February 1986. 
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legislate for fisheries outside the territorial waters where at present 
there was no jurisdiction." 13 
Apart from enabling the development of a quasi-federal arrangement 
concerning fisheries legislation the Federal Council power "over 
fisheries in Australasian waters beyond territorial limits" was adopted 
in the draft constitution bill debated during the first National 
Australasian Constitutional Convention in Sydney in 1891. This 
provision, although subject to minor amendments in 1898, formed the 
basis of Section 51(x) of the Australian constitution. 
The analysis of the the convention debates provides an insight into the 
framers' perception over the operation of the Australian federal 
system. 14 In relation to the "fisheries power" these debates illustrate 
how most delegates envisaged a concurrent system of legislation 
retaining a significant, if not primary, role for the States. This emerged 
despite the dominance of the Brycean interpretation of the American 
division of powers, 15 as reinterpreted by key actors of the first 
convention such as Griffith, Kingston and Inglis Clark." Not 
unexpectedly this arrangement led to quite extensive interaction 
between the States and the Commonwealth over fisheries management 
prior to the enactment of specific Commonwealth legislation in the 
13 D. P. O'Connell, "Australian Coastal Jurisdiction", 255. 
14 For a detailed exposition of this argument see J. Warden Federal Theory and the 
Formation of the Australian Constitution, unpublished PhD thesis, (Australian 
National University, 1990). 
15 ibid. 
16 Inglis Clark, a Tasmanian delegate to the 1890 and 1891 meetings was a strong 
supporter of the United States constitutional structure and opposed a Canadian style 
division of powers. At the 1890 Melbourne Conference Inglis Clark, with Playford, was 
responsible convincing delegates of the flaws in a Canadian constitutional model. 
75 
1950s. 17 
The convention debates emphasise the delegates' concern to retain, as 
far as possible, existing responsibilities related to fisheries management. 
Some delegates to the first convention voiced concern over the effect of 
the repeal of the Federal Council of Australasia Act on fisheries, but 
were reassured by Griffith that this would not affect state law. 18 
Although other matters took up much of the discussion over the 
powers of the Commonwealth in the 1891 and 1897 sessions, the 
Melbourne session of the second convention in March 1898 provided a 
relatively lengthy discussion of the wording and implications of the 
provision which later became Section 51 (x); "fisheries in Australian 
waters beyond territorial limits". This was the only session which 
considered the implications of extra-territorial competence of State law 
or the limits on Commonwealth power. According to O'Connell the 
fisheries power (placitum x) was "adopted word for word from the 
powers given to the Federal Council of Australasia". 19 The drafting 
history outlined by Quick and Garran, and in the more recent analysis 
by Crommelin, has emphasised the scant attention the provision gained 
at the early meetings of the Convention. 20 O'Connell indicates that 
[alt the Adelaide meeting in 1897 discussion was directed solely to 
the policy of federal control of inland fisheries, and no reference 
was made to territorial waters. At the Sydney meeting the debate 
turned on the definition of "Australian waters". It was only at 
17 A. J. Harrison, "The Development of the Commonwealth Government's Role in 
Fisheries Management", Mimeo, (Hobart: Department of Political Science University of 
Tasmania, 1989). 
18 Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian Convention (Sydney 
1891): 557- 
19 D.P. O'Connell, "Australian Coastal Jurisdiction": 256. 
20 j. Quick; and R.R. Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1901); M. Crommelin, Offshore Mining and 
Petroleum: Cbnstitutional Issues, Papers on Federalism 3 Intergovernmental Relations 
in Victoria Program (Melbourne: Melbourne University Law School, 1981). 
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Melbourne [in 1898] that the question of colonial jurisdiction in 
territorial waters was raised, and it was treated in a casual and 
uncritical manner.21 
An examination of the convention debates reinforces O'Connell's 
argument but it is also clear that the legal bases to Section 51(x) were 
considered by Barton and Isaacs. Equally other delegates 22 at the 
convention (in particular Forrest and Deakin) were concerned with the 
wording, and therefore the reach, of this power. While Barton and 
Isaacs debated the intricacies of what was to become Section 51 (x), 
Forrest and Deakin were more directly concerned with how this 
provision would affect State activities over fisheries. 
Barton, concerned with the problems of enforcing section 51 (x), tabled 
an amendment to the provision adding "sea" before "fisheries" and 
deleting "beyond territorial limits". The implications of this 
amendment were not lost on Sir John Forrest, Premier of Western 
Australia. Forrest opened debate on the amendment with the following 
question to Barton: 
I would like to ask Mr Barton whether it is intended to take away 
the state control of fisheries by this clause? . . . It would not be 
desirable to take away any power from the state of legislating in 
regard to these [inshore] fisheries. The words "beyond territorial 
limits" which it is proposed to omit, are very good words. The 
Federal Council, under the Imperial Act, has exercised the power 
of legislating for waters beyond territorial limits with great 
advantage to some colonies. Western Australia and Queensland 
21 D.P. O'Connell,"Australian Coastal Jurisdiction": 256. 
22 The members of the 1891 Convention were officially recognised as "delegates" while 
in 1897 and 1898 they were officially "representatives", although it is common to use the 
former term in relation to the 1897 and 98 conventions, see B. Galligan and J. Warden, 
"The Design of the Senate" in G. Craven (ed.) The Convention Debates 1891-98: 
Commentaries, Indices and Guide (Sydney: Legal Books, 1986): 89. 
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have both Acts of the Federal Council which have been very 
useful in controlling fisheries, such as pearl fisheries, far beyond 
the 3-mile limit. 23 
Barton argued that there was limited effective legislation which could 
be used to regulate fisheries beyond territorial limits, with the exception 
of the commercial activity of selling fish. Barton, foreshadowing the 
problems of overlapping responsibility between the Commonwealth 
and the States, commented: 
a law giving such a right had better not be subject to conflict. If you 
have a state law for fisheries within the 3-mile limits under the 
state and a commonwealth law beyond the 3-mile limit, the 
unlucky fisherman who does not always know whether he is 2 1/2 
or 3 miles away will get into the pickle instead of his fish. 24 
In response to the particular query raised by Sir John Forrest, Barton 
added: 
I quite agree that every state has the right to legislate as to its own 
fisheries within the territorial limits of three miles, but it has no 
right to legislate beyond that limit. . . . That is why I have 
proposed [the addition of] "sea fisheries". It will allow the 
Commonwealth to legislate with regard to the whole area. 25 
Barton went on to explain the reasoning behind his amendment; "[i]f 
you insert the word "sea" before the word "fisheries" and leave out the 
rest of the provision you leave one jurisdiction with regard to the 
legislation and get something clear, and something which the persons 
conducting the fishing business can understand."26 Barton's concern 
23 Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian Convention, Third 
Session (1898): 1857. 
24 ibid . 
25 Ibid 1857-58. 
26 Ibid 1858. 
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to reduce conflict over jurisdiction contrasted with the views of other 
delegates concerned with minimising the loss of colonial power over 
fisheries. 
Given Forrest's objections, Barton indicated that if the amendment was 
worrying delegates he would be quite prepared to argue that the 
particular provision be removed entirely, leaving fisheries, by 
implication, solely a matter for the States. Barton said "I shall move the 
amendment which I have suggested, but I should be just as content if 
the whole of the subsection was struck out." 27 
Although this would have satisfied the delegates concerned with 
maintaining state "rights", 28 Barton's proposal to remove the 
subsection was opposed by several influential delegates. Higgins drew 
attention to the fact that the Commonwealth power could stop inter-
state conflict over fisheries; citing the then recent conflict between 
Tasmania and Victoria over rock-lobster fishing29 as an example of the 
potential role for the Commonwealth. Kingston urged the retention of 
the Federal Council power, adding that most arrangements using this 
power tended to be developed in a co-operative manner. He argued 
that in terms of "the possibility of clashing of state regulations and 
federal legislation, my recollection and experience is that this legislation 
is generally prompted by the state which is nearest to the fisheries 
27 ib id . 
28 Neasey argues that key framers, such as Inglis Clark and Barton rejected the concept 
of States "rights" and preferred the notion of State "interests"; J. M Neasey "Andrew 
Inglis Clark Senior and Australian Federalism" Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, 15, 2 (1969): 1-24. 
29 A.J. Harrison, "Management in the Context of the South-East Australian Fishery", 
Victorian Southern Rock Lobster Fishery Seminar, (June 1977). 
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concerned, and that it simply harmonizes with the local legislation on 
the subject." 30 Almost a century later the aim of harmonising 
legislation was the driving force behind intergovernmental fisheries 
arrangements within the OCS. 
Several delegates argued that enforcement of Commonwealth 
legislation would prove to be a prohibitive cost, and that the States were 
best suited to manage fisheries and enforce regulations. Deakin assured 
Forrest that the States would retain influence over fisheries, and made a 
typically pertinent and prescient observation on the implementation of 
the fisheries power: 
it is only a concurrent power which is proposed. Until the Federal 
Parliament chose to exercise it the power of control in the several 
states would absolutely remain. I have no doubt that the control 
of fisheries within territorial limits would remain with them for 
all time.31 
Although Deakin's comments indicate that he was unfamiliar or 
unconcerned over the result of R. v. Keyn in terms of the boundary of 
colonial/State limits, his views on concurrent responsibilities were 
important issues in the implementation of the OCS framework in 
fisheries. It is important to record the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 
1973, which the States opposed, had none the less specifically included 
"savings provisions" to maintain State legislative responsibilities over 
fisheries. 
The fisheries power, and particularly the meaning of the term "beyond 
3 Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian Convention Third 
Session (1898): 1859-60. 
31 Ibid, 1864-65. 
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territorial limits", has not been directly considered by the High Court, 
although several cases have raised issues related to the boundary 
between State and Commonwealth jurisdiction. 32 Individual 
members of the High Court have interpreted the power to mean 
"beyond the three mile territorial sea",33 although others have 
opposed such an interpretation, leading Zines to observe that "the 
correct construction of s 51 (x) in this regard seems at present 
unresolved". 34 The High Court's support for the fisheries 
arrangements established under the OCS in the Port Macdonnell case, 
and the Court's earlier support for State fisheries legislation maintained 
by the savings provisions in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 
in Pearce v. Florenca, have reduced the likelihood of the 
Commonwealth raising the issue of the extent of the fisheries power. 
The Constitutional Commission's Advisory Committee on the 
Distribution of Powers considered whether the Commonwealth should 
increase its responsibilities for fisheries. In its report to the 
Constitutional Commission the advisory Committee found Inlo 
dissatisfaction was expressed [from the Commonwealth or the States] in 
regard to the operation of the OCS." 35 While an attempt to broaden 
32 See particularly the High Court's deliberations in the Bonser and Raptis cases. 
Lindell, in particular, has criticised the line of reasoning in Bonser in terms of the 
construction of the fisheries power. 
33 L. Zines, The High Court and the Constitution 2nd ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 
1987):22. 
34 Ibid. See also J. Waugh, Australian Fisheries Law, Special Projects Series 1, the 
Offshore Areas, Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria Program (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Law School, 1988). 
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the reach of the Commonwealth fisheries power is unlikely at present it 
could occur if the Commonwealth felt that the States were acting 
outside the national interest. 36 Such action would be highly 
contentious. 
In addition to the fisheries power (Section 51 x) the Commonwealth's 
constitutional powers over the offshore have been supported by the 
external affairs power (Section 51 xxix). As the international law of the 
sea has developed the external affairs power has assumed considerable 
significance in reinforcing Commonwealth jurisdiction offshore. It was 
the external affairs power which was used as the anchor for the 
Commonwealth's Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973. The High 
Court's decision in the States' challenge to this legislation (the Seas 
and Submerged Lands case) was an important reinforcement of the 
external affairs power. 
Intergovernmental Interaction and The Emergence of Commonwealth 
Interest in Fisheries 
It was not until the early 1950s that the Commonwealth enacted 
legislation under the fisheries power of the constitution, although 
legislation concerned with whaling and regulating pollution of the 
marine environment was enacted in the 1930s. 37 Following federation 
the States maintained regulatory and administrative responsibilities for 
fisheries under diverse legislative and administrative arrangements. A 
35 Australia, Constitutional Commission Advisory Committee on the Distribution of 
Powers, . Report of the Advisory Committee on the Distribution of Powers, (Canberra: 
AGPS, 1987):185. 
36 G. Lindell, pers. comm. 7 December 1989. 
37 Beaches, Fishing Grounds and Sea Routes Protection Act 1932; Whaling Act 1935. 
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conference between the Commonwealth and the States convened in 
1907 reflected an early Commonwealth interest in the development of 
the Australian fisheries with "resolutions at this conference related to 
the scientific investigation and development of fisheries as 
Commonwealth responsibility". 38 Following this conference H. V. 
Dannevig was appointed Commonwealth Director of Fisheries and a 
research vessel was commissioned. 
The loss of this fisheries research vessel (the Endeavour) "with all 
hands" (including Dannevig) in the Southern Ocean in 1914, together 
with the pressures from World War I, contributed to a waning 
Commonwealth interest in direct involvement in fisheries 
management. 39 After the war there were several attempts to rekindle 
this interest. Following a Royal Commission on Victorian Fisheries 
and Fisheries Industries in 1919 the Premier of Victoria corresponded 
with Prime Minister Hughes, urging discussions with the 
Commonwealth, although little action followed. Increased interest in 
the potential of Australia's fishery resources led Prime Minister Bruce 
to convene a national fisheries conference which met in Melbourne in 
September 1927. 40 A second meeting of this conference was held in 
Sydney in 1929. 
The emphasis of these conferences was on the development of 
unexploited stocks, and the Commonwealth was encouraged to set up 
an organisation to aid this development. The depression meant that 
38 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives) 28/2/1952:565. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Australian Archives, CP 327/5. 
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this proposal lapsed, and with the outbreak of the Second World War 
attention focussed elsewhere. In the mid 1940s further conferences 
were held between the Commonwealth and the States on fisheries 
development in the post-war period. These meetings foreshadowed 
increased Commonwealth involvement in fisheries linked to post-war 
reconstruction with discussion focused on the establishment of a 
Commonwealth fisheries authority. 
A conference between the Commonwealth and State representatives in 
August 1945 reached agreement to establish such an authority, and in 
the following year it was located within the Commonwealth 
Department of Commerce and Agriculture, 41 to "undertak[e] a 
programme of management and development in the fishing 
industry.” 42  The Commonwealth Minister responsible for the 
fisheries authority was later to claim (in the second reading of the 
Fisheries Bill 1952) that "it had long been apparent that such a 
programme was required but it could not be effectively implemented 
without legislation."43 
The proposal to develop Commonwealth fisheries legislation had been 
discussed between Commonwealth and State fisheries officers in 
February 1947, resulting in agreement "that steps should be taken by the 
Commonwealth to enact legislation to cover fisheries beyond the three 
mile limit."'" According to Harrison, the division of responsibiliities 
41 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives) 28/2/1952, 565. 
See also Australian Archives A432/1946/1412. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
" Ibid. See also Australian Archives A432/1 68/3399, PT 1. 
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agreed at this meeting was very similar to the agreement over the 
fisheries component of the Offshore Constitutional Settlement reached 
in 1979.45 The fisheries officers agreed that a second meeting would be 
held following the enactment of this legislation. Draft legislation was 
prepared in 1948 but was delayed as "the whole question of the 
competence of States to enact fisheries legislation became the subject of 
international discussion."46 One factor contributing to this delay "was 
a request from the United Kingdom Government to withhold action 
pending a decision of the International Court in the British - 
Norwegian [North Sea] dispute."47 
Intergovernmental interaction over fisheries heightened in the 1950s in 
response to two emergent and related issues. The first issue centred on 
the growing international interest in high sea resources which led to 
the North Sea dispute. The second issue, and one which was of more 
immediate influence, were claims that existing State fisheries laws were 
failing to combat "lawlessness" among fishermen who were beginning 
to exploit deep sea trawl grounds off the east coast of Australia. Some 
doubt was expressed in State parliaments and in the press over the 
competence of State fisheries legislation, viewed as being restricted to 
within the "three mile limit". Commonwealth legislation would 
provide regulation of these new fisheries, and resolve the problem that 
Barton had foreshadowed during the fedearation debates. Obviously 
the expansion of Commonwealth powers to deal with domestic issues 
45 A. J. Harrison. "Marine living Resources Policy in Tasmania", in R. A. Herr, R. Hall 
and B.W Davis, (eds.) Issues in Australia's marine and Antarctic Policies, Public Policy 
Monograph, Department of Political Science, University of Tasmania (1982): 81. 
46 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives) 28/2/1952, 565. 
See also Australian Archives A432/1 68/3399, PT.1. 
47 Australian Archives A432/1 68/3399, PT 1. 
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would also enhance the need for strong national claims over the 
resources of the territorial sea and adjacent continental shelf. It was 
these imperatives which encouraged the Commonwealth to enact 
fisheries legislation. 
The Australian Fisheries Act 
McEwen, as Minister for Commerce and Agriculture introduced the 
Commonwealth's Fisheries Bill which received bi-partisan support in 
the House of Representatives. McEwen emphasised: 
that the government has no thought of encroaching in any way 
upon the sovereign rights of the States in their own areas. In 
implementation of a total pattern of fisheries practice and 
conservation, the Commonwealth legislation makes provision 
under which the administration of laws, both State and 
Commonwealth, in the waters contiguous to the States, could be 
supervised by State officials, to the degree necessary, under power 
delegated by the Commonwealth. 48 
After a relatively quick passage through the House of Representatives, 
the Fisheries Bill reached the Senate on the 5th March 1952. The Bill's 
reception in the Senate was in marked _contrast with the debate in the 
House; the legislation was subjected to close examination by a number 
of Senators. Senator Cormack, (Victoria, Liberal) prefacing his remarks 
with the observation that "Wills chamber is the Senate of the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth, and is charged specifically with the 
_defence of the rights of the States", observed "that the Commonwealth 
has no authority to delegate that [fisheries] power to the States, although 
the States may refer power to the Commonwealth in this matter." 49 
48 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives) 28/2/1952, 564- 
565. 
49 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (Senate) 5/3/52 841. 
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Senator McKenna, Opposition Senate Leader, referred to the generally 
accepted view on State powers and implied that Australia could avoid 
the current controversy being experienced in the United States over 
offshore jurisdiction. 
Very fortunately, in this country the constitutional position 
between the States and the Commonwealth is as clearly defined as 
it could be. There is no argument that the States enjoy control 
over their territorial waters which are generally recognised as 
being within three miles of the shore. There is no strictly fixed 
rule about that limit.50 
Although believing that the constitutional position was clearly defined 
McKenna pre-empted a controversy which was to continue well into 
the following two decades when he 
point[ed] out that the words 'territorial limits' are not clearly 
defined. It is not known with certainty where the State's 
jurisdiction ends and that of the Commonwealth begins. 51 
The Opposition highlighted the importance of resolving conflicts 
between Commonwealth and State powers so that "one authority will 
actively operate over the . . . territorial waters and those beyond."52 
McKenna saw this as a solution to duplication in the administration of 
Australian fisheries but also a way of avoiding the difficult issue of 
"determining lines of demarcation between State and Commonwealth 
authorities". 53 It was not until the late 1960s, however, with additional 
50 Ibid. 838. Emphasis added. 
51 Ibid. 840 
52 ibid . 
53 Ibid. 
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stresses brought on by the management of other marine resources, that 
the practical issue of the boundary of State and Commonwealth 
legislation was to be raised again. While the Fisheries Act 1952 gained 
assent following its passage through the Senate it was not proclaimed 
until 1955. The interregnum was due to the need to consult the States 
on the impact of this legislation on their operations. 
Establishing Intergovernmental Arrangements 
The need to formalise arrangements facilitating co-operation between 
the Commonwealth and States over fisheries was discussed at a 
Premiers' Conference in January 1946. A resolution from this 
conference agreed "that officers of the State and Commonwealth confer 
on the subject and report to the next conference of Commonwealth and 
State Ministers". 54 Prime Minister Chifley invited each of the State 
Premiers to consider mechanisms to enable consultation between 
Commonwealth and State Ministers and officials. The Prime Minister 
suggested "that the Australian Agriculture Council be the medium for 
exchanging views and for the development of a common policy."55 
Chifley also suggested that heads of Fisheries Departments might meet 
eitherwith the Standing Committee on Agriculture or in a separate 
conference. The response of the State Premiers indicated the desire to 
establish ministerial contact over fisheries although some States (New 
South Wales, Tasmania and Western Australia) doubted that the 
Australian Agricultural Council was the "appropriate body". 56 It was 
to take another twenty-two years before a separate ministerial council 
for fisheries was established. 
54 Australian Archives A609 105/14/3. 
55 Ibid. 
56 thid. 
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The first meeting of the Australian Fisheries Council (AFC), the 
ministerial council representing Commonwealth and State Ministers 
responsible for fisheries only took place in 1968, although there was 
agreement to establish the AFC after a conference of State and 
Commonwealth Ministers in 1960. State and Commonwealth officials 
had supported the creation of this council in 1958. Although 
Commonwealth had introduced its fisheries legislation fifteen years 
earlier, and the States had argued for a ministerial council and a more 
structured arrangement for meetings of officials from the late 1940s, the 
establishment of a specific intergovernmental council did not take place 
until increased pressures on the fishing industry enhanced the need for 
Commonwealth - State collaboration. 57 As Leach notes 
[relpresentatives of State fisheries departments had been coming 
together from time to time for some years, and in 1955, since 
fisheries had assumed an important place in the Australian 
economy they began to meet annually. They decided very quickly, 
however, that they could not get very far alone because every 
question involving policy matters had to be referred back to the 
Ministers in several states and sometimes to the Commonwealth 
government in Canberra as well. 58 
Leach took the view that "[w]ithin a few years the fisheries group will 
probably be making as significant a contribution to interstate 
cooperation in its area of concern as the Agricultural Council has been 
making in its own for over a quarter of a century." 59 The delay in the 
57 As discussed in the previous chapter this period coincided with the establishment of 
numerous intergovernmental linkages. See also R.J.K. Chapman, "Intergovernmental 
Forums and the Policy Process" in B. Galligan, (ed.) Comparative State Policies 
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1988): 99-121. 
58 R. H. Leach, Interstate Relations in Australia, (Lexington: University of Kentucky 
Press, 1965): 54. 
59 Ibid. 55. 
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"launching" of the AFC is indicative of the the complications arising 
from intergovernmental interaction in this area. Following the 
meeting of Ministers responsible for fisheries in 1961 the 
Commonwealth Minister for Primary industry referred the matter of a 
separate fisheries council to the Commonwealth government "but it 
was decided that this somewhat elaborate machinery [of Ministerial 
Council and Standing Committee] was not necessary at that time". 60 
Pressure to alter the ad-hoc relationship between the Commonwealth 
and the States increased from stresses incurred on fisheries managers as 
the result of a period of rapid development in the Australian fishing 
industry. The value of production increased over 30 percent between 
1961 and 1965-66 - from $31 712 000 to $41 794 000 in 1968 dollar values. 
Similar pressures for a further re-vamping of Commonwealth - State 
arrangements in fisheries occurred during a period of fairly rapid 
change in orientation of Australian fisheries in the late 1970s. In this 
latter period the imperatives associated with the declaration of an 
extended 200 mile Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) in November 1979 
became entangled with discussion over the OCS. 
The AFC and its Standing and Technical committees were to provide 
important forums for intergovernmental interaction in the 1970s and 
1980s, including much discussion on the implementation of the 
fisheries package of the OCS. It was at an AFC 'meeting in 1986, for 
example, that the Commonwealth announced that the fisheries 
component of the OCS would finally be implemented. By the early 
60 Minutes of the First Meeting of the Australian Fisherig Council and Standing 
Committee on Fisheries Agenda item 3.1, (Canberra: Department of Primary Industry, 
May 1969). 
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1990s the AFC had served an important function in facilitating the 
implementation of the OCS arrangements. Like most ministerial 
councils working on a consensus based decision making, the AFC has 
its limitations although it also encourages a flexible approach; New 
South Wales has stood outside the OCS arrangements although it has 
retained an active involvement in the AFC. 
As the Commonwealth became more active in direct fisheries 
management through licensing fishermen and fishing vessels, it was 
drawn into greater conflicts with the States. At the same time the 
Commonwealth was attracting a range of clients; - fishermen who 
looked to the Commonwealth for licences, or as a higher authority in 
the innumerable conflicts within the fishing industry. Becoming 
involved in day to day fisheries management activities meant that the 
Commonwealth developed close links with fishermen and fishing 
industry organisations as well as with State authorities. An important 
adjunct to the establishment of the AFC, described by Herr and Davis as 
the "major landmark prior to the OCS", 61 was the creation of the 
Australian Fishing Industry Council (AFIC), a national industry 
organisation. The need for AFIC reflected a practical issue raised by the 
increased involvement of the Commonwealth, the need to provide 
mechanisms for consultations with resource user groups. Herr and 
Davis argue that it was not surprising that ARC as a new industry body 
took on a national character, as this paralleled the establishment of the 
AFC. However, they comment that "what was somewhat unusual was 
that the Commonwealth's Department of Primary Industry took 
deliberate steps to foster the growth of the national industry body, in 
61  R. A. Herr and B. W. Davis, "The Impact of UNCLOS III on Australian Federalism'!, 
International Journal, XLI (Summer 1986): 684. 
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part to help legitimise the growing use of Commonwealth fisheries 
powers."62 
The important nexus created between government and industry 
concerning fisheries policy in the late 1960s was to continue into the 
1990s. The institutionalisation of industry organisations into the policy 
process was enhanced in the 1980s as a result of a major conference 
called by the Australian Fisheries Service in January 1985. This strategy 
had the strong support of the Commonwealth Minister for Primary 
Industry and was seen as a way of improving relations between industry 
and the Commonwealth government. Prior to this conference, which 
saw AFIC replaced by the National Fishing Industry Council (NFIC) and 
the Fishing Industry Policy Council of Australia (FIPCA), AFIC had 
provided the Commonwealth with a further vehicle by which it could 
increase its influence in fisheries policy. AFIC also benefited from the 
close relationship with the Commonwealth fisheries agency and this 
was reflected in the view that "Etlhe fragile local associations of rather 
parochial fishermen were given encouragement in the late 1960s to 
spread their wings and join the -respective State branches of the 
Australian Fishing Industry Council." 63 
In some States, notably Western Australia and South Australia, the 
AFIC organisation became influential, but in others (such as Tasmania 
or Victoria) AFIC did not displace the traditional industry organisations. 
In these States it was used as an alternative organisation by fishermen 
disaffected by decisions or lack of action by traditional industry groups. 
AFIC's influence at the State level therefore waxed and waned as a 
62 ibid. 
63 J. Cole, "Relationships with Industry and Government", Paper Presented to the 
Australian Fisheries Conference, (Canberra: January 1985). 
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result of the internecine political battles between fishermen and the 
tendency for the industry to fragment into smaller groups as a result of 
these internal conflicts. At the national level, however, the 
establishment of the AFIC can be seen as an attempt by the 
Commonwealth to enhance its claims to have a legitimate role as a 
fisheries manager, administrator or regulator, and its participation in 
the Australian Fisheries Council. 
The relationship between industry groups and different tiers of 
government in a federal system provides an important, yet neglected, 
aspect of intergovernmental interaction. The linkages between industry 
groups and government departments provide reinforcement of that tier 
of government's interest in the particular policy area. Client groups 
will be attracted to develop close relationships with their patrons, but 
this will not preclude them from using the opportunities provided by 
the federal system to "appeal to a higher authority". The presence of 
these groups adds a third party dimension to intergovernmental 
arrangements whose influence is generally understated in the 
literature.64 
The Commonwealth's increased influence, and the number of "client 
groups" it had attracted, was viewed with some concern and suspicion 
by State governments. This wariness ensured that uneasy collaboration 
ratfier than harmony characterised Australian fisheries policy making. 
The establishment of the relatively strong links through the AFC , and 
its Standing Committee - examples of Warhurst's rods of iron - 
64  But see N. Bankes, Co-operative Federalism: Third Parties and Intergovernmental 
Agreements and Arrangements in Canada and Australia" Alberta law review, XXIX, 4 
(1991): 792-838. 
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occurred just before the question of offshore jurisdiction was raised 
again. With most interest centred on oil and gas, issues specifically 
related to fisheries tended to be removed from centre stage and yet still 
had important influence. 
Technological developments in offshore oil and gas drilling continued 
to proceed, leading to increased interest in sedimentary basins in 
offshore areas. Drilling from self supporting platforms in shallow bays 
and inlets had been undertaken since the 1930s, but by the end of the 
Second World War that technology was developing to enable drilling in 
deeper water, further offshore. Given the potential of offshore 
sedimentary basins President Truman acted to declare sovereignty over 
these resources of the continental shelf. The Truman Proclamation 
"declared that the natural resources of the submerged lands beneath the 
sea bordering the coastline of the United States were to be under its 
exclusive jurisdiction and control". 65 Australia followed the lead of 
the United States by making a similar declaration to the Truman 
Proclamation in 1953, asserting control over activities exploiting the sea 
bed and sub-sea areas of the Australian continental shelf. 66 Australia 
proclaimed on the 11th September 1953 that it held "sovereign rights 
over the sea bed and subsoil of the continental shelf contiguous to the 
coasts of Australia and its Territories for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting the natural resources of that sea-bed and subsoil." 67 
65 J. D. Dennis, "Territorial Waters-Ownership and Control", Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law, 8, (1976): 244. 
66 R. D. Lumb, "The Law of the Sea and Australia's Future Maritime Policy' Pacific 
Community, 6 (Spring 1970): 64-72. 
67 Commonwealth Statutory Rules 1901-1956, V. 535d quoted by C. W. Harders, "The 
Sea-Bed", Federal Law Review, 3, (1969): 202. 
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International Treaties 
The Truman Proclamation (and similar actions by other coastal states 
such as Australia) encouraged the international community to consider 
the implications of such practices. Moves to establish a conference on 
the law of the sea gained momentum during the 1950s with the first 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) 
concluding in Geneva in 1958. Unlike an earlier conference in 1930, 
sponsored by the League of Nations, which produced draft texts on the 
territorial sea and contiguous zone which did not gain ratification, 68 
this conference produced agreement on four conventions which were 
progressively ratified and entered force in the 1960s. The United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea concluded in 1958, with the 
four conventions open for ratification. Australia ratified the 
Convention on the Continental shelf in 1963, with the convention 
needing twenty-two instruments of ratification to be lodged before it 
could enter force. The twenty-second state to ratify the convention (the 
United Kingdom) did so in April 1964 during, coincidentally, a major 
conference between the Commonwealth and the States on the issue of 
offshore jurisdiction and royalties. The Convention on the Continental 
Shelf entered force in 1965 and was to become a major influence on 
Australian policy and intergovernmental relations offshore. 
Australia was instrumental in gaining the inclusion of "living 
resources" in the conventions which emerged from the first- United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). 69 Although 
68 T.T.B. Koh, and S. Jakakumar, "The Negotiation Process of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the law of the Sea" in M. H. Nordquist, (ed.) United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary Vol. 1 (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoft,1985): 30. 
69  C. W. Harders, "The Sea-Bed", 202. 
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issues such as the extent of, and fishing rights within, the territorial sea 
were not resolved during UNCLOS I it was clear that, as a result of 
increased interest in marine resources, continued development of 
distant water fisheries would impact on coastal states such as Australia. 
The removal of the last of the "Macarthur lines" limiting the area of 
operation of the Japanese distant water fishing fleet in 1952 was an 
important influence on Australian decision making. The declaration of 
sovereignty over the continental shelf, the concern with including 
living resources in the United Nations law of the sea agenda and the 
passage of the Australian Fisheries Act 1952 all occurred soon after the 
restrictions on the Japanese fishing industry were lifted. 
The development of customary international law of the sea following 
UNCLOS I and the inconclusive Second Law of the Sea Conference 
(UNCLOS II), provide an important adjunct to attempts by the 
Commonwealth to assert jurisdiction over Australian coastal waters in 
the late 1960s and early. 1970s. The nexus between developments in the 
international law of the sea and Australian domestic policy making was 
to continue to influence intergovernmental relations throughout the 
1960s and 1970s. The period during which intense intergovernmental 
negotiations took place over the OCS occurred while the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was meeting 
between 1974 and 1982. It is telling that while Australian domestic 
conflicts over offshore jurisdiction played no real part in Australia's 
position at UNCLOS III meetings, with the exception that a "States 
Advisor" was included in the delegatiOns to the latter sessions of the 
conference, the States were well aware of the implications of the 
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developments in the international law of the sea in terms of domestic 
political and policy outcomes. 
Although UNCLOS II collapsed, Australia followed Britain, Canada the 
United States of America and New Zealand in extending its fishing 
zone to twelve miles." Australia extended its fishing zone to twelve 
miles in 1967. As Hardman indicates "no change was made in the three 
mile width of the territorial sea of the individual States and 
Territories". 71 A consensus that the States controlled fisheries 
activities in the territorial sea was to be shattered in the late 1960s. The 
way that existing arrangements were challenged is as interesting as the 
outcome which gave the Commonwealth the opportunity to reconsider 
the intergovernmental arrangements which had emerged in the decade 
and a half after the proclamation of the Australian Fisheries Act in 
1955. 
Given the uncertain status of jurisdiction offshore the High Court was 
eventually to become involved in adjudicating competing claims. The 
determination of, or the resolution of disputes over, the boundaries of 
offshore jurisdiction was seen by O'Connell as being linked to broader 
questions. He commented that "the way a court will approach the 
problem of maritime boundary will in the last resort depend upon its 
attitude to federalism as a theory and as a system of government." 72 
Judicial Review 
In 1969 the High Court brought down a decision in Bonser v. La 
70 D. J. Hardman, "Commonwealth-State Relationships in the Australian Fishing 
Industry", Public Administration, )(XVII, 2/3 (June -September 1969): 217. 
71 ibid. 
72 D. P. O'Connell, "Australian Coastal Jurisdiction", 291. 
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Macchia73  which was to provide an important stage in judicial review 
of contending Commonwealth - State claims over the offshore, and an 
important element prior to the eventual Seas and Submerged Lands 
case of 1975. Bonser v. La Macchia involved a prosecution for a breach 
of fisheries regulations issued under the Australian Fisheries Act 1952. 
The defendant 
challenged the constitutional validity of the Proclamation [of 
scheduled waters under which regulations could be made] firstly 
on the grounds that the constitutional power of the 
Commonwealth with respect to fisheries is limited to fisheries in 
waters within three nautical miles of the Australian coast. 
Implicitly this contained the argument that the States end at the 
low water mark. 74 
As it turned out the High Court read the fisheries power to mean that 
Commonwealth legislation was valid and dismissed the challenge. The 
interest in Bonser arises, however, less from the decision of the court 
but in the individual judgements in the case. O'Connell noted that "of 
the five justices who delivered judgements in Bonser v. La Macchia 
only two went into the question of State boundaries and that they, 
Barwick (C.J.) and Windeyer (J.) held that R v. Keyn had determined 
that the colonial boundaries lay at the low water mark." 75 O'Connell 
emphasised that Barwick and Windeyer had considered that nothing 
that had happened since had altered this position. 
Bonser's case caused a flurry of intergovernmental consultation as a 
result of the unexpected comments of Barwick and Windeyer. Most 
73 Bonser v. La Macchia(1969) 43 A.L.J.R 
74  D. P. O'Connell, 'The Commonwealth Fisheries Power and Bonser v. La Macchia", 
Adelaide Law Review, 3, 4 (August 1970): 500. 
75 Ibid. 504. 
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State officials and legal officers had expected the Court to uphold the 
Commonwealth's legislation as the case raised the very situation that 
the Commonwealth had used to argue for the Fisheries Act in the early 
1950s. The State fisheries and law officers had expected the case to be 
decided simply on the validity of the Commonwealth Act, not to 
involve, however laterally, the question of the boundary of State 
jurisdiction. 76 As a result of this unexpected intervention in 
Commonwealth - State arrangements, Bonser's case was discussed at 
the second meeting of the Standing Committee on Fisheries where a 
paper on the High Court's decision was tabled by the Commonwealth. 
The Commonwealth officials tended to down play the impact of 
Bonser's case. They "pointed out that no case had been argued and no 
decision had been handed down relating specifically to the inner 
boundaries of Proclaimed Waters and it should be remembered that the 
chief justice and one justice had expressed opinions in this regard."77 
State fisheries officers were less sanguine, some foreshadowing further 
challenges to the Commonwealth Fisheries Act within two years. 
Bonser v. La Macchia did raise important, and broader issues. In 
raising the question of the boundaries of the States, Barwick and 
Windeyer indirectly provided a trigger for the expansion of 
Commonwealth claims offshore. Not only did Bonser provide the 
Gorton government with support (admittedly in a tangential manner) 
for legislation attempting to declare Commonwealth jurisdiction from 
low water mark, but it reopened questions which were finally to be 
answered by the High Court in the Seas and Submerged Lands case. 
76 R Jennings, pers. comm. October 1989. 
77 Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Standing Committee on Fisheries, (Hobart, 
February 1970): 27. 
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Bonser illustrates how the High Court can have an influence in setting 
the boundaries for further intergovernmental interaction rather than 
resolving jurisdictional disputes. The case also shows how the 
intergovernmental agenda can be influenced by specific elements of 
judgements, rather than the court's formal decision. Thus this case is 
also useful in reinforcing the point that outcomes of such judicial 
decisions may be more complex, and in many cases more important, 
than a literal black letter interpretation would allow. 
Of more direct concern for the States was the increased uncertainty over 
offshore jurisdiction between the Commonwealth and States. The early 
1960s saw attempts to reduce this uncertainty in the face of rapid 
development of oil and gas exploration in Bass Strait. The discovery of 
commercial quantities of both oil and gas in early "wild-cat" drilling led 
to lengthy negotiations between- the Commonwealth and the States 
which concluded with the introduction of an intergovernmental 
agreement governing offshore oil and gas exploration and production. 
The development of, and reaction to, what became known as the 1967 
Petroleum Agreement is discussed in the following Chapter. 
Chapter Three 
Intergovernmental Agreements and Offshore Oil and Gas: 
The 1967 Petroleum Agreement 
In an attempt to encourage exploration for oil and gas, following 
discoveries of oil in far north-western Western Australia in the 1950s, 
the Commonwealth established a subsidy for oil and gas search. This 
subsidy encouraged large-scale exploration and saw seismic surveys 
being introduced to assess the relative prospectivity of broad areas. 
Although most of these surveys were concentrated on-shore, 
consultants to Broken Hill Proprietory (BHP) - Australia's largest 
mining and manaufacturing company - encouraged it to fund seismic 
-- work offshore in the Gippsland Basin in Bass Strait. 1 
The discovery of extensive hydrocarbons reserves in Bass Strait in the 
mid 1960s was particularly influential in sharpening the 
Commonwealth's interest in the question of offshore jurisdiction 2 
1 BHP hired Lewis Weeks, who had worked for Standard Oil in the USA, as a 
consultant to oversee their interets in the oil search. Weeks reportedly told the BHP 
directors that their on-shore search had little liklihood of success, and if they were 
serious they should be "prepared to get their feet wet". See A.Trengove, What's Good 
for Australia ...: The Story of BHP, (Stanmore: Cassell Australia, 1975) and R. 
Wilkinson, A Thirst for Burning: The Story Of Australia's 011 Industry, (Sydney: 
David Ell Press, 1983). 
2 R. Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore, Intergovernmental Relations in 
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although it lacked sufficient legislative power to influence the 
allocation of the first offshore exploration permits. In the absence of 
relevant Commonwealth legislation the original tenements for the Bass 
Strait region were granted by the South Australian, Tasmanian and 
Victorian governments. 3 The potential economic return from 
offshore oil and gas also attracted the interest of the State governments. 
The uncertainty of the constitutional position, particularly following 
the American experience and the discoveries in Bass Strait, encouraged 
the Commonwealth and State governments to establish an 
administrative framework which would facilitate and encourage the 
exploration of, and production from, offshore leases. 
A determined attempt was made by both the Commonwealth and the 
States not to pre-empt a constitutional challenge over offshore 
jurisdiction. As a dispute over jurisdiction may have disrupted the 
emerging exploration programme, negotiations began in 1962 over such 
a framework. These negotiations concluded with the implementation 
of what became known as the "Petroleum Agreement" in 1967. The 
extensive round of intergovernmental interaction leading to the 1967 
Agreement was greatly influenced by two, related, factors. The first, and 
most immediate, was the effect of the unresolved issue of constitutional 
power in the territorial sea and the second was the ratification, and 
Victoria Programme, (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Law School, 1985). 
3 C. H. Leigh, "Oil and Natural Gas Developments in the Bass Strait Area, 
Australia", Geography, 55, (1970): 221-223. Interestingly the original tenement granted 
to the ESSO-BHP joint venturers, prior to later revocation of areas in the Otway and 
Bass basins, comprised 64,000 square miles (158,000 km2)-the total area of Bass Strait. 
An indication of the fact that the resource developments had outstripped legislative 
change is that only Victoria had a specific "undersea resources" legislation; M. 
Haward, "The Australian Offshore Constitutional 'Settlement", Marine Policy, 13, 4, 
(October 1989): 334-348. 
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entering into force, of the United Nations Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. 
In early 1962 Sir Garfield Barwick, then Commonwealth Attorney - 
General, prepared an opinion acknowledging the rights of the States in 
the territorial sea. The States saw the issue of constitutional powers as 
important and prepared to raise the issue at a meeting of the Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG) later in the year. In March 
1963, following the meeting of SCAG, the Commonwealth 
parliamentary draftsman forwarded material to Barwick regarding the 
question of jurisdiction. The Victorian and Queensland State 
governments corresponded with the Commonwealth Attorney - 
General, and reiterated their claims over the offshore areas. An 
opinion prepared by A.L. Bennett Q.C. for the Queensland government 
was forwarded to Barwick who in turn passed it to the Victorian 
Attorney-General. The Bennett opinion proposed using Section 51 
(xxxviii) of the Australian constitution as a means of retaining State 
power4 in the event of a challenge to State jurisdiction - a measure to 
be resurrected fifteen years later and underpin the OCS through the 
_Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cwth). 
Following the exchange of legal opinion, there was greater impetus 
toward an agreement between the Commonwealth and the States over 
arrangements for the administration of offshore oil and gas. A 
Commonwealth and State conference was scheduled for mid April 1964 
to discuss these matters. This meeting, convened by the New South 
Wales Minister for Mines between the 16th and 17th April 1964, 
involved the State Ministers for Mines, with legal and technical 
4 Archives Office of Tasmania Solicitor-General's Department, SGD 40, 1 (1435/6). 
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advisors (including State Solicitors-General) present. The first day of 
the conference saw the States exchanging information and attempting 
to establish a consensus position prior to meeting with Commonwealth 
ministers. On the 17th of April the conference met with the 
Commonwealth Minister for national development (Sir William 
Spooner) and the newly appointed Commonwealth Attorney-General 
(Mr Billie Snedden). 
The State Ministers and officials discussed the issues of jurisdiction in 
the territorial sea and over the continental shelf. Sir Henry Winneke 
(the Victorian Solicitor-General) pointed out existing Commonwealth 
powers and drew attention to the importance of the treatment of 
inconsistency between Commonwealth and State laws and raised the 
issues of the nexus with the "peace order and good government" 
clauses of State constitutions. 5 The delegates discussed the problems 
of a lack of clearly defined property rights in the continental shelf, and 
the complex situation regarding royalties which could be legally seen as 
"a duty of customs and excise". The issue of excise was to surface again 
in the 1970s and 1980s, _ initially as the means by which the 
Commonwealth was able to increase its share of oil and gas revenues 
which triggered, a few years later, an attempt by Victoria to circumvent 
the effects of this distortion to the pattern of revenue sharing. The 
question of the sharing of oil and gas• royalties was one of the major 
concerns of the meeting in April 1964, and is one of the few times 
where this issue was discussed in two and half decades of 
intergovernmental negotiation over offshore oil and gas. 
5 Memo from D.M. Chambers to Attorney General 21/4/64 Archives Office of 
Tasmania Solicitor-General Department files: SGD 40,1 (1435/6). 
104 
The States had originally argued that since they claimed jurisdiction 
over offshore minerals and petroleum they were entitled to all the 
royalties, in the same manner that onshore mining was conducted. 
One delegate informed the rest of the meeting that "he had heard 
unofficially that day. . . that the Commonwealth would be suggesting 
that royalties were to be shared on an equal basis". 6 The State 
Ministers and officials agreed that, the royalty question apart, some 
Commonwealth legislation was necessary to give security of title to 
offshore explorers. This response reflects the obvious fear that proposed 
drilling programmes in Bass Strait would be forestalled if this security 
could not be guaranteed. The royalty issue was less easily settled. The 
Tasmanian Solicitor-General "suggested that . . . the states ought to 
prepare themselves by considering what weapons, if any that they held 
when it came to a matter of hard bargaining." 7 The conference 
adjourned until the following day to meet the Commonwealth 
representatives. 
Sir William Spooner, the Commonwealth Minister for National 
Development, informed the States that - the issue of offshore mining 
had been to federal cabinet and that the Commonwealth proposed that 
an agreement with the States would be an appropriate instrument to 
resolve the matter. He said the Commonwealth's proposals "were 
motivated by a desire to promote certainty and celerity and to avoid 
litigation". 8 The Commonwealth's position shifted somewhat. An 
exchange between Spooner and Mr Rylah (the Victorian Attorney- 
7 6 The source of the information is not identified in the Chambers memo. Archives 
Office of Tasmania SGD 40,1 (1435/6). 
7 Chambers memo, Archives Office of Tasmania SGD 40,1 (1435/6). 
8 ibid. 
105 
General) intimated that Sir Garfield Barwick had modified his opinion 
over the extent to which the States held rights in the territorial sea. 9 
The form of the proposed intergovernmental agreement was discussed 
at this meeting. The consensus was that the administration of any 
legislation should be undertaken by the States, with royalties from 
production shared between the States and the Commonwealth. South 
Australia criticised the Commonwealth proposals with Sir Lye11 
McEwan asking "legalities aside, where was the business justification 
for the Commonwealth claiming half the royalties when the states 
would be doing all the administration?" 10 This argument, supported 
by the Victorian delegates Rylah and Winneke,11 was to continue to be 
the major point of dispute in negotiations over the next two and a half 
years. 
As a result of the States' opposition to the revenue sharing proposal, a 
revision of the Commonwealth's proposals was prepared and 
submitted to the State delegates in the afternoon of the 17th April 1964. 
A draft intergovernmental agreement over offshore mining and 
petroleum issues was also discussed, although criticised by Winneke as 
"attempting to legislate the States out of the territorial sea." A report of 
the meeting published by the Age: 
9  Sir Garfield Barwick, a former Liberal-Country Party coalition Attorney-General 
and Minister for External Affairs was appointed . to the High Court in 1964 amidst some 
controversy over his handling of the external affairs portfolio. See B. Galligan, The 
Politics of the High Court (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1987): 194. 
I° Chambers memo, Archives Office of Tasmania SGD 40,1 (1435/6) 
11 As an aside, both Ryah and Winnecke continued to play important roles in the 
ongoing discussions over the offshore. In the mid to late 1970s each was involved in the 
early negotiations over the OCS. 
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recognized that the Commonwealth and the States had conflicting 
constitutional claims to the offshore sea-bed and were anxious to 
avoid any action that would induce litigation. . . . A royalty of 10 
per cent of value at well head would apply, with royalties to be 
shared on an agreed reasonable basis. 12 
Although failing to gain agreement over the form of the 
intergovernmental arrangement, or over the contentious issue of 
revenue sharing related to the mode of royalty payments, the April 1964 
meeting was, none the less, significant. The Tasmanian Solicitor-
General informed his Attorney-General (Mr Roy Fagan) that "no formal 
agreement has yet been reached between the States and the 
Commonwealth but all the States felt after the conference was 
concluded that a satisfactory arrangement with the Commonwealth was 
possible." 13 
The process to establish an intergovernmental agreement over offshore 
petroleum continued. The matter was raised at the Premiers' 
Conference of June 1965 which resulted in agreement that there should 
be a legislative base for the arrangement. Following the Premiers' 
Conference it was expected that draft bills would be presented to the 
Commonwealth parliament in the budget session of 1965. 14 
Statements regarding this legislation, giving the broad parameters of the 
Petroleum Agreement as well as the initial design of the arrangement, 
were presented to all State and the Commonwealth parliaments in 
November 1965. 15 Mr Fairbairn (Commonwealth Minister for 
National Development) released a Ministerial statement to the House 
12 Age "Offshore Oil Search Code to be Drafted" 18 April 1964. 
13 Chambers memo, Archives Office of Tasmania SGD 40,1 (1435/6). 
14 Australian 2 August 1965. 
15 R. D. Lumb, The Offshore Petroleum Agreement and Legislation", Australian Law 
Journal, 41, (February 1968): 453. 
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of Representatives on the 16th November 1965 in which he announced 
that "Mlle Governments of the Commonwealth and of the Australian 
States have reached agreement on a system of legislation to control and 
safeguard the exploration for and exploitation of the petroleum 
resources in Australian offshore areas." 16 
Fairbairn's statement indicates that one aim of the agreement was to 
give certainty to titles acquired by companies engaged in offshore oil 
search, and at the same time "enable constitutional issues to be put on 
one side, thus avoiding constitutional litigation of the kind that has 
been going on in the United States for many years." 17 The statement 
concluded by announcing that legislation embodying the agreement 
"would be brought down in the next Session of Parliament."18 The 
Opposition's interest in the proposed scheme became apparent as 
Deputy - Opposition Leader Whitlam questioned the Minister over the 
position of territorial limits in the Gulf of Carpentaria, the Gulf of St. 
Vincent, Spencer Gulf and Bass Strait. The drawing of boundaries in 
the Gulf of St Vincent was to be considered in legal action in the High 
Court in the 1970s-with argument in Raptis' case in 1977 central to this 
issue. 19 
Notwithstanding the desire of Fairbairn, and presumably the 
Commonwealth government, to introduce the necessary legislation in 
the first half of 1966, the proposed legislation implementing the 
Petroleum Agreement was subject to another round of meetings with 
16 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives) 16/11/1965, 
2741. 
17 ibid . 
18 ibid . 
19 Raptis, A and Son v South Australia (1977) 51 A.L.J.R. 637. 
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the States in late 1966 and early 1967. These meetings concerned the 
final balance in the sharing of royalty payments, with consensus 
eventually reached enabling the 1967 Petroleum Agreement to be 
ratified by Commonwealth and the States. The Commonwealth 
accepted the States' view that they should have a majority share of the 
royalty revenue, moving from its original position of equal shares. 
Agreement with the States was hastened by the inclusion of a specific 
clause which stated that the agreement in no way derogated 
jurisdictional claims of either the Commonwealth or the States. 
The 1967 agreement (see Appendix One) went to considerable lengths, 
however, to avoid raising these questions of sovereignty or 
jurisdiction. 20 Reid, with some justification, argues that it was an 
"agreement to postpone rather than to resolve the outstanding 
constitutional issues", describing the 1967 Agreement as a . "substantial 
achievement" in co-operative federalism inspired by "pragmatic 
goodwill". 21 These elements, the basis of the negotiations between the 
Commonwealth and the States, were evident in the preamble to the 
agreement. 22 Reid has argued that that the Petroleum Agreement was 
20 The full title of this arrangement was An Agreement Relating to the Exploration of 
and Exploitation of the Petroleum Resources and Certain Other Resources of the 
Continental Shelf of Australia and Certain other Submerged Lands (Canberra: 
Commonwealth Government Printing Office, 1967). 
21 P C Reid "Commonwealth-State Relations Offshore Mining . and Petroleum 
Legislation; Recent Developments: An Historic Milestone or Millstone?" Australian 
Mining and Petroleum Law Journal, 2, 2 (1980): 60. 
22 The Preamble states "The Governments of the Commonwealth and the States have 
decided, in the national interest, that, without raising questions concerning, and without 
derogating from, their respective constitutional powers, they should co-operate for the 
purposes of ensuring the legal effectiveness of authorities to explore for, or exploit, the 
petroleum resources of those submerged lands". Quoted by Reid, "Commonwealth-State 
Relations Offshore Mining": 60. 
109 
"first a method of granting exploration and production titles which 
would be valid regardless of any limitations on the constitutional 
powers of the parties and, second, a uniform legal regime governing 
offshore petroleum operations." 23 
This regime was established by declaring what were to become known 
as "adjacent areas" offshore from each State. The States were to be 
responsible for the operation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) 
legislation in the adjacent areas. The mechanism ensuring uniformity 
within the regime involved establishing "mirror legislation", (identical 
Commonwealth and State legislation which applied equally to each 
adjacent area) to govern exploration and production operations. This 
legislation was designed so that: 
[w]hile the Commonwealth legislation applied to all such adjacent 
areas, each State's legislation applied to the one area adjacent to its 
land boundaries. Thus two statutes, one Commonwealth and one 
State, applied to each adjacent area, and there could be no conflict 
provided the two pikes of legislation remained the same, and it 
was agreed that they would remain the same since amendments 
could only be made by unanimous consent. 24 
_ . 
Harders claimed that "the legislative scheme [for the 1967 Petroleum 
Agreement] that all seven Australian Parliaments have adopted 
provides a most interesting illustration of federalism at work". 25 The 
lengthy period of negotiation over revenue sharing arrangements and 
the complex mechanics needed to implement the mirror legislation 
underpinning the agreement, indicate the efforts involved in 
developing and implementing the agreement. The Senate Select 
23 ibid. 
24 ib id . 
25 C. W. Harders, "Australian Offshore Petroleum Legislation", 428 
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Committee on Offshore Petroleum Resources was to note that "the 
drafting of the provisions of the legislation was said to have taken 27 
months and involved the preparation of about 100 drafts".26 Much of 
this drafting was directed at designing legislation which would conform 
to the desire of all parties not to pre-empt a major constitutional 
dispute. 
It seems clear that the desire to maintain the impetus of offshore oil 
exploration, particularly in Bass Strait, by providing security of title for 
the companies engaging in that search, provided a major impetus for 
completing the 1967 Agreement. Harders commented that although "it 
is not possible to exclude completely the possibility of a challenge being 
made to the constitutional validity of either the Commonwealth 
legislation or the legislation of the state . . . . [i]t is difficult to imagine 
circumstances in which a purpose would be served by taking a 
constitutional objection to the validity of one Act since the liability or 
obligation would remain under the other Act."27 The device of mirror 
legislation was, in addition to any intergovernmental imperatives, thus 
able to satisfy the concerns of exploration companies for security of title. 
There is considerable evidence to support the view that the driving 
force behind the 1967 Petroleum agreement was the desire by all 
governments to maintain the interest in offshore oil search. The 
agreement aimed to facilitate the allocation of exploration titles and 
production licences, following practice in the United Kingdom and the 
United States where support for exploration for offshore oil was seen as 
26 The Senate Select Committee on Offshore Petroleum Resources, (Interim Report 
(Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printing Office, September 1970):, 94. 
27 Ibid. 427. 
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a major element of policy. 28 The oil industry argued, and continued to 
maintain throughout the 1970s, that investment in the offshore was 
dependent on resolving the issues of jurisdiction.29 In the 1980s the 
major dispute between government and industry over oil and gas 
policy centred on taxation regimes; indicative of later stages in policy 
development as the Commonwealth government attempted to increase 
returns from these developments. 30 
Esso Australia, the joint venturer with BHP in the Bass Strait fields, 
"accepted that the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act has effectively 
eliminated any risk that an offshore permit or license issued by either a 
State or the Commonwealth would be held invalid as an infringement 
of the authority or proprietary rights of the other."31 The oil industry • 
was also concerned over the implications of offshore industries for the 
"general body of Australian law" concerning such aspects as workers 
compensation, criminal law, income tax law. 32 The arrangements 
28 A brief survey of the issues arising from offshore oil development in the 1960s in the 
U. S. A. is given by J.M. Murphy with M.H. Belsky "OCS Development: A New Law and 
a New Beginning", Coastal Zone Management Journal, 7, 2-3-4, (1980): 297-337; J.G. 
Liverman, "Without Precedent: The Development of North Sea Oil Policy", Public 
Administration, 60, (1982): 451-469 provides a similarly useful summary of 
developments in the United Kingdom. 
29 J. H. Hamlin, Comment on Lumb "Sovereignty and Jurisdiction Over Australian 
Coastal Waters" Australian Law Journal, 43, (October 1969): 445. 
30 See M. Haward, "The Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement" Marine 
Policy, 13, 4 (October 1989): 335. The desire to expand the economic rent from offshore 
oil and gas production is a common feature of the development of oil and gas regimes in 
various countries. See, for example Liverman, "Without Precedent: The 
Development of North Sea Oil Policy": C. Hunt, The Offshore Petroleum Regimes of 
Canada and Australia, (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1989); M 
Haward, "Intergovernmental Relations and Offshore Resources Policy in Australia and 
Canada", Australian - Canadian Studies, 9, 1&2 (1991): 35-51. 
31 J. H. Hamlin, Comment on Lumb "Sovereignty and Jurisdiction Over Australian 
Coastal Waters": 445. 
32 ibid. 
v.% 
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embodied in the 1967 Agreement where the operation of day-to-day 
activity was administered under laws appropriate to the State in whose 
adjacent area the activity was taking place was accepted by the industry 
as "good sense".33 
The 1967 Petroleum Agreement relied upon all parties giving effect "to 
the true meaning and spirit thereof"34 of this intergovernmental 
arrangement. This provided stresses in subsequent years as the 
Commonwealth moved to unilaterally assert jurisdiction from low 
water mark, affecting oil and gas arrangements. Given the importance 
of the 1967 Petroleum Agreement in developing an intergovernmental 
regime for offshore oil and gas it is a useful exercise to consider what it 
did not attempt to do. It sidestepped the resolution of competing 
jurisdictional claims over the offshore and did not establish "legal 
relationships justiciable in a Court of Law". 35 In addition the 
Commonwealth and State governments agreed to: 
33 Commonwealth of Australia, "Offshore Minerals other than Petroleum" 
Parliamentary Paper 89, 1970. The issue of the management of "offshore minerals other 
_than petroleum" was discussed several times during the negotiation over the 1967 
Petroleum Agreement. Given the need to develop legal and administrative frameworks 
for petroleum exploration and production the development of such policy tended to be 
placed on the "back burner". Several meetings were held in the late 1960s, a list of 
which, together with correspondence and documents relating to the Commonwealth - 
State discussions was released as a Parliamentary Paper of the Commonwealth 
Parliament in 1970. Given the lack of pressing demand for exploration titles the 
foreshadowed intergovernmental regime did not eventuate. The attempt to conclude a 
similar arrangement for offshore minerals within the ambit of the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement in the late 1970s also failed to eventuate with 
Commonwealth legislation (without complementary State Acts) being proclaimed in 
February 1990. 
34 Ibid. 
35 1967 Petroleum Agreement S26, quoted in A. G. Lang, and M. Cronunelin, Australian 
Mining and Petroleum Laws (Sydney: Butterworths, 1979): 227. 
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refrain from amending such legislation except in accordance with a 
prior agreement to do so. In addition, the governments agreed not 
to make, amend or repeal regulations under the legislation except 
in accordance with prior agreement to do so. 36 
Such an accommodation became more difficult to maintain as the 
Commonwealth was able to reinforce its claims offshore as a result of a 
number of events. The decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in the 
BC Offshore Oil Reference in 1967 and the comments of Justices 
Barwick and Windeyer in Bonser v La Macchia in 1969 placed stress on 
the Petroleum Agreement. Given the lack of any obvious 
counterfactual it is difficult to predict what would have occurred if the 
BC Offshore Oil Reference had been made sooner or if the substantial 
reserves in Bass Strait had been discovered earlier. In the former case it 
is likely that the Commonwealth would have struck a harder bargain, 
while in the latter the States, initially at least, would have been in a 
stronger position in terms of revenue-sharing arrangements. In any 
event neither hypothetical situation would have necessarily avoided 
the need for an agreement nor precluded the lengthy battles witnessed 
during the OCS negotiations.37 
The 1967 Petroleum Agreement epitomised to Sawer "the machinery of 
co-operative federalism" where the "States [play] the main part in legal 
regulation and administration and the Commonwealth [serves] to co-
ordinate inquiry, general policy formulation and standard setting, and 
specifying budget priorities by direct conditional grants or by influencing 
State decisions in the spending field in other ways."38 The relative 
36 ibid . 
37 Such considerations were also reflected in the interaction over offshore oil and gas in 
Atlantic Canada in the 1980s. 
38 G. Sawer "Conservation and the Law" in A.B. Costin and H. F. Frith (eds.) 
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strengths of the Commonwealth and States in the bargaining leading to 
the agreement was succinctly expressed by Sawer in evidence to the 
Senate Select Committee on Offshore Petroleum Resources. He viewed 
that: 
[s]o long as the Commonwealth and the States have reasonably 
comparable bargaining positions, there is no peril to federalism in 
the arrangement of this kind. Such bargaining equality is amply 
secured in relation 'to the present subject [the 1967 Agreement], 
because the Commonwealth derives substantial bargaining 
strengths from its claims to the control of the Continental Shelf 
under the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, whereas the 
States have substantial bargaining power deriving from their 
claims to the first three miles of the territorial sea and the control 
of shore installations and subsequent treatment and distribution 
on shore.39 
In spite of Sawer's claim that the States had sufficient resources to 
ensure a bargain was concluded, O'Connell returned to the 
fundamental complication to this accommodation: 
Considering the total national interest one wonders if the finding 
of the United States Supreme Court that the federal government 
has paramount rights in the offshore area is not the cogent policy 
consideration for Australia. At the same time it must be 
recognized that the United States for internal political reasons has 
had to hand the territorial sea back to the States and that pressure 
is mounting in Canada to do the same with respect to the 
Provinces. The Australian Constitution might not prove 
amenable to such a political solution, so that a judicial finding that 
the territorial sea is extraterritorial to either or both States and 
Commonwealth might prove irrevocable. Until these 
conundrums are resolved a national maritime policy will be 
Conservation, rev. ed. (Ringwood, Penguin 1974) quoted by D. E. Fisher, Environmental 
Law in Australia, (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980): 30. 
39 Parliament of Australia Report of the Senate Select Committee on Offshore 
Resources, 180. 
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difficult to formulate. 40 
Not surprisingly, given its significance in terms of offshore resources 
policy and its practical impacts on Australian federalism, the 1967 
Petroleum agreement has been analysed in considerable depth. 41 It 
was described in the 1970s as the most complex and innovative 
intergovernmental agreement yet negotiated: "the co-operative 
agreement which was signed in 1967 attempted to make provision for 
the responsibilities, needs and policies of all governments, in a way 
unique not only in the history of Australian federalism, but also in the 
settlement of the problem of jurisdiction over the offshore areas in 
federations elsewhere." 42 
The legislative design and administrative arrangements established 
40 D.P. O'Connell 'Comment on Lumb 'Sovereignty and Jurisdiction' Australian Law 
Journal, 43 (October 1969): 443. 
41 See for example R. D. Lumb, 'The Offshore Petroleum Agreement and Legislation", 
Australian Law Journal 41, (February 1968); R. D. Lumb, The Law of the Sea and 
Australian Offshore Areas (2nd ed) (St Lucia, University of Queensland Press), 1978; C. 
W. Harders, "Australian Offshore Petroleum Legislation: A Survey of its 
Constitutional Background and its Federal Features", Melbourne University Law 
Review, 6 (September 1968); C. Wells, (Saunders) Co-operative Federalism in 
Australia, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis University of Melbourne 1975; P. C. Reid, 
"Commonwealth-State Relations Offshore Mining and Petroleum Legislation; Recent 
Developments: An Historic Milestone or Millstone?" Australian Mining and Petroleum 
Law Journal, 2, 2 (1980); R. Cullen, Australian . Federalism Offshore, 
Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria Programme, (Melbourne, University of 
Melbourne Law School) 1985; R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: The Australian and 
Canadian Offshore Disputes, (Sydney: Federation Press, 1990); M. Haward, "The 
Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement", Marine Policy, 13, 4, (October 1989): 
334-348. 
42 C. Wells, (Saunders) Co-operative Federalism in Australia, Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis University of Melbourne 1975, 315. See also C. W. Harders, "Australian 
Offshore Petroleum Legislation: A Survey of its Constitutional Background and its 
Federal Features", Melbourne University Law Review, 6 (September 1968): 415-428. 
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under the agreement were undoubtedly unique, although it is also clear 
that actors close to the process saw the agreement as part of a continuing 
process of intergovernmental co-operation within the Australian 
federal system. The Report from the Senate Select Committee on 
Offshore Resources indictated that: 
the legislation was stressed by several witnesses to be a remarkable 
example of co-operative federalism. The Committee accepts that it 
is probably the most striking indication of co-operative action in a 
complex field that Australia has witnessed. It is the latest in a long 
line of legislative and administrative compromises which the 
states and the commonwealth have created in a mutual agreement 
as to what serves the national interest in order to overcome the 
legal hurdles which the Constitution establishes.43 
A similar view was expressed in The Australian Law Journal, which 
observed that: 
Nile Petroleum (Submerged Lands) legislation of both 
Commonwealth and States, passed in 1967, is a good example of 
cooperative federalism. Adaptation to such new needs in Australia 
is dependent on political and administrative ingenuity and 
cooperation, in view of the freezing of judicial doctrine recently 
commented on, and the unwillingness of electors to support 
drastic formal changes in constitutional structure. The long 
litigation in the United States over constitutional competence may 
well be avoided. Some criticism has been made of the wide powers 
vested in the State authorities over the granting of licenses but the 
commonwealth retains control under its constitutional powers by 
virtue of an intergovernmental agreement signed before the 
legislation was introduced. It would seem that no State would act 
contrary to it because of the risk of re-opening the whole• 
constitutional question." 
The extent to which either the States or the Commonwealth were able 
43 Ibid. 179. 
44 Anon. "Comment on Lumb 'Sovereignty and Jurisdiction Over Australian Coastal 
Waters" Australian Law Journal, 43, (October 1969): 439 
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to develop independent policy positions without challenging the 
agreement raised further issues. Lumb noted that: 
the agreement embodying the principles on which the legislation 
is founded is dated 16th October 1967 - two days before the Bills 
were presented in the Parliaments. It is an intergovernmental 
agreement, signed, as has been said, by the Prime Minister and all 
the Premiers on behalf of their Governments. Clause 26 of the 
Agreement acknowledges that the agreement is not intended\to 
create a legal relationship justiciable in a court of law, but declare 
that the agreement shall be construed and given effect to by the 
Parties in all respects according to the true meaning and spirit 
thereof. It is clear that this clause has the specific effect of 
excluding the agreement from the class of agreements which 
would, according to the principles of contract, be given effect to by a 
court of law.45 
Such legal formalities were to prove fortuitous in the mid 1970s with 
the intergovernmental issues arising from the Seas and Submerged 
Lands case. As Harders commented: 
[l]egislative co-operation is necessarily part and parcel of the 
Australian federal system and measures adopted with regard to 
offshore petroleum can, I suggest, be fairly regarded as a 
continuation and _development of the process. I say 
"development" because, on close analysis, the offshore petroleum 
scheme differs in certain respects, I believe, from what has gone 
before.46 
The influential report of the Senate Select Committee on Offshore 
Resources, released in late 1971, 47 saw the 1967 Agreement as an 
important outcome of intergovernmental co-operation. This Select 
Committee was established in November 1967 in response to issues 
45 R. D. Lumb, 'The Offshore Petroleum Agreement" 453-454 (emphasis added). 
46 C. W. Harders, "Australian Offshore Petroleum Legislation", 417. 
47 Parliament of Australia, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Offshore 
Resources, Vol. One - Report, (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printing -Office, 
1972). 
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arising from the passage of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Bill 
1967 through the Commonwealth Parliament.48 The Committee's 
terms of reference included examining whether the legislation 
establishing the 1967 Agreement was consistent with the constitutional 
responsibilities of the Commonwealth and the States; whether the 
system of administration established by the 1967 Agreement was the 
most effective way of utilising the offshore petroleum resources; 
whether the legislation made provision for free interstate trade in gas 
and oil; whether the level of royalties was in the national interest; 
whether permit areas granted under the legislation were too large; 
whether proper provision is made relating to permit renewals; and the 
provisions of the legislation generally. 49 Prior to the Committee 
bringing down its final report it released an interim report in September 
1970 "having regard [in part] to the recent introduction in the House of 
representatives of a Bill for an Act relating to the Territorial Sea and 
certain other Waters of the Sea and to the Continental Shelf, the 
committee believes that it would be recreant in its duty if it did not 
report as soon as it was able to do so." 50 
The interim report criticised several areas of the 1967 agreement 
48  The Select Committee, under various chairmen, met for three and a half years and 
took evidence from eighty four witnesses. It had been established when the ALP 
attempted to refer the package of Bills associated with the 1967 agreement to a select 
committee. An amendment to this effect was lost, but the Government accepted a 
compromise suggested by Senator Wright (Tasmania) that after the passage of the Bills 
was completed a select committee be set up to inquire into and report upon offshore 
Petroleum resources in Australia. Parliament of Australia .Report of the Senate Select 
Committee on Offshore Resources: (Vol. One - Report): 1. • 
49 This paragraph is derived from the terms of reference of the Report of the Senate 
Select Committee on Offshore Resources: 2. 
50 The Senate Select Committee on Offshore Petroleum Resources, Interim Report 
(September 1970): 4. 
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including the presentations of completed intergovernmental 
agreements as "faits-accomplis" to the Parliaments of Australia. The 
design of the administrative arrangements, as much as the structure of 
the legislation, led to considerable criticism from commentators such as 
Professors Sawer, Richardson, Cowen and Reid regarding the 
implications for such an arrangement on the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility. 51 While the Select Committee found, inter alia, that 
the constitutional basis of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) 
legislation is inconsistent with what should be the proper constitutional 
relationship between the parliament and the executive, it concluded 
that the legislation was not "inconsistent with the 'proper 
responsibilities' of the Commonwealth and the States because, as a 
result of the decision to avoid litigation which would have resolved the 
matter, it cannot say what is the measure of those proper constitutional 
responsibilities." 52 In order to resolve the "proper constitutional 
responsibilities" one of the Select Committee's specific 
recommendations was "[Oat the Commonwealth do not leave 
unresolved and uncertain the extent of State and Commonwealth 
authority in the territorial sea bed and the Continental Shelf." 53 
Although the petroleum industry, and the State governments, had 
made much of the disruptive effects of the Whitlam government's 
attempt to resolve the extent of Commonwealth power offshore 54 the 
design of the 1967 agreement, and particularly the mirroring of 
51 See Report of the Senate Select Committee on Offshore Resources see paragraphs•
6.156 -6.169: (145-150) 
52 Ibid: 7. 
53 Ibid: 31. 
54 See M. Haward, Institutions: Interest Groups and Marine Resources Policy 
Unpublished MA Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Tasmania, 
(1986). 
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Commonwealth and State legislation, removed any constitutional 
doubt to the validity of the award of exploration permits or production 
licenses.55 As Reid comments 
the congenial scheme [forming the 1967 Agreement], although 
giving security of title to the companies operating in this area, 
merely postponed, but as we now know did not ultimately 
prevent, the subsequent conflict concerning questions of offshore 
jurisdiction. 56 
Commonwealth Claims and State Responses: Challenges to the 
Petroleum Agreement 
In the late 1960s a change in leadership within the Liberal Party led to 
the Commonwealth adopting a more activist approach to asserting 
jurisdiction in the territorial sea, encouraged in part by the precedent of 
increasing federal involvement in offshore management in the United 
States and Canada. The Gorton government introduced the 
Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill in 1970 which claimed 
Commonwealth sovereignty over the territorial sea. In initiating this 
legislation the government announced that: 
the object is to carry out the government's decision to introduce 
legislation asserting and establishing the exclusive right of the sea 
bed off the Australian coast, from low water mark to the outer 
limits of the continental shelf. At present the State governments 
claim sovereign rights in this same area. 57 
The Commonwealth's unilateral decision to overturn the 1967 
Petroleum Agreement was influenced by several developments 
55 G. Stevenson, Mineral Resources and Australian Federalism Research Monograph 
17, (Canberra: CRFFR/ANU,1976): 39-40. 
56 P. C. Reid, "Commonwealth-State Relations Offshore Mining", 60. 
57 J. Killen, Killen: Inside Australian Politics, (Sydney: Methuen Haynes, 1985): 158. 
121 
occurring in the late 1960s. Moves within the United Nations to 
convene a Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, spearheaded by the 
Maltese Ambassador to the United Nations, Arvid Pardo, occurred at 
this time, and influenced the Australian debate on the offshore. 
Domestic politics were influenced by the flurry caused by the 
judgements of Justices Barwick and Windeyer in Bonser's case, and 
highly publicised incidents involving foreign fishing ventures close to 
Australian territorial waters. Concern over oil pollution from tanker 
groundings increased in the wake of the Torrey Canyon disaster off 
Great Britain in March 1967. In 1969 the discovery of the Soviet prawn 
trawler Van Gogh fishing within the Gulf of Carpentaria close to 
Australian territorial limits raised considerable concern over the level 
of surveillance offshore. The threat of an oil spill from the grounded 
tanker Oceanic Grandeur within the Great Barrier Reef highlighted 
problems in providing adequate management or protection of the 
Australian territorial sea. Conflict over oil exploration in the Great 
Barrier Reef region in the wake of the controversy over the Oceanic 
Grandeur incident has been seen as a trigger for the Territorial Sea 
BilL58 
The outright opposition of the States to the proposed legislation and 
the Federal Liberal Party's discomfort with Gorton's vision of 
federalism epitomised by the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf 
Bill resulted in considerable conflict within the party. Claims of a 
"creeping centralism" in policy from the State branches and State 
parliamentary parties impacted directly on the fate of the "Gorton Bill", 
with the Liberal Party's attitude towards jurisdiction offshore being 
58 Ibid. 
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greatly affected by this internal party dispute. Gorton, although alleged 
to be a "centralist" by his own party, disputed the accusation and, for 
that matter, the appellation. In his address to the Liberal Party's Federal 
Council in early June 1970, Gorton gave his view of federalism and the 
Australian federal system. 
In his address today, the President referred to the word 
"centralism" and "centralist". I am not entirely sure what these 
words mean for they are rarely defined by those who use them. 
But if they mean a system or person who wants all power, all 
policy-making, all administrative decisions concentrated in one 
place, then there are none of us here who could possibly be 
described as centralist. . . . Similarly, if a federalist is one who 
believes that a national government should have no 
responsibility and no voice in matters of nation-wide importance 
as education or health or national development or agriculture or 
in any other fields, that there is no room there for co-operation 
between a national government and a state government, then I 
do not think that person is a true federalist or serves the nation 
wel1.59 
Much of the antagonism between the Commonwealth and each of the 
State governments centred on Gorton's attempt to assert sovereignty 
and CommOnwealth paramountcy offshore. Even though the Liberal 
Party had been founded on a principle of retaining the federal system in 
the face of the perception of the Chifley government's centralisation 
and nationalisation objectives, it had presided over a period of 
expansion in Commonwealth power, helped, without a doubt, by 
financial influence it gained by the High- Court upholding The 
Uniform Tax cases in 1942 and 1956. The Liberal Party however 
retained a particular view of the "federal principle" as an article of 
faith, and used it effectively in the election campaigns of the 1950s and 
59 j. G. Gorton, "Address to Federal Council" 8 June 1970 reprinted in Y. Thompson, G. 
Brandis, and T. Harley, (eds.) Australian Liberalism: The Continuing Vision, 
(Melbourne: Liberal Forum Publication, 1986): 100. 
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1960s. In 1970 "Gorton attempted to modernise the party platform by 
reducing its heavily federal emphasis." 6° This was undertaken, 
according to Emy, as "a necessary prelude to giving authority to the 
federal government to act alone in such controversial matters as the 
control of off-shore minerals exploration."61 
Gorton's review of the party platform was stymied for exactly the same 
reasons as his offshore scheme foundered: the States saw it as a 
removal of their power and autonomy and a reduction of their 
influence in the determination of party policy, or at least the possibility 
of being able to influence party policy through the Federal Council of 
the Party. The "Gorton Bill" was later to lapse with the proroguing of 
parliament on October 24th before the 1972 election - held on the 2nd 
December 1972, but not before it led to a further split in the 
parliamentary party and the resignation of Gorton. The second reading 
speech for the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill continued for 
most of the afternoon of the 18th October 1972. Gorton's attempt to 
increase Commonwealth powers offshore focussed on the issue of 
jurisdiction over oil and gas, but also included a major battle with 
Queensland over State proposals to undertake exploratory oil drilling 
in the reef region. This battle62 saw the the question of jurisdiction 
being raised first in relation to the State government's proposals and 
second in terms of attempts to get Commonwealth protection for the 
Great Barrier Reef. 
60 H. V. Emy, The Politics of Australian Democracy (2nd ed) (Melbourne: Macmillan, 
1978): 662. 
61 ibid . 
62 As described in the title of a book detailing an account of the imbrolglio by one of the 
major actors; see J. Wright, The Coral Battleground, (Melbourne: Nelson, 1977). 
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David Solomon's account of the Gorton era sees the dispute arising 
from the introduction of the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf 
Bill63 as a central element of the corrosive Commonwealth - State 
relations in this period: 
. • . the question of off-shore mineral rights . . . [was] a subject 
which developed into a major row during Mr Gorton's period as 
Prime Minister. He eventually gained some support from the 
Liberal party on the basis that Commonwealth legislation was 
necessary so as to allow the High Court to make the decision one 
way or the other. 64 
The Territorial Seas and Continental Shelf Bill was to have a tortuous 
path through the parliament. It was introduced and given a second 
reading on the 16th April 1970 with debate not resuming until the 18 
May 1972. By the time the second reading debate was resumed Gorton 
had "abdicated" the leadership of the Liberal Party and the position of 
Prime Minister in the face of a tied cabinet room ballot, refusing to use 
a casting vote to retain office. - The drafting of the Territorial Sea and 
Continental Shelf Bill was greatly influenced by Gorton's Attorney-
General, T. E. F. Hughes. Hughes was to remain a staunch supporter of 
the Bill, and, along with Gorton and Jim Killen, was to continue to 
support the Bill in the face of considerable back-bench disquiet over the 
proposal. The second reading speech for the Territoral Sea and 
Continental Shelf Bill continued for most of the afternoon of the 18th 
October 1972. Debate ended with Gorton Moving the gag. The ALP 
63  D. Solomon, "Commonwealth-State Relations" in Mi Harris and G. Dutton (eds.) 
Sir Henry, Don Baby and Friends, (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1971). 
64 Ibid. 206. 
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supported the motion and with John Gorton and Jim Killen "crossing 
the floor" the government held a two vote majority. Hughes. 
(Gorton's Attorney-General) absented himself from the chamber 
without a pair during the vote. 65 
On the same day the Territorial Seas Bill was introduced Gorton 
agreed to table, with the consent of the States, minutes of meetings 
between them and the former Minister for National Development (Mr 
Fairbairn) concerning the proposed legislation. 66 A major dispute 
arose between Fairbairn and Gorton over the extent to which the 
meetings, the first of which was held on the 3rd March and the second 
on the 22 September 1969, could be regarded as fulfilling the 
Commonwealth's commitment to consultation with the States. At the 
March meeting Fairbairn had told State ministers: 
I can certainly give an assurance that the States will be consulted 
again before any legislation is brought in. I know that it is 
sometimes difficult to keep something of this sort confidential, 
but I do urge you to keep this document confidentia1. 67 
A motion to- censure Gorton was• moved by the Opposition on the 15th 
May over his handling of the matter. This censure proved to be the 
breaking point for many in the Parliamentary Liberal Party. Soon after 
a party room vote was held which led to Gorton stepping down as 
party leader and Prime Minister. 
Prior to Gorton's resignation the "correspondence and documents 
65 E. G. Whitlam, The VVhitlam Government, (Ringwood: Penguin,1985): 257. 
66 rbid. 
67 Extract from Proceeding of The Second Meeting of the Australian Minerals Council" 
Parliament of Australia, Offshore Minerals Other Than Petroleum Parliamentary 
Paper No 89 1970 (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printing Office, 1970): 10. 
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relating to offshore minerals other than petroleum" were tabled in 
Parliament on the 8th May 1970. The Parliamentary Paper comprised 
71 pages of letters between the Commonwealth and State Ministers 
and transcripts of meetings of ministerial councils and press releases. 
The paper provides a clear statement of the Gorton government's 
attitude to the question of jurisdiction in offshore areas on the basis of 
the Commonwealth claim for paramountcy. This led, inevitably, to 
the Commonwealth's questioning the arrangements and division of 
responsibility established under the 1967 Petroleum Agreement. 
The Commonwealth's concern over these matters had been 
announced by Fairbairn at the second meeting of the Australian 
Minerals Council in Canberra on 3rd March 1969. Fairbairn stated that: 
[i]n the case of offshore petroleum both the States and federal 
government asserted jurisdiction over the seabed beneath 
territorial waters and over the outer continental shelf. The 
essential element in the petroleum arrangement . . . [is that the 
Commonwealth and States] should co-operate for the purpose of 
ensuring the legal effectiveness of authorities to explore for, or to 
exploit the petroleum resources of the submerged lands off our 
coasts.68 
The Commonwealth's view was that it should "assert total rights 
outside the three mile limit". Fairbairn believed that the 
administration of the mineral activity: should be undertaken in a 
similar manner to that established by:ithe 1967 agreement. When 
questioned on when legislation establishing the Commonwealth's 
position would be introduced into parliament Fairbairn replied "that 
68 Parliament of Australia, Offshore Minerals Other Than Petroleum Parliamentary 
Paper No 89 (1970): 4. This document provides an important source of material and 
indicates the flurry of activity surrounding the "Gorton" proposals. 
127 
no date has been set, but I assume it will be done as soon as possible. I 
think it would be doubtful that we could get legislation through 
during the Autumn session this year [1969]."69 
Dissent from within the Liberal Party," reflecting in part the 
opposition from the States to the proposal of Commonwealth 
jurisdiction, led to the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill 
being stalled before it had completed its passage through the 
parliament. The dispute over the proposed legislation occurred at two 
levels, the major conflict was between the Commonwealth and the 
States although an equally acrimonious battle was being fought within 
the federal parliamentary Liberal Party. Within the Party. 
la]ntagonism to the move for the Commonwealth to assume 
sovereignty over the sea bed was assiduously cultivated" 71 as a means 
of deposing Gorton. The loss of seats in the 1969 election, Gorton's 
leadership style, and his determination to proceed with the Territorial 
Seas Bill, provided ammunition to "those waiting for an opportunity 
to get rid of John Gorton." 72 
69 Ibid. 7. 
70 The unpopularity of what became known as the "Gorton Bill" and its influence on 
the events leading to Gorton's eventual resignation from the leadership of the Liberal 
Party (and, as a result, from the position of Prime Minister) is interesting in the light 
its sheds on the influence of the States in offshore matters prior to the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act. The reaction of the States to the "Gorton Bill" is also 
interesting in terms of the Fraser governments introduction of the OCS. For details of 
the problems faced by Gorton see H. V. Emy, The Politics of Australian Democracy (1st 
ed.) (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1973): 204; and E.G. Whitlam 'The Cost of Federalism" in 
A. Patience and J. Scott, Australian Federalism: Future Tense (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1983): 41. 
71 J. Killen, Killen, 157. 
72 ibid. 
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Gorton's views sat uneasily with the parliamentary Liberal party, faced 
with a revolt from the State parliaments and party machines over the 
offshore Bill. 73 After Gorton resigned the newly appointed party 
leader and Prime Minister, McMahon, tried to avoid the conflict which 
was rapidly engulfing the Territorial Sea Bill by placing it at the foot of 
the House of Representatives notice paper - a tactic attacked by 
Opposition Leader Whitlam. More significantly the key architects of 
the ill-fated Bill, Gorton and Hughes and Killen, were all demoted or 
dumped during the ministerial reshuffle which followed the defeat of 
Gorton. 
On the 7th December 1971 Whitlam attempted to move for the 
suspension of standing orders to make the Territorial Seas Bill a 
matter of urgency. He highlighted the history of the Bill following its 
introduction in April of the previous year. 
On the last sitting day in the Autumn session last year, 12th June 
1970 it was [Bill] No 11. There were still 12 Bills after it on the 
notice paper. But on the the first day of the Budget session last 
year, 16th August, it was No 16. It was the last of the Bills listed on 
the notice paper and ever since it has been the last of the bills 
listed on the notice paper. The House has been, I suggest, 
extremely patient in this matter. 74 
Whitlam went on to state that the bill was currently listed last on the 
notice paper, Bill No 52. 75 
73 The backbench concern over Gorton's performance was clearly a major factor in the 
tied vote in the party room. Reid claims that "on my count three House of 
Representatives' Ministers, and twenty two backbench Liberal MHRs had voted 'no 
confidence' in Gorton. Gorton's Senate strength had also eroded. Eight out of twenty 
liberal senators had voted against him." A. Reid,The Gorton Venture (Sydney: 
Shakespeare Head Press, 1971): 443. 
74 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives) 7/12/71 4140. 
75 Ibid. 
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In the period before the second reading debate on the Territorial Seas 
Bill resumed in October 1972, a series of meetings had been held 
between the Commonwealth and State representatives "to see whether 
this matter could be resolved in some other way".76 The issues were 
discussed between officials and Ministers at the Australian Minerals 
Council and the Standing Committee of Attorneys-Genera1.77 These 
meetings preceded a meeting held in Canberra on the 10th August 1972 
between the Commonwealth Ministers for Foreign Affairs and 
National Development and "appointed ministerial representatives" 78 
from each State. This meeting has had little publicity, no doubt being 
buried under the weight and import of subsequent events including 
the electoral defeat suffered by the McMahon government. 
In spite of the lack of publicity this ministerial meeting is significant 
and a communique was released which provides the position of the 
States towards the "offshore question". The communique was 
incorporated into Commonwealth Hansard during the speech by Mr N. 
H. Bowen (then Minister for Foreign Affairs) on the 18th October 
1972.79 It reads: 
The meeting then examined questions concerning the territorial 
sea and continental shelf under Australia's federal system. The 
meeting identified problems for the Commonwealth and the 
States in regard to these matters and explored possible courses of 
future action. The Commonwealth emphasised the desirability of 
removing legal uncertainties as to where sovereignty lay. While 
this was recognised by the States, they all took the view that a 
possible series of legal cases was not a satisfactory method. One 
76  Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives) 18/10/72 2770. 
77 Ibid. 2784 
78 /bid. 
79 Ibid. 2784-2785. 
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proposal was put forward was that the preferable method in the 
long term would be to determine the the question by 
constitutional amendment It was suggested that it might be one of 
the matters brought before the Constitutional Review 
Convention. The States unanimously affirmed their opposition 
to the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill and their 
preference for finding a solution through co-operation between 
the Commonwealth and the States. .. . The States put forward the 
view that an examination should be made of the feasibility of - 
1. A Solution of the problem of off-shore minerals by means 
of complementary State and Commonwealth legislation; 
2. A resolution of legal questions surrounding control of the 
territorial sea and the continental shelf by means of 
Commonwealth- State co-operation; 
3. Defining the internal waters of the States and the Base lines 
from which the territorial sea is measured by means of 
consultation between the Commonwealth and the States. 80 
The communique encapsulated the States' arguments for a co-
operative solution to the impasse that had arisen over the Territorial 
Sea and Continental Shelf Bill. Bowen also informed the House that 
these matters had been discussed by cabinet which had agreed that 
further negotiations were warranted given the substance of the States 
concerns. As a result: 
[oln 5th September the Prime Minister (Mr McMahon) wrote to 
each State Premier informing him that the Commonwealth was 
agreeable to the suggested discussions and studies taking place. 
Since 5th September all State Premiers have replied favourably to 
the Prime Ministers letter. So, with the agreement of all existing 
State governments and the Commonwealth government, it has 
been decided that it is responsible and proper now to put to study 
these matters of internal waters, the means of resolving the 
question and co-operative legislation in relation other than off- 
shore petroleum.81 
80 Ibid. (Emphasis added). 
81 Ibid. 2785. 
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The States agreed to study these matters. Bowen stated that the 
government "properly" took "the view that it should not at this time 
seek to force the Bill through parliament". 82 The Leader of the 
Opposition, Mr Whitlam, responding to Bowen's speech claimed that 
the McMahon government had made an about face on the Territorial 
Sea and Continental Shelf Bill 83 and that the arguments that the 
government did not wish to proceed with the Bill "at this time" 
contrasted with the introduction of the Bill as a matter of some urgency 
in April 1970. Whitlam also dismissed the possibility of gaining 
agreement with the States, arguing that "we can gain no comfort from 
the history of Commonwealth - State agreements in these matters." 84 
The States were concerned that the Gorton Bill still remained on the 
notice paper, although McMahon assured the States that no unilateral 
action would be taken by his government to enact it. The SCAG had 
considered the Territorial Sea Bill at meetings in 1971, when the only 
ALP State government (South Australia) supported the Liberal and 
Country - Liberal States in investigating mechanisms to overturn the 
legislation. The South Australian government commissioned an 
opinion from Professor D. P. O'Connell, then Professor of International 
Law at the University of Adelaide. O'Connell, an expert on the law of 
the sea, "advised a petition to the Queen to refer the dispute to the 
Privy Council under the Judicial Committee Act 1833, on the ground 
that it was a territorial dispute between British Colonies." 85 While 
this tactic was' not needed in response to the controversial but ill-fated 
"Gorton Bill", O'Connell's advice was to be followed up when the 
82 ibid . 
83 Ibid. 2786. 
84 Ibid. 2787. 
85 E .G. Whitlam, The Whitam Government 603 
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Whitlam government introduced its own legislation (the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act ) establishing Commonwealth sovereignty 
from low water mark in 1973. 
Although generating much intra-party conflict, intergovernmental 
interaction over the Gorton Bill lacked the partisan dimension of later 
conflict over the offshore arising from the Whitlam government's 
assertion of paramountcy. The intergovernmental dispute over the 
Territorial Seas Bill was driven less by partisan differences than from 
differences between the Commonwealth and the States over 
jurisdiction which surfaced in what became a bitter intra party 
struggle. Whitlam has recounted that: 
the Bill was introduced at a time when, for the first time since 
1909, there were no ALP governments in Australia. The five 
Liberal Premiers and the Country Party Premier combined to 
oppose the Gorton government's legislation. The tension 
between the Federal and State Governments was a principal 
ingredient in Gorton's demise as Prime Minister. 86 
The Politics of Commonwealth - State Relations: The Great Barrier 
Reef 
The issue of oil drilling on the Great Barrier Reef provided a further 
impetus for the Commonwealth and the States to confront issues 
which had been neatly avoided in the 1967 Agreement. It was clear that 
the 1967 Agreement, while accommodating the desires of the States to 
exercise control over offshore oil and gas exploration and the 
Commonwealth's support for exploiting these resources, could not 
accommodate differing views over exploration in environmentally 
86 Ibid. 256 
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sensitive areas. The 1967 Agreement was, as its title and preamble 
state, a means of controlling and regulating exploitation of the 
hydrocarbon resources rather than incorporating environmental 
controls. Queensland resisted any attempt from the Commonwealth 
to restrict the issue of exploration permits, beginning a major dispute 
with the Commonwealth which lingered until the late 1970s. 
Seismic surveys and other preliminary work had been carried out in 
the Great Barrier Reef in the mid 1960s, following the discovery of oil 
in the offshore Gippsland Basin. Although permits had been issued 
for exploratory drilling on the Reef since the 1920s, it was only the 
increased interest in oil and gas in the mid 1960s which caused some 
concern over the environment of the reef. Six wells had been drilled 
between 1926 and 1969 with "the first two . . . quite shallow and 
intended to provide geological information of a general kind and not 
concerned with discovering oil." 87 Between 1968 and 1969 three oil 
wells were drilled offshore from the Reef and were the focus of 
considerable public concern. Permits for exploratory drilling were 
issued by the Queensland Government under the terms of the 1967 
Petroleum Agreement. 
The stand-off over the Barrier Reef increased academic interest in the 
question of offshore jurisdiction. Sir Percy Spender, one-time Foreign 
Minister under Prime Minister Menzies, Ambassador to the United 
States and member and President of the International Court of Justice, 
prepared an opinion that the Commonwealth had the power to 
stop drilling on the Great Barrier Reef. Spender based his opinion on 
87 ibid. 512. For details of early exploration on the Reef see Anon. "Origins of the 
Great Barrier Reef Committee" Diving Downunder 16,1 (July-October 1989): 33-34. 
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the view that State jurisdiction ended at low-water mark, following 
the argument in the Franconia case. Spender's views were given at a 
symposium on "The Future of the Great Barrier Reef" convened by the 
Australian Conservation Foundation in May 1969. Spender concluded 
that: 
1. Excluding what are commonly known as inland waters, the 
territorial boundaries of Queensland and other Federal States end 
at low water mark. 
2.The Territorial sea bordering Australia and the sea bed thereof 
with all its natural resources are those of the Commonwealth, not 
those of any Federal State. 
3. Dominion over the sea bed and the natural resources of the 
whole of the Continental shelf commencing at low water mark, 
and the rights to explore and exploit these, or permit others to do 
so, is vested exclusively in the Commonwealth. 88 
The drilling of the exploratory wells and the Queensland governments 
insistence on its right to determine the resource development of the 
Reef resulted in an interesting and unique example of 
intergovernmental collaboration. Pressure on both the 
Commonwealth and the Queensland governments, both facing an 
election in 1969, led to the Prime Minister and Queensland Premier 
establishing a joint Royal Commission into oil drilling in the _Barrier 
Reef. Joint commissions in themselves may not be unusual, however 
the mechanism used to set up the inquiry illustrated the influence of 
88 P. C. Spender, 'The Great Barrier Reef legal Aspects" in The Future Of The Great 
Barrier Reef, Australian Conservation Foundation Special Publication No 3 (Sydney: 
Australian Conservation Foundation,1969): 38-39. 
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the unresolved issue of jurisdiction. The Royal Commission was 
established by separate decisions of the Commonwealth and 
Queensland governments and by separate letters patent issued by these 
governments. 89 In effect there were two royal commissions although 
both sets of letters patent appointed the same personnel to the inquiry. 
The establishment of the Royal Commission, which was to bring down 
its report in 1976 led to a moratorium on the exploration programme. 
The Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen reaffirmed his view that 
his State should be responsible for management of the Great Barrier 
Reef. 
The unresolved questions surrounding the 1967 offshore petroleum 
agreement, which had been referred to the Senate Select Committee on 
Offshore Resources, had become embroiled in the intergovernmental 
conflicts over the Barrier Reef. The long awaited report of the Senate 
Select Committee on Offshore Petroleum Resources was tabled in early 
December 1971 at the time the Labor Party was attacking the McMahon 
government for stalling the debate on the Territorial Sea and 
Continental Shelf Bill and while the Royal Commission into the 
exploitation of the Great Barrier Reef was taking evidence. It is 
somewhat ironic, given the conclusion of the Senate Select Committee 
recommending the Commonwealth act to resolve the constitutional 
uncertainty offshore, that the final report of the Senate Select 
89 Senate Select Committee on Offshore Petroleum Resources Report Voll (1971), 522 
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Committee was brought down at a time corresponding to the zenith of 
the States' exerting political pressure on the Commonwealth as a 
result of the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill. Such was the 
reaction of the States that the McMahon government, after 
considerable efforts, could not engineer an accommodation with the 
States to resolve the issue. 
Tensions between the Commonwealth and the States increased in the 
late 1960s as a result of three primary factors: international 
developments, an expanding environmental agenda and a 
Commonwealth leadership attitude on both sides of the partisan fence 
favouring political centralisation. New nternational agreements and 
changing practices provided a pretext to expand the Commonwealth's 
influence over marine resources, a trend which was to continue for a 
quarter century. At the same time the Commonwealth was being 
encouraged by environmental groups to take action against State-
initiated development projects with ecological impacts. Initially this 
focused on the need to protect the Great Barrier Reef from oil 
exploration permitted by Queensland and the threat to the Australian 
fishing industry from foreign fishing vessels. Demands for increased 
Commonwealth action were viewed favourable by Prime Ministers 
Gorton and Whitlam who philosophically favoured Commonwealth 
leadership in areas such as the offshore. Of these three, it is clear 
that the Commonwealth's increased involvement in the offshore 
reflected first and foremost its desire to assert an interest in areas 
which had previously been under the sole jurisdiction of State 
governments. The Commonwealth was able to use developments in 
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international law and pressure from various domestic interests to 
support its challenge to the intergovernmental arrangements which 
had been developed in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The Challenge to the Status Quo: The Seas and Submerged Lands Act 
The ALP had signalled its support for the "Gorton Bill" and 
foreshadowed acting to assert Commonwealth sovereignty in the 
territorial sea when it achieved government. Opposition Leader 
Whitlam indicated the ALP's interest in changing the arrangements 
established by 1967 Petroleum Agreement, particularly in terms of 
revenue sharing with the States. The ALP's support for the Gorton Bill 
was reinforced by modifications to its platform prior to the 1972 
election. The 1971 National ALP Conference held in Launceston, 
Tasmania, committed a future Labor government to assert sovereignty 
over offshore mineral resources." 
Given the ALP's attitude to offshore jurisdiction it was inevitable that 
the offshore would- become a major battleground between the Whitlam 
government and the States. The battle-lines were drawn by the 
Commonwealth's aim to assert, or to increase the use of, constitutional 
heads of power in areas it considered to be of "national significance"" 
following its victory in the December 1972 federal election. The 
Whitlam government quickly asserted its view that the 
Commonwealth held constitutional primacy in relation to offshore 
90 This conference was particular important as it also saw an important change in the 
ALP's attitude towards federalism, with the "unification" clause in the party platform 
severely modified. See B. Galligan and D. Mardiste "Labor's Reconciliation with 
Federalism" Austrlaian Journal of Political Science, 27, 1 (March 1992): 71-86. 
91 G. Evans, (ed.) Labor and the Constitution 1972-75: Essays and Commentaries on 
Controversies of the Whitlam Years, (Richmond: Heineman, 1977). 
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resources. It announced that it intended introducing legislation 
asserting Commonwealth sovereignty over these resources during the 
opening of the 28th parliament on the 27th of February 1973. This 
legislation, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973, was to reshape the 
contours of Commonwealth - State relations over the offshore. 
The proposed Seas and Submerged Lands legislation, already leading 
to acrimony between the States and the Commonwealth, was the focus 
of more controversy on the 16th May 1973 when the government 
successfully moved a suspension of standing orders to create series of 
"urgent Bills", including the Seas and Submerged Lands Bill and its 
associated Seas and Submerged Lands (Royalties on Minerals) Bill. In 
response to objections from the Opposition the Leader of the House 
(Mr Daly) argued that the offshore legislation had, in effect, been 
debated for three years. The Opposition criticised the undue haste of 
this move with senior Shadow Minister Mr Lynch arguing that "the 
Government recognises that today it is under major attack from 
significant sections of the Australian community . . . [including] the 
problems with the Labor - States in terms of offshore legislation." 92 
Amendments moved by Lynch to extend time for debate were defeated, 
leaving the Seas and Submerged Lands legislation (along with the 
Pipeline Authority Bill 1973 and the Prices Justification Bill 1973) as 
urgent Bills. The time allotted for the two Seas and Submerged Lands 
Bills meant that all stage of the Bills were completed by 10 and 10.15 
pm respectively on Thursday 17th May 93 - the next sitting day. 
92 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives) 16 May 1973: 
2179. 
93 'bid: 2182 (emphasis added) 
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The Opposition, through Mr Bowen, attempted to move a further 
amendment to the Seas and Submerged Lands legislation which stated 
"this House, while not declining to give the Bill a second reading and 
accepting that that the question of sovereignty should be determined, 
(a) deplores the method adopted by the Government of proceeding 
without consultation with the States especially in relation to the code 
_ which is contained in Part III of the Bill, and (b) is of the opinion that 
consultations with the states for a co-operative regime for controlling 
the exploitation of the resources and generous royalty distribution to 
the States should commence forthwith."94 The Opposition attempted 
a further amendment later in the evening of the 17th May by removing 
the words "not declining to give the Bill a second reading speech". The 
guillotine was enacted and the "amended" amendment was lost. 
The Opposition's argument gives an insight into the complexities of 
Commonwealth - State relations. The initial support for a resolution 
of the jurisdictional impasse contrasted with the McMahon 
government's agreement with the States that it would not to act 
unilaterally. The second amendment reflects the Liberal Party's 
concerns with retaining good relations with the States. 
The Seas and Submerged Lands Bill and the Seas and Submerged 
Lands (Royalties on Minerals) Bill were :passed by the House of 
Representatives on the 17th May and introduced into the Senate on the 
22 May 1973. The Opposition leader in the Senate, Senator Withers, 
"immediately moved an amendment in Bow.en's terms and added that 
the debate should resume on the first sitting iday of the Senate after the 
1[st of] August". 95 The Whitlam government's problems with a 
94 Ibid., 17 May 1973, 2306. 
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hostile Senate, which was to contribute to its dismissal in late 1975, was 
also to play an important part in the dispute over offshore resources 
management. When parliament resumed after the winter recess the 
Liberal Party had decided to support the Seas and Submerged Lands 
Bill if the mining code, forming Part III of the legislation, was 
removed. 
In late November the second reading of the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Bill was held in the Senate. Prior to this, with three months 
having lapsed without the Senate acting on the Bills, Connor 
reintroduced them to the House in mid September. 96 After opposition 
from the Country Party the Liberal Party and the Democratic Labor 
Party, Part III of the Bill was removed during the committee stage. The 
companion legislation to the Seas and Submerged Lands Bill, the Seas 
and Submerged Lands (Royalties on Minerals) Bill 1973 was defeated 
in the Senate. This legislation was originally considered as one of the 
six triggers for the double dissolution of April 1974, however it 
was not included in the Prime Minister's submission to the 
Governor-General. The drastic amendment of the companion to 
this Bill (Seas and Submerged Lands Bill 1973) made it futile to 
push on with this Bill. 97 
On the 28th November 1973 the Whitlam government accepted the 
alteration of the Seas and Submerged Lands Bill - the exclusion of the 
mining code (Part III of the Bill) - and the legislation, so modified, 
received assent on 4th December 1973. Although the States announced 
95 E. G. Whitlam, The Whitlam Government:257. 
96 thid: 256. 
97 C.J. Lloyd and G.S. Reid, Out of the Wilderness: The Return of Labor, (Melbourne: 
Cassell, 1974): 370. 
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their intention to challenge the validity of the latter legislation, 
Connor 
then introduced, in July 1974, Part III of the Act as the Minerals 
(Submerged Lands) Bill. The House twice passed it but the 
Senate, on the pretext that the Parliament should await the 
outcome of the High Court challenge, twice rejected it. This Bill 
became one of those on which Governor-General Kerr, ostensibly 
on the advice of his appointed Prime Minister, Fraser, dissolved 
both Houses on the 11 November 1975. 98 
The Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 completed the legislative 
design first promoted by Gorton and a small number of his supporters 
in 1970. The aim of the Bill was clearly expressed by Connor in the 
Second Reading Speech. He claimed to "introduce this bill . . . to 
remove any doubt about the exclusive right of the Commonwealth to 
sovereign control over the resources of the seabed off the coast of 
Australia and its territories from low water mark to the outer limits of 
the continental shelf." 99 Connor suggested that this legislation was 
long overdue, reflecting on first the lack of progress of the "Gorton 
Bill", and second that "as matters stand now the question of 
jurisdiction and ownership in offshore areas is in doubt." 100 It is dear 
from the States' response to the Gorton Bill and the Whitlam 
legislation that they disputed this latter point. 
The strategy adopted by the Whitlam government was relatively clear. 
Connor announced that: 
if there are parties - individuals or. governments - who would 
98 E. G. Whitlam, The Whitlam Government: 258. 
99 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives) 10 May 1973: 
2005. 
1°° Ibid: 2006. 
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dispute our right to take the course I now propose, let them 
challenge this legislation in the courts. We take this stand not in 
an attitude of provocation but in the confidence of doing what is 
dearly right and necessary.im 
In spite of this assertion Connor claimed that "the Bill will not affect 
existing agreements between the Commonwealth and the States 
concerning off-shore petroleum however,. or the legislation giving 
effect to those agreements which will continue to operate for the 
present time."102 The States were not satisfied with this, believing that 
the Commonwealth's legislation broke the 1967 Petroleum Agreement. 
The ALP's approach mirrored that which had been attempted by the ill-
fated Territorial Seas and Continental Shelf Bill 1970. The Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act 1973 was similar in many respects to the 
Continental Shelf and Territorial Seas Bill, particularly in its assertion 
of Commonwealth sovereignty from low water mark. The major 
distinction between them was that the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 
1973 included a mining code for minerals other than petroleum in 
areas which had been designated in earlier parts of the Act . 103 - 
A further element in the Whitlam government's strategy was to 
harness the nexus between the domestic issue of offshore jurisdiction 
and international law of the sea. The Whitlam government claimed 
that the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 implemented the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf. 	These international 
101 Ibid . 
102 ibid .: 2006 . 
103 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, (House of Representatives) 10 May 1973: 
2007 
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conventions were appended as schedules to the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act. They were no doubt included to reinforce a constitutional 
anchor for legislation facilitated by the primacy of the Commonwealth 
in "external affairs", under Section 51 (xxix) of the Australian 
Constitution. 
The State Premiers saw the Seas and Submerged Lands Act as a major 
threat to their powers and to "sovereignty", given that "the [Seas and 
Submerged Lands] legislation also ha[d] the effect of determining the 
distribution of internal sovereignty within the Australian federal 
system. . 104  Reece, the Tasmanian Premier, still smarting from the 
conservation movement's attempts at Federal Government 
intervention to stop the flooding of Lake Pedder, 105 condemned the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act as a major attack on "states rights". 106 
He foreshadowed an immediate challenge to the validity of the 
legislation. In fact the Tasmanian and Queensland governments went 
further and "petitioned the Queen for leave to appeal to the Privy. 
Council to declare the act invalid as a usurpation of the state's 
sovereign rights."107 
104 R. D. Lumb, The Law of the Sea,:52 (original emphasis). 
105 The damming of Lake Pedder has become .a major cause celebr'e in Australian 
environmental policy, and provided the first of a series of continuing environmental 
conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s in South-West Tasmania, including the intervention of 
the Hawke government to stop the proposed dam-on the Franklin River. 
106 Australian 12 May 1973. Graham Maddox in his article "Federalism: or 
Government Frustrated?" Australian Quarterly 45, 3 (September 1973): 92-100, makes 
the point that the words "sovereign" or "sovereignty" in relation to States rights were 
mentioned twelve times in this two-column newspaper article. 
107 H.V. Emy, The Politics of Australian Democracy (1st ed.) (Melbourne, Macmillan), 
1973, 204-205. Emy claimed that this was "a significant constitutional victory for the 
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The Tasmanian and Queensland reference to the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council arose from the opinion given by Professor O'Connell 
in response to the "Gorton Bill". Tasmania and Queensland decided to 
act on the O'Connell opinion when it became clear that the Whitlam 
government would implement its promise to complete the task Gorton 
had begun. 108 The attempt to refer the matter to the Privy Council led 
the Whitlam government to introduce the Privy Council (Appeals 
Abolition) Bill into the Commonwealth parliament at the end of May 
1973. This bill was introduced on the same day that the two States had, 
unbeknown to the Commonwealth, lodged petitions with the Privy 
Council registry seeking a reference of the Seas and Submerged Lands 
Bill to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Counci1. 109 
The introduction of the Privy Council (Appeals Abolition) Bill 1973 
was made with the knowledge of the expected State challenge to the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act. Whitlam considered "that we must 
avoid a situation in which both the Privy Council and the High Court 
■■■ 
would be called upon to consider the same question with possibly 
- differing conclusions and that there should not be two streams of 
authority. 
Following correspondence between the British Prime Minister and 
Whitlam and between Whitlam and Governor-General Hasluck, it 
Commonwealth as it means that the States can now only appeal to the High Court to 
counter federal power". 
108 Queensland continued to be advised by O'Connell, (by then Chichele Professor of 
Public International Law at the University of Oxford), on offshore matters until his 
death in 1980. 
109 E. G. Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, (Ringwood: Penguin,1985): 604-605. 
110 mid., 604. 
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became clear that the British government would advise the Queen not 
to accept the petition from Tasmania and Queensland. Visiting 
Australia in early 1974, the Queen opened the Commonwealth 
parliament on 28th February 1974 when she: 
inform[ed] Honourable Senators and Members that I have decided 
not to refer to the Privy Council petitions addressed to me by the 
State of Queensland and the State of Tasmania concerning rights 
to the seabed. My Australian and United Kingdom Ministers were 
agreed that the High Court of Australia is the appropriate tribunal 
to determine the issues raised in the petitions and, accordingly, 
that the petitions should not be referred to the Judicial 
Committee. 111 
The Tasmanian Solicitor-General, Mr Roger Jennings, who together 
with his Queensland counterpart had spent several weeks in England 
attempting to lodge the petition, had gained opinions from several 
legal authorities for the inevitable legal challenge in either the Privy 
Council or the High Court. Jennings' actions were supported by the 
then Tasmanian Attorney-General Mervyn Everett who also joined the 
two Solicitors-General in the presentation of the petition to the Privy 
Council. This infuriated the new Commonwealth Attorney-General, 
Lionel Murphy. 112  In one of the many ironies associated with the 
dynamics of Australian federalism and offshore matters Murphy's first 
constitutional case after his controversial appointment to the High 
Court was hearing the eventual challenge to the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act 1973. 
Some confusion has crept into the literature over Whitlam offshore 
legislation, probably due to the similarity in broad policy areas between 
the Seas and Submerged Lands Act, .and the Minerals (Submerged 
111 Opening address to Parliament 28 February 1974 quoted by Whitlam, The 
Whitlam Government, 607. 
112 R. Jennings, pers. comm. October 1989. 
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Lands) Bill (the controversial mining code which formed Part III of the 
original bill). Galligan, in his study of the Australian High Court, 
correctly describes the declaratory nature of the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act as being modelled on the "abandoned" legislation promoted 
by then Prime Minister Gorton, 113 and then states that: 
the Whitlam government revived the [Gorton] legislation and 
finally had it passed at the joint sitting, all the states challenged its 
constitutional validity. The states preferred the previous 
arrangement under which the ultimate constitutional issue was 
left untested, while they enjoyed a partnership with the 
commonwealth in administering offshore petroleum and sharing 
in its royalties. 114 
The convoluted parliamentary tactics surrounding the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Bill were to continue as the Whitlam government 
maintained its commitment to Commonwealth paramountcy in the 
territorial sea. Additional legislation, most notably the Petroleum and 
Minerals Authority Bill 1973 also aimed at increasing the 
Commonwealth's role in offshore resources policy. The Petroleum 
and Minerals Authority (PMA) was 
113 B. Galligan, 	Politics of the High Court, 228. 
114 Ibid. While not disputing Galligan's analysis an error is present in this statement. 
In fact, as has been discussed earlier, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act (with the 
contentious Part III mining code removed) had been passed and given royal assent in 
December 1973. The Seas and Submerged Lands Act had, in addition, included "savings 
provisions" for existing State laws which did not claim sovereignty over the 
continental shelf (in effect most fisheries legislation was therefore "saved" from the 
provisions of the legislation). The remaining part of the original Bill, (what became 
the Minerals (Submerged Lands) Bill) had, as has been indicated, an equally tortuous 
path through the parliament becoming embroiled in the challenge by the States to the 
Seas and Submerged Lands legislation. The Senate refused to pass the Minerals 
(Submerged Lands) Bill on the grounds that the legislation should wait until the High 
Court had brought down its decision. 
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the main means by which the. Government planned to increase 
Australian equity in mining. . . The functions of the PMA were to 
explore for and develop Australia's petroleum and mineral 
resources on Australia's behalf. 115 
In simple terms the PMA was to be a government utility which would 
enter into joint ventures with overseas corporations, or even small-
scale Australian interests. 
The PMA . legislation was strongly attacked by the Liberal and National 
Parties who saw it as an attack on private enterprise and on the risk 
capital invested by private mining interests. Companies involved in 
offshore petroleum exploration were also critical of the proposed 
legislation. The Opposition stalled the legislation in the Senate 
following its introduction mid December 1973. An Opposition motion 
was quickly moved to adjourn debate on the Bill until February 1974. 
On resumption of debate in early April 1974, the Petroleum and 
Minerals Authority Bill was rejected by the Senate. However, the 
legislation was reintroduced into both the House and the Senate. The 
Senate again rejected the legislation on the 10th April. The 
Government then used it as part of its trigger for a double dissolution, 
granted on the 11th April 1974 by the Governor-General Sir Paul 
Hasluck. This was not the end of the matter as although: 
the Bill to establish the Petroleum and Minerals Authority was 
one of the six passed at the Joint Sitting [held following the re-
election of the Whitlam government] . . . It was challenged by two 
states primarily on the ground that it had not satisfied the three 
115 E.G. Whitlam, The Whitlam Government: 250. Whitlam provides a succinct 
account of the Petroleum and Minerals Authority saga at 251-252. 
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months time interval imposed by section 57 [of the 
Constitution]. 116 
The result of the Petroleum and Minerals Authority case 117 was that 
the legislation was ruled invalid on a technicality: the Senate's 
adjournment of the debate on the Bill did not, for a majority of justices, 
correspond to a rejection and therefore the Bill could not be submitted 
to the joint sitting. 118 
There is no doubt, of course, that the assertion of Commonwealth 
sovereignty encompassed in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 
would have a major impact on Australian federalism, and particularly 
on the management of the offshore oil and gas resources. In spite of 
Connor's view that "for the present time" the 1967 intergovernmental 
agreement would continue to operate, the States were particularly 
concerned over the fate of the 1967 Petroleum Agreement. Following 
the lodging of each State's challenge to the validity of the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act, Justice Menzies "ordered that, in lieu of each 
action being heard before the Full Court of the High Court, the question 
whether or not the Act is a valid Law be argued before the Full 
Cour t." 119 The full bench of the High Court heard the Seas and 
116 H.V.  Emy,  The Politics of Australian Democracy (2nd ed): 230. 
117 Victoria v. Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337. 
118 The PMA case, and the implications of this case in terms of the joint sitting 
mechanism are discussed by B. Galligan, Politics of the High Court: A Study of 
the Judicial Branch of Government in Australia, (St Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1987): 226-228; and H.V. Emy, The Politics of Australian Democracy (2nd ed), 
230-233. 
119 New South Wales v. the Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 339. An interesting 
aside, and one which has a direct relationship to the fate of the Whitlam government, 
was that Justice Menzies, who had served the High Court from 1958, retired later in 
1974. This resignation led to the controversial appointment of Senator Murphy to the 
High Court. Murphy was Attorney- General in the Whitlam government prior to his 
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Submerged Lands case in March and April 1975, bringing down its 
decision on December 17th 1975. 120 The challenge to the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act was made by New South Wales on behalf of the 
other five States. 
The High Court's decision is described succinctly by Professor Lumb. 
The High Court upheld the provisions relating to sovereignty 
over the Territorial Sea (by a 5-2 majority) and (unanimously) the 
provisions relating to the continental shelf. Two strands of 
thought are to be found in the reasons of the majority judges, first 
that the external affairs power of the Commonwealth Constitution 
s.51[xxix] is a basis for the exercise of the legislative power of the 
Commonwealth in relation to the territorial sea, either on the 
basis that it deals with matters and areas geographically external to 
Australia or as implementing international conventions relating 
to such areas; and second, as related to the first proposition that 
the area of territorial waters, three miles in breadth, was not 
within the limits of the newly established states after federation. 
Consequently the legislation was not in derogation of any 
territorial or property rights held by the states or protected by the 
Constitution. 121 
On the question of jurisdiction offshore Chief Justice Barwick and 
Justices McTiernan, Mason and Jacobs, found that "the boundaries of 
elevation to the Bench and a keen supporter of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act. 
Murphy was appointed to the High Court on the 9th February 1975 resulting in the 
NSW Premier, Mr Lewis breaking convention and appointing an Independent, Mr 
Cleaver Bunton, rather than a ALP member to the casual vacancy created by Murphy's 
resignation. As has been indicated earlier Murphy's first case on taking up his 
appointment to the Court was the challenge to the Seas and Submerged Lands 
legislation. 
129 NSW v the Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 339. Interestingly T. E. F. Hughes, 
former Attorney-General and acknowledged as the primary draftsman of the 
Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill which was the catalyst for the Whitlam 
legislation, appeared for the Commonwealth. 
121 R.D. Lumb, The Law of the Sea and Australian Offshore Areas, 2nd ed. (St. Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1978): 52. 
150 
the former Australian colonies ended at low-water mark and that they 
had no sovereign or proprietary rights in respect of the territorial sea or 
the superadjacent soil or superadjacent airspace." 122 Justices Gibbs and 
Stephen provided an opposing view in their judgements. Gibbs 
conclude[d] that at the time of federation the bed of the territorial 
sea adjacent to each of the colonies was vested in the Crown and 
the territorial limits of the colony extended to the three mile limit. 
. . . Nothing that occurred on federation altered the pre-existing 
situation. 123 
Stephen argued that: 
[Waving stated my reasons for concluding that the British owned, 
as royal waste, the waters and beds of league sea surrounding the 
Australian continent when the Australian continent came to be 
given responsible government I pass now to the effect upon this 
position of the grant to these colonies of responsible government. 
In my view it resulted in league seas henceforth being owned by 
the crown in right of the respective littoral colonies, so that at 
federation their existed six Australian colonies in respect of each 
of which the crown in right of that colony owned its league 
seas. 124 
• Justice Murphy's judgement considered the question of the 
relationship of the legislation to international agreements relating to 
the territorial sea. He found that "although the colonies exercised 
some jurisdiction over the territorial sea before federation and were 
becoming involved in international agreements, on federation the 
territorial sea attached as an attribute of international personality to the 
Commonwealth. "125 
122 New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 338. 
123 Ibid. 407. 
124 Ibid.  439. 
125 Ibid. 338. 
151 • 
In upholding the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 the High Court 
resolved the questions of offshore jurisdiction, and using an 
appropriate metaphor, provided the "high tide" mark of 
Commonwealth offshore jurisdiction. The Gorton and Whitlam 
governments' proposals to assert, by declaratory legislation, jurisdiction 
from low water mark, raised considerable opposition from the States, 
who opposed any attempts to reduce their "sovereignty" offshore. The 
High Court provided a legal solution to the question of jurisdiction 
however the political fallout of the Seas and Submerged Lands case 
was to continue to be an important factor in Australian federalism and 
the offshore. Galligan comments that "frniuch of the political heat was 
taken out of the Court's decision because it came down in December 
1975 just after the new Fraser Liberal government had been sworn 
in. ”126 
Court's decision and their involvment in devising an 
intergovernmental arrangement which entrenched federalism offshore. 
The following Chapter examines the States' reaction to the High 
126 B. Galligan, 	Politics of the High Court : 229. 
Chapter Four 
Commonwealth - State Relations and the Offshore 
1975- 1979: 
Negotiating an Intergovernmental Agreement 
The Seas and Submerged Lands case raised several problems for the 
newly elected Fraser government in its dealings with the States. It had, 
by default, achieved the answer to the question of jurisdiction offshore 
which had eluded the Gorton, McMahon and Whitlam governments. 
The government, not surprisingly, welcomed the ratification of this 
area of Commonwealth power, but the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr 
Anthony, assured the States that sensible arrangements would be made 
with them. 1 This arrangement was likely to be complex to allow for 
the Commonwealth's interests yet also account for State concerns. The 
solution to the dilemma posed by the Seas and Submerged Lands -case 
was eventually resolved by the Fraser government's commitment to a 
co-operative new federalism, 2 a direct contrast with particular aspects 
of the federalism promoted by the Whitlam government3 - to which 
1 B. Galligan, 	Politics of the High Court, (St. Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1987): 229. See also Australian 18 December 1975. 
2 C. Sharman, 'The Commonwealth, the States and Federalism" in D. Woodward, A. 
Parkin, and J. Summers, (eds.) Government, Politics and Power in Australia (3rd ed.) 
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1985): 108. See also C. Saunders and K. Wiltshire, 
"Fraser's New Federalism 1975-1980: An Evaluation" Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, 26, 3 (1981): 355-371. 
153 
the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 was part. Most attention has 
focused on the fiscal elements of Fraser's new federalism, particularly 
in the attempt to return certain taxation powers to the States. 4 The 
OCS, however, has had greater impact and longevity, on Australian 
politics than the ill-fated proposal for reform of taxation sharing. 
The Reaction to the Seas and Submerged Lands Case 
Although the Fraser government's reaction to the Seas and 
Submerged Lands case became closely linked to the new federalism, 
the offshore was not originally seen by Fraser as integral to this set of 
proposals. Galligan has argued that the judicial decision in the Seas 
and Submerged Lands case provided the Fraser government with the 
possibility of "establish[ing] good faith with the states and [to] give some 
concrete substance to its new federalism rhetoric." 5 The Fraser 
government promoted the OCS as a response to a need to move away 
from the confrontation of the past and, in addition, provide clear 
substance to the new federalism by applying this framework to the 
"offshore problem". This view tends to downplay the significance of 
intergovernmental interaction and the States' ability to gain significant 
outcomes from the vague promises for "co-operation" and 
"consultation" offered them. An alternative perspective, therefore, 
3 This was, perhaps confusingly, also known as new federalism. For a comparison of 
the Fraser and Whitlam "New Federalisms" see A. Peachment and G. S. Reid, "New 
Federalism in Australia" in A. Parkin, J. Summers and D. Woodward, Government, 
Politics and Power in Australia: An Introductory Reader (2nd ed.) (Melbourne: Longman 
Cheshire,1980):108 426. 
4 R. Matthews, "Issues in Australian Federalism" Economic Papers 58 (April 1978): 1- 
14. A little known aspect of the new federalism was consultation with the States over 
the Commonwealth's ratification of treaties. This was also to impact on the offshore 
settlement, given the nexus between these issues and the deliberations at UNCLOS III 
5 B. Galligan, 	Politics of the High Court:229. 
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emphasises the States' influence in developing the OCS. The 
incorporation of the offshore problem into the new federalism ensured 
that the States' played a central role the implementation of the OCS 
arrangements. 
The Seas and Submerged Lands case provided the States with an early 
test of the Fraser government's commitment to its new federalism. 
Within three months of the almost co-incident High Court decision 
and the election of the Fraser government, the SCAG had met and 
"agreed to explore areas of co-operation in relation to the legal aspects 
of offshore matters." 6 Prior to this, the Commonwealth had 
circulated a paper setting out the "consequences" of the decision of the 
High Court. The SCAG paper stated that: 
in reaching this conclusion, the Court for the first time decided 
two matters of far-reaching importance. ... The first is that the 
States end at low-water mark and not at the three mile limit. The 
second is that the power to legislate with respect to external affairs 
authorises the Commonwealth Parliament to pass laws 
controlling and dealing with matters and events which are 
geographically beyond Australia's low water mark. 7 	- 
The Seas and Submerged Lands case had, therefore, considerable 
significance for the administration of a range of diverse activities in 
which the States were involved. These included the administration of 
petroleum activities, managing fisheries, and responsibility for 
prosecutions over crimes at sea. The Commonwealth proposed that 
three sub-committees of the SCAG should be established; (the 
"baseline", "seabed" and "offshore waters'! committees) 8 which were 
6 R. Cullen, Australian Federalism OffshoreAlst ed) Intergovernmental Relations in 
Victoria Program (Melbourne: Melbourne University Law School, 1985): 63 
7 Paper prepared for the Meeting of Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
Hobart 5th March 1976. Archives Office of Tasmania SGD 40 4 (1435/19). 
155 
to report back to a further meeting of Attorneys-General. The 
Commonwealth recommended: 
to the standing committee that problems affecting areas such as 
fishing, shipping and navigation, marine pollution, environment 
etc., should be dealt with in the first instance at meetings of the 
relevant State and Commonwealth Ministers. Their legal advisers 
[were] to report problems (if any) to the appropriate legal 
Committee who will in turn report to the Standing Committee. 9 
At this stage the Commonwealth made no commitments regarding 
potential solutions to the problems arising from the decision of the 
High Court in the Seas and Submerged Lands case. 
The process which resulted in the OCS was established by this meeting. 
The respective ministerial councils would consider the impact of the 
problems raised by the High Court decision but the intergovernmental 
settlement was to remain firmly in the control of the Commonwealth 
and State legal officials mediated through the SCAG. The central place 
of the law officers was to provide a distinctive pattern to these 
negotiations and affect a number of issues within the ambit of the 
offshore problem. Of these issues, the question of the status of the 
extra-territorial jurisdiction of the States in relation to fisheries 
legislation was of considerable concern for all States. 1 ° 
8 The subcommittees had the following responsibilities; 
Baseline Committee:  To identify principles for determining (a) baselines for measuring 
Territorial Sea, (b) Closing lines for historic bays, (c) closing lines of pre-federation 
internal waters. Seabed committee: To exchange views on available legal alternatives 
in areas such as mining (petroleum and otherwise), miscellaneous Crown leases and 
licenses, marine parks, Sea Protection Works etc. Offshore Waters Committee: To 
examine operation and administration of laws beyond State limits. See Agenda for 
meeting of Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Hobart 5th March 1976. Archives 
Office of Tasmania SGD 404 (1435/19). 
9 The Attorneys-General received the sub-committee reports in June 1976. 
10 Existing State fisheries legislation was, however, excluded, by specific savings 
156 
The States, Intergovernmental Relations and Fisheries 
Fisheries were, almost inevitably, to become a major element of any 
negotiations over the offshore. Chapter Two has argued that as 
Australian fisheries were dominated by inshore or coastal operations 
each State had a sizeable interest in administrative infrastructure and a 
long history in management of these resources. Each State gained 
important political resources from the establishment of complex 
regulatory arrangements giving strong links with State based fishing 
industry organisations. None of the States supported increasing the 
role for the Commonwealth, and articulated such views at the seventh 
meeting of the Australian Fisheries Council (AFC) held in October 
1976. Not surprisingly, given the position of the States, this meeting 
"resolved to apply the doctrine of the New Federalism to fisheries." 11 
At the parallel meeting of the AFC's Standing Committee, the 
Commonwealth officers announced that the Minister for Primary 
Industry, Ian Sinclair, had a view that the Commonwealth would 
provide the legislative control, and the States the administration of 
fisheries. The State and Territory officials were strongly opposed to this 
proposal given that Sinclair had earlier intimated that 
Commonwealth's view was to give the States greater control over 
fisheries. In a speech to the Australian Fishing Industry Council (ARC) 
in February 1976 - soon after taking office - Sinclair had stated "it is my 
intention to initiate discussions with State Ministers to ensure to the 
clauses, from the effects of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973. 
11  A. J. Harrison, "The Commonwealth Governments Role in the Administration of 
Australian Fisheries", mimeo, Hobart, Dept. Political Science University of Tasmania 
(October 1988): 68-69. 
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maximum their departments will be responsible for administration of 
fisheries jurisdiction to the limit of Australian jurisdiction." 12 
The States' position in negotiations over fisheries was further 
strengthened by litigation in the High Court. Although State Premiers 
had criticised the Seas and Submerged Lands case as leading to 
increased Commonwealth control over State fisheries, the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act 1973 had an extremely tenuous link with 
existing State fisheries legislation. As a result of legal action which 
challenged the validity of Western Australian State fisheries legislation 
on the basis of the outcome of the Seas and Submerged Lands case,13 
the High Court held "that there was no conflict between ... [the Western 
Australian] Act and the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 
(Cwth)."14 
Pearce v Florenca arose from the apprehension of a fishermen taking 
undersized rock lobsters (illegal under the Western Australian fisheries 
legislation) within three miles of low water mark. At a hearing in a 
lower court in_ Western Australia the defendant claimed that the 
Western Australian Fisheries Act was made redundant by the decision 
by the High Court in the Seas and Submerged Lands case. The 
magistrate "took the view that, because under the Commonwealth 
[Seas and Submerged Lands] Act sovereignty over the territorial sea and 
thus over the place where the offences were committed was vested in 
the Commonwealth, the relevant provisions of the state Act no longer 
12 B. Chatterton, arid L. Arnold, "Fisheries Management and the New Federalism" in 
D. Jaensch, (ed.) The Politics of the New Federalism, (Adelaide: APSA, 1977): 175. 
13 Pearce v Florenca (1976) 50 A.L.J.R. 670. 
14 R Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore (2nd ed)Intergovernmental Relations in 
Victoria Program (Melbourne: Melbourne University Law School, 1988): 55 
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had any valid operation as to that place in the territorial sea and 
dismissed the charges, holding that there was no case to answer." 15 
An appeal against the magistrate's decision in the Western Australian 
Supreme Court led to the matter being referred to the High Court. The 
High Court held that the Western Australian Fisheries Act had an 
"extraterritorial" character, related to the fact that the States could make 
laws with an extraterritorial reach if they related to the peace, welfare 
and good government of the State. 16 The High Court, in reinforcing 
the savings clauses of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act, provided 
judicial reinforcement of the States' interest in fisheries, an important 
resource in their negotiations with the Commonwealth. Unlike the 
management of offshore oil and gas, which was uncontestedly within 
the control of the Commonwealth following the 1958 Convention of 
the Continental Shelf and the decision in the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act, Pearce v Florenca upheld States' fisheries legislation 
within the three mile limit, and possibly outside this boundary, at a 
crucial period in intergovernmental interaction over the offshore. 17 
The reinforcement of State legislative power over fisheries, and the 
15 Pearce v. Florenca (1976) 50 A.L.J.R. 670. 
16 The major issue involved the section 6 of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act which 
"declares and enacts" that sovereignty in respect to the territorial sea is vested in the 
Commonwealth, even though the act included a savings provision in section 16 which 
did not limit or exclude the operation of any law of a state in force at the date of 
commencement of the Act or coming into force after that date, except in so far as the law 
is expressed to vest or make exercisable any sovereign rights. Stephen J argued that "it 
appears to me to be clear beyond debate that neither that section 6 or any other 
provision of that Act gives rise to any inconsistency between its provisions and those of 
the Fisheries Act (WA)" Pearce v. Florenca (1976) 50 A.L.J.R. 675. 
17 M. Haward, "The Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement", Marine Policy 
13,4 (October 1989): 334-348. 
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States' insistence that the Commonwealth stand by its proposal that 
they would retain the major proportion of fisheries management 
activity, contributed to the lengthy delay in gaining agreement over 
fisheries. An ongoing conflict related to the boundary between 
Commonwealth and State management, particularly in terms of 
licensing fishermen or vessels. As indicated in Chapter Two, conflict 
between the States and the Commonwealth had began to emerge in the 
late 1960s when, during a period of expansion in the Australian fishing 
industry, the Commonwealth began issuing licences for various 
fisheries previously under sole State licensing and regulation. In some 
cases, such as in the fisheries of Bass Strait, fishermen who were 
precluded from gaining licences or endorsements from State 
authorities could gain Commonwealth licences. Although these 
Commonwealth licences could be viewed as operating outside the 
three mile limit, the extra-territorial character of State fisheries powers 
made the position less clear, particularly when the State enforced size 
limits or other controls which may not have applied to those 
fishermen with Commonwealth licences. 
Given the practical problems arising from Commonwealth and State 
licences in the same fishery, it was not surprising that this issue was 
eventually the subject of litigation in the High Court. This action had 
the effect of narrowing the extent of unresolved questions concerning 
jurisdiction offshore. The definition and the extent of State 
jurisdiction in territorial waters, together with the issue of "closing 
lines" across bays or gulfs affecting the operation of Commonwealth 
and State fisheries licences in these waters, were raised in Raptis' 
case. 18 The Raptis fishing company had a Commonwealth but not a 
18 A Raptis and Sons v South Australia (1977) 51 A.L.J.R. 637. 
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South Australian licence to fish for prawns in waters off South 
Australia. Catches were seized by South Australian fisheries officers as 
no State licence was held. The company then challenged the seizure of 
the catch on the basis that since the area in which they were fishing was 
Commonwealth and not State waters, there was, therefore, no need for 
a State licence. In addition the writ brought by the company sought a 
declaration on the areas in which Commonwealth licences could 
operate. 
The South Australian government opposed the Commonwealth's 
"closing lines" - the baselines drawn around heavily indented 
coastlines - from which maritime boundaries are measured, arguing 
that the area at the heart of the challenge was in fact State waters. In 
effect South Australia claimed Investigator Strait as State waters by 
drawing a closing line from the mainland to Kangaroo Island. The case 
therefore raised the status and origin of "closing lines" and also the 
constitutional status of what were termed "historic bays". 19 The High 
Court rejected South Australia's claim, with "a majority . . . [finding] 
that the fish had been caught within waters that were neither within 
the territorial limits of the state nor within internal waters or the three 
mile territorial sea." 20 The High Court did find, from analysis of the 
Letters Patent establishing colonial boundaries, that Spencer Gulf and 
the Gulf of St. Vincent were historic waters and therefore to be 
considered "in effect inland waters within the State". These waters 
were, by definition, under State jurisdiction. The identification of 
"historic waters", identified from the colonial Letters Patent which 
19 For a detailed discussion of Raptis' case see R. Cullen, Australian Federalism 
Offshore, (2nd ed.): 58 and J. Waugh Australian Fisheries Law, Intergovernmental 
Relations in Victoria Program (Melbourne: Melbourne University Law School, 1988). 
20 R. Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore, (2nd ed.): 60. 
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included statements over the maritime domain covered by these 
instruments, was another important resource for South Australia and 
Tasmania in discussions with the Commonwealth over fisheries. 
The conflict over fishing licences at the heart of the dispute in the 
prawn fishery had led South Australia to support arguments presented 
by Western Australia and Victoria at the meeting of the Australian 
Fisheries Council in October 1976. Western Australia had "staged] the 
case for the dominance of State legislation and administrative control 
over State based ('isolated') fisheries." 21 This was seen as a suitable 
way of conforming with the "rationalisation of Commonwealth and 
State administration" proposed by Prime Minister Fraser's new 
federalism. The negotiations over fisheries were, none the less, 
inconclusive, at this stage being quickly swamped by broader questions 
emerging over the "seas and submerged lands matters". 
Intergovernmental Negotiations - The Ebb and Flow of "Seashore 
Federalism". 
In a letter dated 4th April 1977 Prime Minister Fraser assured the 
Premiers that he "would consult with the states on matters of principle 
touching seas and submerged lands policy". These matters were raised 
again at a Premiers' Conference on the 12th April 1977 at which Fraser 
reiterated the Commonwealth's concern over the offshore, and gave a 
promise to review Commonwealth policy in this area. Fraser 
undertook to forward any proposals from the Commonwealth to the 
Premiers prior to the next Premiers' Conference. Correspondence 
21 B. Chatterton and L. Arnold, "Fisheries Management and the New Federalism": 
175. 
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between the Prime Minister and individual Premiers followed, most 
directed at points raised in the Prime Minister's letter and supporting 
the convening of a Premiers' Conference to deal specifically with these 
matters.22 The Prime Minister's replies to the State Premiers gave an 
assurance that the Commonwealth "would not initiate any 
negotiations of a substantive or policy nature regarding those 
discussions" which were already in train.23 
One outcome of these discussions was that a special Premiers' 
Conference was held in October 1977 "to deal specifically with the 
offshore issue". 24 Prior to this conference Fraser, in a letter to the 
Victorian Premier, re-affirmed his government's position: 
An essential theme of our federalism policy is that we must 
restructure our forms and institutions of government, and our 
attitudes of mind, to general co-operation and not conflict, and to 
partnership and not domination. The Commonwealth should 
not be using the High Court judgement on the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act as a means of intruding into functions more 
properly the responsibility of the States. The Commonwealth's 
direct role should be confined to the minimum of areas in which, 
in the national interest, it is reasonable, rational and economic for 
the central government to have a role. Our approach is that we 
want to discuss with the states the options that are open. 25 
22  An example of this correspondence is the letter sent from the Tasmanian Premier to 
the Prime Minister on the 29th April "seeking clarification" of the Prime Ministers 
letter of the 4th April. Archives Office of Tasmania SGD 40 4 (1435/19). 
23 This Correspondence is summarised in Archives Office of Tasmania SGD 40 4 
(1435/19). 
24 R. Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore, (1st ed.): 64. It is interesting in the 
light of the intergovernmental negotiation over the implementation of the OCS 
packages, examined in more detail in Chapter Four, that Cullen implies there was only 
one issue that needed to be resolved at the Premiers' Conference. 
25 Letter from Fraser to Hamer 13 October 1977 Archives Office of Tasmania SGD 40 3 
(1435/18). 
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The Premiers' Conference of the 21st October 1977 dealt with the 
challenge posed by the Seas and Submerged Lands case in a 
particularly innovative manner. The States wished to have control 
over territorial waters "returned" to them and as this involved 
consideration of a number of factors, Prime Minister Fraser was 
naturally cautious in his response. 26 Weller's study of the Fraser 
Prime Ministership highlights the multilateral negotiations which 
followed; negotiations labelled, appropriately, by Weller, the "ebb and 
flow of seashore federalism". At the October Premiers' Conference 
Fraser was asked about the level of his commitment to return the 
territorial sea to the States. This no doubt reflected the concern felt by 
the State Premiers that such a proposal could easily fall apart, or that 
Fraser would use the High Court decision as a lever if the "states 
niggled too much." 27 The Prime Minister replied: 
[a]s to a firm commitment, whatever comes from here I have to 
take back to my own cabinet. However, Mr Anthony and Mr 
Lynch are here and I suppose we have a reasonable chance of 
getting something through cabinet. 28 
Following advice from the SCAG and the special offshore sub-
committees of the Solicitors-General, the Premiers' Conference agreed 
to five resolutions which were to form the basis of what was (much 
later) to be called the Offshore Constitutional Settlement. The 
resolutions were: 
1. That subject of the resolution hereunder with respect to 
offshore mining and fisheries, the territorial sea should be the 
responsibility of the states and that for this purpose the limits and 
26 P. Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM: A Study in Prime Ministerial Power, (Ringwood: 
,Penguin,1989): 296. 
Ibid: 293- 295. Weller had unrestricted access to the Fraser papers and to cabinet 
documents making this section of Malcolm Fraser PM an important source of material. 
28 'bid: 296. 
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powers of each state should be extended to embrace the territorial 
sea adjacent to it. This would not affect the Commonwealth's 
international responsibilities. 
2. That, in the case of offshore mining for petroleum and other 
minerals beyond the present state limits, there should be a joint 
Commonwealth/State authority or authorities, with the essential 
day-to-day administration being in the hands of the State 
concerned and to preserve the present arrangement for the 
sharing of royalties in the case of petroleum. The functions of 
these authorities and royalty arrangements in the case of other 
minerals are to be the subject of further examination. 
3. That control of fisheries to be considered at a later Premiers' 
Conference. In the meantime the question is to be considered by 
the Australian Fisheries Council and the Standing Committee of 
Attorneys-General. 
4. The Commonwealth's constitutional power with respect to 
navigation and shipping are acknowledged and no joint authority 
is contemplated. This is subject to the reservations made by the 
States in respect of certain vessels. 
5. The Standing Committee of Attorneys-General should be asked 
to advise on the legal means of achieving these ends. 29 
_ 
The State and Coinmonwealth Solicitors-General, comprising the 
"special committee of the standing Committee of Attorney-General On 
offshore matters other than offences at sea" met in Perth on the 3rd and 
4th November 1977. This meeting considered the various means by 
which the "limits or powers" of the States could be extended but also 
discussed the proposed joint authority for offshore oil and gas and the 
fisheries arrangements. Although the minutes of the meeting indicate 
that it was concerned "merely to identify possibilities rather than to 
attempt to argue for consensus" 3° a draft of the mechanisms available 
29 Resolutions of Premiers' Conference 21/10/77, Report of the Special Committee to 
the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 3/2/1978. Archives Office of Tasmania 
SGD 404 (1435/19). 
165 
to implement the Premiers' Conference resolutions regarding State 
"limits and powers" was prepared. 
A number of means could be used to achieve the extension of the 
"limits" of the States. These included the use of several constitutional 
provisions; Section 128 - (the referenda provision), Section 123 - 
(alteration of state limits), or Section 51 (xxxviii) - (the "request" 
power). Other methods included the use of the Imperial Colonial 
Boundaries Act 1895, or enacting specific Commonwealth legislation 
or specific United Kingdom legislation. The extension of the "powers" 
of the States could be made through Sections 128 or 51 (x)oariii) of the 
constitution or through specific Commonwealth legislation. 
These proposals were circulated to State and Commonwealth 
Solicitors-General, and discussed at a further meeting of the "special 
committee" in Melbourne on the 19th December 1977. The meeting of 
the special committee of Solicitors-General also briefly discussed "the 
desirability of having an agreement in writing between the 
Commonwealth and - the states that would set out the basic 
understandings sought by the states in relation to the offshore area." 31 
It also considered the operation of the proposed joint authorities, 
focusing on issues raised in a paper presented by Victoria. Fisheries 
matters had not been neglected and had been discussed at a meeting of 
the Standing Committee on Fisheries during the previous week. 
The issue of a formal, written, intergovernmental agreement over the 
30 ibid . 
31 Correspondence from Murray (Queensland Parliamentary Counsel) to Jennings 
(Tasmanian Solicitor-General), 4 January 1978, Archives Office of Tasmania SGD 40 4 
(1435/19. 
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offshore was to continue to be raised in correspondence, and at various 
meetings, between the members of the "special committee" and also at 
the SCAG. Queensland law officers prepared a draft of the basic 
provisions they considered necessary to be included in such an 
agreement, and in covering correspondence to other State officials 
provide an illuminating account of the States' position in 
intergovernmental negotiations to this point. 
The expectation would be that such an agreement would impose a 
moral obligation, at the least, on the present government and 
future governments of the Commonwealth to observe in respect 
of the offshore area the division of powers provided by the 
Constitution. While the significance of an agreement between the 
governments fades somewhat if the Constitution were suitably 
amended to secure States' jurisdiction to the outer limit of the 
territorial sea the existence of a formal agreement between the 
governments would be highly relevant if steps short of 
constitutional amendment were taken to support States' 
jurisdiction in the off-shore area. Its existence may act as a 
sufficient obstacle to a future Commonwealth government 
reversing the steps so far taken. 32 
Notwithstanding the fact that discussion had centred on the form of a 
formal intergovernmental "treaty", the Tasmanian law officers advised 
the Tasmanian Attorney-General that following their meetings: 
[n]o agreement has yet been reached by legal advisers as to the best 
means of implementing resolution 1 [extending the limits or 
powers of the states] of the Premiers' Conference. This issue too, 
which is fundamental, will be the subject of a report emanating 
from the legal advisers meeting on February 3rd 1978 and should, 
in the opinion of the Solicitor-General, be the subject of discussion 
between you and the Premier before you go to [the next meeting of 
the Standing Committee in] Wellington. Another document 
requiring political judgement is to be circulated amongst State 
advisers only sometime in January. Its purpose will be to 
strengthen what is likely to be the best solution found acceptable to 
32 ibid . 
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both the Commonwealth and the States. The Solicitor-General 
proposes to explain to you the nature and origin of this document 
and the role it might well play in an ultimate solution - when he 
meets you in early February. 33 
The next meeting of SCAG was scheduled for late February in 
Wellington, New Zealand. 34 The Commonwealth Attorney-General 
was concerned that this meeting may be an unsuitable forum in which 
to indude agenda items dealing with submerged lands: 
I have reservations about the appropriateness of including the 
Seas and Submerged lands item in the Agenda for the meeting of 
the Standing Committee to be held in Wellington. This is 
essentially an Australian political issue and it seems to me to be 
inappropriate that it should be discussed in New Zealand under 
the Chairmanship of the New Zealand Attorney-Genera1. 35 
The Special Committee of Solicitors-General met again between the 1st 
and 3rd February 1978 prior to the Wellington meeting of SCAG. The 
law officers met with fisheries and mines officials to discuss possible 
arrangements for offshore petroleum and fisheries. Reports from the 
meeting indicated that lallthough some progress was made . . . the 
question of new Federal arrangement with respect to mines and 
fisheries is not yet resolved".36 The Solicitors-General resolved to 
meet again in Adelaide on the 8th March where a new Commonwealth 
33  Correspondence from Tasmanian Crown Counsel to Hon. Brian Miller MLC 
(Tasmanian Attorney-General) 21st December 1977, Archives Office of Tasmania SGD 
404 (1435/19). 
34  As has been indicated in Chapter Two this ministerial council includes the New 
Zealand and Papua New Guinea Attorneys-General. 
35  Correspondence from Senator Durack (Commonwealth Attorney-General) to Hon B 
Miller MLC (Tasmanian Attorney-General) 23rd December 1977. Archives Office of 
Tasmania SGD 404 (1435/19). 
36  Correspondence from Jennings, (Tasmanian Solicitor-General) Ito Hon Brian Miller 
MLC (Tasmanian Attorney-General) 9 February 1978, Archives Office of Tasmania 
SGD 404 (1435/19). 
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paper on fisheries was to be circulated and a report made of ongoing 
discussions regarding offshore mining. The extensive debate over the 
"seas matters" reportedly led the Commonwealth Solicitor-General to 
comment that "I must admit for me the charm of the subject matter is 
nearing extinction" 37 but this meeting did settle the final report to the 
Attorneys-General on the question of extending the "limits and 
powers" of the States. 
Although the Commonwealth (and some State) Attorneys had 
believed that the offshore was better left as an "Australian matter", 
these issues were raised at SCAG by Victoria and Queensland. Little 
debate on these issues took place with the other States seeming happier 
to discuss such sensitive issues at later meetings. It was felt that given 
the nature of the "fine balance" achieved in the intergovernmental 
negotiations over the offshore, a special meeting of SCAG on the 
offshore should be called. The New Zealand and Papua New Guinea 
Attorneys-General indicated that they would not attend the next 
meeting of SCAG, resolved to be held on the 7th and 8th April 1978, in 
Melbourne. 
In spite of the limited debate on the offshore at the Wellington 
meeting, 1.11.10 gathering -Wv.as important as it was here that the 
Queensland Attorney-General, Lickiss, promoted the notion of a 
formal .written agreement between the Commonwealth and the States 
over the offshore matters. The normal rotation of SCAG to New. 
Zealand may have given Lickiss greater freedom to raise these issues; 
given the lack of any serious debate from other States on what was a 
major .issue for all Australian participants. The Queensland. 
government was also embroiled in a major conflict with the 
37 Informal Record of Meeting of Solicitors-General Committee, Archives Office of 
Tasmania SGD 404 (1435/19). 
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Commonwealth over control of the Barrier Reef, and this may provide 
some explanation for Queensland's insistence that a formal agreement 
be struck. Lickiss announced that he: 
would like to raise one matter in connection with this ["the seas 
matters"] - the form of the agreement between the 
Commonwealth and the governments of the States relating to 
sovereignty of the off-shore areas. Those of us who were at the 
Prime Minister and Premier's (sic.) Conference, were quite clear in 
our own minds as to what the clear intention was at that time, and 
since then, because of the lapse of time, question whether 
communication from that meeting has filtered accurately and 
adequately to various other Ministers who may have some role to 
play in relation to this, and to officers concerned with this who are 
assisting the governments who are able to bring to fruition the 
intention of the meeting. I would like to see an agreement drawn 
up between the Commonwealth and the States clearly setting out 
what was the real intention of the Premier's Conference and 
which is agreed to by the Prime Minister. I would like those 
guidelines to be printed so that those officers and Ministers who 
are participating in this exercise know precisely how far they can 
go, and how far they shouldn't go. 38 
The Attorneys-General agreed that the Solicitors General should 
examine the "Draft Commonwealth-State Agreement _ Relating to 
Sovereignty in Offshore Areas" prepared by Queensland. This move 
may well have been an example of "non-decision making" 39 to avoid 
38 Transcript of Meeting of Standing Committee of Attorneys-General Wellington 
February 1978, Archives Office of Tasmania T 3 SGD 40 4 (1435/19). Lickiss' approach 
to the Premiers' Conference, referring to 'Prime Minister and Premier's Conferences' is 
interesting in the light of the argument he was advancing. The lack of formal meetings 
between State Premiers outside the Premiers' Conference - Loan Council meeting chaired 
by the Prime Minister is in direct contrast with Canadian practice. The new federalism 
initiative of 1990-1991 led to the States proposing a Council of the Australian 
Federation, a meeting of Heads of Government to discuss broader issues than federal 
financial relations. The Commonwealth has endorsded the creation of the Council of 
Australian Governments, which will provide an important adjunct to existing elements 
of executive federalism in Australia. 
39 P. Bachrach and M. Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical 
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the multiplicity of problems in such an arrangement, including the 
Commonwealth lack of support for such an agreement. 
The proposed draft intergovernmental agreement was considered by 
the committee of Solicitors-General, who provided a report to the 
Attorneys-General at the Melbourne meeting of the SCAG. The 
Solicitors-General indicated that the draft agreement posed problems in 
terms of the resolutions referred to the Attorneys-General from the 
October 1977 Premiers' Conference. The Solicitors-General considered 
that the Premiers' Conference resolutions were deliberately vague and 
ambiguous but that the benefits of the Queensland proposal did little to 
outweigh the advantages of a looser arrangement. As a result the 
Attorneys-General agreed that the Draft Agreement was "designed to 
hold the Commonwealth on its political promises [and] although [they] 
agreed to be a good proposal is not to be proceeded with at this stage." 4° 
Several issues were not addressed in the Draft Agreement, with the law 
officers finding three areas which would make a formal agreement 
difficult. The first problem arose as "differing views were expressed" 
over whether the territorial sea was confined to three miles or could 
accommodate any future changes in its breadth. A second complication 
arose relating "to the scope of the power" which remains with, the 
Commonwealth after the change in responsibilities vis 'a vis the 
Commonwealth and States over the offshore had been effected. A 
third issue concerned the "express reservation" of offshore mining and 
framework" American Political Science Review, 57 (1963); 632-642. 
4° Memoranda to Tasmanian Acting Solicitor-General 10 April 1978, Archives Office 
of Tasmania SGD 404 (1435/19). 
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fisheries" in the resolutions of the Premiers' Conference which would 
restrict the efficacy of a formal agreement over offshore sovereignty. 41 
Of more importance, and with greater consequence, was the Solicitors'- 
General advice to the Attorneys-General over the extension of "the 
limits and powers" of the States. This advice involved a detailed 
consideration of the constitutional and legal options available to 
implement the resolutions of the October 1977 Premiers' Conference 
which would be central to any settlement of the offshore problem. 
These options, Sections 128, 123 or 51 (xxxviii) of the constitution, 
legislation under the Colonial Boundaries Act, or specific United 
Kingdom legislation were put to the SCAG. Opinion at SCAG was 
divided between the use of Sections 128 and 51 (xxxviii) with most 
States favouring them as their first or second choices. 42 
41 Reports of the Solicitor-General on Seas Matters: Draft Commonwealth State 
Agreement Relating to Sovereignty in Offshore Area (sic) Archives Office of Tasmania 
SGD 404 (1435/19). 
The order of preferences were: 
Commonwealth - S128, S51(38), S123, United Kingdom legislation., Colonial. 
Boundaries Act; 
New South Wales - S128, S51(38), S123, Colonial. Boundaries Act, United Kingdom 
legislation; 
Queensland - United Kingdom legislation, S51(38), S128, S123, Colonial Boundaries 
Act; 
South Australia - "each way bet" between S51(38) and S128; 
Tasmania - "equally divided" between S128 and S51(38); 
Victoria - S51(38), S128, S123, United Kingdom Legislation, Colonial Boundaries Act; 
Western Australia - S51(38),United Kingdom legislation, S128, S123, Colonial 
Boundaries Act. 
Standing committee of Attorneys-General 7/8th April 1978, Archives Office of 
Tasmania SGD 404 (1435/19). 
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Each proposal had its drawbacks. A referendum formally altering the 
constitution to incorporate the resolutions was the most emphatic 
solution although the process involved did not guarantee achieving 
the desired outcome. A request to the British parliament to pass 
specific legislation was an option, although this also raised several 
problems in terms of Australia's legislative independence. As 
indicated in Chapter One the States could refer matters to the 
Commonwealth under the "reference" power (Section 51 x)(xvii) of the 
constitution, although this was the reverse of what was desired by the 
States - the return of jurisdiction. 43 The "request" power (Section 51 
xxxviii) seemed to provide a greater opportunity although it had never 
been used and there was some doubt over its purpose. The reluctance 
of the legal officers and Ministers to chance the offshore 
accommodation on a referendum is understandable. 
The federal Parliamentary Labor Party maintained its support for the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 making it difficult to produce a bi-
partisan referendum on the offshore. Referendum history, reinforced 
•by the events of the 1988 referendums, clearly shows that proposals 
which do not have the unanimous support of both major political 
parties and from all the States will fail. The option to amend formally 
the constitution was, therefore, of limited use to reduce 
intergovernmental tensions over the offshore. The political 
imperatives driving the offshore negotiations saw Section 51 (xxxviii) 
43 Section 51 xxxvii (the reference power), although "expressly contemplat[ing] that 
the States may refer legislative powers to the Commonwealth" has been rarely used 
although Saunders believes that this appears to be related to political rather than 
legal concerns. C. Saunders, Intergovernmental Arrangements: Legal and 
Constitutional Framework, Papers on Federalism 14, Intergovernmental Relations in 
Victoria Program (Melbourne: Centre for Comparative, Constitutional Studies: 
September, 1989): 6. See also K.W. Ryan & W.D. Hewitt, The Australian 
Constitutional Convention, Occasional Paper 6, (Canberra: CRFFR/ANU, 1977):11. 
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being promoted as a solution to the "offshore problem", simply because 
there was, in effect, no altemative.44 
" Croirunelin, in his analysis of the legal and constitutional issues surrounding offshore 
mining and petroleum, provides a detailed analysis of the drafting history of section 51 
(xxxviii). M. Crommelin, Offshore Mining and Petroleum : Legal and Constitutional 
Issues, Papers on Federalism 3 Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria Program 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Law School, 1981): 8-14. A detailed examination of a 
legal interpretation of the use of the reference powers is found in K. Booker, "Section 
51(xxxviii) of the Constitution" UNSW Law Journal 4 (1981): 91 and R. D. Lumb, 
"Section 51, pl. (xxxviii) of the Commonwealth Constitution" Australian Law Journal, 
55 (June 1981): 328-332. A broader interpretation of the placitum in undertaken by G. 
Winterton, "Section 51 (xxxviii) of the Constitution and Amendment of the "Covering 
Clauses" UNSW Law Journal 5 (1982): 327-330. Constitutional issues raised by the use 
of placitum xxxviii are discussed by R. Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore, (2nd 
ed.) Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria Program (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Law School, 1988). The provision was debated during both the first and second 
Constitutional Conventions during the 1890s. At the 1891 Convention Sir Samuel 
Griffiths drew "special attention" to the provision and commented that 
we are aware ... that there are many things now upon which the legislatures and 
governments of the several Australian colonies may agree, and upon which they 
may desire to see a law established, but we are obliged, if we want that law to be 
made, to go to the parliament of the United Kingdom, and ask them to be good 
enough to make the law for us. ... It is not proposed by this provision to enable 
the parliament of the Commonwealth to interfere with the state legislatures; but 
only, when the state legislatures agree in requesting such legislation, to pass it, so 
that there shall be no longer any recourse to a parliament beyond our shores when 
once this constitution has been passed by the parliament of the United Kingdom. 
Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian Convention (Sydney 
1891): 253. See also J. Quick and R.R. Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the 
Australian Commonwealth, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1901): 651. At the 1898 
session of the second Convention debate focussed on the meaning of the words "exercise 
within the Commonwealth" and the confusion arising from the reference in the 
placitum to powers exercised by the Federal Council of Australasia. Isaacs pointed out 
that this body was to be dissolved upon' the assent of the Constitution Act and 
therefore queried its purpose. Notwithstanding Isaacs' argument only minor 
amendments were made to this, provision. These amendments meant that the placitum 
was extended to include the words "any power" rather than Griffith's earlier proposal 
which was more limited, referring to "the power". M. Crommelin, Offshore Mining 
and Petro. leum: 13. 
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SCAG accepted that Section 51 (xxxviii) or Section 128 were the 
appropriate mechanisms to extend the limits or powers of the States, in 
accordance with the resolutions of the 1977 Premiers' Conference. 
Although Section 51 (xxxviii) was first used as the constitutional 
anchor for the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980, the provision 
was also used to anchor the Australia Acts 1986. This legislation, like 
the offshore settlement, was predicated upon an agreement between 
the Commonwealth and the States as the trigger for the use of the 
request provision. Not surprisingly the enactment of the Australia 
Acts 1986 provided considerable impetus for analysis of the request 
pow er. 45 Zines suggests, following a consideration of Section 51 
(xxxviii) in relation to the Australia Acts 1986, that the provision 
"should be interpreted according to its terms and . . . to pass other 
legislation that was not within the competence of the Commonwealth 
or the States on 1 January 1901. 1 ' 16 
The Victorian Attorney-General, Mr Haddon Storey, chairing the 
meeting of SCAG observed that: 
I think the Constitution, section 51(38) comes out first, and. . . the 
United Kingdom legislation, closely afterwards. The question is 
now whether the Ministers would like to discuss those two 
45 Given the increased interest in intergovernmental affairs in the 1970s and 80s 
greater interest was given to the interchange of legislative powers between the 
Commonwealth and States. Booker has noted that "Monstitutional commentators 
largely ignored section 51 (xxxviii) after Quick and Garran concluded that it was 
difficult to see what power it conferred" "Section 51 (XXXVIII) of the Constitution" 
1.1.N.S.W Law Journal 4 (1981): 91. Lumb identifed the range of interpretations given to 
the meaning of section 51 (xxxviii) "Section 51, pl. (xxxviii) of the Commonwealth 
Constitution" Australian Law Journal, 55 (June 1981): 328-332. 
46 L. Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (2nd ed.) (Sydney: 
Butterworths,1987): 273 -279. 
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alternatives to see whether in the light of the final discussion 
there is any final view.47 
This discussion then centred on the viability of the alternative 
proposals. The lack of precedent in using Section 51 (xxxviii) was of 
some concern whereas Section 128 had its own particular, and well, 
appreciated, problems. Senator Durack, the Commonwealth Attorney-
General supported the use of the request power, although he believed 
that Section 128 was: 
from the legal point of view, ... a most excellent way of [extending 
the limits and powers of the States]. Of course, I am not anxious to 
have a referendum and from that point of view the use of section 
51 (38) is most attractive and I personally have got a great deal of 
regard for it." 
The report of the Standing Committee's meeting in the 
Commonwealth Record° noted that the SCAG had "considered [a] 
legal framework for the new accord on offshore matters", 50 which was 
to be considered at the 1978 Premiers' Conference. 
- _ 
"Seas and Submerged Lands" comprised item three of the Premiers' 
Conference which opened on 22 Tune 1978. Within this item there 
were 12 subsidiary matters 51 listed for consideration. Only five 
47 Transcript of Meeting of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 7/8th April 
1978, Archives Office of Tasmania SGD 40 4 (1435/19). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Commonwealth Record 3-9 April 1978, 320-321. 
5° Ibid: 320. 
51 These included Crimes at Sea, Port Type Facilities, Offshore Fisheries, Offshore 
Mining for Petroleum and Other Minerals, Offshore Non-Petroleum Royalties, Marine 
Pollution-Land Based, Shipping and Navigation, Marine Parks, Marine Pollution-Ship 
Sourced, Marine Pollution Through Dumping, Historic Shipwrecks and the Extension of 
Limits or Powers of the States. 
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(extension of limits or powers, crimes at sea, ports, offshore fisheries 
and offshore mining) were discussed at the conference. Prior to this 
meeting Commonwealth cabinet had met to consider issues arising 
from SCAG and from the extensive discussions with the States. As part 
of its deliberations the Commonwealth had sought several legal 
opinions over the use of Section 51 (xxxviii) and particularly how this 
mechanism would bind the Commonwealth. Of the "seven legal 
opinions sought five thought Section 51 (xxxviii) legislation could be 
unilaterally repealed by the commonwealth without the states being 
consulted." 52 Notwithstanding concern over the use of placitum 
,ocxviii, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet suggested that 
cabinet not consider any approach that could contradict the resolutions 
agreed at the 1977 Premiers' Conference as this "might allow Premiers 
to reopen the issue."53 Cabinet eventually endorsed the use of Section 
51 (xxxviii), if agreed by the State premiers, to extend "the powers, not 
the boundaries of the states to the three mile limit." 54 
The bargaining and manoevering over the offshore continued at the 
1978 Premiers' Conference. The States were wary of the unprecedented 
use of the request power, particularly as the possibility remained of the 
Commonwealth being able to unilaterally repeal the legislation and 
therefore overturn any intergovernmental settlement. As a result 
several Premiers urged the Commonwealth to use United Kingdom 
legislation to ensure the entrenchment of the scheme to extend State 
52 P Weller, Malcolm Fraser: PM, 297. For a contrary view of the possibility of repeal 
see M. Crommelin, Offshore Mining and Petroleum: Constitutional Issues 
Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria Program, Papers on Federalism No. 3, 
(Melbourne: University of Melbourne I.Aw School, 1981). 
53 P. Weller, Malcolm Fraser: PM,297-298. 
54 Ibid: 298. 
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limits and powers. Such views were encapsulated in the statement 
from New South Wales ALP Premier Wran: 
[n]o one cares how we give effect to what are fundamental 
objectives we are agreed upon .... The only issue is how to do it in 
a way which will be legally binding and least subject to challenge 
in the courts.55 
A resolution prepared by Victoria (which was the only State to agree 
with Prime Minister Fraser that an appeal to the British parliament 
should be the last resort) 56 was adopted, with minor amendments, by 
the Premiers. The Premiers' Conference resolution read: 
That the powers of the States be extended to the territorial sea 
including the seabed, by the use of Section 51 (38) in such a 
manner as to confer upon the States the same powers as they 
possess over the land mass. That the use of Section 51 (38) be 
supported by the appropriate amendment of the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act and the vesting of proprietary rights in the 
states in respect of the seabed of the territorial sea.57 
At the 1978 Premiers' Conference Prime Minister Fraser remained 
closely involved in the negotiations. The following transcript shows 
the cent-al role of the Prime Minister: 
Mr. Fraser: Could I get agreement that in relation to shipping and 
navigation, marine parks, marine pollution-ship sourced, marine 
pollution through dumping, historic shipwrecks and royalties for 
offshore petroleum and offshore mining for minerals other than 
55 Ibid. This statement was to be later attacked by Whitlam as contributing to the 
unravelling of the ALP's achievements in resolving the question of jurisdiction. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Transcript of the Premiers Conference June 1978, 58-59. Summary prepared for the 
Solicitors-General Committee 11th July 1978, Archives Office of Tasmania SGD 40 4 
(1435/19). 
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petroleum that we commit ourselves to meaningful discussion 
aimed at getting agreement? That will enable us to move to 
resolve all outstanding issues upon which progress has not been 
made. Could we have as an objective getting it all cleaned up in 
the next twelve months so that hopefully we can ratify everything 
at a subsequent Premiers' Conference and get it all put away? 
Mr Hamer: Could I suggest that these matters be committed to the 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General which can,as it has in 
the past, draw advice from appropriate sources? 
Mr Fraser: That is the way in which it has been working. 
Sir Charles Court: I take it that it is now a question of the 
Attorneys-General reaching agreement as to the form that this 
should take. We are anxious that no legislation on the question of 
shipping and navigation be introduced until agreement is reached. 
Mr Fraser The purpose is to get agreement. We will not go ahead 
unilaterally. 58 
This extract indicates the desire of the Commonwealth to maintain 
progress, but also the important influence of the State Premiers in 
shaping a consensus over the offshore. Practical issues surrounding 
the use of the request power dictated a consensus approach but the 
more the States could engage the Commonwealth in negotiation the 
less likely the arrangement would unravel. The desire to resolve the 
outstanding matters prior to the 1979 Premiers' Conference is also clear, 
as is the merit of the approach so far taken by the Attorneys-General 
and the centrality of legal advisers in the process. Following the 
Premiers' Conference the Solicitors-Generals "special committee" 
considered the next stage to be "a full examination. . . by legal advisers 
drawing on the advice of the appropriate policy departments [which] 
58 Transcript of the Premiers Conference June 1978, 79. (Emphasis added). It is 
interesting that Court and Hamer, crucial actors in gaining the Special Premiers' 
Conference the previous year, continued to maintain pressure on Fraser. 
179 
should identify the issues that need to be resolved as between the States 
and the Commonwealth."59 
The State officials were aware that one outstanding issue was the effect 
of developments in customary international law of the sea, particularly 
the increasing support for coastal states to expand their territorial seas 
- from three to twelve miles. These developments were viewed with 
interest by certain States who sought an increased role if Australia 
moved to an extended territorial sea. While domestic policy had had 
little effect on Australia's position at meetings of the United Nations 
Third Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III), the States had observed 
that the Canadian provinces had representatives on their national 
delegation to these meetings and argued strongly for greater 
consultation over the deliberations at UNCLOS 
UNCLOS III and Intergovernmental Relations Over the Offshore 
The Australian States had long been concerned over the implications 
of the- "external affairs power", and particularly the implications of the 
law of the sea since the Seas and Submeged Lands case. As part of 
their response to the Fraser new federalism, the States had pressed for 
greater involvement in treaty making and particularly to be 
represented on Australian delegations to meetings negotiating 
international treaties. In relation to the question of the offshore the 
States pressed for a representative on the delegation to the UNCLOS III 
meeetings which had begun in 1974. 
59  Summary of Premiers' Conference 11 July 1978, prepared for the Solicitors-General 
Committee 11th July 1978, Archives Office of Tasmania SGD 40 4 (1435/19). 
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The Fraser government's new federalism acknowledged the 
importance the States placed on such treaty negotiations and moved to 
co-opt a representative of the States to the Australian delegation . to 
UNCLOS III. Tasmanian Solicitor-General Roger Jennings was 
appointed the first States' "advisor" on the Australia delegation 
(beginning with the the seventh session of the UNCLOS III conference 
held between March-May 1978). Jennings had been closely involved 
with the "ebb and flow" of offshore federalism; responsible for 
attempting to present the Tasmanian case to the Privy Council in 1973, 
appearing before the High Court in the Seas and Submeged Lands case 
as well as having a lengthy involvement in the special committees 
advising SCAG. His "primary functions were to advise the Delegation 
on those areas which are, or are likely to become, of special interest to 
the State Governments and inform State governments of these 
matters. "60 
The well-established linkages between Commonwealth and State 
officials over the "seas matters" were an important part of the process 
which resolved domestic intergovernmental issues over the offshore. 
An important adjunct to this process was the parallel international 
negotiations occurring at the sessions of UNCLOS III. As it became 
clear that deliberations at UNCLOS III supported an extended 
territorial sea, the spatial extent of the agreement over extended State 
powers and jurisdiction within the Australian territorial sea became 
critical. The Commonwealth maintained its view that these 
arrangements were based on a three mile "territorial sea" while the 
6° Department of Foreign Affairs, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea Seventh Session Geneva 28 March -19 May 1978 - Report of the Australian 
Delegation, (Canberra: AGPS, 1978). 
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States wanted greater flexibility, and the possibility of the area under 
State control extending if Australia moved to extend its territorial sea 
to twelve miles. 
International law and the reach of the external affairs power on 
domestic policy also impacted on the offshore in more specific ways. A 
long - running dispute between Queensland and the Commonwealth 
centred on the administration of fishing in the Torres Strait, which 
became an international maritime boundary with Papua New Guinea's 
independence in 1975. The Queensland government's negotiations, or 
intransigence, over the Torres Strait had a major influence on the 
attempts to ratify this treaty. Hugh Collins argues that as a result "the 
history of the Torres Strait Treaty is as much a study in 
Commonwealth-State diplomacy as bilateral negotiations between 
Australia and New Guinea". 61 He adds: 
Wile Torres Strait Treaty . . . stands as an example of a genuinely 
federal issue in Australia's external relations. Here was a matter 
of national policy in international affairs, yet neither Canberra nor 
Brisbane could act unilaterally to resolve it. 62 
Queensland's early refusal to compromise over what it saw as as an 
example of "states rights" and the complexity of negotiating fishing 
arrangements between Queensland, the Commonwealth and Papua 
New Guinea, explains why the Torres Strait Treaty, signed in 1978, was 
not ratified by Australia until 1985. 63 
61 H. Collins, "Federalism and Australia's External Relations" Inaugural Arthur 
Calwell Memorial Lecture, Australian Outlook 39, 2 (August 1985): 124. 
62 rbid . 
63 M. Haward, "The Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement" Marine :Policy 
13, 4 (October 1989). See also J.R.V. Prescott, Australia's Maritime Boundaries, 
Canberra Studies in World Affairs No.16, (Canberra: ANU, 1985). 
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The development of the Torres Strait Treaty provides a useful example 
of the influence of intergovernmental relations and the development 
of treaties and policies towards the management of marine resources. 
Prescott comments that "it was the need to produce complex legislation 
to govern fisheries (of Torres Strait] in Canberra, Port Moresby and 
Brisbane and to ensure that the legislation meshed perfectly that caused 
the long delay before ratification." 64 
The Queensland government's attitude to the Torres Strait illustrates 
the muti-faceted nature of the offshore "problem". In addition there 
were other more specific complications with the Torres Strait issue. 
Weller notes that the Fraser government found that: 
[d]ealing with Queensland meant dealing with Joh [Bjelke-
Petersen]. That meant relations were often unpredictable and 
never straight forward". 65 
As personal relations between Bjelke-Petersen and Fraser became 
strained Fraser used "intermediaries or emissaries" to negotiate a range 
of intergovernmental issues, including the - Torres Strait Treaty, 
agreement over the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park and aboriginal 
policy. These emissaries were able to trade off various elements in 
each of the different policy areas to gain Queensland's support of the 
intergovernmental arrangements offshore. At the same time the 
Commonwealth was asserting its interests in the Great Barrier Reef it 
was preparing to hand back to Queeensland control of aboriginal 
set tlements. 66 
64 J.R.V. Prescott, Australia's Maritime Boundaries: 123. 
65 P. Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM: 278. 
66 K. Wiltshire, Planning and Federalism, (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 
1986): 146. 
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In spite of the problems posed by Queensland, the search continued for 
an agreement over the offshore. Much had been accomplished 
between October 1977 and June 1978, due to the efforts of the committee 
work by the Commonwealth and State Solicitors-General. While all 
Premiers agreed with the principles behind the Fraser government's 
proposal, several issues still remained unresolved. It is interesting that 
the Commonwealth continued negotiating over these points rather 
than implementing the agreement over the use of the request power to 
extend States "powers or limits" in the territorial sea. While the 
"settlement" of the "offshore problem" hung in the balance - having 
survived two federal elections in 1977 and 1980 - the Commonwealth 
was not prepared to allow individual States to articulate ambit claims 
which may have disrupted the processes of entrenching the settlement 
or have Commonwealth interests negotiated away. 
An example of such a barrier to an agreement was the Queensland 
government's claims over management of the Great Barrier Reef. The 
Queensland government had opposed the Whitlam government's 
legislation establishing the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park in 1975, 
maintaining that the area was the responsibility of the Queensland 
government. Although Premier Bjelke-Petersen was to continue to 
hold this position, Prime Minister Fraser made statements in the 
House of Representatives which indicated to Queensland that the 
Commonwealth's Great Barrier Reef. Marine Park legislation would 
remain intact although the State would have a role in management. 67 
Final agreement over the management of the Great Barrier Reef 
67 Fraser made statements on the Great Barrier Reef on the 22nd May 1979 in answering 
a question and in a Ministerial Statement of the 4th June 1979. 
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Marine Park was reached between the Commonwealth and 
Queensland in the middle of June 1979, just prior to the Premiers' 
Conference which concluded the offshore arrangement. 
This agreement effectively ended fifteen years of tension over 
responsibilities for the Great Barrier Reef. The key to the settlement of 
the intergovernmental dispute over the management of the Great 
Barrier Reef became known as the "Emerald Agreement", so named as 
the crucial, final, meeting over the Reef held in the central Queensland 
town of Emerald. The agreement reconciled several contentious issues. 
Existing Commonwealth legislation would remain and the boundaries 
of the marine park established by this legislation would not be altered. 
A Ministerial Council would be established to address the key issues 
concerning the management of the marine park, with Queensland to 
have responsibility for the day-to-day running of the park, subject to 
guidelines established by the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority. 
It was envisaged that the ministerial council would have oversight 
over the management of activities in the region. 
The Emerald Agreement also established that Queensland legislation 
would be amended to complement the Commonwealth's marine park 
legislation, and following the offshore settlement agreed that 
Queensland would have control within the three mile limit. The final 
component of the agreement included the resolution to proclaim the 
first area of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park - the Capricornia 
section. The. Emerald Agreement resolved "the issue of control and 
management (3f the Great Barrier Reef which haid] clouded the whole 
topic of present and proposed offshore constitutional 
185 
arrangements." 68 
The federal Opposition had remained concerned over the management 
of the Great Barrier Reef, and in particular the issue of oil drilling, 
attacking the lack of progress in asserting the Commonwealth's 
interests in the management of the reef. In defending his 
government's position the Prime Minister referred to the majority 
recommendations of the Royal Commission into exploratory and 
production drilling in Great Barrier Reef which had submitted its 
report in November 1974 (see Chapter Two). Prime Minister Fraser 
announced that "there should be no renewal of petroleum exploration 
permits in the region until the results of both short and longer term 
research are known." 69 Fraser also acknowledged that the 
Commonwealth had constitutional powers over the Great Barrier Reef 
(stemming from the Seas and Submerged Lands case) although he also 
informed parliament that "[d]iscussions with Queensland on the 
interrelated questions of the Premiers' Conference agreements on the 
extension of state powers to the territorial seas and the management of 
the Great Barrier Reef are at an advanced stage." 70 
The Emerald Agreement reflected the realities of federalism offshore 
and was achieved against a backdrop of the State's rights rhetoric of the 
Queensland Premier, who had continually opposed the involvement 
of the Commonwealth in what he regarded as a jewel in a solely 
Queensland crown. The successful establishment of the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Ministerial Council and consultative committee 
68 Commonwealth Record 25 June-1 July 1979: 831. 
69  Commonwealth Parliamenatary Debates (House of Representatives) 4 /6/ 1979: 
2839. 
70 Ibid: 2840. 
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resolved a major "loose end" of the offshore scheme, and ensured that 
Queensland would join the other States in agreeing to the offshore 
scheme, satisfying the unanimity condition for the use of Section 51 
:ocxviii. 
The contretemps over the Great Barrier Reef was a microcosm of the 
broader processes of intergovernmental interaction over the offshore. 
Although Queensland had continued to maintain its position of "state 
rights" over the reef, its bargaining position and any potential veto of 
Commonwealth involvement, was gradually eroded. The Seas and 
Submerged Lands case was important, although the Commonwealth's 
influence was reinforced by bipartisan parliamentary support for the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975. The signing of the Torres 
Strait Treaty in 1978 was a further limitation on Queensland's 
bargaining although, as discussed earlier, the ratification of this treaty 
had to take account of Queensland's concerns over fisheries 
management. Following the agreement over the offshore settlement, 
the listing of the Reef under the World Heritage convention in 1981 71 
gave a further reinforcement to the Commonwealth's influence in the 
region and, in effect, entrenched its involvement as a result of the 
obligations arising from this convention. 
While the flurry over the Emerald agreement was important in settling 
tensions over the Great Barrier Reef, the agreement with Queensland 
for joint management had broader implications. The high politics over 
the Great Barrier Reef culminating in the Emerald Agreement reflects 
the significance of a potential Queensland veto over the offshore 
scheme which could arise from Queensland's unhappiness over • 
71 The Convention for the World's Cultural and Natural Heritage UNESCO (1972). 
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arrangements governing the Great Barrier Reef. This is a good example 
of the bargaining which accompanied intergovernmental interaction. 
Queensland implemented various strategies in attempting to maximise 
its involvement offshore; Queensland officials and Ministers had 
attempted to establish a written agreement over the Commonwealth's 
role on the offshore. When this failed Queensland used the need for 
"minimum tolerable consensus" as leverage to maximise its 
involvement in the management of the Great Barrier Reef. It is 
possible that Queensland fought hard for something that the Fraser 
government was always going to give it, but the theatre of 
intergovernmental interaction was, as usual, directed at a State 
audience. 
Queensland played a predictable hand; given that all States needed to 
pass legislation under the request provisions of Section 51 (xxxviii) they 
attempted to hold out for a particular deal on the Barrier Reef. Since 
there were other players involved in the game, Queensland could not 
win using this strategy and was subject to increased pressure from these 
other players. Eventually, as Weller indicates, Fraser's patience was 
wearing thin72 and the pressure on Queensland to accept proposals for 
joint action (the Emerald Agreement) intensified. Part of this pressure 
related to the potential problems which would occur if the 1978 in 
principle agreement was not completed As a result of the Emerald 
Agreement little stood in the way of intergovernmental settlement 
over the offshore. All that was needed was the premiers' Conference to 
ratify the various agreements which became known as the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement. 
72 P. Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM: 301. 
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The Intergovernmental Settlement 
The Premiers Conference of June 1979 provided the final stage in the 
extensive intergovernmental and inter-institutional interaction over 
the in principle intergovernmental agreement concerning "seas and 
submerged lands matters" Apart from a last minute attempt by some 
States to push for an extension of State controlled waters if the 
Commonwealth extended its territorial sea to twelve miles, the meeting 
ratified the in principle position of the previous year. The State 
Premiers agreed to the compact which had been managed, in effect, by 
the Solicitors-General. The attempts by some of the States to maintain 
an open claim over the territorial sea illustrates the finely balanced 
nature of the offshore agreement. As Weller recounts: 
Fraser stood firm at the 1979 Premiers' Conference. He pointed 
out to the Premiers that the federal government did not have to 
use section 51 (xxxviii). It could simply amend the Seas and 
Submerged Lands legislation; indeed this had been the earliest 
preferred tactic, but had changed because of states wishes. He 
would certainly not concede . . . [to continued pressure] on the 
issue of an approach to Britain which he declared 'offensive'. 73 
The Premiers' Conference ratified earlier decisions regarding the 
legislative design of the extension of "state limits or powers". The 
resulting agreement was given the title "the Offshore Constitutional 
Settlement", a curious name for an explicitly political device. 74 This 
arrangement was publicised as a major achievement in "co-operative 
federalism", and as showing the new federalism at work, although as is 
73 P. Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM: 301. 
74,It appears the title of the agreement was chosen by Pat Brazil then Secretary of 
the Attorney-Generals department. Brazil was to also be reponsible for the rather 
more controversial advice regarding the announcement of the proclamation of the 
State Titles Act in February 1983, action which took place during the federal election 
campaign of that year. P Brazil pers. comm. December 1989. 
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clear in the preceding discussion, the Commonwealth had considerable 
influence, and exercised a veto, in the negotiations leading to the 
agreement. Fraser's role in the settlement was acknowledged by the 
States' with Premier Wran stating that it was necessary to: 
record the historic nature of the decision that has been made. We 
would want to compliment you Mr Prime Minister for the role 
you have played in what to my mind has -been the best illustration 
of co-operative federalism in the last three years. 75 
Bjelke-Petersen, having lost the battle for sole control over the Great 
Barrier Reef, was to state later "I believe that it is a mark in State - 
Commonwealth relations that the Fraser - Anthony government agreed 
to return to the states control of our territorial seas - a step which was 
taken after numerous representations to the federal government and 
following challenges in the High Court."76 Both Wran and Bjelke-
Petersen saw the issue as centering on the States' control over the area 
from low water mark to three miles offshore. Arguably the emphasis 
on this issue left much of the implementation of the OCS undecided, 
making a second_ round of negotiations inevitable, a round at which 
the Commonwealth could continue to exercise influence in the three 
mile zone. 77 
Fraser, dragged into the maelstrom of "seashore federalism" by the State 
Premiers, particularly Sir Charles Court and Rupert (Dick) Hamer, was 
able to look back at the four years of sometimes tenuous negotiations 
with a sense of achievement. 
75 P. Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM, 302. 
76 j. Bjelke-Petersen, "A Queensland view" in A. Patience and J. Scott, (eds.) 
Australian Federalism Future Tense, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983): 64. 
77 R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Disputes, 
(Sydney Federation Press,1990): 130. 
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There have been arguments over the last ten, twelve or fourteen 
years that have been difficult for the Liberal Party and for the 
nation; offshore sovereignty and High Court cases which gave 
authority to the Commonwealth. It would have been possible to 
say to Dick Hamer in relation to Bass Strait, or to Sir Charles Court 
in relation to the North-West Shelf; 'Well, the Court's have 
given us sovereignty and we are going to exercise it totally. Our 
Department of National Development will move out into the 
states and you can get out of this area. It is of no concern to you!' 
This is precisely what the Labor Party has said that they will do. 
But we have set about in a painstaking way to negotiate a set of 
agreements on mining, drilling, fishing and the management of 
resources offshore. We have come to an agreement with all the 
states - Labor and Liberal - in a truly historic set of documents 
which have established agreement. We have done this without 
having to go to a referendum. We have done it without dispute. 
We have done it in a way which establishes a common sense 
relationship between the administration of the states and of the 
Commonweal th. 78 
Given the debate raised by the use of placitum xxxviii as the 
constitutional support for the Coastal Waters State Powers Act 1980 
and the wide ranging discussions over the sidestepping of the High 
Court's decision in the Seas and Submerged Lands case the 
"settlement" of Australian offshore federalism involved as much 
controversy as the earlier intergovernmental battles over jurisdiction 
offshore. Several important differences, however, separated the OCS 
from the 1967 Agreement. The legislation implementing the OCS was 
not "mirror" but "complementary" legislation. The difference in .terms 
(see Figure 3.1) expresses the fundamental distinction, yet at the same 
time provided a way that both the Commonwealth and the States,could 
retain influence over their maritime interests. 
78 M Fraser, "The Commonwealth and the States" Address to the Victorian Lib&al 
Speakers Group" 21 September 1981 in D. M. White and D. A. Kemp (eds.) Malcolm 
Fraser On Australia (Melbourne: Hill of Content, 1986): 156. 
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The 1967 agreement employed mirror legislation which is, as the 
description implies, identical Commonwealth and State legislation. 
The OCS was based on complementary legislation aimed at creating, by 
legislation, a boundary between Commonwealth and State jurisdiction 
that had been rejected by the High Court. 79 Complementary legislation 
aimed to return to the situation where the States were responsible 
within three miles of low water mark and the Commonwealth 
responsible for the areas outside the three mile limit. Such a settlement 
would not be sustainable unless there was unanimous support from the 
States. 
A further consideration was that each State parliament had to pass 
'request' legislation "which was a condition precedent to the use of s.51, 
pl.(xxxviii)." 83 This legislation was duly enacted and enabled the 
Commonwealth's legislation to be introduced into the House of 
Representatives in May 1980. The States had passed enabling legislation 
within ten months of the agreement being publicly announced. This 
speed, and the remarkable progress in developing such an innovative 
intergovernmental framework (in total twenty months from the 
resolutions passed by the Premiers' Conference in October 1977), is in 
marked contrast to the slow progress in intergovernmental negotiations 
over the the 1967 agreement and the abortive "Gorton Bill" of the early 
1970s. 
79  See R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Revenue Raising: A Case of One Government Too 
Many?" Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 6 (1988): 213-247. 
8° Anon., "The Offshore Constitutional Settlement" - Current Topics Australian Law 
Journal, 54, 9 (September 1980): 519. 
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The Offshore Constitutional Settlement arose, according to the 
Commonwealth as a "reordering and readjustment of powers and 
responsibilities - as between the Commonwealth and States - was 
necessary to take account of the 1975 [Seas and Submerged Lands case] 
decision."81 The OCS agreement was claimed to have: 
marked the solution of a fundamental problem that had 
bedevilled Commonwealth-State relations and represents a major 
achievement of the the policy of co-operative federalism. 82 
Senator Durack, who as Attorney-General was responsible for the 
passage of the key OCS legislation on a potentially stormy voyage 
through parliament, believed that the settlement: 
will ensure that the States will have adequate powers to deal with 
matters in the territorial sea. History, commonsense and the sheer 
practicalities make these matters for State administration, rather 
than central control, in the absence of overriding national or 
international considerations. 83 
The rationale for the- organisation of the various packages comprising 
the OCS reflects the essence of the "new federalism" promoted by the 
Fraser government D'arack stated: 
I have no doubt at all that historically, constitutionally and legally 
the settlement is in the authentic tradition of the Australian 
nation and the federation formed in 1901. . . . The offshore 
settlement provides the framework within which the 
81 Commonwealth of Australia Attorney-General's Department, "The Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement: A Milestone in Co-operative Federalism", Offshore 
Australia, (Canberra: AGPS, 1980): 4. 
82 Ibid: 1. 
83  Commonwealth of Australia Attorney-Generals Department, "The Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement: Selected Statements and Documents 1978-79" Offshore 
Australia (Canberra: AGPS, 1980): 14. 
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development and protection of these areas can go ahead. 
Workable arrangements are being established that will ensure 
effective and harmonious administration of the offshore areas 
and a fair sharing of the nation's offshore resources. 84 
There are two contending arguments over the introduction of the OCS. 
In one sense the OCS agreement could be expected given the 
conundrum facing the Fraser government discussed earlier in the 
Chapter. The Commonwealth faced a dilemma between retaining a 
significant (and hard won) constitutional victory and the States'clesire 
to retain management of marine resources and to maintain influence 
in any developments. The situation was complicated by the fact that 
any increase in Commonwealth activity, say in fisheries management, 
needed the effective co-operation of personnel or infrastructure support 
from State authorities. It is neither unexpected nor surprising that, 
once the Fraser government indicated its willingness to discuss the 
offshore, the States would be assertive. This view presents the 
intergovernmental bargaining following the Seas and Submerged 
Lands case as deliberately avoiding a treaty along the lines of the 1967 
Petroleum Agreement which would inevitably lead to further disputes. 
Negotiations aiming for a consensus over an appropriate sharing of 
responsibilities enable the States to exert considerable influence. 
Gaining Commonwealth support for extension of powers and limits of 
the States reflected the ability of the States to articulate their interests 
and resources at the bargaining table. The States' commitment to 
jurisdiction within the three mile limit dominated, and inevitably 
reordered federalism offshore. 
84 P. Durack, "Statement on the Offshore Constitutional Settlement" 
Commonwealth Record (23-29th June 1980): 892. 
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An alternative view acknowledges that the Commonwealth retained 
considerable control of intergovernmental interaction over the 
offshore. While the States maintained a commitment to jurisdiction 
this commitment was countered by the range of legal constitutional and 
political resources available to the Commonwealth. There is no doubt 
that the agenda - although greatly influenced by the States' concerns and 
by the intervention by individual State politicans and officials - was 
controlled by the Commonwealth. The States achieved their main 
objective but the question remains over their influence. Did they gain 
what the Commonwealth was happy to give them? Did the concern 
over legislative and jurisdictional issues leave important questions 
surrounding the implementation of the "agreed arrangements" 
unanswered? 
If the States' motives are relatively clearly defined, what then were the 
driving motives for the Commonwealth to conclude the agreement? A 
decade later it is questionable whether Durack's view that these 
arrangements were "harmonious" or would lead to "a fair share of 
resources" can be sustained. The Commonwealth was able to retain 
considerable influence which may have cut across the objectives of the 
OC S. The "high intergovernmental politics" 85 which had 
accompanied the offshore dispute throughout the 1970s meant that the 
Commonwealth's interests could not be ignored. The Commonwealth 
was given considerable room to manouevre during implementation of 
the OCS, which went to considerable lengths not to bind either party. 
85 This type of interaction was emphasised by the pivotal role played by the Prime 
Minister Fraser. At crucial periods he was able to use his personal imprimatur to gain 
agreement from the States over contentious matters. 
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The States regarded the OCS agreement as safeguarding their interests 
in the Australian territorial sea. From this the States expected a major 
role in implementing the policy packages contained within the OCS. 
The implementation of a political and philosophical commitment to 
maintaining State involvement in marine resource policy making did 
not, however, necessarily reduce, in zero-sum fashion, the level of 
Commonwealth activity. As a result the framework established by the 
OCS maintained a complex matrix of Commonwealth and State 
legislation, giving rise to extensive overlap in administration and 
regulation. 
The "federal" structure established by the OCS reflects the reality of the 
entrenchment of Commonwealth power by the High Court as much as 
the strength of the interests of the States. For all its complexity the OCS 
remains essentially an accommodation between assertive State 
governments, who had a range of resources, including a commitment 
from the Commonwealth to a reappraisal of the Commonwealth-State 
relations behind their negotiating strategies and a compliant 
Commonwealth who was prepared to agree to arrangements which 
were, in the main, "common sense". When the States introduced non-
negotiable items (such as Queensland's attempt to maintain control of 
the Great Barrier Reef or arguments to extend State influence over the 
territorial sea if and when Australia extended its boundary from the 
three mile limit) the Commonwealth exercised its veto, buttressed by 
the Seas and Submerged Lands case and the concurrent negotiations 
over UNCLOS 
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Evaluating the States' impact on the negotiations which led to the OCS 
must account for the limited impact the States had in changing 
direction of policy concerning certain offshore resources. The 
agreement between the Commonwealth and the States took 
arrangements established by the 1967 Petroleum Agreement as read. 
Little attempt was made to re-open debate over royalty provisions of 
the offshore oil and gas regime,86 given the concern to establish a 
"watertight" intergovernmental arrangement. Re-negotiating the 
royalty arrangements was politically unwise, and of little concern at the 
time to the majority of States without direct benefit from offshore oil 
and gas. In spite of this the OCS was established in a period where the 
- Commonwealth was able to wield considerable formal power in this 
policy area. The Australian Law Journal made the pertinent 
observation that "[u]nforeseen problems can still arise, and the 
settlement should not be regarded as definitely marking the end of all 
negotiations between the Commonwealth and State governments 
concerning this area of offshore responsibilities." 87 The continued 
. intergovernmental negotiation through the 1980s, discussed in the 
following chapter, directed at the implementation of the OCS packages, 
was directed at resolving these "unforseen problems". 
86 R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Revenue Raising: A Case of One Government Too Many?" 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 6 (1988): 213-247. 
87 Anon. "The Offshore COnstitutional Settlement" Current Topics Australian law 
Journal, 54, 9 (September 1980): 519. 
Chapter Five 
The Offshore Constitutional Settlement 1979 - 1990. 
Establishing and Implementing the Agreement 
In June 1979 the Fraser government launched the OCS, purportedly 
concluding two decades of intense intergovernmental conflict with the 
States. The OCS was described as "a milestone in co-operative 
federalism", and a major achievement in new federalism. This chapter 
examines the implementation of the OCS, arguing that in entrenching 
responsibilities of both Commonwealth and State governments it was 
less successful in achieving a settlement of— intergovernmental 
tensions. The publicity surrounding the OCS tended to gloss over the 
conflict between the Commonwealth and the States which had 
occurred in the earlier struggles over the offshore, a gloss which wore 
thin in the 1980s during the implementation of the various 
components of the OCS. 1 
The OCS comprised, several elements or packages. Apart from the legislation 
underpinning the arrangement, additional packages were concerned with the 
development of management "regimes" for offshore oil and gas, fisheries and marine 
parks. The OCS also included packages that established intergovernmental 
frameworks for the administration of ship sourced pollution, crimes at sea and historic 
shipwrecks. 
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The lengthy period of time taken to negotiate and implement the OCS 
(the "agreed arrangements" of 1979 were only completed in 1990), 
contributed to a change in the character of the OCS. The original 
organic design gave way to a "sectoral" approach which can be 
identified in implementation of the OCS agreed arrangements. 2 The 
shift from an organic to a sectoral approach was influenced by several 
factors, including the election of the Hawke ALP government. The 
change of government was important although it is clear that the 
direction of intergovernmental relations over the offshore altered once 
the legislative base of the OCS had been proclaimed. Greater time was 
available to consider the operation of the OCS in different areas, or the 
specific arrangements necessary for its implementation. These factors 
encouraged the individual States to focus on particular issues which 
enhanced a sectoral focus. Queensland, for example, was clearly 
interested in the arrangements affecting the Great Barrier Reef, while 
Victoria was concerned with the administration of offshore oil and gas. 
Arrangements concerning historic shipwrecks had particular salience 
in Western Australia while Tasmania and South Australia focused on 
fisheries. 
OCS Design and The Agreed Arrangements 
Following the Premiers' Conference of mid 1979 the Commonwealth 
Attorney-General's Department published a kit explaining the origins, 
2 I introduced the concept of organic and sectoral approaches in "The Australian 
Offshore Constitutional Settlement".Marine Policy 14, 3, (October 1989): 334-348. 
Organic refers to the arrangement in which each component was established as an 
integral part of the larger settlement. Sectoral captures the sense in which the OCS is 
applied as a framework in differing, and discrete, policy areas with little concern with 
other areas. These concepts are elaborated in this chapter. 
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aims and mechanics of the OCS. This kit, entitled Offshore Australia, 
included what were known as the "agreed arrangements", forming the 
basis for the application of the OCS. The origins of the "agreed 
arrangements" can be traced back to the resolutions of the 1977 
Premier's Conference as adjusted by the numerous meetings between 
Commonwealth and State Ministers and officials. 
The agreed arrangements included the legislative basis of the 
agreement achieved through "complementary legislation". This 
complementary legislation was established by two overarching acts: 
The Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cwth), which extended 
the legislative power of the States to include the adjacent waters of 
territorial sea from low water mark to three miles offshore; and the 
Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980 (Cwth) which vested title of the 
seabed of this area to the States. Amendments to the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act 1973 and concomitant amendments to fisheries, 
petroleum, navigation and historic shipwrecks legislation were 
necessary so that the "powers" and "titles" legislation 3 was not 
invalidated. 
- 
In economic terms the most significant element of the OCS related to 
the arrangements concerning offshore petroleum. Following the OCS 
parameters established that operations outside the three mile boundary 
3 The legislation forming the OCS, in addition to the "powers" and "titles" Acts, 
included the Crimes at Sea Act 1979, Seas and Submerged Lands Amendment Act 1980, 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Amendment Act 1980, Petroleum (Submerged Lands) 
(Royalty) Amendment Act 1980, Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Registration Fees) 
Amendment Act 1980, Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Exploration Permit Fees) 
Amendment Act 1980, Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Production Licence Fees) 
Amendment Act 1980, Fisheries Amendment Act 1980, Navigation Amendment Act 
1980 and the Historic Shipwrecks Amendment Act 1980. 
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would continue to be regulated by Commonwealth legislation. "Day-
to-day" administration was to continue, on the basis of arrangements 
first established under the 1967 Petroleum Agreement, to be 
undertaken by the States. The existing pattern of royalty payments vis. 
a vis. the Commonwealth and the States was to be retained, a fact 
which was to lead to considerable friction between the Commonwealth 
and Victoria in the mid and late 1980s. A Joint Authority, comprising 
the Commonwealth and State Minister, was established for each State's 
adjacent area and was concerned with matters such as determining 
permit areas, granting of permits and licenses and determining 
conditions governing the level of work or expenditure. The agreed 
arrangements also included a regulatory regime for offshore mining 
for minerals other than petroleum based on complementary 
Commonwealth and State legislation embodying a common mining 
code. 
Arrangements over offshore fisheries aimed to introduce a more 
flexible approach to fisheries administration. The OCS established that 
as far as possible a fishery would be managed by a single law, rather 
than the existing overlap between Commonwealth and State 
legislation. Reducing the complexity of fisheries management gained 
widespread support from the States, keen to promote proposals for 
"the dominance of State legislation and administration over State 
based fisheries."4 
The fisheries arrangements included several joint authorities, 
consisting of the Commonwealth , Minister and the appropriate State 
4 B. Chatterton & L. Arnold "Fisheries Mangagement and the New Federalism" in D. 
Jaensch (ed.) The Politics of New Federalism, (Adelaide: APSA, 1977): 175. 
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Ministers to regulate fisheries involving more than one State. Four 
joint authorities were included in the "agreed arrangements", 5 which 
noted that "in the event of disagreement within a fisheries joint 
authority, the views of the Commonwealth Minister will prevail." 6 
The presence of the Commonwealth Minister's veto was not accepted 
by the States who generally avoided this type of arrangement in the 
implementation of the fisheries package. The emphasis on flexibility in 
the agreed arrangements implied that other joint authorities could be 
established. The agreed arrangements made no mention of the 
legislative basis of the joint authorities, although given the necessity 
for amendments to State fisheries legislation to incorporate 
complementary responsibilities arising from the OCS, either 
Commonwealth and State fisheries legislation could be used to anchor 
such arrangements. 
The OCS also included arrangements to deal with Historic Shipwrecks, 
chiefly the amendment of the Commonwealth's Historic Shipwrecks 
Act 1976 so that it would apply, or be applicable, to waters adjacent to a 
State or the Northern Territory with the consent of that State or 
Territory. 7 The arrangements over historic shipwrecks reflected the 
5 These were a South-Eastern Fisheries Joint Authority (the Commonwealth and 
NSW, Victorian, Tasmanian and South Australian Ministers), a Northern Australian 
Fisheries Joint Authority (Commonwealth and Queensland and Northern Territory 
Ministers), a Western Australian Fisheries Joint Authority (Commonwealth and 
Western Australian Minister) and a Northern Territory Fishery Joint Authority 
(Commonwealth and Northern Territory Minister). 
6 "The Offshore Constitutional Settlement: A Milestone ...":10. 
7 Legal matters surrounding the discovery and exploitation of shipwrecks, 
particularly those off the Western Australian coast had emerged as a major issue in the 
1970s. Claims arising out of the extent of "rights of discovery" over the wreck of the 
Gilt Dragon and for compensation in response to the passage of the Western Australian 
legislation which "purported to vest property in historic and achaelogical sites" R. 
Cullen Federalism In Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Disputes 
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need for the OCS to incorporate the High Court's decision, (post Seas 
and Submerged Lands case) in Robinson 's case. 8 
As a result of the Emerald Agreement, the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park was included as a package within the agreed arrangements. The 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 was to continue to apply to 
the whole of the Great Barrier Reef, as defined by that Act. 
Consultative arrangements were to be established between the 
Commonwealth and Queensland "for the management and 
preservation of the region which extends right into low water mark 
along the Queensland Coast and around Queensland islands in the 
area."9 Apart from the Great Barrier Reef, the agreed arrangements 
established that other marine parks were to be either State or 
Commonwealth responsibility on the basis of the three mile boundary 
between State or Commonwealth legislation. 
The agreed arrangements included several other ancillary packages 
including intergovernmental agreement regarding the prosecution of 
crimes at sea. Complementary Commonwealth - State legislation was 
to ensure that "an appropriate body of Australian criminal laws - either 
state or territory - is applicable to ships and to activities in offshore 
areas coming under Australian jurisdiction". 10 It was envisaged that 
(Sydney: Federation Press, 1990): 96. 
8 Robinson v. Western Australian Museum (1977) 138 CLR 283. Robinson led to a 
three-three split on the High Court with the case decided in favour of the plaintiff on 
the opinion of the Chief Justice (Sir Garfield Barwick). Barwick also found that the 
Western Australian legislation was beyond the legislative power of the State of 
Western Australia. R. Cullen, Federalism in Action : 96. Cullen gives a succinct account 
of what he describes as 'Robinson's adventurous (and litigous) life". 
9 "The Offshore Constitutional Settlement: A Milestone ..." 11. 
10 Ibid: 12. 
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State law would apply for offences committed in the territorial sea and 
for offences committed on voyages between two ports in one State, or 
that began and ended at the same port. Commonwealth legislation 
would deal with other cases, but would apply the laws of the State to 
which the vessel was "linked", most usually the State in which it was 
registered. Such arrangements would not affect the application of 
- specific Commonwealth legislation such as the Customs-Act." It was 
claimed that the agreement over crimes at sea "contained innovative 
provisions for the removal of proceedings from a court on one part of 
Australia to a court in another part of Australia where that would be 
• 	 expedient to avoid hardship . . . or to promote a speedy triai."12 
The development of intergovernmental agreements concerned with 
Shipping and Navigation focused on arrangements concerning vessel 
survey and issue of certificates of seaworthiness, regulations governing 
the manning and control of ships' crew and the qualifications of those 
crew. 13 Under these arrangements the States would be responsible for 
all "trading vessels", except for those . proceeding on interstate or an 
overseas voyage. The latter would remain the responsibility of the 
Commonwealth. Registration and regulation of commercial fishing 
boats, except those undertaking overseas voyages, would remain the 
responsibility of the States. Foreign vessels in Australian waters" 
would remain under Commonwealth regulations. An exemption to 
the category of "overseas voyage" was made to accommodate the 
particular case of Queensland registered fishing vessels operating in the 
11 ibid . 
12 Ibid: 14. 
13 
14 This was to be more significant given the declaration of a a two hundred (nautical) 
mile Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) on the 1st of November 1979. 
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Torres Strait. These vessels would remain under Queensland control 
as a result of negotiations arising from the Torres Strait Treaty. 
Inland waters were not affected by the OCS although NSW would 
retain control of the vessels operating on the River Murray upstream 
from the South Australian border. This continued existing practice, 
although it did not resolve other issues surrounding the "river 
question" - a major intergovernmental issue since federation. 15 
Offshore oil-drilling vessels would remain under the control of the 
Commonwealth. The intergovernmental arrangements concerning 
shipping and navigation were negotiated at the same time that the 
Commonwealth and States established a Uniform Shipping Laws 
Code. This code was released on 28th December 1979 16 and provided 
uniform regulations over the construction, safety, survey and manning 
of commercial vessels, including fishing vessels. 
The agreed arrangements on shipping and navigation were established 
"within the parameters of international conventions regarding safety at 
sea, in particular the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention. 
Amendment of the Navigation Act (the Navigation Amendment Act 
1979) implemented the 1974 International Convention for the 
15 Even before federation the river question proved to be a large obstacle in the path to 
a federated Australia. Galligan notes that there are over 400 pages of debate on this 
topic in the Convention debates of the 1890s, see B. Galligan, "Judicial Review in the 
Australian Federal System: Its Origin and Function", Federal Law Review 10 (1979): 
367-397. It was not until the 1980s that an intergovernmental body was established for 
the Murray-Darling basin. See A. Kellow "The Murray -Darling Basin " in B. 
Galligan, 0 Hughes & C. Walsh, (eds.) Intergovernmental Relations and Public 
Policy, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin , 1991): 129-145. 
16 Commonwealth Gazette 28 December 1979. 
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Prevention of Collisions at Sea. Following the pattern in other OCS 
packages this allowed "state law to apply these regulations to all ships 
in the territorial sea and provides the necessary Commonwealth law to 
apply the international regulations to ships outside the three mile 
limit."17 As in other areas of the offshore, Australia's ratification and 
enactment of legislation giving effect to such conventions impacted on 
the responsibilities of both Commonwealth and State governments. 
The agreed arrangements announced that the Commonwealth was 
preparing a Shipping Registration Bill to replace the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 under which Australian vessels were registered as 
British ships. 18 
The OCS updated existing co-operative intergovernmental 
arrangements controlling ship sourced marine pollution. These 
arrangements were established following Australia's ratification, in 
1960, of the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (the MARPOL Convention). This 
convention was given effect in Australia by Commonwealth legislation 
which applied to Australian Ships outside the territorial sea and by 
legislation which applied to all ships within the territorial sea. The 
Commonwealth and States agreed that these arrangements, which 
17 'The Offshore Constitutional Settlement: A Milestone ...", 14. 
18 During the heated confrontation over the attempt to refer the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act to the Privy Council, the Tasmanian Solicitor General had investigated the 
possibility that registration of vessels (including ocean racing and cruising yachts) as 
British ships could influence the reference to the Privy Council. 
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predated the decision in the Seas and Submerged Lands case, should be 
retained in the OCS framework. 
The Agreed Arrangements and Commonwealth-State Relations 
The opportunity afforded the States by the Commonwealth's 
commitment to recognise their concerns encouraged the successful 
development of the agreed arrangements. The period was marked by 
Commonwealth and State collaboration where the sole critics of the 
agreed arrangements appeared to be the federal Opposition. The 
influence of the federal ALP's opposition was moderated by the support 
given the arrangements by ALP State Premiers Wran (New South 
Wales) and Lowe (Tasmania). The ALP-governed States found little 
would be gained by supporting the Federal ALP party platform, 
reflecting their earlier vehement opposition to the Whitlam 
government's legislation. The support given by Lowe and Wran, and 
involvement of officials from these States in the design of the OCS, led 
to some intra-party conflict, although criticism was most noted from 
individual members of the ALP who saw the Whitlam government's 
design being unravelled. 19 
The support from all States towards the agreed arrangements was not 
surprising. Each State had invested a considerable amount of time, 
effort and expense in drafting the arrangements which had emerged 
from a consensus from the many meetings of Solicitors-Genera1. 20 At 
the margin however was the Commonwealth's possible fall-back of 
19 See P. Keating's comments during the debate on the Coastal Waters (State 
Powers/Titles) legislation and Whitlam's comments in The Whitlam Government, 
(Ringwood: Penguin, 1985). 
20 P. Brazil, pers. comm. December 1989. 
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implementing the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973, while at the 
same time reinforcing and publicising the savings provisions in this 
legislation for policy areas which did not raise questions of sovereignty. 
The focus of the Solicitors-General was on achieving what were the 
immediate concerns of the States; their limits and powers in the 
territorial sea. 21 The high politics over the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act was dissipated by the activities of the Solicitors-General and 
their staffs and the realisation by all concerned of the need to act upon a 
fortuitous combination of the coalition parties' commitment to the 
new federalism, the High Court decision in the Seas and Submerged 
Lands case and the result of the December 1975 election. 
While the major focus was on the legislative design, and the 
arrangements for the major resource packages, the OCS was much 
more than arrangements for oil and gas or fisheries. The OCS packages 
concerned the development of administrative or legal frameworks to 
avoid the problems of inconsistency between State and 
Commonwealth jurisdiction or law. Grasping the opportunity of 
almost unprecedented intergovernmental "goodwill", the States 
attempted to reduce the level of Commonwealth overlap in different 
resource sectors. 
• Several factors were to ensure that the Commonwealth retained an 
important presence in the offshore. The "agreed arrangements" stated 
"Mlle . . legislation and also the petroleum and fisheries arrangements 
. will be limited to a territorial sea of 3 miles, irrespective of whether 
Australia subsequently moves to a territorial sea of 12 miles." 22 
21 See R. Cullen Federalism In Action. 
22 "The Offshore Constitutional Settlement: A Milestone ...": 7. In November 1990 
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Limiting the extent of • the States' jurisdiction, together with the 
arrangements for joint authorities in particular packages, reinforced the 
Commonwealth's position offshore. A consequence of the 
development of the "agreed arrangements" was that the 
Commonwealth retained a major brokerage role in many policy areas. 
Co-operative federalism, promoted as an integral part of the OCS, 
understates the latent power of the Commonwealth in such a 
brokerage role. An example is found in the agreed arrangements over 
fisheries where it was stated that the Commonwealth could agree that 
a State be responsible for the administration of a particular fishery from 
low water mark to the edge of the 200 mile fishing zone, rather than 
giving a mandatory role for States in such an arrangement. 
Entrenching the Agreement: From Fraser to Hawke 
The legislation providing the foundation of the OCS, the Coastal 
Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 and the Coastal Waters (State Title) 
Act 1980, were introduced into and passed by the Commonwealth 
parliament in May 1980. As discussed earlier, the settlement required 
complementary "powers" and "titles" legislation .by the States and the 
Northern Territory to complete the legislative design. A model Bill for 
the complementary State legislation was included in the kit Offshore 
Australia. Although great efforts were made to ensure 
complementarity, each State was responsible for its own legislation 
Australia declared a 12 mile teritorial sea. This provision in the OCS has meant that 
Australia is unlikely to undergo further conflict over the managemtn of the extended 
territorial sea, unlke the USA where a similar extension of the territorial sea has 
raised a number of questions over federal-state relations. See, for example, R. Wilder, 
"Reassesing the 3- Mile State-Federal Boundary" in 0.1 Magoon, H. Converse, V. 
Tippie, L.T Tobin & D. Clark, (eds.) Coastal Zone 91: The Proceedings of the Seventh 
Symposium on Coastal and Ocean Management Vol 2, (New York: ASCE, 1991): 1356- 
1370. 
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with the result that variations in drafting and design are found 
between the States. Since complementary rather than mirror 
legislation was needed, such variations are of little practical importance 
although of some interest to constitutional lawyers. 23 
The Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cwth) was proclaimed 
with little fanfare in January 1982. The companion legislation, the 
State Titles Act, was proclaimed in more controversial circumstances, 
on the 14th February 1983. This date is significant given the ALP's 
recorded opposition to the OCS arrangements. Prime Minister Fraser 
gained a dissolution of the Commonwealth parliament on the 3rd 
February 1983 for an election on 5 March 1983.24 The announcement 
of the intention to proclaim the Coastal Waters State Title Act 1980 
(Cwth) was gazetted the same day as the dissolution was announced. 
The gazettal and proclamation of the legislation, although 
controversial under Westminster conventions which govern the 
introduction of legislation during election periods, was undertaken by 
the Government on the advice of the senior officials in the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department. It is clear that the 
23 R. Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore, Intergovernmental Relations in 
Victoria Program (Melbourne: Melbourne University Law School, 1988). It is possible of 
course that State parliamentary drafting attempted to claim much more than was 
intended by the model legislation prepared by the Solicitors-General. 
24 The events of the 3rd of February, when Hayden the ALP leader stepped down and 
was replaced by Hawke have entered Australian political folklore. Fraser's attempt to 
take on a divided ALP is acknowledged as a major spur to the early election; see P. 
Ayres, Malcolm Fraser: A Biography , (Melbourne, William Heineman Australia), 
1987. 
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proclamation of the State Titles Act, which had been ready for several 
months after completing the necessary passage through the State 
parliaments in 1982, was made to reduce the chance of the OCS being 
"unravelled" if, as eventually occurred, the ALP won the March 1983 
federal election.25 
It is somewhat ironic that the Fraser government was defeated at the 
polls within three weeks of the offshore settlement being proclaimed. 
Like Whitlam before him Fraser found the shaping of offshore policy 
had foundered upon the rocks of an uncharted electoral defeat. The 
Fraser government lost the federal election of 5th March 1983 before 
the OCS, which the Prime Minister and his Cabinet had been 
promoting strongly as an exercise in Commonwealth - State co-
operation within the new federalism, had been fully implemented. 
The OCS had hung in the balance before, most critically during the 1980 
federal election, which may explain the haste with proclaiming the 
Coastal Waters (State Titles) Act 1980 in February 1983. The ALP had 
bitterly opposed the OCS during debate in the Commonwealth 
parliament and had threatened to overturn the agreement and return 
to the sovereignty established by the High Court. 26 Cullen was to 
comment "it will be interesting to monitor the Settlement's progress 
over the next few years in the face of judicial review and the attitude of 
a federal government with an official policy of dismantling the 
settlement."27 
25 P. Brazil, pers. comm. 5th December 1989. For a discussion of the impact of the 
State Powers Act . see H. Nelson, "Legislative Outputs " in B. Galligan (ed.) 
Comparative State Policies, (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1988): 20-39. 
26 Corrunonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) 5/5/ 1980. 
27 R. Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore, 1st ed., 141. 
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Each of the States - with the most to lose in terms of the hard-won 
recognition of their roles as well as an acceptance of their involvement 
in offshore resources policy if the OCS was overturned - waited for the 
Hawke Government's response. A major question, as Herr and Davis 
have indicated, was whether the Hawke government would dismantle 
the OCS in its entirety or just the elements concerned with offshore 
petroleum and minerals. 28 On gaining government the Hawke 
government established a wide ranging internal review of the OCS 
arrangements, reinforced by a decision at the 1984 biennial ALP 
Conference which "endorsed the restoration of Commonwealth power 
and title over the three mile zone." 29 The result of the review was 
that although: 
the Government is of the view that title over the territorial sea 
should not have been transferred from the Commonwealth by the 
previous government . . . the arrangements which were entered 
into as part of the Offshore Constitutional Settlement have been 
working satisfactorily and for this reason the government does 
not intend to take action at the present time to regain title to the 
territorial sea. Nor does the Government intend to alter the 
current powers legislation." 
The government considered that this approach would remain 
dependent on the "satisfactory operation" of the existing arrangements, 
foreshadowing Commonwealth intervention if a State or the Northern 
Territory failed to act "in a manner compatible with the national 
interest. "31 
28 R.A. Herr and B.W. Davis, 'The Impact of UNCLOS III on Australian Federalism" 
International Journal XLI, 3, (1986), 689. 
29 Ibid. 
3°Commonwea1th Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) 20/6/ 1986 
(emphasis added). 
31 Ibid. 
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The Hawke government's response to the OCS supports the argument 
advanced in this study regarding the States' influence over 
intergovernmental relations offshore. The ALP's federal platform 
included a policy of enforcing Commonwealth jurisdiction offshore, 
and while in opposition Labor had strongly opposed the OCS, 
foreshadowing a return to the arrangements established under the 
• Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 on gaining government. The 
Hawke government's response recognised the problems in such a 
course. The significance of the States in offshore resources 
management and their strengths at the bargaining table resulting from 
these activities made Commonwealth unilateralism unattractive, if not 
impossible. The adoption of strategies of mutual accommodation in 
particular policy areas may overshadow the demands of partisan 
platforms. 
Intergovernmental relations, particularly over the environment, 
dominated the first sixth months of the Hawke government's first 
term. The pre-election promise from the ALP to act to stop the 
flooding of the Franklin River in South West Tasmania utilising the 
"external affairs" power, led to the passage of the World Heritage 
Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cwlth). The Franklin Dam case32 
was viewed with some concern by the States as a harbinger of increased 
intervention by the Commonwealth. 33 The Hawke government's 
reaction to the OCS must therefore be measured against the 
contemporary climate of Commonwealth State relations. The agreed 
32 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 450. 
33 B. Burke "Federalism After the Franklin" Australian Quarterly 56, 4 (December 
1984): 4-10, and G. Samuels " The End of Federalism?" Australian Quarterly 56, 4 
(December 1984) 11-19. 
214 
arrangements, after all, enabled the Commonwealth to achieve its 
objectives of maintaining the national interest and fulfilling 
Australia's international obligations under a range of general 
international treaties as well as specific maritime and marine 
environment conventions. 
Notwithstanding the ALP's federal platform the reluctance to overturn 
the OCS arrangements reflected the fact that very little had, in fact, 
changed with the introduction of the OCS. In most cases the agreed 
arrangements formalised practices that had developed over forty years, 
or had targeted areas that had been problematic in the past. The lack of 
prescription in the agreed arrangements allowed a considerable degree 
of flexibility in the implementation of the OCS (a point recognised by 
State officials) and hence Commonwealth policy objectives in 
particular packages, for example the introduction of new taxation 
regimes for oil and gas production, were unlikely to be affected by the 
OCS structure. 
Accepting the political costs involved in any dismantling of the OCS 
was another consideration in shaping the Hawke government's 
response to the OCS. Real costs would accrue to the Commonwealth if 
it had tried to overturn the OCS. Apart from questions of 
compensation for the States it is questionable whether the 
Commonwealth could have provided the management and regulation 
of the the range of activities taking place in offshore Australia. The 
interesting legal questions surrounding the possible revocation of the 
OCS aside, the question of compensation for the territory ceded to the 
States under the State Titles legislation,34 would have led to a major 
34 While this situation remains in the realm of speculation, the provisons of Section 
123 of the Constitution (regarding the alteration of the limits of the States) would no 
doubt be the focus of State interests. 
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intergovernmental battle. 
By 1983 the offshore had, in Galligan, Hughes and Walsh's terms, 
shifted from being seen as high intergovernmental politics, and by 
1986 was firmly entrenched as a joint intergovernmental 
arrangement. 35 There were to be several skirmishes during the late 
1980s as implementation of the OCS arrangements gathered pace. 
Given the major role played by Commonwealth officials in the 
negotiation over the OCS, and the Hawke government's "steady as she 
goes" approach to policy change there seems, on reflection, to have 
been little desire to overturn the OCS. It was the return to 
institutionalised arrangements over the offshore which was one of the 
achievements of the OCS. The return of responsibilities to the specific 
ministerial councils (and standing or technical committees) that 
enhanced the emergence of the sector approach to implementation. 
Intergovernmental Relations and the Implementation of the OCS - 
The Emergence of the Sectoral Approach 
The implementation of the agreed arrangements in each of the specific 
areas within the OCS was the final phase of Commonwealth - State 
relations over the offshore. The agreement of June 1979, was in 
Churchillian terms "not even the beginning of the end but. .. perhaps 
the end of the beginning." 36 The uncertainty over the Hawke 
government's attitude to the OCS and the declining significance of the 
offshore problem once the coastal waters legislation had been 
B. Galligan, 0 Hughes and C. Walsh "Introduction" in B. Galligan, 0 Hughes and 
C. Walsh (eds.) Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy (Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin, 1991). 
W. S. Churchill "The Battle of Egypt Speech" Mansion House 10 November 1942 in 
Bloomsbury Dictionary of Quotations, (London: Bloomsbury, 1991). 
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proclaimed, contributed to the States' attempting subtle reshaping of 
the agreed arrangements within different sectors. 
A sectoral approach may have been inevitable, but it is clear that the 
States' desire to maximise their position(s) in any regimes were 
important factors in shaping the pattern by which the OCS was 
implemented. This led to some complications. The time taken to 
achieve agreement over fisheries contrasted with the speedy adoption 
of the OCS arrangements in other sectors, with the fisheries package 
yet to be fully implemented in New South Wales. 37 Oil and gas 
arrangements, in contrast to fisheries, were soon completed. 
(a) Offshore Oil and Gas 
The offshore petroleum regime established under the OCS did little 
more than to update the arrangements of the earlier 1967 agreement 
between the Commonwealth and the States. This regime: 
provides for Joint Authorities, comprising the Commonwealth 
Minister and the relevant State Minister, to decide the major 
issues under the legislation including the award, renewal, 
variation, suspension - and cancellation of titles and conditions of 
titles. Day to day matters are handled by the State Ministers and 
their Departments.38 
Administration of the regime involves consultation between 
37  Meetings between the NSW and Commonwealth Governments over the clasification 
of fisheries were held in 1990 and was at that time OCS arrangements were expected to 
be in place by the end of that year. G. Hamer pers. comm. July 1990. As yet NSW 
fisheries have yet to be fully to be integrated into the OCS . See also Industry 
Commission Cost Recovery for Managing Fisheries, Report No. 17 (Canberra: AGPS, 
1992): 44. 
38  J. C. Starkey, "Australia's Offshore Petroleum Legal and Administrative Regime" 
Maritime Studies, 37 (November- December 1987), 25. 
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departmental officials from the Commonwealth and the States and 
Northern Territory through the the Standing Committees of the 
Australian Minerals and Energy Council (AMEC). In addition there is 
extensive consultation between administrators and industry. 39 
While administrative practice has generally been settled, the question 
of revenue sharing and royalties has emerged as a major source of 
(Victorian) dissatisfaction. A major element of intergovernmental 
negotiations leading to the 1967 Petroleum Agreement, concerned 
royalties - particularly the sharing of these royalties between the 
Commonwealth and the States. To recap, this agreement established 
an ad valorem royalty of 10 per cent well-head value shared 60/40 
between the State and the Commonwealth. Little serious challenge 
was made to the existing royalty arrangements° in the negotiations 
over the OCS, no doubt because of the dubious legal and concomitantly 
weak political position of the States in such negotiations. The States' 
claims were weakened further by the Commonwealth's use of the 
excise power in the Constitution to increase its revenue share at the 
expense of the States. 
The question of revenue sharing over offshore oil and gas is bound 
closely to intergovernmental relations over the offshore. Revenue 
sharing also involved the complexities of pricing of crude oil, and the 
calculation of well - head values. In negotiating the initial production 
licenses from Bass Strait fields the Commonwealth enacted a ten year 
pricing agreement with the oil exploration companies, an agreement 
39 Ibid. 
4° See also R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Oil Revenue Raising: A Case of One Government Too 
Many" Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 6,4 (1988): 245. 
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which expired in the mid 1970s. While this agreement provided a basis 
for calculating well-head revenues, (and in fact included a price to the 
oil companies which exceeded the going market rate) the world price 
for crude oil soon. increased. The pricing agreement did not anticipate 
the "oil shocks" which followed the OPEC induced price increase of the 
early 1970s, which meant that by the mid 1970s the Australian price for 
indigenous crude was well below that paid for overseas crude. When 
the pricing agreement expired, both government and industry 
supported the introduction of import parity pricing for what was called 
"new oil" discovered after September 1975. 41 
While the royalty structure negotiated in the 1960s remained in place 
the Commonwealth was able to increase its share of revenues through 
changes to the pricing policy for crude oil and through the 
introduction of an excise or "crude oil levy" paid by the downstream 
refineries. This excise was to increase dramatically with the 
introduction of import parity pricing, giving the Commonwealth large 
windfall profits during the controversial "resources boom" of the late 
1970s. Since the Australian constitution precludes the States from 
enacting excise duties the crude oil levy had the effect of giving the 
Commonwealth a massive increase in revenues from offshore 
production. 42 The introduction of parity pricing in September 1975 
provided increased revenues to the companies while at the same time 
the return to Victoria, the only State directly affected by these 
41 The evolution of oil pricing policy is discussed in M. Haward, Institutions, Interest 
Groups and Marine Resources Policy, Unpublished MA Thesis, Department of Political 
Science, (Hobart: University of Tasmania, 1986). 
42 This issue is exmained in R. Wilkinson, A Thirst for Burning: The Story of 
Australia's Oil Industry, (Sydney, David Ell Press),1983 and M Haward Interest 
Groups and Marine Resources Policy. 
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arrangements at the time, was effectively reduced by the Fraser 
government's excise arrangements. This resulted in: 
[m]ost of the revenue levied by governments on Bass Strait oil 
production go(ing] to the Commonwealth, which collects about 
$3.5 billion in royalties or excise under the world parity pricing 
arrangements and the Commonwealth Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) Act while Victoria receives only $170 million.43 
In 1987-88 $219 million was collected in royalties from Bass Strait and 
the North West Shelf. Excise on production from Bass Strait raised a 
further $2.6 billion in this period. 44 The revenue sharing 
arrangements in the Petroleum (Submerged lands) Act led to $143.9 
million in royalties being paid to Victoria and $4.8 million to Western 
Australia.45 This had the effect of altering the 60:40 split in royalties 
in Victoria's favour in the early 1970s to a better than 95: 5 split in the 
Commonwealth's favour 46 without any formal alteration to the 
revenue sharing system established by the 1967 Petroleum Agreement. 
In response to the reduction in "real" revenues by the imposition of 
the downstream excise the Victorian government attempted to 
increase its return by changing the license fees on production through 
pipelines within the State's jurisdiction. Hematite Petroleum, the BHP 
subsidiary which jointly held Bass Strait production licenses with 
ESSO, challenged - the validity of the pipeline fee and sought the return 
43 B. Galligan, A. Kellow and C. O'Faircheallaigh, "Minerals and Energy Policy" B. 
Galligan (ed.) Comparative State Policies, (Melbourne, Longman Cheshire) 1988: 222. 
44 Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Annual 
Report 1987-88 (Canberra: AGPS, 1988): 72. 
45 Ibid. 
46 R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Oil Revenue Raising: A Case of One Government Too Many", 
232. 
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of $19,992,920 in license fees paid by the company following the 
introduction of the scheme. The Victorian government's pipeline 
levy was overturned by the High Court in the Pipelines case,47 which 
ruled in a four, two decision that: 
notwithstanding that the pipeline operation fee payable by the 
plaintiffs was not calculated arithmetically by reference to quality 
or value of products transported, and the flow of such products 
could cease during he period for which a fee was payable. . . was 
accordingly a duty of excise. It resulted that s[ection] 2 of the 
Pipelines (Fees) Act 1981 (Vic) was invalid.48 
The attempts by the Victorian government to increase its share of 
offshore revenues through the pipeline fee reflects its frustration with 
the existing system of royalty/excise payments, although this system 
began to benefit all States as the Fraser government directed 
Commonwealth funds from the oil levy towards the States as part of 
the Commonwealth's financial assistance grants. 
The fiscal elements of the Fraser government's new federalism meant 
that each of the States (rather than simply the designated authority) 
benefited from the revenues gained from the oil excise. Between 1981 
and 1986 all States shared (to a limited extent) the revenues raised by 
the downstream excise through the introduction of the States (Tax 
Sharing and Health Grants) Act 1981 (Cwth). As a result of this 
legislation revenues raised by the crude oil levy contributed to the "tax 
pool" from which general revenue grants were made to the States. 49 
47 Hematite Petroleum v Victoria (1983) A.L.J.R. 57 591. 
48 Ibid. 
49 R. Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore (2nd ed) 1988. Oil and gas revenues 
comprised between 6 and 8 per cent of total Commonwealth revenues in the early 1980s, 
see R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Oil Revenue Raising: A Case of One Government Too Many" 
232 and Review Committee into Australian Marine Science and Technology, Oceans of 
Wealth? (Canberra: AGPS, 1989). 
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The Hawke government amended the arrangements under this 
legislation to return to grants rather than a statutorily fixed percentage 
of global revenues. 50 Thus the Hawke government effectively 
reduced the level of payments from the tax pool to the States, 
emphasising the significant place of the broader parameters of federal 
financial relations in the oil and gas sector. 
The Victorian government maintained its objections over the 
methods adopted to determine the level of royalties on Bass Strait 
production. In 1986 and 1987 the Commonwealth, in response to that 
objection, commissioned a study into the royalty and excise 
arrangements for production from the Bass Strait fields. In 1986 the 
Victorian Minister for Industry, Technology and Resources, Mr 
Fordham, wrote to the Bass Strait producers (Esso - BHP) indicating 
that the agreement reached in mid 1980 with the Commonwealth over 
the method of calculating the royalty for Bass Strait production had 
been terminated. The 1980 agreement involved the deduction of the 
-crude oil levy from the "base product price" in arriving at the wellhead 
value. Fordham indicated that the arrangements would revert to the 
earlier "interim" arrangements, which would directly increase the 
amount of the royalty. 51 
• The Commonwealth refused, as Cullen states, to accommodate the 
' changes proposed by Victoria. Although the move would have 
increased revenues to both governments the crude oil levy would 
50 R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Oil Revenue Raising: A Case of One Government Too Many", 
232. 
51 Ibid 237. Cullen gives an succinct analysis of the complex arguments in the Fordham 
action. 
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have had to be adjusted reducing the Commonwealth's revenue. 52 
Following the refusal of the Commonwealth to agree to any alteration 
to royalty payments, Minister Fordham registered an appeal in the 
Federal Court (under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Act) against the way in which the Commonwealth was calculating 
royalty payments. In November 1987 the Federal Court ruled in 
favour of the Commonwealth in two of the eleven grounds of appeal. 
• The remaining grounds were deferred pending a foreshadowed High 
Court challenge mounted by Victoria under the Tariff Act 1921, the 
legislation which forms the basis for the petroleum excise. Although 
• the case has lapsed, Cullen pointed out that: 
this action has a political as well as a legal dimension. The action 
will be running whilst the States and the Commonwealth are 
negotiating on sharing arrangements with respect to . . . offshore 
fiscal regimes. 53 
The Hawke government's attempts to introduce these new regimes 
governing revenue sharing had an obvious impact on 
Commonwealth-State relations. The ALP's 1983 federal_ election 
platform included a commitment for the introduction of a Resource 
Rent Tax (RRT) to replace the existing complex mixture of royalties 
and excise. The RRT (sometimes described as a "profits tax") involves 
a tax rate that is levied once returns (profits) exceed a certain threshold. 
The States objected to such a tax as they felt that they would not gain 
any benefits from increased payments. In addition the States saw the 
RRT as a disincentive for further exploration administered by the 
States, the costs of which are reimbursed by the Commonwealth. 
52 Ibid. 
53 'bid 238. 
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The States were involved in broad discussions over the RRT although 
most interaction took place between the exploration companies and 
the Commonwealth Minister. 54 Given significant opposition the 
RRT was modified to apply only to "greenfields" projects, that is new 
oil and gas fields discovered after July 1st 1984. This excluded existing 
production areas in Bass Strait from the RRT. Debate over the RRT 
was lengthy and opposition from the Liberals and Australian 
Democrats in parliament led to the bill, initially introduced in May 
1987, being withdrawn and resubmitted late in 1987. Assent to this 
amended legislation was announced in February 1988. 
Negotiations between the Commonwealth and the States over a 
revenue sharing model continued. A possible model for a future 
royalty system may be the agreement reached between the Western 
Australian and Commonwealth governments over what has been 
termed the Resource Rent Royalty (RRR). 55 The RRR, developed for 
production from Barrow Island in north-western Western Australia, 
would replace the Commonwealth's crude oil excise and • the State 
government's ad valorem royalty. The RRR, structured on a similar 
basis to the RRT, established a royalty of 40 per cent once a threshold 
had been passed. These revenues would be split 75/25 between the 
Commonwealth and the State governments. There has been little 
pressure to extend the RRR offshore, as the States argued that such 
arrangements reduced revenue. 56 
A review of revenue sharing arrangements for Bass Strait was 
54 See M. Haward, Institutions, Interest Groups and Marine Resources Policy. 
55 R. Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore (2nd ed.), 35-36. 
% J• Starkey, pers. comm. 6th December 1989. 
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undertaken by the department of Primary Industry and Energy in 1988 
- 1989. Investigating revenue sharing under RRT was "academic" as at 
this stage there were no RRT revenues being generated. The RRT as 
the basis for offshore oil revenues was reintroduced in the 1990 
Commonwealth budget. 57 The royalty review, and particularly the 
issue of revenue sharing from Bass Strait, was not surprisingly, of 
considerable interest to Victoria, who had been challenging the 
validity of the revenue sharing arrangements for five years. Victorian 
officials considered that the introduction of the RRT in the 1990 budget 
amounted to the Commonwealth abrogating commitments to the 
spirit and intent of the OCS. 58 
The Hawke government, while retaining the OCS framework for the 
administration of offshore oil and gas resources, was able to institute 
specific changes to the operation of this regime. The most significant 
change concerned the method of awarding exploration permits. The 
traditional method of awarding permits involved competing interests 
submitting their proposed exploration programmes to the State 
minister (the designated authority under administrative arrangements 
established by 1967 Petroleum Agreement and the OCS) with the "best" 
programme gaining the permit. The Hawke government argued that 
such a method of allocating permits could result in extensive drilling 
programmes being committed in areas that were of only marginal 
prospectivity.. A system of "cash bidding", a competitive auction 
system, was proposed by the government in order to reduce the 
arbitrary nature of existing permit allocation and to reduce the capital 
wastage in unproductive programmes. The level of bid was seen as 
57 Financial Review September 1990. 
J. 'Zimmer, Department of Premier and Cabinet, Victoria, pers. comm. 14 August 1992. 
reflecting the company's view on the prospectivity of the permit, and 
be a more realistic forecast of the exploration programme. 
Cash bidding was opposed by industry who regarded it as an "up front" 
financial impost. As a result of negotiations with industry the 
Commonwealth government agreed to modify the work programme 
system. This meant the addition of a "dry hole agreement" to the 
work programme system. This method ensured successful bids were 
aware "that . . . the first three years of the work programme bid must be 
completed [and] . .. which parts of the work programme are committed 
and which include a contingency element." 59 The introduction of 
"modified work programme bidding" involved considerable 
negotiation with industry and Victorian and Western Australian State 
governments, with the Commonwealth's original proposal of "cash 
bidding" eventually being restricted to permits in highly prospective 
areas in the Timor Sea. 
Intergovernmental interaction was influenced by the presence of a 
strong and well resourced industry body the Australian Petroleum 
Exploration Association (APEA). APEA has maintained a close 
interest in the arrangements governing exploration and production of 
offshore oil and gas. In 1989, in response to the review into oil and gas 
administration undertaken by DPI&E, APEA identified several areas of 
concern to industry. In a letter to DPI&E the Executive Director of 
APEA criticised the arrangements arising from the 'separation of 
responsibility between joint authority and designated authority•
arguing that this had led to considerable delays in approving permit 
59 J. C. Starkey, "Australia's Offshore Petroleum Legal and Administrative Regime", 
27. 
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application or alterations to work programmes.° APEA maintained 
its opposition to increasing the costs of exploration through the 
imposition of cash bidding and RRT arrangements, views which were 
supported by some State governments. 61 
The issues raised by the question of the appropriate revenue - sharing 
arrangements have continued - throughout the implementation of the 
oil and gas package. The primacy of these issues in interaction between 
Victoria and the Commonwealth is inversely proportional to the 
amount of time taken to discuss them during the negotiations which 
established the OCS. Although the oil and gas arrangements have 
attracted considerable academic attention, 62 Cullen has directed 
attention to the contrast between the "fairly amicable" negotiations 
between Victoria and the Fraser government during the design of the 
OCS and the conflicts in the mid to late 1980s. 63 It is more surprising 
that little was made of the revenue sharing issue during 1977-1979, for 
it was at this time that the introduction of world parity pricing and the 
crude oil levy was effectively (and rapidly) reducing the States' share of 
revenues. 
6° Correpondence from K. Orchison to Petroleum Division DPI&E, 28 March 1990. 
61 Victoria and Western Australia and Tasmania were concerned that such proposals 
would reduce exploration activity. See M. Haward, Institutions, Interest Groups and 
Marine Resources Policy 
62 see,  for example P. C. Reid, "Commonwealth-State Relations, Offshore Mining and 
Petrolueum Legislation Recent Developments: A Historic Milestone or Millstone?" 
Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Journal 2, 2 (1980); R.A. Herr and B.W. Davis, 
"The Impact of UNCLOS III on Australian Federalism"; R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Oil 
Revenue Raising: A Case of One Government Too Many", and R. Cullen, Federalism in 
Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Oil and Gas Disputes, (Sydney: 
Federation Press, 1990). 
63 R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Oil Revenue Raising: A Case of One Government Too Many. 
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Cullen, in making the point that "it would appear from the public 
record that revenue sharing did not receive the status of a serious 
agenda item during [the OCS] negotiations", 64 poses the obvious 
question "why was this so?" Discussion in the previous chapter 
reinforces Cullen's view that little discussion took place over revenue 
sharing during the negotiation of the OCS. Cullen argues that the 
"preoccupation" with regaining jurisdiction led the State legal officers 
to pursue the legislative return "of what the High Court had said was 
never theirs; their coastal waters". 65 The preoccupation with the 
implementation of the political commitments made by Prime Minister 
Fraser is understandable. Several factors explain the lack of serious 
debate on revenue - sharing. The Solicitors-General had carriage of the 
issue but there were also clear signals given by the Prime Minister in 
his correspondence with the State Premiers on the limits to the 
negotiations over the seas and submerged land matters. The issue of 
oil and gas revenue sharing only directly affected Victoria. The other 
States, more concerned with other issues, were as one Commonwealth 
official has remarked, "along for the ride". 66 
The contrast between the intergovernmental arrangements over 
offshore petroleum and those in Australia and Atlantic Canadian is 
striking.67 Although the jurisdictional disputes over offshore oil and 
gas followed a similar process, with judicial review favouring the 
" Ibid: 245. 
65 Ibid See also R Cullen Federalism in Action: The Australian and Canadian 
Offshore Oil and Gas Disputes, (Sydney: Federation Press, 1990): 104-132. 
J. Starkey pers comm. December 1989. 
67 See R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Oil 
and Gas Disputes and M. Haward "Intergovernmental Relations and Offshore 
Resources Policy in Australia and Canada", Australian Canadian Studies, 9 1,2 (1991): 
35-51. 
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federal government, the outcomes of the political settlement are 
remarkably different. The provinces of Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia have achieved considerable autonomy in regulatory control and 
revenue raising under the Atlantic and Nova Scotia Accords, 
arrangements denied the Australian States under the OCS. Cullen has 
described the Australian oil and gas arrangements as a national 
scheme administered by the States, while in Atlantic Canada the 
arrangements have a strong regional emphasis. 68 Although the oil 
and gas sector may have lacked a regional emphasis, devolution of 
responsibilities was greater in other sectors, and most clearly 
developed in relation to the Great Barrier Reef. 
(b) The Great Barrier Reef 
The OCS agreed arrangements reinforced the regime governing the 
administration of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park established by the 
Whitlam government's Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975. 
This, not unexpectedly, raised considerable opposition from the 
Queensland government with Bjelke Petersen opposing the 
"duplic[ation] of a major activity of the state government and . . . [the 
involvement of the Commonwealth] . . . in a large percentage of 
Queensland's coastline". 69 The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority (GBRMPA) established by the earlier Commonwealth 
legislation was responsible for the management of the Park. GBRIVIPA 
has seen almost all the Great Barrier Reef region included within the 
marine park since the first section of the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park - the "Capricornia Section" - was proclaimed in October 1979. 
68 R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore oil and 
Gas Disputes. 
69 J. Bjelke-Petersen, "Australian Federalism: A Queensland View" in A. Patience and 
J. Scott (eds.) Australian Federalism: Future Tense, (Melbourne: Oxford, 1983): 64. 
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Intergovernmental relations over the Great Barrier Reef prior to the 
OCS, detailed in preceding chapters, saw Queensland and successive 
Commonwealth governments involved in a paradigm case of Fritzler 
and Segal's "distintegrative conflict". The achievement of an 
accommodation between parties with what amounted to apparently 
mutually exclusive - positions appeared difficult - Russell Mathews 
commented that in the early 1970s: 
relations between the Queensland government and the national 
government have been so bad as to seem on occasions that the 
state of Queensland and the Commonwealth are hostile foreign 
powers. The disagreements have been between state and 
National governments, not between Queensland and other 
states.70 
The Emerald Agreement, and much deft manoevring by 
Commonwealth and State officials saw the first meeting of the Great 
Barrier Reef Ministerial Council being held in Brisbane on the 4th 
October 1979. This meeting led to co-operative intergovernmental 
management practices - known as "complementary management" 71 - 
being established. In contrast to the earlier political belligerence, 
administrative and bureaucratic co-operation over the management of 
the park has been the dominant mode of intergovernmental 
transaction. The success of complementary management in the Great 
Barrier Reef has meant that it has become a model for marine 
protected area management world wide. 
R Mathews, "Foreward" in K. Wiltshire, Administrative Federalism, (St Lucia: 
University of Queensland press, 1977): ix. 
L.K. Kriwoken, "Great Barrier Reef Marine Park: Intergovernmental Relations" 
Marine Policy (September 1991): 349-362. 
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The successes in management reflect the good working relationships 
established by Commonwealth and State officials, and the staff of 
GBRMPA. This illustrates that much of Australian intergovernmental 
relations take place offstage, shaped by senior officials who share a 
concern and interest in similar policy issues. The achievement of what 
Fritzler and Segal would term "mutual accommodation" from what 
was clearly "disintegrative conflict" emphasises the importance of the 
linkages between officials at Commonwealth and State agencies in 
resolving disputes. Ensuring that these disputes do not recur is a major 
role for intergovernmental agencies such as Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park Authority - part of their function in mediating or moderating 
Australian intergovernmental conflicts. 
(c) Other Marine Parks 
The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park comprises 94.2 per cent of the total 
declared area of Australian marine parks and protected areas. 72 
Various categories of Marine and Estuarine Protected Areas (MEPAs) 
are found under State jurisdiction, ranging from proclaimed marine 
parks or aquatic reserves to marine extensions to terrestrial National 
Parks. 73 Ivanovici provides a useful, although perhaps unnecessarily 
broad definition of a MEPA: 
any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its 
!superadjacent water and associated flora and fauna which has 
been reserved by legislation to protect part or all of the enclosed 
72 A. Ivanovici, "Marine and Estuarine Protected Areas (MEPAs): A National 
Perspective" Maritime Studies 32, (January- February 1987): 11. See also L.K. 
Kriwoken and M. Haward, "Marine and Estuarine Protected Areas in Tasmania, 
Australia: The Complexities of Policy Development", Ocean and Shoreline 
Management (1991): 143-163. 
73 A. Ivanovici, "Marine and Estuarine Protected Areas (MEPAs): A National 
Perspective": 13. 
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environment for conservation, scientific, educational and/or 
recreational purposes. 74 
There are some problems with this definition in terms of marine 
protected areas; a range of areas can be regarded as "protected" as long as 
they are reserved under legislation whether or not any restrictions are 
placed on exploiting the resources in the area. 75 The definition does, 
however, emphasise the number of potential MEPAs under State 
jurisdiction. Although the total area is particularly small, all States 
have declared MEPAs of one kind or other. These range from areas 
reserved and protected from any activities to multiple-use marine 
parks. The limited co-ordination of MEPAs policy indicates the real 
problems of implementing, enforcing or ensuring compliance with 
measures taken at ministerial council meetings. The Council of 
Nature Conservation Ministers (CONCOM) - now amalgamated with 
the Australian and New Zealand Environment Council (ANZEC) - had 
developed extensive criteria for the protection of marine 
environments and established agreed guidelines for the 
implementation of MEPAs throughout Australia. These guidelines 
were developed from criteria adopted by the International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), a major 
international environmental organisation, and endorsed by all State 
Ministers, yet the States have not moved to implement these criteria in 
planning or managing MEPAs. Announcements made by the Prime 
Minister and the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment in 
1990 and 1991 have meant that the development of an integrated 
system of marine protected areas formed an integral part of the 
74 Ibid., 11. 
75 G Edgar, University of Melbourne, pers. comm. August 1989. 
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Commonwealth's Ocean Rescue 2000 initiative. Ocean Rescue 2000 
involves GBRMPA and the Commonwealth's Australian National 
Parks and Wildlife Service (ANPWS), in conjunction with the States, 
implementing an integrated aproach to marine protected areas. 
Ocean Rescue 2000 arose from criticism of the piecemeal approach of 
policy towards marine protected areas and the lack of ecological criteria 
used in the development of State MEPAs. 76 The development of State 
marine parks and reserves has been seen as a response to increased 
public concern over the maritime domain with little desire to develop 
an integrated system of reserves. The uncertainty over the OCS had 
been used in specific cases (in particular Tasmania) to limit the 
introduction of a State policy towards MEPAs, although the claims of 
jurisdictional uncertainty was used to justify what was in effect "non-
decision making".77 Although the OCS arrangements has allowed for 
joint Commonwealth - State management of MEPAs, all reserves, with 
the exception of Ningaloo Marine Park in Western Australia have been 
established under either Commonwealth or State legislation. 78 
The lack of progress towards joint managment can be explained first by 
a lack of suitable areas, but more importantly the reluctance of the 
States to enter into joint arrangements with the Commonwealth 
76 LX. Kriwoken, "Great Barrier Reef Marine Park: Intergovernmental Relations". 
77 See L.Kriwoken and M. Haward "Marine and Estuarine Protected Areas in 
Tasmania, Australia: The Complexities of Policy Development". 
78 It is important to note the significance of non-government groups such as the Fund for 
Animals and the Australian Underwater Federation in the making of MEPA policy. 
The latter group , its constitutent bodies and individual dive clubs have been 
responsible for the "establishment" of voluntary marine reserves in many areas off the 
Australian Coast See M Haward "Australian Marine Conservation Policy: A 
Framework For Analysis" Proceedings ECOPOLITICS II Conference (Hobart, Centre 
for Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania,1987). 
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which reduces the level of discretion afforded them. While the Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park illustrates the opportunities afforded by what 
has been termed "complementary management" and the justifed 
claims for the success of GBRMPA, the Ningaloo case illustrates some 
of the problems that arise when joint Commonwealth - State 
management is proposed. The experience in the Ningaloo Reef Marine 
Park shows that intergovernmental tensions in this particular sector 
can arise from a lack of communication and consultation between 
management agencies at different levels of government. 
Ningaloo Reef is located off the Western Australian coast in the 
vicinity of North-West Cape. It is claimed to be a unique reef system as 
"unlike the Great Barrier Reef and other Reefs in the North Coast of 
Australia it is not separated by a wide expanse of coastal waters". 79 
The proximity of the Reef to the Western Australian coast has made it 
a popular fishing and recreation area. Sole management of a marine 
park in the reef area could not be undertaken under Western 
Australian legislation as Ningaloo Reef transcended the three mile 
boundary between Commonwealth and State jurisdiction established 
by the OCS. As a result of this particular situation the Ningaloo Marine 
Park is at present the only MEPA to have been established under joint 
Commonwealth and State management. The Ningaloo Working Party 
did, however, emphasise: 
that the management of a joint Commonwealth State Marine 
Park is the prerogative of the State. The agreement (over the 
proclamation of the park) does not provide for Commonwealth 
79 R. F. May, R. C. J. Lenanton, and P. F. Berry. Ningaloo Marine Park: Report and 
Recommendations by the Marine Park Working Group (Perth: West Australian 
National Parks Authority, June 1983): ix. 
involvement without the concurrence of the State.80 
Western Australian officials saw that Ningaloo Reef lent itself to joint 
State-Commonwealth management but such an arrangement enabled 
integrated management, involving management of the terrestrial 
margin, as well as the marine environment to be incorporated. The 
Commonwealth was therefore drawn into the management of the 
proposed marine park through geography rather than any great desire 
to become actively involved in the area. This is a major explanation 
for the problems experienced in the implementation of joint 
Commonwealth - State management in the Ningaloo region. 
The Western Australian government established a management plan 
and administrative authority over "its" part of Ningaloo in 1983. The 
Commonwealth, no doubt because of the pending review of the OCS, 
and greater interest in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, lagged 
behind in establishing proposals for the outer parts of the proposed 
park. The Commonwealth management plan for its sector of Ningaloo 
Reef was not released until May 1990 by the ANPWS. This 
considerable delay concerned the Western Australian government, 
however the Commonwealth had also been criticised for its tardiness 
by a range of non-governmental groups including APEA. 81 
(d) Offshore Minerals 
: The limited commercial development of offshore minerals other than 
petroleum has meant that there has been little pressure to establish an 
8° Ibid: 30. 
81 Wayne Bennett, APEA pers. comm. October 25 1990. APEA was concerned that the 
delay in settling arrangements could impact on oil and gas search in the vicinity of the 
reef. 
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OCS framework. Although the agreed arrangements foreshadowed 
that such a regime would be established, no State has enacted 
complementary legislation. Thus the template envisaged by the OCS 
for this policy area remains to be implemented. Commonwealth 
legislation establishing such a regime was passed a year later than the 
rest of the Settlement, in June 1981, and was prodaimed in early 1990. 
Although no complementary State or Territory legislation is in place it 
is possible given the passage of the State Titles legislation, and the 
nexus with "peace order and good government" clauses of each State's 
constitution, existing State mining legislation could be applied to this 
regime. The lack of State legislation does not necessarily reflect an 
absence of interest; sea bed minerals have been discussed at various 
intergovernmental forums, but rather the lack of commercial interest 
in terms of exploration. The lack of progress in the Australian offshore 
minerals regime contrasts with on-going negotiations at the 
international level, particularly those associated with the United 
Nations sponsored Preparatory Commission on deep sea bed 
. 	82 
In response to international interest in deep sea mineral exploration 
and exploitation, the Commonwealth Department of Primary 
Industries and Energy (DPI &E) began negotiations over 
intergovernmental aspects of the administration of offshore mineral 
exploration. DPI & E considers that there is a: 
need for legislation to control minerals exploration and 
development in Australia's offshore areas. Consultations on this 
82 See A. Bergin, "The Politics of PrepCom" Marine Policy 12, 3 (October 1987); and G. 
Triggs, "The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Legal Twilight Zone" Maritime 
Studies, 39, (March- April 1988): 1-14. 
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matter have been held with the States and the Northern Territory 
at Ministerial and officials level. Amendments to the, as yet, 
unproclaimed Minerals (Submerged Lands) Act 1981 are being 
drafted to bring it it into line with the Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) Act 1967. Complementary State/Northern territory 
legislation is being prepared. 83 
The Minerals (Submerged Lands) Act (Cwth) was eventually 
proclaimed in February 1990 with the first permit to explore for such 
minerals (diamonds and other gemstones offshore from the Kimberly 
region of North Western Australia) granted in July 1990. 84 There is no 
complementary State legislation yet in force, although increased 
interest from exploration companies may enhance drafting of such 
measures. Manganese nodules and polymetallic sulphide deposits 
form the major valuable deep sea bed minerals. 85 From limited 
surveys within Australian waters it is apparent that there is "a 
pavement" of nodules off Cape Leewin in Western Australia, but of an 
inferior quality to discoveries in the Pacific. 86 Continued exploration 
for these resources within Australian waters is considered likely in the 
future, although their exploitation is likely to depend on the 
discoveries of richer deposits. Costs surrounding the extraction of 
other sea bed minerals make it unlikely that they will be mined 
offshore.87 
The offshore minerals sector illustrates that intergovernmental 
agreements or arrangements arise when both the Commonwealth and 
83 Department of Primary Industries and Energy Annual Report 1987-88, 57. 
84 Weekend Australian 21-22 July 1990. 
85 J. B. Hinwood, "Offshore Engineering" in Maritime Australia: Exploring the 
Scientific and Technological Base Occasional Papers in Marine Affairs 4, (Canberra, 
Australian Centre for Maritime Studies), 1987, 66. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid: 65. 
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the States recognise the need for such instruments either in a multi-
lateral, or a series of bi-lateral agreements. In the case of seabed 
minerals the States have not acted under the complementary 
legislation framework offered them under the rubric of the OCS, 
although they supported the Commonwealth's proclamation of its 
legislation.88 The States responded in a similar manner over ship-
sourced marine pollution. In this area the Commonwealth has also 
acted to regulate activity and it is Commonwealth legislation that 
"covers the field", although the opportunity exists in the "roll-back 
provisions" in these Acts for State legislation to be introduced. 89 
(e) Ship-Sourced Marine Pollution 
Ship-sourced pollution involves two aspects, each requiring different 
legislative and policy responses, and therefore involving different types 
of intergovernmental interaction. The first and most obvious form of 
ship-sourced pollution is the accidental discharge of pollutants through 
collisions, groundings or accidents in loading or unloading cargo. The 
second form of ship-sourced pollution concerns dumping of wastes, 
either as terrestrial originated waste material or as ballast water. The 
former is usually dumped well out to sea on the edge of the continental 
shelf, and hence is readily regulated under Commonwealth legislation 
while the latter is more problematic, and is of some concern in inshore 
areas. Ballast dumping is supposedly regulated, but usually occurs 
within harbours or close to shore (even though international 
conventions encourage the transfer of ballast at sea). Ballast water, and 
J. Starkey, Department of Primary Industries and Energy, pers comm. Dec 1989. 
89 An excellent concise discussion of roll-back clauses is found in H. 
Burmester,"Federalism, The States and International Affairs" in B. Galligan (ed.) 
Australian Federalism, (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1989): 192-216. 
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the problems of introduced species of flora and fauna contained within 
it, is emerging as a major source of ship sourced pollution. 
The OCS retained arrangements governing the acccidental discharge of 
ship-sourced marine pollution established in 1960 following the 
passing of Commonwealth and State legislation implementing the 1954 
International Convention for the Prevention of the Sea by 0i1. 9 
Although given the opportunity, no State enacted complementary 
legislation following the proclamation of Commonwealth's Protection 
of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 1983. This 
resulted in necessary amendments to the Commonwealth's legislation 
"to allow its operation in the territorial sea to the extent that their is no 
adequate State or Northern Territory legislation on the subject."91 
Several reasons can be postulated for the failure of any of the States to 
enact such legislation. The first may be a perception that there was no 
immediate need for State legislation as the Commonwealth legislation 
was in place. A second factor may be the reluctance of the States to 
become involved in complex issues raised by compliance with, or 
90 "The Offshore Constitutional Settlement: A Milestone 	", 16. See also M. 
Crommelin "Commonwealth Involvement in Environment Policy: Past Present and 
Future", Environment and Planning Law Journal, 4, (June 1987), 107. As Crommelin has 
noted, developments concerning ship-sourced marine pollution "suggest some 
modifications to the provisions of the offshore constitutional settlement." 
91 M. Crommelin "Commonwealth Involvement in Environment Policy." Recent 
developments in Tasmania indicate that there are some problems in controlling a 
particular form of ship-sourced marine pollution associated with dumping of water 
ballast from bulk carriers. The discovery of foreign sea weeds and dinoflagellate spores 
within sediments in the port of Triabunna has been traced to contaminants contained 
within ballast tanks of bulk woodship carriers using the port. These spores are 
considered to have the potential to lead to toxic plankton blooms which could damage 
the developing mariculture industry in the State. This example highlights the 
intergovernmental aspects of marine resource policy as co-ordination of .controls over 
ballast dumping involves Commonwealth and State agencies and the local port 
authority, see the Mercury 18 May 1988. 
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enforcing of, international treaties. A third explanation may be that the 
States did not wish to take responsibility for regulating complex anti-
pollution practices, necessary if State legislation was introduced. If such 
State/Territory legislation was enacted the Commonwealth Act would 
cease to apply to the area under State jurisdiction, but the roll-back 
clause would ensure that the MARPOL convention still applied. 
The regulation of the dumping of ballast water emerged as a major 
concern following discoveries of introduced toxic marine organisms 
and seaweeds. In response to scientific evidence which indicated the 
potential harm from such organisms the Commonwealth introduced 
guidelines on the "uptake and discharge" of ballast water in February 
1990. These voluntary guidelines were "extended indefinitely" in 
August 199092 and served to complement regulations established in 
the early 1980s. Australia signed the international Convention on 
Offshore Dumping in 1973. This convention, popularly known as the 
London Dumping Convention, came into force in 1975 although "it 
was applied in Australia on a voluntary basis in co-operation with the 
states and industry until the Environmental Protection Sea Dumping 
Act 1981 was passed to give legislative effect to the Convention." 93 
This legislation was enacted within the framework of the OCS. Roll-
back provisions enabled the appropriate Commonwealth Minister to 
make a declaration that the State law was the basis for regulating 
activity within three miles of the low water mark "if satisfied that the 
law of the state or Northern Territory makes provision for giving effect 
92Mercury 6 August 1990. 
93 H. Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the Sea - The Protection and Preservation 
of The Marine Environment" In K. Ryan (ed) International Law in Australia, (Sydney: 
Law Book Company in association with the Australian Institute of International 
Affairs, 1984): 443. 
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to the convention in relation to coastal waters (essentially the 
territorial sea) of that state or territory." 94 
Amendments to the Environmental Protection Sea Dumping Act 
1981 passed in 1986 removed the need for a Commonwealth permit 
for loading waste if a State had approved legislation in place. 95 Prior 
• to this amendment the _arrangements controlling dumping caused 
some confusion, chiefly arising from the need for both Commonwealth 
and State permits which, in effect, replicated each other. 96 This 
arrangement reflected the general orientation of the OCS where the 
States were able to assume greater responsibility for activities as long as 
Australia's obligations in terms of international treaties were 
maintained. Amendments to the London Dumping Convention mean 
that signatories to the convention will curtail dumping at sea from 
1995, and so further Commonwealth - State interaction is likely as the 
administrative regime is further modified. 
Australia's ratification of international treaties has, therefore 
considerable significance in the administrative arrangements 
governing marine pollution. The dumping of radioactive wastes, for 
example, which are excluded from the more general coverage in the 
London Dumping Convention, now has to conform to Australian 
responsibilities under recently signed South Pacific regional treaties. 
Thus intergovernmental arrangements reflect Australia's , commitment 
94 Ibid: 444. Note that this was written when the Australian territorial sea was still 
three miles. 
95 J. Brown, (ed.) Australian Practice in International Law 1986-87 Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade for Public International Law Seminar, (Canberra: Australian 
National University, 20-22 May 1988): 60. 
96 H. Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the Sea ...", 444. 
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to regional agreements, chiefly the South Pacific Regional 
Environmental Protection Convention (SPREP) and the South Pacific 
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ, or more correctly, the Treaty of 
Raratonga). Ratification of these treaties has meant that the Australian 
States are no longer able to legislate for the loading, dumping or 
incinerating at sea of radioactive waste.97 This underscores the point 
that intergovernmental interaction over domestic policy is influenced 
by Australia's international personality, which gives primacy to the 
agreements which are entered into by the state of Australia, as opposed 
to arrangements practised by the States of Australia. 
(f) Fisheries 
The delay in concluding the fisheries component of the settlement has 
resulted from several factors, including the length of time taken to 
complete negotiations between the Commonwealth and the States over 
the classification of fisheries and the resistance of some States to 
increased involvement of the Commonwealth in day-to-day 
management. 98 Slow progress could be expected as the fisheries 
• package involved a reorientation of existing practice. The 
development of new arrangements for the management of stocks 
which transcended state waters would, naturally take time. The States' 
initial concerns over some elements of the fisheries package related to 
the implications arising from a commitment to administer Australian 
fisheries under "one law". Such proposals were bound to involve 
lengthy negotiation (and disputation) between the Commonwealth and 
the States, and also ensured that the fisheries package could proceed 
97 J. Brown, Australian Practice in International Law 1986-87: 60. 
98 A.J. Harrison The Commonwealth Government in the Administration of Australian 
Fisheries: A Sort of Mongrel Socialism RAIPA National Monograph 6 (January 1991). 
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only at the pace set by the slowest participant. 99 
Chapter Three has indicated that State Ministers had readily agreed that 
fisheries could be appropriately dealt with under the provisions of the 
Fraser government's new federalism. This agreement had been 
reached soon after the election of the new government and well before 
the OCS had been completed. 100 The emphasis that the Fraser 
government placed on an organic settlement meant that such ready 
agreement over fisheries had to wait until other arrangements 
completing the OCS regime were in place. State fisheries Ministers and 
the fishing industry were concerned that the fisheries elements were 
being neglected, a point echoed by the Senate Standing Committee on 
Trade and Commerce in its major report on the Australian fishing 
industry released in 1982. 101 The committee observed that: 
Mndustry has welcomed in principle the proposed new fisheries 
arrangements provided for in the Fisheries Act 1980. However it 
is concerned that because the fisheries agreement is only one part 
of the offshore constitutional settlement package, the new 
fisheries regime will not be implemented until all the offshore 
matters are settled despite the fact that agreement has already 
been reached on the fisheries component. 102 
The first fisheries arrangements were eventually established in June 
R .A. Herr "Federalism and Fisheries" Paper presented to National Fisheries 
Officers Course Australian Maritime College (November 1987). 
100 B. Chatterton and L. Arnold, "Fisheries Management and the New Federalism" in 
D. Jaensch, (ed.) The Politics of the New Federalism , (Bedford Park: APSA, 1977). 
101 Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Standing Committee on Trade and Commerce, 
Development of the Australian Fishing Industry, (Canberra: AGPS, 1982). 
102 /bid :  15 (emphasis added). 
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1986. Although the defeat of the Fraser government in early March 
1983 was a contributing factor, the Fraser government's timetable over 
the offshore settlement placed a low priority on the fisheries elements. 
The Senate Standing Committee provides a concise summary of this 
timetable. 
In June 1980 it was agreed at the Premiers' Conference that the 
offshore constitutional settlement was a 'package' and that the 
following action would be required to be taken by all states and the 
Northern Territory preparatory to the commencement of all 
elements of the legislation relating to the settlement; 
* introduction of legislation in all States and the Northern 
Territory in respect to petroleum and fisheries; 
* proclamation of the Coastal Waters (State and Northern 
Territory Powers) Act when the above is achieved; 
* adoption of a common mining code for petroleum as a 
prerequisite to bringing the Coastal Waters (State and 
Northern Territory Titles) Acts into force; 
* enactment by all States and the Northern Territory of the 
necessary complementary fisheries legislation; and 
* co-ordination arrangements (sic.) for the simultaneous 
commencement of all eight fisheries laws. 103 
The practical issues relating to the enactment of legislation contributed 
to, but was not the cause of, the lengthy delay in implementing the OCS 
arrangements for fisheries. Amendments to State legislation werw 
prepared between 1981 and 1982 as part of the requirements for 
complementary legislation. Delays arose, and intergovernmental 
interaction increased over the classification of fisheries. The 
Commonwealth maintained control over this process as its agreement 
was needed on any classification. The review of the OCS undertaken by 
the Hawke government provided an interregnum in which the States 
103 Ibid: 14. 
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were able to "renegotiate" earlier arrangements. The re-opening of the 
negotiations over the classification of fisheries further delayed the 
process of implementing this package. 
The moves to declare a 200 mile fishing zone was yet another factor 
influencing the implementation of fisheries arrangements. Following 
the practice of other coastal states to claim extended jurisdiction 
offshore, Australia announced a 200 nautical mile extended fishing 
zone in November 1979. The Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ), 
approximately 1,854,000 square (nautical) miles in area, is the third 
largest in the world and is approximately equivalent in area to the land 
mass of Australia. Given the particular oceanographic characteristics of 
the area, productivity of the marine living resources within this area is 
limited. Most fisheries resources within the AFZ are considered to be 
fully developed, if not over-exploited, with little excess capacity. Until 
UNCLOS III enters force Australia has responsibility for the continental 
margin in excess of 200 miles offshore off Cape Leeuwin and in the 
North West Shelf areas of Western Australia. 104 
Intergovernmental relations over fisheries and the declaration of the 
AFZ were interwoven during negotiations over maritime boundaries 
in the Timor Sea, Torres Strait and Coral Sea. Determining, and 
gaining agreement over, these boundaries involved negotiations with 
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, France and the Solomon Islands. 105 
104 The announcement in September 1991 that Australia will legislate to introduce a 200 
mile Exclusive Economic -Zone (EEZ) also included a commitment to introducing the 
definition of the continental shelf under UNCLOS III. 
105 J. R. V. Prescott, Australia's Maritime Boundaries, Canberra studies in World 
Affairs No. 16, (Canberra: Department of International Relations Australian National 
University, 1985): 74-75; 125-126. 
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Although the Commonwealth retains control of the negotiation over 
such boundary treaties or agreements, the State governments retain 
considerable interests in these matters and can, as was the case with 
Queensland's concerns over the Torres Strait Treaty, influence the 
process of negotiation. The incomplete boundary in the Timor Sea was 
concluded by the "Timor Gap Treaty", in November 1989, which closed 
the sector of the Australian -- Indonesian boundary offshore from the 
island of Timor. The treaty involved a joint development zone 
bounded by national zones and, as the area was close to the highly 
prospective Jabiru and Challis oil and gas fields, was directed at oil and 
gas rather than fishing. 
Negotiations were also shaped by several factors unique to fishery 
management within a federal political system. Intergovernmental 
relations were complicated where fisheries involved vessels from 
different States or which were based on grounds which transcended the 
offshore extensions of State boundaries. These matters were, however, 
clarified by the High - Court in the Port Macdonnell case in 1989. 
Adopting a "single law" was further complicated where different 
regulations and management histories or philosophies governed each 
State's fishery. In Bass Strait, for example, the same fisheries in 
Victoria and Tasmania were managed by contrasting, and to some 
extent mutually exclusive, strategies. 106 
106 Tasmania operates a system of "open entry" fisheries, with fishermen able to apply 
for endorsements for particular fisheries once they have obtained a license for their 
vessel. In Victoria a limited entry" system is used with fishermen being licensed for a 
single fishery. Such different management systems were highlighted when vessels from 
each state were fishing the same waters, usually under Commonwealth licences. The 
major conflicts arose within the Bass Strait scallop fishery where declining catches 
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Originally the OCS agreed arrangements proposed a three tiered 
structure of fisheries administration. Fisheries would be administered 
by either a State, the Commonwealth or by a Joint Authority. Under 
the OCS arrangements, where agreement was reached with the 
Commonwealth, fisheries administered by a State could extend to the 
edge of the AFZ. The "default" position within the OCS fisheries 
arrangement was to retain the status quo, that is licensing and 
management under overlapping State and Commonwealth legislation 
and regulation. In order to reduce complexity and the effects of 
spillovers the Commonwealth would retain control over foreign 
fisheries within the Australian (Extended) Fishing Zone (AFZ) and 
retain control of highly migratory species such as the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna. The Commonwealth's position in the tuna fishery was, 
according to Herr and Davis, reinforced by "a transcendent 
international obligation through the membership of a regional 
regulatory organisation", 107 the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency. 
The question of managing fisheries across jurisdictional boundaries 
was of particular interest to the States. Earlier discussion has indicated 
that the fisheries package within the OCS "agreed arrangements" was 
designed to include four joint authorities, with possibility of other joint 
authorities being established if an agreement was reached between the 
Commonwealth and the appropriates State(s). The Commonwealth 
focused the fishermen's dissatisfaction over these conflicting management 
philosophies. See M. Haward, Institutions, Interest Groups and Marine Resouces 
Policy, Ch 4. 
107 R. A. Herr and B. W. Davis, "The Impact of UNCLOS III on Australian 
Federalism": 690. 
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promoted the joint authority as a significant achievement in the co-
operative management of fisheries, and saw such bodies as having the 
ability to administer fisheries through the issue of licences. 108 In 
practice, however, there has been little progress towards the 
establishment of these bodies. Long-standing tension between the State 
and Commonwealth fisheries agencies, and sometimes vitriolic 
confrontations between State agencies, have contributed to the limited 
success of joint authorities. The States, particularly Tasmania, 
questioned the legal basis for joint authority licences, seeing this as 
adding to, rather than reducing complexity in fisheries management. 
The lack of enthusiasm from the States for the joint authority system is 
perhaps understandable as they had little chance of winning a dispute 
within the joint authority. 
While the OCS "agreed arrangements" fostered the use of joint 
Commonwealth - State authorities to manage particular fisheries, the 
only examples of such formal arrangements are within Torres Strait, 
where the Commonwealth administers the fisheries on behalf of the 
Queensland government, and in Western Australia where a newly 
established joint authority has been established for the South - Western 
demersal shark fishery. The latter joint authority has been established 
under State legislation. The Australian Fisheries Service of the 
Commonwealth Department of Primary Industry and Energy
109 
took 
10_8 D. Macdonald "Fishermen and the Offshore Constitutional Settlement" Australian 
Fisheries, (February 1982): 2-3. 
109 The Australian Fisheries Service (AFS) was replced in February 1992 by the 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) a statutory authority charged 
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the view that any joint authority should be established under the 
"most appropriate legislation". 110 
With the Western Australian shark fishery a recent exception, the 
States' reluctance to embrace joint authorities relates to the explicit 
Commonwealth veto built into the agreed arrangements. The lack of 
unanimous support for the OCS fisheries packages, has been fuelled by 
State concerns that they enable increased Commonwealth 
involvement in fisheries management. As the fisheries arrangements 
evolve, further collaboration through joint authorities is possible. 
New South Wales' opposition to Commonwealth interference has, for 
example, moderated following retirements of "States rights" oriented 
officials and Ministers. The importance of personalities reinforces 
Simeon's, and Warhurst's, arguments over intergovernmental 
diplomacy. Changes in personnel were believed to have facilitated the 
adoption of the OCS style arrangements in NSW, although as yet these 
have not been implemented. 111 Even in fisheries where the 
-Commonwealth has sole responsibility, the States are able to influence 
the outcomes of management plans. Attempts to -restrict the incidental 
catch (or non-target species) of Southern Bluefin Tuna as part of a 
management plan for the South Eastern Tuna Fishery was strongly 
opposed by the States. Although a compromise was reached over the 
level of incidental catch, the flurry of activity it engendered illustrated 
again the intergovernmental dimension to a fishery that was maanged 
by the Commonwealth. What is clear, however, is that the 
Commonwealth cannot unilaterally impose policy directives on the 
with controlling Commonwealth fishing activites. 
110 H. Lis, • —, pers. COMM. 5th December 1989. 
111 Interviews with Commonwealth and State officers in 1989, 1990 and 1991. 
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States, needing instead a consensus through the AFC and/or its 
standing committee. 
Implementation of the OCS fisheries package emphasises what may be 
termed the "positive" and "negative" elements of intergovernmental 
interaction. Agreement over management practices, or the need to 
take action in fisheries suffering severe declines in catch (and 
profitability) is enhanced by intergovernmental collaboration. In 
contrast the ability of States to "hold out" against co-operative efforts in 
attempts to retain control or autonomy, or even to frustrate 
developments they consider to be detrimental to their interests, may be 
a more common response. It is probably no surprise that the Bass Strait 
Scallop fishery, the first management regime to be established under 
the OCS, was one which involved extensive inter State rivalry and 
dispute. The Bass Strait scallop regime was developed in response to 
problems in managing the fishery and disputed rights over particular 
grounds. 
Tasmanian fishermen resented Victorian fishermen (with 
Commonwealth licences) fishing scallop beds off the coast of Tasmania. 
Conflict was heightened by differences in management strategies and 
fisheries practices adopted by the Victorian and Tasmanian 
governments over the scallop fishery. Tasmania and Victoria appealed 
for the Commonwealth to act on access to Bass Strait fishing grounds, 
but on predictable grounds. Tasmania argued that the OCS would 
enable Victorian fishermen to be excluded, while Victoria argued that 
the OCs framework enabled open access outside three miles from low 
water mark. The impasse was resolved with the introduction of a 
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management regime in June 1986 which created two zones of State 
jurisdiction extending twenty miles offshore from low water mark in 
Tasmania and Victoria. The Commonwealth would control the 
"central zone" between the two States. The scallop management 
regime was established following Commonwealth agreement that the 
fisheries component of the OCS would be implemented on a fishery by 
fishery basis. 
Following further negotiations between the Commonwealth and the 
States, arrangements were gazetted on the 1 June 1987 concerning 
agreement over the OCS fisheries package for fisheries in waters off 
Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania. 112 
These agreements established that the management of the tuna fishery 
and the fishery within the area of Australian jurisdiction in the Torres 
Strait Protected Zone would be under Commonwealth law, and also 
determined which fisheries would be managed under "State law". 
With the agreement on the Bass Strait scallop fishery concluded the 
previous year involving Victoria, the OCS extended to five States, with 
New South Wales choosing to opt out of the OCS arrangements. 
Individual fisheries arrangements established under the 1987 bilateral 
agreements were the focus of legal challenges in 1988 and 1989. While 
important in terms of future fisheries management this action had 
important implications for the future of the offshore constitutional 
settlement. The challenges were made by third parties, individuals or 
fishermen's organisations, rather than the States (who supported the 
OCS), but focused on the constitutional validity of the legislation 
r- 
112 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette S104 1 June 1987 and "OCS now extends to Five 
States" Australian Fisheries, 46, 6 (June 1987): 16-17. 
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underpinning the OCS. The Port Macdonell case was directed at the 
arrangements which established the management of the South 
Australian southern rock lobster fishery as a State fishery and the 
validity of the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980. The second 
case, Harper v the Minister for Sea Fisheries, indirectly questioned the 
vailidity of the Coastal Waters (State Titles) Act 1980 in a challenge 
over the level of licence fee in the Tasmanian abalone fishery. 
The Port Macdonell case (Port Macdonell Professional Fisherman's 
Association Inc v South Australia and the Commonwealth) 113 arose 
from the opposition of the fishermen to management decisions made 
under South Australian laws and regulation following arrangements 
entered into following the implementation of the OCS fisheries 
regime. As Waugh noted: 
South Australian management of this fishery has been extended 
beyond the usual limit of three miles from shore (or from the 
closing lines of certain bays and gulfs) by intergovernmental 
arrangements made under matching provisions of the Fisheries 
Act 1952 (Cth) and the Fisheries Act 1982 (SA). These matching 
provisions are part of the fisheries component of the OCS, and it is 
this extended jurisdiction of the state which is now under 
challenge. 114 
The challenge to the validity of the arrangements over the Rock 
Lobster fishery in Port Macdonnell proceeded on two levels. The first 
assumed that the OCS fisheries package was valid and argued that the 
arrangements for the South Australian fishery were not supported by 
113 Port Macdonell Professional Fisherman's Association Inc v South Australia and the 
Commonwealth (1989) 63 A.L.J.R. 671. 
114 j Waugh "Offshore Fisheries - High Court Challenge" Intergovernmental News, 1, 
4 (April 1989): 5. 
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the legislation. An important aspect of this element of the challenge is 
that the waters defined by the arrangements "encroached on Victorian 
coastal waters and were therefore not waters 'adjacent' to South 
Australia". 115 The second level of the challenge had greater 
significance as it was: 
based on constitutional grounds. It [was] argued that the operation 
of South Australian legislation in the fishery beyond three miles 
is not supported by section 5 (c) of the Coastal Waters (State 
Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) which purports to give the States extended 
legislative power over fisheries where intergovernmental 
fisheries management arrangements are made. 116 
The challenge to the constitutional validity of the Coastal Waters 
(State Powers) Act - particularly as this would inevitably involve a 
consideration of the validity of Section 51(xxxviii) - raised the level of 
dispute from simply a matter of local concern to involve all States. If 
the first level of the challenge was upheld other fisheries arrangements 
made under the OCS would be invalidated on the same grounds. If the 
second level, the constitutional level, of the challenge to the validity of 
of the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 was upheld then as 
Waugh states "it would involve sweeping consequences since it would 
imply that the whole of the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act is 
invalid." 117 
The High Court delivered a joint judgement which held that the 
arrangements regarding the management of the rock lobster fishery 
was valid "within waters adjacent to the State" 118 and was supported by 
115 ibid . 
116 ibid : 5.6 . 
117 ibid . 
118 Port Macdonell Professional Fisherman's Association Inc v South , Australia and the 
Commonwealth (1989) 63 A.L.J.R. 689. 
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both Commonwealth and South Australian legislation. The Court also 
found that the Coastal Waters (State Powers Act) 1980 (Cwth) "is a 
valid law of the Commonwealth and that there was no inconsistency 
between aspects of the South Australian and Commonwealth fisheries 
Acts. The High Court also examined, for the first time, the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement, providing a concise summary of the effect of 
the OCS arrangements, the use of Section 51 (xxxviii), and a detailed 
examination of the definition of "adjacent area" of the State relating to 
the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act.119 The definition of the adjacent 
area was,as indicated earlier, a crucial element in the challenge from 
the Port Macdonell Fishermen's Association. During the negotiations 
of fisheries agreements Commonwealth and State officials had believed 
the notion of "adjacent" was flexible and could be established according 
to fish stocks. 120 The High Court examined the boundary of the rock 
lobster arrangement and established that it included "2000 km 2 of sea 
on the Victorian side of the line of equidistance drawn from the 
intersection of the South Australian and Victorian border with the 
coastline and which is part of the "adjacent area" in respect of the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967. 121 
Although differing from the boundaries established under the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967, the problem in the definition 
of the adjacent area did not directly invalidate the arrangements over 
the management of the South Australian rock lobster fishery. These 
arrangements were originally established under the OCS on 13 April 
119 Ibid.  675. 
120 H. Lis pers. comm. December 1989. 
121 Port Macdonell Professional Fisherman's Association Inc v South Australia and the 
Commonwealth (1989) 63 A.L.J.R. 676. 
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1987 and amended by a second arrangement on 1st November 1988. 122 
The second arrangement was necessary "as the earlier arrangement did 
not define the boundaries of the rock lobster fishery to which it 
applied." 123 The amendment was introduced after the writ issued by 
the Port Macdonnell Fishermen's Association had been lodged in the 
Adelaide office of the High Court of Australia in September 1987. The 
issue of the amendment to the arrangements was of little importance; 
the High Court noted that "argument in case was predominately 
directed to the second arrangement". 124  
The High Court found that "the references to the part or parts of the 
territorial sea that are adjacent to that 'State' or 'Territory' in the 
definition of 'coastal waters' in s4A of the Commonwealth Fisheries 
Act must be construed as being a reference to a discrete area separated 
from the 'coastal waters' of an adjoining state or territory by a fixed 
boundary." 125 The Court found that "appropriate fixed boundary lines" 
were those identified by the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act126 
bringing, perhaps unwittingly, the OCS back to the organic basis 
_ envisaged by the Fraser government. 
Following the decision in the Port Macdonnell case, brought down in 
October 1989, the Australian Fisheries Service contacted all State and 
Territory Ministers to canvass their opinions on the findings of the 
122 ibid 673. See also Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S104 (Special) (1 June 
1987): 8; Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S406 (Special) (21 December 1988): 
1-2. 
123 Port Macdonell Professional Fisherman's Association Inc v South Australia and the 
Commonwealth (1989) 63 A.L.J.R. 673. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid: 679. 
126 ibid. 
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Court, and whether there was any need to amend legislation in the 
light of the decision. 127 Port Macdonnell meant that greater care was 
needed to define adjacent areas, and following the High Court's view of 
appropriate boundaries as being established by the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands Act), some alteration to existing fisheries 
arrangements may have been needed. 128 
The Port Macdonell case did, however, validate the use of Section 51 
(xxxviii) as the anchor for the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980. 
The attitude of the High Court in this matter follows the view 
established in Re Duncan and in earlier cases where the court saw 
intergovernmental co-operation as an essential and integral part of the 
Australian system. The High Court would not invalidate such 
agreements or consider them justiciable as long as some link with 
constitutional powers or the executive power of the Commonwealth 
could be established. Cullen has suggested that "the remarkably 
cooperative nature of the 1979 settlement likely fortified the Court's 
disposition towards finding the scheme to be constitutionally valid." 129 
The second challenge to the OCS, Harper v Minister of Sea 
Fisheries,130 concerned the legality of state fisheries arrangements, and 
indirectly raised a challenge to the Coastal Waters (State Titles) Act. 
127 H Lis, pers. comm. December 1989. 
128 Such an outcome had been foreshadowed by Waugh who argued that a possible 
solution would be to include more specific geographic references in such arrangements as 
the Court was likely to clarify the notion of "adjacency" which would limit the area 
under which such arrangements can be applied. J. Waugh, "Offshore Fisheries - High 
Court Challenge": 5-6. 
129 R. Cullen, "Case Note: Port Macdonnell. PFA inc v South Australia" Monash 
University Law Review, 16, 1 (1990): 129. 
130 Harper v Minister of Sea Fisheries (1989) 63 A.L.J.R. 687. 
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Harper, a Tasmanian abalone diver, originally challenged the right of 
the Tasmanian government to levy license fees in this fishery, (which, 
under regulations promulgated in 1987, could exceed $20,000 dollars for 
certain divers). Harper claimed that this license fee was a "duty of 
excise", and therefore ultra vires. An amended statement of claim, in 
addition, included a challenge to the validity of the Coastal Waters 
(State Title) Act to return "title" of the three mile limit to the state. 
The challenge reflects the nature of the fishery as the abalone is a 
sedentary, or slow moving, mollusc (sometimes described as a marine 
"snail") found on rocky coastal margins of the coast and on reefs well 
within the three mile boundary of the Tasmanian fisheries 
jurisdiction. The abalone is harvested by divers prising the mollusc 
from these rocky areas, and like the southern rock lobster, is highly 
prized as a quality seafood in Asia making it a high value fishery. 
The involvement of the Coastal Waters (State Titles) Act 1980 was part 
of the strategy adopted by the lawyers representing Harper. If it could be 
shown that this legislation was invalid, and that Tasmania did not 
control this area, the question of an excise would be on stronger 
ground. If the Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980 was valid the 
implication was that the State "owns" the abalone and the license fee 
could be argued to be a royalty, and not an excise.131 The 
announcement that the original writ would be amended, and the new 
argument would include a reference to the Coastal Waters (State Title) 
Act caused a disruption to the case before the High Court. An 
adjournment was granted as it was clear that under the conditions of 
131 j Waugh,  pers. comm. 3 April 1989. 
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the amended statement of daim other States may wish to intervene. In 
the event Harper was decided on different grounds from Port 
Macdonnell. The excise claim was thrown out and, the validity of the 
State Title Act was not tested. Harper did reinforce the legal basis of 
fisheries license fees charged by State governments, in themselves an 
important resource in intergovernmental bargaining. 
The decision in the Port Macdonnell case saw the the OCS 
arrangements legally entrenched a decade after the agreement was 
released. Cullen has noted that "the brevity of the reasoning causes 
one to wonder if the court was, at least partly, impressed by the fact that 
this settlement was the outcome of an agreement between the 
Commonwealth and the States. 132 In spite of some modifications being 
necessary to some fisheries arrangements arising from the Port 
Macdonnell case, the OCS has, none the less been strengthened. The 
High Court's decision reflects its longstanding attitude to the "political" 
basis of intergovernmental agreements and more recent reluctance to 
overturn these arrangements. 
While the challenge to the validity of fishery arrangements under the 
OCS had some implications for the nature of the settlement in the 
1990s, it is important to note that the OCS framework has been 
extended from the original parameters set by the "agreed 
arrangements". The development of Commonwealth legislation 
governing the establishment of offshore installations such as floating 
hotels, while not part of the agreed arrangements, shows the ongoing 
development of the OCS as a framework for intergovernmental 
132 R. Cullen, "Case Note: Port Macdonnell PFA inc v South Australia": 129. 
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relations offshore. The development of an OCS style arrangement for 
offshore tourism reinforces the argument for the emergence of the 
sectoral approach. 
(g) Offshore Tourism and Related Activities 
Developments on the edge of the Great Barrier Reef in the mid 1980s 
introduced pressures to regulate the operation of floating hotels and 
other tourist activities. The proposal to establish a floating hotel on 
John Brewer Reef, part of the outer Barrier Reef seventy-three 
kilometres offshore from the North Queensland coast, initiated the 
Commonwealth's Sea Installations Act 1987. 133 Ancillary legislation 
was prepared to amend customs, excise, quarantine, migration, tariff 
and taxation laws so that any such installation did not fall outside 
Australian jurisdiction. Any confusion over what comprised a "sea 
installation" was avoided by incorporating a definition of such 
installations as a "man made structure which can be used for an 
environmental related activity". Oil platforms, drill ships or defence 
installations were specifically excluded from the ambit of the Sea 
Installations Act 1987. 
The legislation and administrative arrangements for this regime 
followed the pattern established in other OCS packages, particularly 
those encompassed in the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act. This 
133 The hotel development on John Brewer Reef was opposed by environmentalists who 
argued that such developments were unsympathetic to the ecology of the reef systems 
with particular problems concerning mooring and waste removal. After commencing 
operation the hotel, did not maintain commercial viability and was removed from 
the reef and towed to Vietnam to operate as a wharf -based hotel in May 1989. 
Further proposals for tourism developments in the offshore zone ensure that this issue 
will remain onthe agenda. 
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meant that the Commonwealth retained its legal powers over 
developments on the continental shelf, but delegated day-to-day 
administration of the legislation to the appropriate State government. 
Attempts by the Queensland government to pass legislation regulating 
such developments were overturned by this legislation although the 
Commonwealth undertook to reimburse the State for administrative 
costs incurred in administering its legislation. Levies gained from any 
permits would, however, accrue to the Commonwealth. Like other 
OCS legislation the Sea Installations Act 1987 does not apply to the 
area under State jurisdiction from low water mark to the three mile 
boundary. 134 Opposition members raised some concerns over the 
Commonwealth's power over the allocation of permits and argued that 
the commitment to a consultative process over such permits did not 
guarantee that allocation of permits would not be made arbitrarily by 
the Commonwealth. 135 
(h) Coastal Zone Management 
Although coastal zone management was not included in the OCS 
• agreed arrangements it has emerged as a major issue in contemporary 
Australian intergovernmental relations. Although several of the OCS 
packages have an impact on coastal management, the lack of an 
integrated approach has resulted from a lack of coordination between 
different governments. Although primary responsibility for protection 
of coastal environments and management of coastal resources falls to 
State and local government, there is a recognition that many of the 
problems emerging in the coastal zone, as well as planning for the 
134 Following Australia's extention of its territorial sea to 12 miles the confusion over 
three mile boundary has ben reduced. 
135 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) 5/5/ 1987: 
2591-2592. 
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future may be beyond the financial capacity of the States and /or local 
governments to solve. 136 
Numerous Commonwealth and State inquiries have been held into 
coastal management with thirteen reports from the Commonwealth 
alone related to this area. Many of these reports contained a 
recognition that the -management of the - coastal -zone involved -- 
intergovernmental coordination, with various recommendations - 
— including the establishment of a specific coastal ministerial council - 
proposed as a means of achieving this coordination. There seemed 
little need to duplicate further the work being undertaken by 
established ministerial councils given that coastal management had 
been a longstanding topic on the agendas of meetings of the Australian 
and New Zealand Environment Council (ANZEC) and the Council of 
nature Conservation Ministers (CONCOM). ANZEC sponsored a 
major national conference on coastal management in 1986, although 
little action occurred until the level of coastal pollution, of both point 
and non-point source origin, attracted public concern. The visible 
increase in levels of sewerage pollution on beaches in major 
metropolitan areas led to demands for action from local, State and 
Commonwealth governments. 
Several initiatives were established between 1989 and 1991 in response 
to this increased concern from Commonwealth and State 
governments. In June 1989 the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts (HORSCERA) 
136 See House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and 
the Arts The Injured Coastline; Protection of the Coastal Environment, (Canberra: 
AGPS, 1991) and M. Haward and A Bergin "Australian Intergovernmental Relations 
and Coastal Zone Policy" In O.T. Magoon, H. Converse, V. Tippie, L.T Tobin and D. 
Clark (eds) Coastal Zone 91: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium on Coastal Zone 
Mangement ( New York, ASCE 1991): 737-751. 
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began an inquiry on the protection of the coastal zone. The terms of 
reference for the inquiry included "the review of previous 
parliamentary reports relating to the coastal zone" and "the role of the 
Commonwealth Government in ensuring the proper management of 
the coastal zone".137 The report from this inquiry was presented to 
parliament in April 1991 with the Commonwealth announcing that it 
intended to develop a national coastal policy in April 1992. In May 1990 
the then Independent Senator Irina Dunn presented a Bill to the Senate 
which proposed an amendment of the Coastal Waters State Powers 
Act 1980 (Cwlth) "to give the Commonwealth express powers to 
formulate codes of practice for the conduct of environmentally 
sensitive operations within the coastal sea, and in the event that a state 
does not comply with and apply such codes, to make regulations for 
their enforcement". 138 This Bill lapsed when Senator Dunn failed to 
retain her seat in the Senate following the half Senate election of 
March 1990. 139 
The central role of the Commonwealth in any national coastal strategy 
had been recognised by both Commonwealth and State governments. 
HORSCERA _recognised the importance of setting agreed national 
standards for water quality, with the Commonwealth best placed to 
initiate discussion on these standards. The Premiers of New South 
Wales and Queensland had, as part of broad-based criticisms of 
Australian federalism, supported discussion of the respective roles of 
the States and the Commonwealth in such areas of environmental 
management. The Premiers' concerns were supported by other State 
137 The Injured Coastline:, vii. 
138 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Senate) 16/5/ 1990: 429. 
139 Under Section 13 of the Constitution Senate terms begin on "the first day of July 
following the day of election", hence Dunn was still sitting even though she had been 
defeated. 
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and Territory leaders and led to Prime Minister Hawke supporting a 
"closer partnership with the States". This in turn led to discussions 
which initiated what became known as the Hawke government's "new 
federalism". 
Two other initiatives from the Commonwealth reflect the growing 
salience of coastal management. A proposal for a National Working 
Group on coastal management was announced by the Minister for the 
Environment in February 1990 coordinated by the Department of Arts, 
Sport, Environment, and Territories (DASET). DASET began to focus 
on coastal zone matters although its influence was limited by the small 
number of staff available to provide support in this area. 140 The 
Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) (established by the Hawke 
government in July 1989) was informed that it would be charged with 
an inquiry into aspects of coastal zone management. The reference 
needed to establish the RAC coastal zone inquiry was forwarded to the 
Commission from the Prime Minister in September 1991, with Special 
Commisioners appointed in February 1992. The RAC inquiry was to•
report to the Prime Minister by November 1993. 
The Commonwealth's activities have been matched by increased 
activity in coastal management by the States. In October 1990 the New 
South Wales government released a coastal policy statement. This 
statement did not, however, apply to the area from Newcastle to 
Wollongong, arguably the area with the greatest pressures on coastal 
resources and with the greatest impacts from urban and industrial 
effluent. Queensland released a coastal policy paper in April 1991 
14° C. Steele, DASET, pers. comm. July 1990 
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which reflected increasing concern with the impacts of tourist 
developments in the coastal margin. Tasmania, planning to link into 
the RAC process, began work on a coastal policy in June 1991, with a 
discussion paper released in September of that year. Victoria released a 
major study on the state of the coastal environment in May 1992, 
having completed a revision to its 1988 coastal policy in 1991. 
The States and the Commonwealth support greater intergovernmental 
coordination over coastal zone management. Integration of a range of 
ecological, social and economic values necessary for effective 
management of the coastal zone involves each tier of government 
increasing the imperatives for the establishment of an 
intergovernmental regime. A model of such an intergovernmental 
regime for coastal zone management could be derived from experience 
in United States. 
The intergovernmental regime for the coastal zone management in the 
United States was established in the early 1970s, "an unusually 
productive period of innovation in legislation designed to develop, 
preserve and protect marine resources" . 141  Each piece of legislation 
contributed to an increased role for the federal government, yet 
"intergovernmental relations took their distinctive contours for each 
resource use from legislation, court decisions, and from the experience 
of implementation"_. 142  The 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act 
(CZMA) originated from widespread concern over the degradation of 
141 M. Silva, and L.King "Ocean Resources and Intergovernmental Relations: The Record 
to 1980" in M. Silva, (ed.) Ocean Resources and U.S. Intergovernmental Resources in the 
1980s, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986): 75. 
142 Ibid: 76. 
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coastal environments, "and was the product of a number of distinctive 
legislative interests that evolved through the late 1960s. 143 Avoiding 
treating the coast as a narrowly defined sector, the CZMA attempted "to 
take a comprehensive approach to reconciling pressures for both 
conservation and development along the nation's shorelines". 1" The 
act 
asserts 'a national interest in the effective management, beneficial 
use, protection and development of the coastal zone'. To realize 
these diverse and frequently conflicting goals the act set up grant-in 
aid programs to provide financial incentives for coastal states to 
'exercise their full authority over the lands and waters in the 
coastal zone'. 145 
The provision of incentives to facilitate State participation in coastal 
management under the CZMA occurred as the federal government had 
to recognise State jurisdiction onshore and within three miles of low 
water mark. 146 As Silva and King comment "political feasibility 
dictated that the program be a voluntary process between the States and 
- the federal government."147 Incentives included grants to support the 
preparation of management plans and, following Federal approval of 
the plan, further funds to implement the plan. Additional grants were 
available for plans which promoted marine sanctuaries or fostered 
143 /bid : 75. 
144 Ibid: 93. 
145 Ibid. 
146  As a result of the "tidelands saga", descibed. briefly in Chapter Two, the United 
Sates Congress passed legislation granting the States jurisdiction from low water mark. 
This legislation, the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, created State waters from low water 
mark to three miles offshore and provided an importanbt model for the Australian 
OCS. 
147 M. Silva, and L.King "Ocean Resources and Intergovernmental Relations: The Record 
to 1980": 93. 
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public access to beaches. 148 The States were encouraged to participate 
through the CZMA's "consistency provision", a commitment that 
federal agencies or individuals would act consistent with the State 
developed coastal zone management plan. 149 
Hildreth has noted that "the CZMA's consistency provisions have 
assumed greater importance in the 1980s while the flow of federal funds 
[to the program was] reduced". 150 The significance of the consistency 
provision has increased in the intergovernmental battles over oil and 
gas leasing under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands legislation. 
Numerous lower and Supreme Court actions arose from States, chiefly 
California, asserting that the sale of such leases contravened the 
consistency provision of the CZMA. The revalidation of the CZMA in 
1990, and the reinforcement of the consistency provisions of this 
legislation through judicial review has led to a view that the future of 
the coastal zone management programme in the United States is 
providing the opportunity for diversity of responses from the States, 
_while at the same time ensuring sound management of the US 
coasts. 151 The announcement by President Bush of his Coastal America 
initiative in February 1991 has meant that, as in Australia, public 
concern over the state of the coastal and marine environment in the 
United States has placed intergovernmental relations over coastal 
management high on the political agenda. 
148 Ibid: 94. 
149 R. Hildreth, "Ocean Resources and Intergovernmental Resources in the 1980s: Outer 
Continental Shelf Hydrocarbons and Minerals",175. 
150 mid. 
151 D. Brower and D. Owens "Coastal Zone Management" presented at Coastal Zone 91 
Conference, Long Beach USA July 1991. 
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Following submissions which urged Australia to investigate the utility 
of the US framework as a basis for the ongoing management of the 
Australian coastal zone The Injured Coastline recommended, inter-
alia, that: 
The Commonwealth provide financial assistance to State and local 
governments as part of a National Coastal Management Strategy. 
The provision of such funding would be based on fulfilment of 
certain performance criteria, which ensure that State, regional and 
local plans are consistent with the agreed national objectives and 
work towards achieving those objectives. 152 
It is likely that coastal management will emerge as the major focus for 
intergovernmental interaction in the next decade, and emerge as a 
further sector under the OCS framework. Coastal zone management 
requires arrangements which allow sufficient flexibility to manage a 
widely diverse range of coastal environments, with differing pressures 
exerted upon them, while at the same time taking account of the 
national and regional significance of the resources and benefits of these 
areas.153 
The implementation of the OCS has provided a template and a 
framework for intergovernmental interaction over offshore resources. 
The implementation of the OCS illustrates that, as Rosenthal and 
Hoefler have suggested, the constitutional division of powers and 
responsibilities establishes a "structure of relations" between 
governments. The emergence of the sectoral approach was inevitable 
given the character of this relationship, and as such is the latest stage of 
the evolution of federalism offshore. The OCS agreed arrangements 
152 The Injured Coastline: xiv. 
153  M. Haward and A Bergin "Australian Intergovernmental Relations and Coastal 
Zone Policy" 
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facilitate intergovernmental collaboration, formally recognise the 
interests of the States, but also allow the Commonwealth considerable 
influence in the development of marine resources policy. The 
potential of a Commonwealth veto in these policy areas is perhaps a 
paradox in the light of the OCS's avowed commitment to "co-operative 
federalism", although it explains the ongoing dynamic underpinning 
continued intergovernmental tensions over marine resources policy, 
particularly fisheries, that have been experienced in Australia 
following the launching of the OCS. 
The examination of the implementation of the "settlement" highlights 
much about the dynamics of intergovernmental relations and of the 
ability of the States to influence outcomes in intergovernmental 
arenas. In spite of this the States found that entrenching the offshore 
settlement did not preclude the Commonwealth from continuing to 
pursue an active interest in State activites such as fisheries 
management. In terms of oil and gas the States did not pursue 
questions of an improved share of revenues nor did they attempt to 
gain "ultimate management rights in [this] far more economically 
important, continental shelf offshore zone. 154 
Although the States had great influence in the design of the agreed 
arrangements, many aspects of the intergovernmental disputes which 
had characterised offshore federalism from the 1950s to the end of the 
1970s were carried over into the implementation of the OCS sectors. 
Such disputes reflect the essential federal character of the offshore 
settlement, and the importance of constitutional, political and 
administrative parameters in shaping arrangements in this area. These 
issues are developed in the following chapter; an assessment of 
federalism and the Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement. 
154 R. Cullen, "Case Note: Port Macdonnell PFA inc v South Australia": 130. 
Chapter Six 
Federalism and the 
Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement 
The offshore was a central item in interaction between the 
Commonwealth and State governments from the early 1950s to the 
late 1980s. This interaction was punctuated by several major events, 
the 1967 offshore Petroleum Agreement, the Seas and Submerged 
Lands case brought down in late 1975 and the announcement of the 
OCS agreed arrangements in mid 1979. These constitutional, 
legislative and administrative developments conform to two broad 
phases; first there was the struggle between the Commonwealth and 
the States over jurisdiction followed by the second phase in which a 
collaborative intergovernmentaL regime over the offshore was 
established. Once jurisdictional issues were settled by the outcome of 
the Seas and Submerged Lands case and the proclamation of the 
Commonwealth's Coastal Waters (State Titles) Act 1980 in February 
1983, the offshore became a routine item within the 
intergovernmental machinery. In this latter period Commonwealth - 
State interaction concerned practical issues of resource management or 
regulation of activities, rather than the high politics of the struggle 
over jurisdiction which had dominated. the earlier intergovernmental 
agenda. 
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Analysis of the OCS illustrates the various influences on 
Commonwealth - State interaction. In particular, this study 
concentrates on the relationship between the structural (and 
institutional) features of the federal system and the processes of 
federalism and intergovernmental relations which arise from this 
structure. The "ebb and flow of seashore federalism" 1 provides 
important insights into broader issues of Australian federalism by 
examining how the "structure of relations" can determine 
intergovernmental arrangements. 
The preceding chapters emphasise the substantial limitations of 
focusing solely on the apparent expansion of Commonwealth 
influence in the offshore, even if this is the most visible artefact of 
such interaction. In spite of the central role of the Commonwealth in 
specific marine resource policy sectors, as detailed in Chapter Four, the 
OCS cannot be adequately explained by traditional interpretations of 
Australian federalism; interpretations described as the "unity 
preference" tradition in Australian federal analysis. 2 Using this 
1 P. Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM : A Study in Prime Ministerial Power (Ringwood, 
Penguin 1989). 
2 In general, with some important exceptions, the study of Australian federalism has 
remained bound to a tradition that views federalism as obsolecent, inefficient and 
conservative. This literature, with some significant exceptions, has concentrated on 
the negative impacts of federalism, leading to the dominance of what Galligan has 
recently termed the "unity-preference tradition in Australian political thinking". The 
assumptions that overlip in responsibility between the Commonwealth and the States 
provided a limitation on central policy making were used to explain the "evils", 
"frustrations" and "failures" and underpinned examinations of the "costs" of 
federalism. At its most extreme formulations this perspective argues for a bypassing, or 
abolition, of the States and other institutions, particularly the Senate. See B. 
Galligan, "A Political Science Perspective" in B. Galligan, (ed) Australian 
Federalism, (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1989: 47-50. 
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interpretation the offshore illustrates general trends in Australian 
federalism where the expansion of the reach of Commonwealth 
powers by the High Court and increasing vertical fiscal imbalance 3 
have allowed successive Commonwealth governments to expand 
their interests and influence in areas previously the responsibility of 
State governments. 4 Intergovernmental relations under the unity 
preference approach thus reflects a response to the incremental growth 
in Commonwealth involvement and, as a result, the development 
and broadening of Commonwealth - State interaction but with the 
Commonwealth the dominant party. This approach implicitly 
3 Vertical fiscal imbalance refers to the disparity between a State government's 
revenue raising capacity and its financial reponsibilities. The wartime arrangement to 
centralise the collection and disbursement of income taxation were the focus of High 
Court challenges in 1942 and 1957 in the Uniform Tax cases. The outcome of these cases 
was to entrench the war-time income tax agreement and to give Australia the greatest 
fiscal centralistion of any federation; see B. Galligan, 0. Hughes, and C. Walsh 
"Introduction" in B. Galligan, 0. Hughes, and C. Walsh (eds) Intergovernmental 
Relations and Public Policy, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991). 
4 The expansion of Commonwealth constitutional powers began with the overturning 
of the doctrine of "implied immunities" in the Engineers' case and continued with the 
interpretation of the external affairs power in the 1970s (Seas and Submerged Lands _ 	_ 
case) and the 1980s (Koowarta and Franklin Dam cases). The current High Court has 
expanded the potential reach of Commonwealth powers through its decision in Cole v. 
Whitfield, which has simplfied the issues surrounding the interpretation of section 92 
of the Constitution. The impact on the Commonwealth's powers as a result of Cole v. 
Whitfield has been seen as "a revolution on the High Court" [see D. Solomon, 
Australian Society (June 1998)], however Labor's "reconciliation with federalism" and 
the attempt to establish a new federalism in 1990-91 has made the Commonwealth 
reluctant to expand the potential of this interpreation. See B. Galligan and D. 
Mardiste, "Labor's Reconciliation with Federalism", Australian Journal of Political 
Science, 27, 6 (March 1992): 71-86; and D. Solomon, "Chifley Lives on the High Court" 
Independent Monthly (February 1992). The examination of the influence of shifts in 
legal doctrines which underpinning the High Court's deliberations are examined (from 
different perspectives) by B. Galligan, The Politics of the High Court: A Study of the 
Judicial Branch of Government in Australia, (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 
1987) and L. Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (2nd ed.) (Sydney: 
Butterworths, 1987). 
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assumes the State's influence declines, in zero-sum fashion as the 
Commonwealth's day to day responsibilites increase. That the States 
were able to mount effective responses to the Commonwealth's action 
in extending the reach of its constitutional powers and its increase in 
legislative and administrative involvement, effectively limit the 
utility of the incremental, zero-sum argument. To limit analysis to the 
increased reach of the Commonwealth constitutional powers, 
legislation and administrative arrangements in marine resource policy 
making and management ignores the fact that the States remained 
significant actors in this area and retained considerable powers over 
regulation of resource users. 5 
While the increase in Commonwealth involvement has led to 
overlapping responsibilities for the management of marine resources a 
concomitant outcome was increased collaboration rather than a 
decline in State activity. It is clear that the increased presence of the 
Commonwealth in offshore matters did not reduce the involvement 
or significance of the States. A more appropriate evaluation of. 
• Australian federalism, supported by this study, recognises and takes 
account of the countervailing parameters of intergovernmental 
interaction. At the same time as the Commonwealth expanded its 
interests the State governments and bureaucracies began to assert, with 
greater force, their long standing interests in what were to them 
traditionally important areas of public policy, including the 
management of marine resources. 
5 M. Haward, "The Offshore" in B. Galligan, 0. Hughes and C. Walsh, (eds.) 
Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991): 121- 
122. 
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The States retained legislative competence over the management of 
fisheries and joint management (with day-to-day authority) over oil 
and gas management even following the resolution of the dispute 
over jurisdiction in the Commonwealth's favour. Such legislative 
competence over fisheries could even include an extra-territorial 
dimension; that is State law could be enforced outside the territorial 
limits of the State if a sufficient nexus could be shown between the 
legislation and the "peace order and good government" of the State, a 
crucial element in each State's constitution. 6 
The commonwealth had recognised this competence; even the Seas 
and Submerged Lands Act 1973 retained significant savings clauses for 
State legislation which did not claim sovereignty over the seabed or 
sub-sea resources. The inclusion of such savings clauses can be 
interpreted as reflecting an awareness of the importance of the States' 
role in the management of activities such as fishing. 7 Such savings 
clauses reflect Commonwealth recognition of specific interests or areas 
where the States have expertise. 
The States' legislative responsibilities over offshore resources provided 
a key element in the establishment of intergovernmental 
arrangements for collaboration between governments in the 
implementation of various aspects of marine resource policy. All 
policy areas involve some degree of "co-operation" between the 
6 With the passage of the Australia Acts in 1986 unresolved questions surrounding 
the extra territorial character of State legislation (which has a particular significance 
for fisheries management) were resolved by the inclusion of an extra territorial clause 
in the Australia Acts legislation. See R. Cullen, Federalism in Action (Sydney: 
Federation Press, 1990): 129. 
7 An alternative explanation may relate to the relative economic insignificance of 
fishing as opposed to offshore mineral or hydrocarbon resources. 
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Commonwealth and the States in spite of the broadening of the reach 
of constitutional powers and the dominant fiscal position of the 
Commonwealth. The States, and their bureaucracies, remain 
important, and sometimes the only feasible, actors through which 
policy can be implemented. Policy areas such as the offshore, which in 
Grodzonian terms display a "marbling" of responsibilities,8 reflect the 
mutual dependence of each unit of government.9 Notwithstanding 
the interdependence of intergovernmental interaction this study has 
argued that the implementation of the OCS shows this interaction is 
based on a broad acceptance of the independence of all parties. Greater 
Commonwealth involvement in particular policy areas is a sufficent, 
but not a necessary outcome of the imperatives created by 
interdependence. 
Co-ordination of resource management raises interesting 
constitutional questions in relation to situations where State officers 
are responsible for implementing Commonwealth laws, or conversely, 
where Commonwealth officers are constrained by State legislation and 
regulations. 10 There •are no "consistency provisions" - where 
Commonwealth agencies must act in a manner consistent with 
8  C. Fletcher, "Rediscovering Australian Federalism by Resurrecting Old Ideas" 
Australian Journal of Political Science 26, 1 (March 1991): 79-94. 
9 F. Scharpf, "Interorganizational Polict Studies: Issues, Concepts and Perspectives in 
K. Hanf and F. Sharpf , (eds.) Intergorganizational Policy making: The Limits to 
Coordination and Central Control, (London: Sage, 1978): 345-370. F. Sharpf, The Joint-
Decison Trap: Lessons From German Federalism and European Integration", Public 
Administration, 66 (Autumn 1988): 254-258. 
10 L. Zines, The High Court and the Constitution. Such issues raises significant legal 
interest and has been the focus of much attention by Commonwealth and state legal 
officers and legal academics. As long as the arrangements which establish the cross-
vesting are not seen as ultra vires these concerns will remain academic. 
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relevant State laws - in Australia as found in the United States Coastal  
Zone Management Act 1972. However, cross-vesting of regulatory 
reponsibilities between Commonwealth and State officers is common. 
Australian fisheries regulations enable officers to enforce, if necessary, 
both State and Commonwealth laws. This reflects the practical sense of 
reducing costs in enforcing agreed policy objectives. 
The development of the OCS through the innovative approaches and 
practical skills of State officials, and the ongoing role of the States in 
offshore policy, provides a counter to perspectives which see the 
increasing influence of the Commonwealth reducing the impact of 
State or local government to "mere" agencies or administrators of 
national policy. This argument was developed by Sawer who has , 
claimed that continual interaction within a federal state would lead to 
what he termed "organic federalism", the final stage of a continuum 
incorporating a series of more or less identifiable stages - beginning 
with a co-ordinate model along Whearean lines and then moving 
through an intermediate stage stage of co-operative federalism to 
organic federalism. 11 Sawer stated that at this point: 
organic federalism does demand that the centre should play the 
dominant role; it must determine all major substantive policies 
and in particular spending choices and then supervise the regions 
in giving effect to such choices. The regions become to a 
considerable extent 'mere administrators'. 12 
Although Sawer admitted in works published in the 1960s that "the 
political taxonomist may hesitate to describe . . . [organic federalism] as 
federal at all"13 in the 1970s he argued that the key to characterising 
11 See G. Sawer, Modern Federalism (London: Watts, 1969) and Federalism under 
Strain: Australian 1972-1975, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1977). 
12 G Sawer Federation Under Strain: 6. 
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this model as federal was the continued existence of some guarantee 
that the regions in "their reduced role" will continue to exist and be 
able to fight any attempt by the centre to abolish them altogether or to 
reduce their functions beyond some minimal leve1. 14 Rather than 
simply reiterating the importance of the entrenchment of the formal 
constitutional structure, Sawer argued that such guarantees for the 
autonomy of the region included political as well as legal processes. 
Sawer recognised the fundamental principles of a federal system as 
increasing the opportunities for political interaction between 
constituent elements. In the case of the offshore, and arguably in other 
areas of Australian public policy, it is this interaction which limits the 
extent to which organic federalism can be established. In the offshore 
petroleum and marine pollution regimes the States are, however, 
constrained by policy set by the Commonwealth. 
The OCS and the Parameters of Intergovernmental Interaction 
This study has developed a framework in which Commonwealth - 
State interaction over the offshore is shaped by a series of parameters 
arising from the relationship between the structural (and institutional) 
features of a federal division of powers and the processes of federalism 
and intergovernmental relations. Each of these parameters can alter 
particular aspects, or the arena, of interaction but together they 
combine to facilitate intergovernmental, rather than separate 
Commonwealth or State outcomes. Thus the patterns and outcomes of 
Australian federalism are developed within arenas established by the 
constitutional division of powers, the process of judicial review, or 
domestic legislation giving effect to international treaties. 
13 G. Sawer Modern Federalism: 125. 
14 G Sawer Federalism under Strain: 6. 
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Intergovernmental interaction emerges from the establishment of 
separate independent entities by the constitution which at the same 
time forge institutions which interact within the "political process". 
Shared interests in policy issues and outcomes reinforce the 
interdependence of these entities. The study of Australian federalism 
and the offshore shows that this political process, defined and 
constrained by changes in domestic and international law, creates what 
Lucas has called "the political constitution". 15 The political 
constitution is a shorthand for that set of institutions and processes 
emerging from collaboration over a range of policy areas giving rise to 
a set of "rules" which are supplementary to, but informed by, the 
formal (sometimes seen as the "black letter") constitution. 16 The 
significance of the the extra-legal dimension was noted by Sawer in an 
important work on Australian federalism and judicial review 
published in the mid 1960s: 
The dynamics of the Australian federal system derive almost 
entirely from the political process, not from the law. The function 
of the legal constitutional system is mainly the negative one of 
setting the limits within which the politicians and civil servants 
can operate, though .:.it would be misleading to suggest that they 
can operate only within those limits; they sometimes find ways of 
15 A. R. Lucas "Harmonization of Environmental Policies" in J. 0. Saunders, (ed.) 
Managing Natural Resources in A Federal State: Essays from the Second Banff 
Conference on Natural Resources Law, (Toronto, Carswell 1986): 35. See also B. B. Boer 
and D. Craig, "Federalism and Environmental Law In Australia and Canada", in B. 
Hodgins, J. J. Eddy, S.J., S. D Grant and J. Struthers (eds) Federalism in Canada and 
Australia: Historical Perspectives, (Peterborough: The Frost centre for Cnadaian 
Heriatge and Development Studies, Trent University, 1989): 303. 
16 This view of intergovernmental interaction is close to the "new institutional 
analysis" associated with the work of Elinor Ostrom. See E. Ostrom, "A Method of 
Institutional Analysis" in F.X. Kaufmann, G Majone and V. Ostrom, (eds.)Guidnace, 
Control and Evaluation in the Public Sector, (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986): 
459-479. 
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evading or disregarding the legal limits. 17 
Evidence of "the political constitution" can be seen in a range of policy 
areas offshore but is particularly relevant in the context of 
Commonwealth-state negotiations over the management of the Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park and fisheries described in the previous 
chapter. The enhancement of State interests and the willingness of the 
States to press individual claims, is an important counter to the 
Commonwealth's increasing visibility in decision making. The 
establishment of numerous ministerial councils dealing, however 
transcendently, with offshore issues was a crucial element in 
Australian intergovernmental relations over the offshore. At these 
meetings the States exerted considerable influence over general matters 
in designing the OCS, but also addressed specific issues. While the 
States unanimously supported the increase in the "limits and powers 
of the States" necessary to anchor the OCS and remained responsible 
for policy and management of resources in the three mile zone, 
individual States, not surprisingly, had their own agenda reflecting the 
centrality of particular issues. 18 
The entrenchment of the OCS in February 1983 enabled the States to 
counter the Commonwealth's increased formal constitutional powers 
offshore. It is tempting to see the OCS as reflecting the limitations of 
the legal - constitutional framework to provide mutually satisfactory 
17 G. Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts, (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1967): 6. 
18 Queensland's determination to retain a role in the management of the Great Barrier 
Reef; Victoria's attempts to increase its share of oil and gas royalties and Tasmania's 
concern at the impacts of Commonwealth licenses in State management of fisheries are 
examples of issues presented at intergovernmental forums. 
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outcomes to intergovernmental disputes. At one level, however, this 
perspective is limited; accepting that intergovernmental agreements 
are designed to reduce the level of intergovernmental conflict or 
sidestep the unfavourable outcomes of judicial review means that the 
1967 Petroleum Agreement and the OCS are just further examples of a 
well developed Australian response to the demands (and constraints) 
of joint action. At another level the argument can be falsified by 
pointing out that the Commonwealth retained a considerable influence 
in offshore policy, at times determining outcomes, or constraining 
State policy responses, in certain of the agreed arrangements. The 
empirical material on the interaction leading to the agreements over 
the offshore indicates, however, that the Petroleum Agreement and 
particularly the OCS were based on something more than the 
Commonwealth's desire to harmonise differences with the States to 
achieve outcomes in its favour. 
Intergovernmental Agreements over the Offshore 
Intergavemmental collaboration can only be achieved by the parties to 
the arrangement acting in consort. Integral assumptions of bargaining 
analysis or game theory are that individual parties will interact over 
the bargain or continue to play the game. If one party pulls out there is 
no bargain, or the game remains incomplete, satisfying no-one. In 
practice much of the process of intergovernmental negotiation is taken 
up with avoiding the disintegrative results of such zero-sum outcomes. 
Removing or reducing discordant voices to maintain harmony may be 
as important as establishing the basis of the chorale, therefore 
determining who is to take part in the bargain or in the game is an 
important factor in determining outcomes. 
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Chapman, building upon and at the same time conflating Wiltshire's 
extensive list of factors leading to intergovernmental agreements (see 
Chapter One), considers that intergovernmental agreements reflect 
three distinctive situations: 
1. governments at the national and subnational spheres may 
share the same objectives and wish to agree on policies or at least 
on strategies to establish a common policy; 
2. governments may have policy differences or wish to impose 
different priorities even though their objectives are ultimately 
the same; and 
3. governments may be antagonists either because their policy 
interests are incompatible for partisan or regional reasons or 
because they are competing, or think they are competing, for 
scarce resources. 19 
Obviously none of these categories is mutually exclusive. The 
preceding chapters show how the positions of each of the parties to the 
OCS developed over time, yet throughout this period it is possible to 
identify elements corresponding to each of Chapman's criteria. 
Certainly there was agreement to establish a common policy or strategy 
to overcome the difficulties posed by the High Court decision in the 
Seas and Submerged Lands case, once the Fraser government indicated 
its willingness to incorporate these matters into its new federalism 
agenda. Chapman's second criteria is useful in explaining the pressure 
placed on the Fraser governments by Premiers Court and Hamer to 
include "the seas and submerged lands matters" within the ambit of 
the new federalism. Each of the States had different concerns during 
the OCS negotiations reflecting the diversity of interests in offshore 
19 R.J.K. Chapman, "Intergovernmental Forums and the Policy Process": 104. 
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policy. The fact that the States identified jurisdiction as a priority - 
initially over the three mile limit but with a late attempt to claim 
jurisdiction if and when Australian moved to a twelve mile territorial 
sea - led to the Commonwealth acting to retain its interests in areas 
such as the management of the Great Barrier Reef and in fisheries. 
Chapman's third category is more difficult to identify, simply because 
most of the negotiations took place outside the political arena where 
partisan or regional claims are more likely to be publicised. None the 
less, while partisan politics tended to be understated in the negotiations 
within the special committees of Solicitors-General it is clear that such 
imperatives surfaced in response to actions from the officials' "political 
masters". Queensland's attempt to establish a formal written treaty 
binding the Commonwealth arose at a time when the dispute over the 
Great Barrier Reef was at its height, and the Queensland government 
was maintaining its aggressive "states rights" position from the earlier 
confrontations with the Whitlam government. 
One interesting feature of the empirical material is that non-
governmental interests were excluded from negotiations in all of the 
proposed OCS regimes. The reactions of the major resource user 
groups to the announcement of the OCS were to reserve judgement; an 
oil and gas industry commentator considered the arrangement a 
possible "millstone" rather than "a milestone" in resources 
m an a gemen t. 2 ° Fisheries groups supported the proposed 
rationalisation of regulations under the OCS but were concerned at the 
20 P.C. Reid. "Commonwealth-State Relations, Offshore Mining and Petroleum 
Legislation; Recent Developments: A Historic Milestone or Millstone?" Australian 
Mining and Petroleum Law Journal, 2, 2 (1980): 58-76. 
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length of time taken to implement the arrangements. Given the fact 
that interest groups were excluded from the process it is not surprising 
that the only legal challenges to the legitimacy of the OCS were 
mounted by a fishing organisation and an individual fisherman in the 
Port Macdonell and Harper cases. 
The Port Macdonell case emphasies that intergovernmental 
agreements may not reflect the views of "third parties". 21 Equally each 
party to the agreement may have different motives in concluding such 
an arrangement. The OCS avoided the political costs of the 
Commonwealth asserting its claims over the offshore, and enabled it to 
maintain its influence in key areas, while giving away very little. For 
the States the agreement process reinforced their status in the policy 
area, and enabled them to maintain the legitimacy of their 
administrative and regulatory instruments. Formal agreement 
reinforces the roles of the respective governments in a particular policy 
area, even if at a symbolic level. This may explain "the luxuriant 
flowering"22 of intergovernmental arrangement as the States, as 
constituent governments within- the federal system, see such measures 
as reinforcing their place in the system. Intergovernmental agreements 
show that interdependent action is based uopm a recognition of the 
roles and functions of independent political entities. 
21 See N. Bankes,"Co-operative Federalism: Third Parties and Intergovernmental 
Agreements and Arrangements in Canada and Australia", Alberta Law Review, XXIX, 
4 (1991): 792-838. 
22  G.C. Sharman, "The Bargaining Analogy and Federal State Relations", in R.M. 
Burns, G.C. Sharman, G. Stevenson, P Weller and R.F.I. Smith, Political and 
Administrative Federalism, Research Monograph 14, Centre for Research on Federal 
Financial Relations, (Canberra: ANU, 1976): 13; see also C. Sharman,"Grappling with 
Proteus - A Survey of Intergovernmental Relations", Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 53 (1984): 287. 
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Agreements between the constituent governments are significant 
features in any federal system, although it is evident that similar 
institutions and arrangements are also found in unitary systems. 23 
Collaboration or agreement leading to joint action is not new, with 
each of the classic federations emerging from a process of agreement 
among colonies to establish a federal compact. Davis pointed out (in an 
article written over thirty years ago) that "the special interest which 
arises . . . [in a federal system] is occasioned not by the existence or 
growth of large scale administrative co-operation between the general 
and regional governments but by the various patterns of collaboration 
into which these governments may enter and may have entered". 24 
The "patterns of collaboration" may be quite distinctive, reflecting the 
influence of different constitutional, political and administrative 
imperatives. A comparison between the 1967 Petroleum Agreement 
and the OCS shows, among other things, the influence of significant 
changes in the relative constitutional positions of the Commonwealth 
and the States vis. a vis. jurisdiction offshore which had occurred 
between 1967 and 1979. 
Intergovernmental agreements, like other contracts, can be made in 
different ways. Under the law of contract a verbal agreement is 
binding but is less enforceable than a written contract. 25 Written 
23  See, for example, the impact of such agreements in the British unitary system in R. 
A. W. Rhodes, Beyond Westminster and Whitehall, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987). 
24 S.R. Davis, "The Federal Principle Reconsidered", Australian Journal of Politics 
and History,1 (1955-56): 70 (emphasis added). , 
25 The High Court has, of course, viewed intergovernmental agreements as not 
justiciable as formal contracts at law. See N. Bankes, "Co-operative Federalism: Third 
Parties" and C. Saunders, Accountability and Access in Intergovernmental Affairs: A 
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agreements may differ in complexity, or the extent to which they bind 
each party. Australian intergovernmental agreements over the 
offshore reflect this difference. The 1967 Petroleum Agreement was 
established by a written "treaty" and included mirror legislation 
replicating arrangements between the Commonwealth and States. 
The OCS was less formal and saw the administrative arrangements 
developing from agreed positions concerning the responsibilities of 
the Commonwealth and the States. A complementary legislative 
framework implemented a territorial basis to these responsibilities and 
gave a template for administrative arrangements. Indeed, until the 
proclamation of the final components of the Coastal Waters 
legislation in 1983, the OCS was simply based on the resolutions of the 
October 1977 Special Premiers' Conference. 
Wiltshire notes that the extensive interdependence of the Australian 
federal system is the "basic reason" for the development of 
intergovernmental agreements but implies that this has left the federal 
system in disarray: 
the coordinate or layer cake model of federalism envisaged by the 
Australian . . . founding fathers can no longer exist. . . . The 
federal system . . . [is] no longer coordinate as the actions of each 
level of government have significant effects on other units, and 
moreover, there are many government functions which are 
nowadays performed by more than one level. 26 
The paradox implicit in Wiltshire's analysis is that in areas , such as the 
offshore, the process where "the actions of each level of government 
Legal Perspective, Papers on Federalism 9, Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria 
Programme (Melbourne: Melbourne University Law School, 1984). 
26 K. Wiltshire, Planning and Federalism, (St Lucia, University of Queensland Press 
1986): 139. 
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have significant effects on other units", such interdependence is based 
upon, and leads to a strengthening of each level of government. The 
examination of Australian federalism and the offshore tends to counter 
Wiltshire's more pessimistic view of the future role of the States, a 
view expressed in a recent monograph that "Geoffrey Sawer's organic 
federalism is here to stay".27 
While not disputing Wiltshire's account of the interdependence 
between levels of government, this statement invites further 
consideration in the light of the entrenchment of the OCS. The design 
of this agreement deliberately took advantage of particular 
constitutional provisions enhancing intergovernmental co-
operation28 included in the Australian constitution. Examination of 
convention debates of the 1890s supports the view that the Australian 
framers had a more flexible view of federalism than that ascribed to 
them by Wiltshire. 
It is interesting that the Australian framers established a concurrent 
constitutional framework while at the same time drawing much of 
their understanding of the United States system from Bryce's 
American Commonwealth. 29 Bryce emphasised the independence of 
each tier of government; using a metaphor of a factory, where belts 
crossed over one another yet did not interfere with other machines, to 
27 K.Wiltshire, Ten terfield Revisited, (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press 
1991): 22. 
28 See also C. Saunders, Intergovernmental Arrangements: Legal and Constitutional 
Framework, Papers on Federalism 14, Intergovernmental Relations Program 
(Melbourne: Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies, September 1989). 
29 j Warden, Federalism and the Framing of the Australian Constitution" Paper 
presented to the University of Tasmania June 1989 and Federal Theory and the 
Formation of the Australian Constitution, unpublished PhD thesis Australian 
National University, 1990. 
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describe the federal arrangement. Elazar has shown that extensive 
intergovernmental interaction in the nineteenth century United States 
(the period that Bryce depicted) questions the appropriateness of Bryce's 
coordinate or dual "model of federalism". 30 In establishing a 
concurrent basis for the Australian constitution, the framers expected 
that interaction between the Commonwealth and States would occur. 
Statements in the convention debates clearly indicate that individual 
delegates saw this process as continuing into the future. In terms of 
fisheries, for example, Deakin argued that although the fisheries power 
was concurrent, he could not see the role of the States being 
diminished. 
Judicial Review and Intergovernmental Agreements 
The distinction between the political nature of intergovernmental 
agreements and formal legal obligations arising from them raises 
several issues concerning the constitutional status of such agreements. 
As the High Court gave "apparently definitive answers" in Re Duncan 
regarding the validity of Commonwealth - State agreements, Saunders 
believes that this decision was "likely to encourage the development of 
further co-operative arrangements".31 To give some sense of scale 
Bankes notes that "in Canada there are more than a thousand such 
agreements and in Australia one author estimates there to be at least 
325."32 
30 D.Elazar , "Federal-State Collaboration in the Nineteenth-Century United States" 
Political Science Quarterly, 79 (June 1964): 248-281 reprinted in A. Wildavsky, (ed) 
American Federalism in Perspective, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967): 190-222. , 
31 C. Saunders, Accountability and Access in Intergovernmental Affairs: A Legal 
Perspective„ 8. 
32 N. Bankes, "Co-operative Federalism: Third Parties..", 793. 
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The High Court's reluctance to unravel co-operative agreements 
between the constituent elements of the federation makes such 
arrangements attractive for both the Commonwealth and the States. 
Not surprisingly, given the High Court's view of the legal basis of such 
agreements and the problems of third parties in gaining standing, a 
limited number of High Court cases have considered the legal 
questions arising from co-operative (or joint) action by the 
Commonwealth and the States. Of these Re: Duncan 33 provides the 
most detailed consideration by the High Court of intergovernmental 
agreements.34 As Bankes notes "although the court spilled a lot of ink 
on the ability of the two governments to enter into agreements to 
create joint authorities, in the end it did not appear particularly 
relevant" 35 in deciding the case. In spite of this, the judgements 
handed down in Re: Duncan are valuable as several members of the 
Court provided detailed considerations on the necessity of 
Commonwealth - State co-operation and on the validity of 
intergovernmental agreements or arrangements. Justice Deane stated 
33 Re Duncan: Ex Parte Aust. Iron and Steel Pty Ltd (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 649. While Re 
Duncan did not directly concern issues of offshore jurisdiction members of the High 
Court held that the use complementary Commonwealth and State legislation 
establishing a co-operative administrative body, in this case coal industry industrial 
relations tribunal, was a valid constitutional exercise, and that such co-operation and 
agreements between the Commonwealth and the States were valid as long as they did 
not contravene the constitution. Chief Justice Gibbs did refer to the innate good sense of 
cooperative arrangements concerning fisheries enforcement in his judgement. 
34 C. Saunders, Accountability and Access. Re: Duncan followed earlier cases where 
the Court had found that intergovernmental agreements were not justiciable as 
contracts; in particular P.J. Magennis Pty Ltd v. the Commonwealth (1949) 80 C.L.R. 
382 . which concerned a challenge over the agreement for Commonwealth acquisition of 
land for soldier settlement and South Australia v. the Commonwealth (1962) 108 
C.L.R. 130 which concerned an agreement from the Commonwealth to provide a 
standard gauge rail line. 
35 N. Bankes, "Co-operative Federalism: Third Parties..", 831. 
287 
that: 
co-operation between the Parliaments of the Commonwealth and 
the States is in no way antithetic to the provisions of the 
Constitution: to the contrary, it is a positive objective of the 
Constitution. . . . It would be inconsistent with that objective 
for there to be any general constitutional barrier to concurrent 
legislation by Commonwealth and State Parliaments. 36 
In the same case Justice Mason reiterated the views he expressed in the 
earlier Australian Assistance Plan (AAP) case,37 and considered 
that "a federal constitution which divides legislative powers between 
the the central legislature and the constituent legislatures necessarily 
contemplates that there will be joint co-operative legislative action to 
deal with matters which lie beyond the powers of any single 
legislature."38 
Justice Mason's interpretation of the "classic" federal principle 
emphasises that the crux of this principle is not the legislative 
autonomy of each legislature but the integral nature of 
intergovernmental interaction. Co-operative legislative action dealing 
with "matters which lie beyond the powers of any single legislature" 
raises the question of the limits of joint action. Mason's argument 
contains an implicit assumption that the means and ends of such 
schemes are constrained only by the limits of executive power within 
the constitution. 
These arrangements are limited to the extent that agreement can be 
reached between the respective governments although such 
36 Re Duncan: Ex Parte Aust. Iron and Steel Pty Ltd, (Deane J.) 671 (emphasis added). 
37 Victoria v The Commonwealth and Hayden (1975) 134 C.L.R. 338. 
38 Re Duncan: Ex Pane Aust. Iron and Steel Pty Ltd, (Mason J.) 658 (emphasis added). 
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agreement does not forestall constitutional challenges made by third 
parties excluded from the negotiation over, and the implementation 
of, the agreement. 39 Although driven by political imperatives the 
limits of intergovernmental agreements may, as in the case of the 
OCS, be subject to judicial review arising from these challenges as 
"third parties are more likely to be affected by legislation [or 
regulations] implementing an agreement than by the agreement 
itself."40 Saunders believes that judicial review of such arrangements 
may increase because: 
[a]s long as the [ministerial] councils were purely advisory or 
consultative bodies no question of judicial review arose. As soon 
as the councils are invested with power, either to make decisions 
themselves or to make recommendations on which the eventual 
decision makers may or must act, the possibility emerges that 
persons affected by such decisions will seek to challenge them on 
the grounds that, procedurely or in substance, they are 
unlawful.41 
The literature on intergovernmental agreements in Australia and 
Canada notes that that routine collaboration between government 
units within each federal system can emerge in policy areas which 
previously had been the focus of contentious intergovernmental 
disputes. What is interesting about the OCS (and the offshore oil and 
gas accords in Canada) is the deliberate use of extra-constitutional 
solutions or frameworks to achieve the desired collaboration between 
central and sub-national governments. 
39 As witnessed in challenges to the coal industry agreement (Re: Duncan) and to the 
agreed arrangements over particular fisheries (the Port Macdonell case), 
40 N. Bankes, "Co-operative Federalism: Third Parties..", 794. 
41 C. Saunders, Accountability and Access in Intergovernmental Affairs, 22. 
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Intergovernmental Institutions, Processes and the Offshore 
As each unit of government is forced to interact with others, the 
resources, staff and commitment to maintain this interaction reinforce 
the standing of their unit of government. Participants (either 
politicians, or most usually, officials) in negotiations giving rise to 
intergovenmental agreements such as the OCS represent their 
particular government and hence reinforce claims to be consulted, 
involved and accommodated. While this may lead to what Wiltshire 
has considered to be "significant effects" on other units, each unit is 
able to mobilise an equally diverse set of resources. As shown in the 
preceding chapters these resources ranged from the expertise of legal 
officers through to the offshore, or particularly "States rights", being 
used as an election issue. 
The analogy of diplomacy, with the intergovernmental negotiators as 
emissaries of their respective governments, may explain some of the 
outcomes in the OCS negotiations. It is clear that the State Solicitors-
General were concerned with the retention of State interests within the 
three mile limit, and hence pursued a policy of retaining "state 
sovereignty" 42 in this area. Such a strategy precluded other options, 
for example pressing for increased State control of offshore oil and gas 
revenues, from being considered. It is interesting to consider some of 
the reasons for the States' responses in relation to the oil and gas sector 
of the OCS, particularly as the Canadian outcomes were so dissimilar. 
The intergovernmental settlements over the Nova Scotia and Atlantic 
42 Notwithstanding the contradictory nature of the claim for sovereignty the States 
vigorously pursued the retention of State interests in their immediate reaction to the 
introduction of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act, the subsequent High Court hearings 
and in the meetings which led to the OCS. 
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Accords in Canada that gave the provinces significant regulatory 
autonomy and a substantial share of revenues from these 
developments. 43 
A major influence was the fact that legal issues dominated the OCS 
negotiations. The delegation of the seas and submerged lands matters 
- to the committees of Commonwealth and State Solicitors-General, and 
the pre-eminent role of these officials may have contributed to the 
particular pattern of the arrangement. The jurisdictional strength of 
the Commonwealth over offshore oil and gas, deriving from the 
nexus with the United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf 
and the outcome of the Seas and Submerged Lands case, may also 
explain why this part of the OCS simply updated those established by 
the 1967 Agreement. An important contextual issue is the existing 
pattern of financial equalisation in Australia. The role of the Grants 
Commission would make any State wary of affecting its particular 
"relativity". The pattern of federal financial relations differs in Canada, 
however, and the financial package under the Atlantic Accord "appears 
to insulate [Newfoundland's] equalisation payments for twelve years 
after offshore production commences".44 
The response of the Solicitors-General conforms to Warhurst's 
analysis of intergovernmental relations where the key role of such 
individuals and institutions in Australia is concerned with managing 
43 See R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Oil 
and Gas Disputes, (Sydney: Federation Press, 1990), especially chapters 5 and 6. See 
also M. Haward "Intergovernmental Relations and Offshore Resources Policy in 
Australia and Canada" Australian - Canadian Studies 9, 1-2, (1991): 35-51. See also R. 
Cullen, "Bass Strait Revenue Raising: A Case Of One Government Too Many?, Journal 
of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 6, (1988): 213-247. 
44 R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: 187. 
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interaction rather than with questions of policy. The latter is usually 
left to particular departments. 45 The Solicitors-General became the 
"intergovernmental affairs specialists" in this particular arena, 
reflecting the need to manage a contentious policy area.. Given this it is 
not surprising that few questions were raised over policy in particular 
packages. The coordinating role of the "special committees of 
Commonwealth and State Solicitors-General", described in Chapter 
Three, was central to the development of the OCS. Maintaining 
control precluded extensive consultation with other government 
agencies and non-governmental groups." 
As intergovernmental managers, charged with providing a means of 
implementing the resolutions from the Special Premiers' Conference, 
the Solicitors-General suffered, not unexpectedly, the fate of central 
agencies who "won few friends amongst functional departments," 47 
excluded from the process of intergovernmental negotiation. The 
decline in the influence of the Solicitors-General during the 
implementation of the OCS, at which time the functional departments 
and their intergovernmental machinery and networks began to 
dominate, reflects and reinforced the general shift to a sectoral 
orientation in the OCS. This shift was made at a time when 
intergovernmental management was no longer pressing. The decline 
in tension (with some occasional flurries of excitement in fisheries 
45 J Warhurst, "Managing Intergovernmental Relations" in H. Bakvis and M. 
Chandler, (eds) Federalism and the Role of the State, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1987): 259-276. 
46 P.C. Reid, "Commonwealth-State Relations, Offshore Mining.." 
47 J. Warhurst, "Intergovernmental Managers..", 273. 
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management) over the offshore during the implementation of the OCS 
reflects the shift from high to low intergovernmental politics, and less 
confrontationalist politics of Commonwealth - State relations. 
The Politics of Commonwealth State Relations 
There are several explanations for the impetus from both the 
Commonwealth and the States to conclude an agreement over the 
offshore. Although there had been considerable opposition from the 
States to any increase in Commonwealth involvement in the offshore 
areas prior to the Seas and Submerged Lands case, the High Court's 
decision left the States with little, if any, constitutional bargaining 
power. It is also interesting that the Premiers of the then Labor 
governed States of New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania 
all supported the OCS initiative in the face of hostility from both the 
federal Parliamentary Labor Party and the national ALP conference. 48 
The bi-partisan support from the States indicates the significance they 
placed upon the "settlement" of federal - state conflict although as the 
Australian Law Journal noted, it was "to a large extent a framework 
within which administrative practices must perforce develop if there is 
to be harmonious co-operation between the Commonwealth and the 
States."49 
This comment provides a useful means by which to interpret the 
OCS, and illustrates the major difference between it and the earlier 
1967 Petroleum Agreement. The latter included detailed 
administrative arrangements for the management of offshore oil and 
48 E. G. Whitlam,The Whitlam Government: 1972-1975, (Ringwood: Penguin, 1985): 
259. 
49 Anon., "The Offshore Constitutional Settlement" - Current Topics The Australian 
Law Journal 54, 9 (September 1980): 519. 
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gas, (reproduced in Appendix One), while the OCS arrangements 
were an adumbration of this "framework for administrative practices" 
(see Appendix Two). Chapter Three has shown how the agreed 
arrangements -followed a commitment from Prime Minister Fraser to 
The Victorian and Western Australian Premiers for a co-operative 
resolution of the "offshore problem". From this commitment a policy 
framework of "co-operative federalism" emerged in both functional 
and spatial terms. The implementation of the OCS, as described in 
Chapter Four, has seen the ongoing development of the "framework 
for administrative practices" and the emphasis on the sector approach 
which has maintained the Commonwealth's interests in each sector, 
at times conflicting with the early objectives of the agreement. 
Turning attention to the way the OCS was developed provides an 
answer to conundrums raised in early studies of the OCS. Cullen 
identified the major difference between the OCS and the 1967 
agreement as the terms of the agreement and emphasised that "the 
actual agreement between the parties resulting from the [OCS] 
offshore negotiations has not been published."" The material 
presented in Chapter Three, indicates that there is no "written 
agreement" over the OCS, rather the development of a consensus 
arrangement springing from agreed resolutions from the Premiers 
Conference." State officials' (with carriage of "the seas and 
50 R. Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore, 1st ed. (Melbourne: Intergovernmental 
Relations In Victoria Programme, Law School, University of Melbourne, 1985): 68. 
Cullen was writing without the benefit of archival sources available to this study 
which make it clear that the reason for the "actual agreement" not being released is 
that no such document exists. 
51 The question of the "intentions of the parties to the offshore arrangements" was 
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submerged lands matters") suppression of the Queensland proposal 
for a written agreement between the Commonwealth and States was 
related to the desire to entrench the commitments at the 1977 
Premiers' Conference. Such concern was probably justified as the 
nascent OCS had to survive two federal elections, (with the federal 
opposition formally committed to implementing the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act 1973) before being proclaimed during the 1983 
election campaign. 
One should not be too surprised that the State Solicitors-General 
opposed the Queensland proposition to use a written agreement to 
"bind the Commonwealth". The States were in a weak position in 
claiming a legal basis for jurisdiction in terms of both international 
law and as a result of the High Court's decision in the Seas and 
Submerged Lands case. It was clearly felt (as detailed in Chapter 
Four) that attempts to create a formal treaty could lead to a collapse of 
the negotiations. The politics of Commonwealth - State relations 
drove these negotiations, the very real possibility that the 
Commonwealth could back out was present and the States were 
clearly afraid of the consequences of pushing the Commonwealth too 
far. As a result it is clear that there was no "agreement" signed by all 
parties which set out the parameters of the OCS in a; similar form to 
the 1967 Petroleum Agreement. 
raised in the Port Macdonnell case. Bankes argues that "it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that the court would have been better placed to handle this problem had it 
had access to the terms of the agreement to which the legislation was purporting to 
give effect". N. Bankes, "Co-operative Federalism: Third Parties", 831. As this study 
shows, there was no written agreement. 
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Collaboration between the Commonwealth and States did not 
preclude the possibility of the central government acting unilaterally 
to reinforce and extend its position. In spite of constitutional 
paramountcy offshore, the interaction over the OCS shows that the 
central government may not be able to maximise its constitutional 
position, given the significance of the countervailing dynamic 
emerging from the political constitution. The examination of the 
"offshore sagas" of both Australia and Canada clearly shows that such 
processes can impose considerable political, if not economic costs, for 
unilateral action providing significant limits on central government 
action.52 
Unilateral action involves a range of costs, the obvious economic 
factors associated with taking over responsibility for a range of 
activities as well as the more intangible political costs arising from 
antagonising the States by intervening in particular areas. A 
recognition of these costs was implicit in the correspondence between 
the State Premiers and the Fraser government over the "offshore 
problem" in Australia where the Prime Minister made it quite clear to 
the States that there would be no unilateral Commonwealth action 
over marine resources. Similar constraints were evident in Canada 
during the federal government's disputes with Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland. Revenue sharing arrangements in the Canadian 
negotiations which favoured the provinces and the retention of state 
52 See J. 0. Saunders, Managing Natural Resources in A Federal State; P.H. Russell, 
"The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations: The Political Use of Legal 
Resources", Canadian Public Policy, XI, 2, (1985): 161-170; M. Crommelin, 
"Commonwealth Involvement in Environment Policy: Past, Present and Future", 
Environment and Planning Law Journal 4 (June 1987): 101-112. 
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jurisdiction in Australia illustrated the political limits on central 
government policy making. In utilising the politics of 
intergovernmental relations both Australian and Canadian Premiers 
took the opportunity to articulate and maintain pressure for a 
particular outcome different from that afforded them by the formal 
legal constitutional system 
Federalism and the Offshore Constitutional Settlement: Explaining 
the Outcome 
Chapter One has drawn attention to the insights introduced by 
Rosenthal and Hoefler on the importance of the relationship between 
structural criteria (constitutional rules) imposed by the federal system 
on the interaction (behaviour) of officials.53 It is this relationship 
which incorporates what Lucas has termed "the political 
constitution", the countervailing forces to increasing central power 
and authority. This study argues that the States have been able to 
utilise the various elements of their relationship with the 
Commonwealth to maintain their role in any settlement over the 
offshore. The significance of the States is premised from the 
constitutional recognition afforded them in the Australian 
constitution. Yet this recognition gives the States equally important 
political and administrative resources. The OCS derived, therefore, 
from the interaction between constitutional arrangements and 
institutional arrangements, shaped by rules emerging from the 
operation of these institutions, itself a key element of Australian 
federalism. 
53  See also D.B Rosenthal and J. M. Hoefler, "Competing Approaches to the Study of 
American Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations", Publius 19 (Winter 1989): 1- 
23. 
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The processes leading to the OCS are therefore "representative of a set 
of interactions that is supplementary to the constitutional, financial or 
partisan political context of federal relations".54 Agreements such as 
the OCS have different functions in a federal system. They provide a 
means of ordering arrangements where jurisdiction, resources and 
responsibility over policy are shared, or are complicated by changes in 
the nature of the policy area or subject to broader systemic variations. 
Intergovernmental agreements therefore reflect the impacts of the 
"extra vitamins" introduced by federalism, or intergovernmental 
interaction, into the policy process. 55 The effects of these vitamins, 
Painter suggests, are found in policy areas which have experienced 
increased intervention from the Commonwealth government. The 
political outcome over the offshore dispute which resulted in the OCS 
was bounded, but at the same time vitalised, by the constitutional as 
well as political aspects of federalism and is an example of the impact of 
these vitamins. 
The emergence of the sectoral basis to the OCS is as much a reflection of _
•the ability of the States to determine- the• agenda as it is of the _- 
Commonwealth influencing and controlling the implementation of 
the agreed arrangements, although again this phase did need the 
support of the various State governments. Although this study has 
argued that the States were influential in establishing the offshore 
settlement it is also clear that the Commonwealth maintained 
considerable control in several of the OCS sectors. Even where the 
54 R.J.K. Chapman "Intergovernmental Forums and the Policy Process" in B. Galligan, 
(ed.) Comparative State Policies, (Melbourne, Longman Cheshire), 1988, 104. 
(Emphasis added). 
55 M. Painter, "Australian Federalism and the Policy Process: Politics with Extra 
Vitamins", Politics, 23, 2, (November 1988): 57-66. 
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States have been given responsibility under the OCS they have limited 
autonomy in policy making, a situation which reflects the realities of 
federalism offshore. 
The delegation of authority to State agencies to administer and manage 
oil and gas developments reduced their flexibility in managing this 
-sector.56 There has been some concern that in some sectors, such as 
the regulation of ship-sourced marine pollution, the OCS 
arrangements have been amended to increase the power of the 
Commonwealth. 57 The implementation of fisheries arrangements 
has led to the division of "jurisdiction on the basis of individual stocks 
rather than the three mile limit" which has claimed to have increased 
the involvement of the Commonwealth in the practice of fisheries 
management. 58 The provision of roll-back for ship-sourced marine 
pollution and dumping of waste at sea has ensured that 
Commonwealth policy is implemented, although in this area the 
Commonwealth paramountcy involves its responsibilities under 
international treaties such as MARPOL, the London Dumping 
Convention or SPREP. 
While acknowledging the importance of the Commonwealth in 
marine resources policy, it is equally important to recognise that 
implementation of the OCS agreed arrangements retained, and 
reinforced the role of the States. The States maintained their positions 
56 R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Revenue Raising: A Case of One Government Too Many?", 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 6 (1988): 213-247. . 
57 M. Crorrunelin, "Commonwealth Involvement in Environmental Policy ". 
58 A.J. Harrison, The Commonwealth Government in the Administration of 
Australian Fisheries: A Sort of Mongrel Socialism RAIPA National Monograph No.6 
(Hobart, RAIPA, 1991): 97. 
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and influence on intergovernmental forums which became the main 
mechanism through which the OCS framework was implemented in 
each sector. Intergovernmental institutional arrangements such as the 
Premiers' Conference, or ministerial councils, standing or technical 
committees of officials with functional resposibilities, were of 
paramount importance in shaping the outcome of the offshore 
settlement. The consensus sought at these meetings and the search for 
collaborative outcomes served to define and constrain behaviour, and 
as such influenced intergovernmental interaction within these 
institutions. 
The study of Australian federalism and the offshore to the 1990s 
reinforces the view that the States have been able to engage, and at 
times out-manoeuvre, the Commonwealth in policy "contests" which 
arose from the latter's intervention in this policy area. 59 A similar 
outcome can be observed following the involvement of the 
Commonwealth in land use (wilderness preservation and forestry) 
issues in the 1980s. These conflicts indicate that the States may be able 
to "bid up" claims in areas where the Commonwealth is judicially 
paramount. Claims for compensation for Commonwealth 
intervention are illustrative of the processes; such claims are based 
upon the fact that the States have "ownership and control of natural 
resources within State boundaries."60 The bargaining over policy 
options and accommodation of the sometimes widely divergent views 
59 C. Sharman introduced the notion of policy contests as important elements in 
Commonwealth - State relations in "Fraser, the States and Federalism", The 
Australian Quarterly, 52 (Autumn 1980): 9-19. 
60 M. Crommelin, "Commonwealth Involvement in Environment Policy": 110. 
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which arises in such cases highlight the importance of 
intergovernmental relations in determining the outcomes in the 
Australian system. 
Commonwealth intervention in policy areas such as the offshore that 
have been the traditional concerns of the States give rise to several 
responses, including challenges to the validity of Commonwealth 
jurisdiction, the mobilisation of the electorate by focusing on the 
policy area as an issue of "states rights" and use of intergovernmental 
forums to check Commonwealth power. At times all three processes 
occur simultaneously and, as illustrated by the introduction of the 
OCS, are not mutually exclusive. Accommodation of the majority of 
the States' demands was achieved by intergovernmental negotiation 
where the States were able to assert their political claims. They 
gained a more favourable outcome than that afforded them by the 
judicial process by which the High Court had upheld the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cwth). 
Given that the States retain considerable economic, political and 
regulatory interests in policy areas such as the offshore means that, 
despite judicial decisions in favour of the Commonwealth, effective 
implementation of policy must rely on intergovernmental 
negotiation. Bargaining processes can mediate the "difficulties" 
arising from assertions of jurisdictional paramountcy by the 
Commonwealth. 61 With the entrenchment of the OCS in February 
1983, the question of paramountcy diminished and the focus of 
dispute between the Commonwealth and the States shifted. The 
61 ibid. 
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attainment of a mutually satisfactory outcome over legal power 
offshore and the entrenchment of limits to the extent of 
Commonwealth jurisdiction in the coastal and territorial waters 
meant that the implementation of the OCS arrangements was 
inextricably bound to the 'federal character of the settlement. As a 
result of the concentration on the legislative "return" of jurisdiction 
to the States, other issues, such as the question - of -revenue sharing 
from oil and gas revenues, were put aside rather than being resolved. 
A major issue is of course the extent to which the Commonwealth has 
maintained a controlling influence in marine resources policy despite 
the OCS's avowed commitment to "co-operative federalism". The 
question of jurisdiction offshore is therefore only one part of the 
mosaic of Australian federalism offshore. Claims over jurisdiction are• 
important although any examination of such issues highlights the 
confusing meanings of Commonwealth powers, the extent of State 
extra-territorial competence given the concurrent nature of much of 
Commonwealth power and the extension of reach of powers such as 
the external affairs power. 
Notwithstanding their original objections to the entry of the 
Commonwealth into fisheries policy, the view that the 
Commonwealth had some legitimate right was eventually supported 
by the States. The question of jurisdiction over offshore oil and gas was 
more unclear and, as a result, was the focus of much debate between 
the Commonwealth and the States, particularly between 1962 and 1979. 
In spite of the contradictory elements within the OCS, for example the 
tension between the commitment for a "co-operative federalism" 
within the agreed arrangements and the major brokerage role given to 
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the Commonwealth, 62 there is no doubt that Australian federalism 
offshore has changed markedly as a result of the OCS. It is equally 
clear that the States, while constrained in some sectors, are in a better 
position as a result of the settlement than they would have been if the 
Fraser government had chosen to implement the decision of the High 
Court in the Seas and Submerged Lands case.63 
Overlapping responsibilities and duplication of functions related to 
these responsibilities may lead to a strengthening of all tiers of a 
federal system, not necessarily the destruction of one.64 This 
introduces the defining (and therefore crucial) element of federalism 
into the analysis; if there was no separation between units of 
government as defined by jurisdiction and the system had become 
totally unified, there would be no need in theory 65 to establish 
intergovernmental agreements as simple administrative fiat would be 
sufficient. Wiltshire is correct in arguing that such agreements arise 
from the need to provide order in the system. However this ordering 
entrenches the system and makes it more probable that the States 
emerge as major actors in any intergovernmental regime. 
A comparison between the 1967 Agreement and the OCS provides 
useful evidence of the impact of constitutional, political and legal 
parameters on intergovernmental interaction. The effect of the 
62 Examples of this role include determining the timing of negotiations and the speed 
of implementation of the framework. 
63 R. Cullen, Australian Federalism Offshore, (1st ed.): 140. 
64 It must be recognised that such overlap and duplication may, in extreme cases, lead 
to economic and administrative inefficencies. 
65 In practice of course intergovernmental relations are present even within unitary 
political systems such as the United Kingdom. See, for example R. A. W. Rhodes on 
Centre-local government relations in Beyond Westminster and Whitehall. 
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comments of Chief Justice Barwick and Justice Windeyer in Bonser's 
case in 1969, and external factors led the political upheaval of the 
Gorton Bill in 1970. The upholding of the Seas and Submerged Lands 
Act 1973 by the High Court was to narrow the boundaries of 
intergovernmental interaction. This gave the States less room to 
manoeuvre in the mid 1970s than they had a decade earlier. Chapter 
Two detailed how even during the negotiations concerning the 
intergovernmental agreement over petroleum in the mid 1960s, the 
arena had been narrowed by the entry into force of the international 
Convention on the Continental Shelf in 1965 and the decision of the 
Canadian Supreme Court in the British Columbia Reference in 1967. 
The former event, particularly, had the effect of reinforcing the 
Commonwealth's claims over offshore hydrocarbons. 
The interaction over the OCS shows that, in spite of the narrow band 
from which feasible alternatives to solve the offshore problem could 
be provided (limits recognised very clearly by the State officials), the 
States were able to gain politically what they had lost through the 
judgements of the High Court in the Seas and Submerged Lands 
case. 66 The OCS may have had the effect of modifying aspects of 
jurisdiction, but at the same time it is a product of the relationship 
between constitutional and political elements of a federal system. That 
this relationship is dynamic is shown in the implementation of each 
of the 0CS67 sectors. 
" Although of course the High Court judgement held, in effect, that the States had 
never had jurisdiction from low water mark. 
67 While it has been emphasised that the sectoral approach emerged following the 
election of the Hawke government and the review its undertook of the OCS it is highly 
probable that the Fraser government, had it remained in office, would have faced the 
same trends. The implementation of the OCS agreed arrangements was, as discussed in 
Chapter Four a further lengthy period, fraught with difficulties. The fanfare 
surrounding the launch of the OCS (deliberately, yet understandably) understated the 
complexity of the task of implementation. 
Condusion 
This study has placed the development of the OCS in the context of, 
and as a major outcome from, the interaction between constitutional, 
political and administrative elements of Australian federalism. While 
the offshore may be viewed at one level as simply an interesting and 
unique case study of the dynamics of intergovernmental relations, 1 
an underlying premise of this study is that this policy area highlights 
important and more general aspects of Australian federalism. 
Examination of the development and implementation of the OCS 
shows that State governments are able to place political and 
administrative limits on attempts by the Commonwealth to expand its 
interests, even in areas where its constitutional power has been 
reinforced by the process of judicial review. 
As earlier chapters have suggested that the States have been able to use 
the dynamic between elements of Australian federalism to reinforce 
their role and function in this policy area. It is such processes which 
make it more probable that the eventual outcome will reflect political 
and administrative rather than legal or judicial imperatives. Political 
and administrative federalism emerges, however, from a 
constitutional division of powers and responsibilities: Constitutional 
heads of power are important juridically, but may have greater impact 
as resources in intergovernmental interaction. As Russell argues 
1 See T. Hannan, "Review of B. Galligan, 0. Hughes and C. Walsh (eds.) 
Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy," Australian Journal of Political 
Science, 27, 1 (March 1992): 156. 
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constitutional power should be viewed as a political resource just 
as popularity or a good international economic climate are 
resources for democratic politicians. . . How governments use 
their constitutional gains or seek to overcome their losses 
depends on their political will and skill, and their other 
resources. 2 
As a result the State governments have a range of resources to utilise 
in intergovernmental interaction in policy areas such as the offshore. 
Jurisdictional responsibilities give the States political as well as legal 
resources and ensure that the politics of Commonwealth - State 
relations will be important in determining intergovernmental 
arrangements. 
Since the States are political as well as legal entities they can use these 
resources to counter the expansion in the reach of Commonwealth 
power occurring through judicial review. The implementation of 
expanded Commonwealth powers carries considerable political costs. 
International treaties or conventions reinforce Commonwealth 
powers but do not reduce the interests of the States which are equally 
important in determining outcomes. 
The separation between domestic and international policy imperatives 
in a federal system is increasingly an artificial dichotomy, as domestic 
agendas are rarely limited to domestic issues. The offshore saga shows 
how international treaties can be used as a means to pursue a 
particular domestic agenda; the empirical material shows, however, 
2 P. H. Russell, "The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations: The Political 
Use of Legal Resources" Canadian Public Policy, XI, 2 (1985): 165. 
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that this did not limit or preclude the States from asserting their view 
of the national interest. 3 The impact of Commonwealth legislation 
giving effect to international agreements cannot be understated, 
although concentrating on the Commonwealth's actions tends to 
understate the ability of the States to respond, including launching bids 
for financial compensation, to mediate the impact of the 
Commonwealth's policy.4 
Intergovernmental arrangements over the offshore reflect the 
importance of the States' constitutional claims and their longstanding 
expertise in resource management. The development of regulatory 
regimes has made the States' the major focus for resource users, 
although these groups may also interact with the Commonwealth. 5 
While it is possible - as in the case of the Australian tuna fisheries - for 
an official in Canberra to "manage" particular fisheries, 6 the States 
have integral roles in the enforcement of Commonwealth laws and 
regulations. Even in the case of foreign fisheries undertaken in 
Australian waters and regulated by Commonwealth laws, 
_ Commonwealth officials are based in, and given logistic support by, 
State• fisheries departments. 
3 The States demands for consultation over the implementation of international 
treaties has remained a major issue in Australia since the 1970s; reappearing in the new 
federalism initiative of 1990-91 as part of the agenda of the Special Premiers 
Conference and in the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE) of 
February 1992. 
4 H. Collins, "Federalism, The States and International Affairs: .A Political Science 
Perspective" In B. Galligan (ed.) Australian Federalism (Melbourne: Longman 
Cheshire, 1989): 185-186. 
5 See M. Haward, Marine Resource Policy in Australia: The Policy Environment, The 
Policy Process and the Issue Community", Maritime Studies, 26 (June 1986): 12-16. 
6 In theory without necessarily getting their feet wet, although in practice such 
officers rely upon observers (who may be employed through State agencies) to ensure 
compliance with Commonwealth regulations. 
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Federalism and the Offshore Constitutional Settlement 
The OCS resulted from the dissonance between the Australian States' 
policy objectives and the increased reach of the Commonwealth's 
constitutional heads of power. This study shows that although the 
Commonwealth has expanded its interests in a range of offshore areas 
since the second world war (a process which gives the expansion of 
central power the most "visible gloss" of policy development) the 
States still remain important, and in many aspects the most significant, 
actors in this policy area. 7 Intergovernmental negotiations over the 
offshore in Australia, as in Canada, illustrate, therefore, the importance 
of what has been termed the "political constitution" - the political and 
administrative processes which pose real limits on the extent to which 
the central government can implement its gains through judicial 
review of disputes over jurisdiction. 8 This study reinforces 
Rosenthal and Hoefler's argument that constitutional structure creates 
"rules" under which intergovernmental relations develop and are 
maintained. These "rules" reinforce the political, as opposed to the 
judicial, limits on the expansion of Commonwealth heads of power. 9 
Although this study has emphasised the importance of the less visible 
glosses of intergovernmental interaction it is important to recognise 
that the constitutional structure affects both levels of government. Just 
as the States were csuccessful in constraining various Commonwealth 
7 Even in areas such as oil and gas policy - an area which Cullen correctly cites as 
dominated by Commonwealth policy directives - the States are crucial actors in day to 
day decision making. 
8 A. R. Lucas "Harmonization of Environmental Policies" in J. 0. Saunders, (ed.) 
Managing Natural Resources in A Federal State: Essays from the Second Banff 
Conference on Natural Resources Law, (Toronto, Carswell 1986): 35. 
9 D.B Rosenthal and J. M. Hoefler, "Competing Approaches to the Study of American 
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations", Publius 19 (Winter 1989): 1-23. 
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governments over the assertions of jurisdiction offshore, the States 
themselves were well aware of the presence of implicit limits to, or 
non-negotiable items in, the negotiations over the offshore. This 
provides an explanation why the States were reluctant to push for a re-
evaluation of the revenue sharing formula over offshore oil. The 
majority of States were more concerned with retaining jurisdiction 
over the "three mile limit" and would not support claims which 
would unravel commitments made by the Commonwealth. Thus, as 
shown in the preceding chapters the Commonwealth, in spite of 
entrenching a legislative base for State jurisdiction, was able to retain a 
major role in the offshore. The rules arising from the structure of 
relations (creating Lucas' "political constitution") over the division of 
powers and responsibilities allowed the Commonwealth to maintain 
its influence offshore, yet still avow its commitment to co-operative 
federalism through the OCS. 
In maintaining control over the proclamation of its legislation - the 
crucial elements of the complementary legislation which formed the 
keystones of the OCS - the Commonwealth effectively controlled the 
policy agenda. 10 This control carried through in the implementation 
of some of the OCS packages. As the intergovernmental arrangement 
relating to oil and gas approximates Sawer's model of "organic 
federalism", with the States "mere administrators" 11 the influence of 
the Commonwealth raises interesting questions in relation to the 
proposition advanced in this study that the OCS emerged from the 
articulation of State interests in offshore policy. It is certainly the case 
that a period in which the Commonwealth expanded its legislative and 
10 i control almost came unstuck prior to the March 1983 federal election, resulting 
in the rapid , and rather controversial, decision to proclaim the Coastal Waters (State 
Title) Act 1980 during the election campaign. 
11 G. Sawer, Modern Federalism (London: Watts, 1969). 
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administrative activity after the Second World War increased the 
salience of the offshore areas and the management of marine resources. 
As shown in Chapter Three, the increase in Commonwealth 
involvement was buttressed by changes in the international law of the 
sea, yet this did not reduce the States' interests or legislative and 
administrative responsibilities. 
In each of the administrative regimes established under the OCS the 
Commonwealth retained a major role, although its influence is most 
sharply drawn in the offshore oil and gas sector. While State Ministers 
(known as Designated Authorities) are responsible for determining 
exploration permits and following successful strikes confirming 
production licenses, the Commonwealth retains a major role in -oil and 
gas policy. It is the Commonwealth which determines pricing policy, 
royalties and downstream taxation arrangements. Thus the 
Commonwealth controls the pattern of revenue sharing with the 
States, with the OCS oil and gas arrangements described as a national 
scheme administered by the States.12 
The provision of roll-back clauses allow the States the right to legislate 
under the OCS arrangements; if, however, the States wish to enact such 
legislation the Commonwealth's international obligations must be 
maintained. The Commonwealth has retained an important role in 
the regulation of marine pollution as sea dumping arrangements need 
the Commonwealth Minister's approval. 13 The States' tardiness in 
12 See R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Oil 
and Gas Disputes, (Sydney: Federation Press, 1990): 221. 
13 Dumping of wastes will be phased out by 1995 following amendments to the London 
Dumping Convention. The development of the marine pollution regime under the OCS 
show the influence of Australia's international agreements as practices have been 
modified by the introduction of SPREP and the Treaty of Raratonga (the treaty 
establishing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone). 
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enacting the required complementary legislation resulted in the 
Commonwealth passing amendments in 1986 to the Protection of the 
sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 1981, amendments 
which have been considered by some commentators to have altered the 
intent of the OCS. 14 
The States maintain an important role under the OCS fisheries regime, 
although again the Commonwealth's influence cannot be understated. 
In determining the classification of fisheries, the Commonwealth 
controlled the extent, and agenda, of the introduction of the OCS. 
These arrangements have facilitated a shift away from jurisdiction to 
stock-based management which has increased the Commonwealth's 
day to day involvement in fisheries management. 15 
The joint management arrangements and the success of the work of 
the intergovernmental institutions such as the Great Barrier Reef 
Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) and the Great Barrier Reef 
Ministerial Council contrasts with the two decades of disputes between 
the Commonwealth and Queensland described in earlier chapters. The 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park is seen, justifiably, as a model of 
intergovernmental cooperation in the management of marine 
protected areas. 16 Indeed this is one area where the cooperation 
enshrined in the OCS has been achieved, and where, at least on the 
surface, the interests of both the Queensland and Commonwealth 
14 M. Crommelin, "Commonwealth Involvement in Environment Policy: Past Present 
and Future" Environment and Planning Law JournaL4, (June 1987): 101-112. 
15 A.J. Harrison, The Commonwealth Government in the Administration of Australian 
Fisheries: A Sort of Mongrel Socialism RAIPA National Monograph No.6 (Hobart, 
RAIPA, 1991). 
16 L. K. Kriwoken, "Great Barrier Reef Marine Park: Intergovernmental Relations" 
Marine Policy (September 1991): 349-362. 
311 
governments have been integrated into an intergovernmental regime. 
As has been noted, the establishment of this intergovernmental regime 
has not been without problems; there have been difficulties in 
achieving harmony between State and Commonwealth agencies and in 
coordinating Commonwealth and State legislation. Although some 
differences have arisen in management within the marine park and on 
terrestrial areas- adjacent -to _the _reef, 1_ 7 GBRMPA has generally 
succeeded in moderating these differences. 
The Commonwealth's involvement in each of the OCS regimes is an 
important factor in assessing the validity of the proposition 
underpinning this study that this intergovernmental agreement 
reflects the States' ability to articulate their responsibilities and 
interests, therefore limiting the Commonwealth's ability to act 
unilaterally. Although there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the 
Commonwealth's involvement has increased rather than decreased 
this does not in itself limit the utility of the argument that the States 
remain important actors offshore. The analysis of Australian 
federalism offshore and the Offshore Constitutional- Settlement has 
■.■ 
indicated that each of the elements which reinforce the processes of 
federalism may in fact favour one or other level of government at any 
particular point in time yet pose important limits on each unit . of 
government. As a result the OCS emerged from the evolution of 
Australian federalism offshore since 1901, both part of and and subject 
to the ongoing dynamic underpinning policy making in federal 
systems. Thus the States were able to counter the decision of the High 
Court in the Seas and Submerged Lands case and retain considerable 
influence in offshore policy in spite of reinforcement of 
Commonwealth powers 
17 ibid. 
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The OCS and the Future 
The OCS agreement emerged following intense negotiations and was 
seen as a flagship for the new federalism by the Fraser government. In 
charting a course for less confrontation in Commonwealth-State 
relations much was expected from the OCS, with the sea-worthiness of 
the arrangements being immediately tested. The election of the Hawke 
government, with the ALP formally committed to overturning the 
OCS and implementing the outcome of the Seas and Submerged 
Lands case, led several commentators to forecast a stormy passage. 
The Hawke government, embroiled in a major struggle with the States 
over Commonwealth intervention in South West Tasmania and the 
Daintree - Wet Tropics region in Queensland, was less committed to 
overturning arrangements which were working effectively. Given that 
the OCS enabled the Commonwealth to maintain its commitments to a 
range of international agreements, and allowed the Commonwealth to 
develop particular policy objectives, it was not surprising that the 
Hawke government retained the OCS. Although the complex and 
untried legislative anchor for the OCS was the focus of considerable 
debate among constitutional lawyers, the political consequences of a 
repeal of the Coastal Waters (State Titles) Act 1980 made it unlikely 
that the settlement would be scuttled. The Hawke governments' 
support for the OCS, in the face of some criticism from within the ALP, 
reduced the possibility of the dispute over the offshore dragging into its 
fourth decade. 
Issues concerning Australian coastal and oceans policy have emerged 
more forcefully in the late 1990s as the problems of marine pollution 
and use of the coastal zone have led to calls for greater government 
action to combat these problems. The OCS framework provides a basis 
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for an intergovernmental response to this emerging policy agenda. An 
attempt to increase the Commonwealth's influence in coastal zone 
management, lapsed in 1990. It is possible that the OCS will provide a 
mechanism fot collaboration over coastal zone policy 18 in which the 
States' interests and responsibilities are recognised. This study has 
established that both levels of governments have significant interests 
in marine policy with intergovernmental agreements such as the OCS 
reflecting the inherently federal character of Australian public policy 
making. 
18 M. Haward and A. Bergin. "Australian Intergovernmental Relations and Coastal 
Zone Management" in O.T. Magoon, H. Converse, V. Tippie, L.T. Tobin and D. Clark 
(eds) Coastal Zone 91: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium on Coastal Zone 
Management (New York: ASCE, 1991): 737-751. 
Appendix One 
The 1967 Petroleum Agreement 
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Operation of 
Agreement. 
AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE EXPLORATION FOR, AND 
THE EXPLOITATION OF, THE PETROLEUM RESOURCES, AND 
CERTAIN OTHER RESOURCES, OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
OF AUSTRALIA AND OF CERTAIN TERRITORIES OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH AND OF CERTAIN OTHER SUBMERGED 
LAND. 
THIS AGREEMENT is made the sixteenth day of October, One 
thousand nine hundred and sixty-seven, Between THE GOVERNMENT 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (in this Agreement 
called "the Commonwealth Government ") of the first part, THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES of the 
second part, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF VICTOR:A 
of the third part, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF QUEENS-
LAND of the fourth part, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA of the fifth part. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA of the sixth part and THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF TASMANIA of the seventh part 
(each of the parties of the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh 
parts being in this Agreement referred to as a State Government" and 
the expression " the State Governments in this Agreement meaning, 
unless the contrary intention appears, all those State Governments). 
WHEREAS in accordance with international law Australia as a 
coastal state has sovereign rights over the continental shelf beyond the 
limits of Australian territorial waters for the purpose of exploring it and 
exploiting its natural resources: 
AND WHEREAS Australia is a party to the Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf signed at Geneva on the twenty-ninth day of April, One 
thousand -nine hundred and fifty-eight, in which those rights are defined: 
AND WHEREAS the exploration for and the exploitation of the 
petroleum resources of submerged lands adjacent to the Australian coast 
would be encouraged by the adoption of legislative measures applying 
uniformly to the continental shelf and to the sea-bed and subsoil beneath 
territorial waters: 
AND WHEREAS the Governments of the Commonwealth and of the 
States have decided, in the national interest, that, without raising ques-
tions concerning, and without derogating from, their respective con-
stitutional powers, they should co-operate for the purpose of ensuring 
the legal effectiveness of authorities to explore for or to exploit the 
petroleum resources of those submerged lands: 
AND WHEREAS the Governments of the Commonwealth and of the 
States have accordingly agreed to submit to their respective Parliaments 
legislation relating both to the continental shelf and to the sea-bed and 
subsoil beneath territorial waters and have also agreed to co-operate in 
the administration of that legislation: 
NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED as follows:— 
PART L—PRELIMINARY. 
1.—(1.) Subject to sub-clause (2.) of this clause, the provisions of 
this Agreement shall take effect upon the signature of this Agreement on 
behalf of all of the parties. 
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(2.) Except as provided in sub-clause (3.) of this clause, Part III. of 
this Agreement shall not have any force or effect in relation to the 
adjacent area of a State until the Acts of the Parliaments of the Com-
monwealth and of the States contemplated by clauses 3, 4 and 5 nave 
come into operation. 
(3.) Part III. of this Agreement may by agreement between the 
Commonwealth Government and a State Government be brought into 
force and effect in relation to the adjacent area of the State when the 
Acts of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth and of the State contem-
plated by clauses 3' 4 and 5 have come into operation in relation to that 
adjacent area. 
2.—(1.) In this Agreement, unless the contrary intention appears— Definitions. 
" clause " means clause of this Agreement; 
" Commonwealth " means Commonwealth of Australia; 
" Government " means a Government a party to this Agreement 
and the expression "the Governments" means all those 
Governments; 
" State " means one of the States aforesaid and the expression 
" the States" means all those States; 
"the Common Mining Code S' means, in relation to the adjacent 
area of a State, the Commonwealth Mining Code and the 
State Mining Code of that State in their application to that 
adjacent area; 
"the Commonwealth Mining Code" means Part III. of the Com-
monwealth Act designated the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) 
Act and the Commonwealth Acts designated the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) (Royalty) Act, the Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) (Exploration Permit Fees) Act, the Petroleum (Sub-
merged Lands) (Production Licence Fees) Act, the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) (Pipeline Licence Fees) Act and the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Registration Fees) Act that 
are contemplated by clauses 3 and 5; 
"the Commonwealth Minister" means the Minister of State of 
the Commonwealth for the time being responsible for the 
administration of the Commonwealth Mining _Code and 
includes a Minister or other member of the Federal 
Executive Council who is for the time being acting on behalf 
of that Minister; and 
"the State Mining Code" means Part III. of the relevant State 
Act and any other relevant State Act or Acts that is or are 
contemplated by clauses 4 and 5. 
(2.) A reference in this Agreement to an Act of the Commonwealth 
or of a State shall, except where the contrary intention appears ; be read 
as a reference to that Act as from time to time amended in accordance 
with this Agreement. 
(3.) Where a word, expression or reference that is defined or for 
which an interpretation is given in an Act of the Parliament of the Com-
monwealth or of a State contemplated by this Agreement is used in this 
Agreement, the word, expression or reference shall, unless the context 
otherwise requires, have for the purposes of this Agreement the meaning 
or interpretation attributed or given to it by those Acts. 
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PART 1I.—THE COMMONWEALTH AND STATE LEGISLATION. 
3. The Commonwealth Government will submit to the Parliament of 
the Commonwealth Bills for Acts that contain, apart from any formal 
or transitional provisions, provisions to the effect of the draft Bills set out 
in the First Schedule to this Agreement. 
4. Each Sate Government will submit to the Parliament of the State 
a Bill for an Act, or Bills for Acts, that, apart from any formal or transi-
tional provisions, contains or contain provisions to the effect of the draft 
Bill set out in the Second Schedule to this Agreement. 
5. Each Government will use all reasonable endeavours to secure the 
passing and the coming into operation of the Bill or Bills introduced 
by it. 
6.—(1.) Except in accordance with an agreement between the Com-
monwealth Government and the State Governments, a Government will 
not submit to its Parliament a Bill for an Act that would either— 
(a) amend or repeal an Act that is contemplated by the preceding 
provisions of this Part: or 
(b) in any material respect affect the scheme of the legislation 
that is contemplated by this Agreement. 
(2.) The last preceding sub-clause does not apply to a Bill for an Act 
in so far as the effect of its provisions would be formal or transitional. 
Regulations. 	7. Except in accordance with an agreement between the Common- 
wealth Government and the Stare Governments— 
(a) regulations under an Act that is contemplated by the pre-
ceding provisions of this Part (other than formal or 
transitional regulations) in relation to the Commonwealth 
Mining Code or the State Mining Code shall not be made, 
amended or repealed;_and 
(b) regulations under any Act of the Parliament of the Common-
wealth or of a State that will affect in any material respect 
the scheme of the legislation that is contemplated by this 
Agreement shall not be made. 
Legislation in 
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8. The provisions of the last two preceding clauses do not apply to 
legislation with respect to or in its application to a Territory under the 
authority of the Commonwealth not forming part of the Commonwealth. 
PART M.—ADMINISTRATION OF THE COMMON MINING 
CODE. 
9. The Common Mining Code in respect of the adjacent area of a 
State shall be administered by the person who is the Designated Authority 
for the purpose of the Commonwealth Mining Code and of the State 
Mining Code in respect of that adjacent area. 
10. Where in special circumstances a Government requests another 
Government to provide assistance in implementing the legislation con-
templated by this Agreement, the other Government will, so far as it is 
reasonably able to do so, provide the assistance. 
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11.=(1.) Except in so far as the Commonwealth Government has 
informed the State Government that it is not necessary to do so, a State 
Government will consult the Commonwealth Government— 
(a) before a permit. licence, pipeline licence, access authority or 
special prospecting authority under the Common Mining 
Code in relation to the adjacent area of that State is granted, 
renewed or varied; 
(b) before approval is given to any transfer of a permit. licence, 
pipeline licence or access authority that has been so 
granted; or 
(c) before approval is given to any instrument by which a legal 
or equitable interest in or affecting an existing or future 
permit. licence, pipeline licence or access authority (being 
a permit, licence, pipeline licence or access authority under 
the Common Mining Code in relation to the adjacent area 
of that State) is or may be created, assigned, affected or dealt 
with, whether directly or indirectly. 
(2.) The Commonwealth Government will, in considering a matter 
referred to in the last preceding sub-clause, take into account the follow-
ing Commonwealth responsibilities under the Constitution, namely— 
(a) trade and commerce with other countries and among the 
States, including navigation and shipping; 
(b) external affairs: 
(c) taxation, including taxes in the nature of duties of customs 
and excise: 
(d) defence; 
(e) lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys; 
(f) fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits; and 
(g) postal, telegraphic. telephonic and other like services, 
and will, with all due expedition, give a decision accordingly. 
(3.) In coming to a decision. the Commonwealth Government will 
take into account only matters reasonably related to the responsibilities 
specified in the last preceding sub-clause. 
(4.) When giving a decision that is not consistent with the action 
proposed by the State Government. the Commonwealth Government will 
specify the Commonwealth responsibility or responsibilities with respect 
to which the decision is given and, unless it is considered by the Com-
monwealth Government undesirable in the national interest to do so, 
inform the State Government of the grounds of the decision. 
(5.) A State Government will accept. and will ensure that effect is 
given to, a decision of the Commonwealth Government with respect to 
a responsibility of the Commonwealth taken into account as aforesaid. 
12. Each State Government will, in the administration of the Com-
mon Mining Code in relation to the adjacent area of the State, take all 
reasonable steps to secure compliance with the obligations of Australia 
under the Convention. 
13. A State Government will, when so requested by the Common-
wealth Government, ensure that copies of the returns, reports, maps. 
notifications, logs, records and the like material and adequate portions 
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of all cores, cuttings and samples that are received by it or its authorities 
by virtue of the operation of the Common Mining Code in relation to 
the adjacent area of the State are, as soon as reasonably practicable after 
receipt, forwarded to the Commonwealth Government. 
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14.—(1.) A coVition may be included in a permit or licence under 
the Common Mining Code in its application to the adjacent area of a 
State to the effect that the permittee or licensee shall comply with any 
requirement of the Designated Authority administering the Common 
Mining Code that all or any of the petroleum produced pursuant to the 
permit or licence shall be refined in the State, or, in the case of pet-
roleum in a gaseous state, shall be used, before or after processing, 
within the State. 
(2.) A requirement referred to in sub-clause (1.) of this clause shall 
not be made unless there has been consultation between the Common-
wealth Minister and the appropriate Minister of the State concerning the 
requirement and the Ministers are in agreement that the requirement 
should be made. 
(3.) When consulting, the Commonwealth Minister and the State 
Minister shall consider the interests of the State and of the Common-
wealth generally and the Commonwealth Minister shall not be entitled to 
withhold his agreement to the making of the requirement unless it is 
reasonable in the national interest to do so having regard to the economic 
and efficient exploitation, processing and use of the petroleum resources 
to which the requirement would relate. 
15.—(l.) If, for a reason reasonably related to a responsibility of the 
Commonwealth specified in sub-clause (2.) of clause 11, the Common-
wealth Government so requests, an area or areas of the adjacent area of 
a State will for the time being be made not available for the granting 
therein of permits. licences or pipeline licences under the Common 
Mining Code. 
(2.) When making a requirement for the purposes of sub-clause (1.) of 
this clause. the Commonwealth Government will specify the Common-
wealth responsibility or responsibilities with respect to which the require-
ment is made and, unless it considers that it is undesirable in the national 
interest to do so, inform the State Government of the grounds upon 
which the requirement is made. 
16.—(1.) If a petroleum pool extends or is reasonably believed to 
extend from an adjacent area of a State or Territory into— 
(a) lands of the State or Territory not being part of the adjacent 
area of that State or Territory; 
(6) lands of an adjoining State or Territory, not being part of the 
adjacent area of that State or Territory: or 
(c) the adjacent area of an adjoining State or Territory, 
the Designated Authority or Authorities concerned and, where approp-
riate. the other petroleum mining authority or authorities involved shall 
consult concerning the exploitation of the petroleum pool. 
(2.) Directions for the exploitation of the petroleum pool in accord-
ance with the provisions in relation to unit development of the Common 
Mining Code or of the Commonwealth Mining Code in its application 
with respect to a Territory shall not be given to a licensee until after a 
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scheme for the exploitation of the petroleum pool has been agreed upon 
or approved by the relevant authorities or otherwise than in accordance 
with the scheme so agreed upon or approved. 
17. Where, for the purpose of conveying petroleum produced from 
the adjacent area of a State or Territory, the Designated Authority in 
respect of the adjacent area has granted, or proposes to grant, a pipeline 
licence in respect of a pipeline that extends, or will extend, to the boun-
dary between the adjacent area and an adjoining adjacent area, the 
Designated Authority in respect of that adjoining adjacent area shall 
accord all appropriate and reasonable consideration and treatment to an 
application for the grant of a pipeline licence to enable the pipeline to 
be continued across that adjoining adjacent area. 
18.—(1.) A direction under the Common Mining Code that is incon-
sistent with the regulations made in relation thereto shall not be given 
and an exemption from compliance with the conditions of a permit, 
licence, pipeline licence, access authority or special prospecting authority 
shall not be granted by a Designated Authority unless there has been 
consultation between the Commonwealth Minister and the appropriate 
State Minister or their delegates concerning the proposed direction or 
exemption. 
(2.) Consultation as provided for by sub-clause (1.) of this clause is 
not required— 
(a) in cases concerning which the Commonwealth Minister has 
informed the appropriate State Minister that he does not 
consider consultation to be necessary: or 
(b) in a case of such urgency that consultation is not reasonably 
practicable. 
(3.) The Designated Authority shall, as soon as reasonably practicable 
after a direction or an exemption referred to in sub-clause (1.) of this 
clause has been given or granted. whether or not following consultation 
in accordance with the sub-clause, give a notice in writing accordingly 
to the Commonwealth Minister together with particulars of the direction 
or exemption. 
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19.—(1.) After the coming into force of the Common Mining Code Sharing of 
in relation to the adjacent area of a State, royalties received in respect of Royalties ' 
petroleum produced from that adjacent area shall, subject to sub-clause 
(2.) of this clause, be shared as follows— 
(a) as to so much as is royalty, not being over-ride royalty, pay-
able at a rate that does not exceed ten per centum of the 
value at the well-head of the petroleum in respect of which 
royalty is payable—four-tenths shall be -allocated to the Com-
monwealth and the remaining six-tenths shall be allocated to 
the State; and 
(b) any royalty consisting of over-ride royalty in addition to the 
royalty referred to in paragraph (a) of this sub-clause shall 
be allocated to the State. 
(2.) If the rate at which royalty is payable under a licence includes 
over-ride royalty and that rate is reduced by the Designated Authority in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Common Mining Code 
and of the next succeeding clause, the royalties received at the lower 
rate so fixed shall for the purposes of the operation of paragraphs (a) and 
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(b) of sub-clause (1.) of this clause be deemed to be composed of royalty 
other than over-ride royalty and of over-ride royalty in the same respec-
tive proportions as those that comprised royalty other than over-ride 
royalty and over-ride royalty before the reduction. 
(3.) Any additional amount received by reason of late payment of 
royalty shall be allocated between the Commonwealth and the State in 
the same respecti;e proportions as the royalty in respect of which the 
amount is payable is to be allocated in accordance with the preceding 
sub-clauses of this clause. 
20. The rate at which royalty is payable in respect of petroleum 
recovered from a well in the adjacent area of a State shall not be 
reduced by the Designated Authority except by agreement between the 
Commonwealth Minister and the appropriate Minister of the State. 
21. The Designated Authority shall consult the Commonwealth 
Minister before exercising the power under the Common Mining Code 
to determine, otherwise than by agreement with the permittee or licensee, 
the value of any petroleum. 
22. As between the Commonwealth and the State, the State shall be 
entitled to the benefit of all moneys, other , than royalties, payable under 
the Common Mining Code in relation to the adjacent area of the State, 
including moneys paid in respect of the grant of a permit or licence over 
a block or blocks within the adjacent area of the State with respect to 
which a permit or licence was previously in force but which has or have 
again become available for the grant of a permit or licence. 
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PART IV.—GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
Governments _ 	23. The Commonwealth Government and the State Governments will to confer, confer from time to time concerning the operation and administration of 
- the legislation of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth and of the States 
• contemplated by this Agreement and concerning any other matters that 
may arise out of or in connexion with this Agreement. 
Commonwealth 
and State 
Operations. 
24.—(1.) This Agreement shall not affect any right of the Common-
wealth or of a State, by itself or by an authority or corporation on its 
behalf, in an adjacent area to carry on petroleum mining operations. 
(2.) Where the Commonwealth Government or a State Government 
proposes itself, or by an authority or corporation on its behalf, to carry 
on petroleum mining operations in an adjacent area, the State Govern-
ment and the Commonwealth Government will confer in relation to the 
proposed operations and, in the case of proposed operations by or on 
behalf of a State Government, the provisions of -sub-clauses (2.), (3.), (4.) 
and (5.) of clause 11 shall, with appropriate modifications, apply to the 
State Government and the Commonwealth Government as if the carrying 
on of the proposed operations were a matter referred to in sub-clause (1.) 
of that clause. 
(3.) A Government by or on behalf of which petroleum mining 
operations are carried on in an adjacent area shall ensure, as far as 
appropriate and reasonably practicable, that those operations are carried 
on in conformity with this Agreement and the Common Mining Code 
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and that all acts and things relating or incidental to those operations shall 
be done which the Common Mining Code, if it applied, would require 
to be done. 
(4.) If petroleum is produced from the adjacent area of a State by 
the Commonwealth Government or a State Government_ or by an 
authority or corporation on behalf of either, the Government concerned 
shall ensure that the share of the other Government under paragraph (a) 
of sub-clause (1.) of clause 19 to the moneys that would be payable by 
a private producer as a permittee or licensee in respect of the petroleum 
is accorded to the State or to the Commonwealth, as the case may be. 
(5.) In this clause "petroleum mining operations" means— 
(a) prospecting for petroleum; 
(b) recovering petroleum; 
(c) constructing and operating pipelines; and 
(d) doing all other things incidental thereto. 
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25.—(1.) This Agreement shall not be capable of being varied or 
revoked or of being determined by any Government except by 'agreement 
between all of the Governments for the time being parties thereto. 
(2.) The last preceding sub-clause shall not prejudice the right of any 
Government to determine this Agreement in relation to a Government 
that is in default thereunder. 
26. The Governments acknowledge that this Agreement is not 
intended to create legal relationships justiciable in a Court of Law but 
declare that the Agreement shall be construed and given effect to by the 
parties in all respects according to the true meaning and spirit thereof. 
Variation, etc., 
of Agreement. 
Construction 
and Effect of 
Agreement. 
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Appendix Two 
The OCS Agreed Arrangements 
Extension of the legislative powers of the States in and in 
relation to coastal waters 
The Commonwealth Parliament will pass legislation, based on section 
51 (38) of the Constitution, to give each State the smile powers with 
respect to the adjacent territorial sea (including the seabed) as it would 
have if the waters were within the limits of the State. 
The legislation will also give each State powers outside the territorial 
sea in respect of port-type facilities, underground mining extending from 
land within a State, and fisheries. The power with respect to fisheries 
will apply to fisheries that, under an arrangement to which the Com-
monwealth is a party, are to be managed in accordance with the laws 
of the State concerned, under the offshore fisheries scheme described 
below. 
The status of the territorial sea under international law is to be 
expressly preserved. Also, savings provisions are to be included: 
– to safeguard existing State extra-territorial powers in the offshore 
area: 
– to ensure that laws of the Commonwealth that apply in the 
territorial sea prevail over any inconsistent State law in accordance 
with the paramountcy given to Commonwealth laws under section 
109 of the Constitution. 
The intended use, for the first time since federation, of section 51 (38) 
of the Constitution is of considerable significance for federal relations 
as its exercise requires the request or concurrence of the Parliaments of 
the States concerned. All States have agreed to pass Acts requesting 
the Commonwealth legislation. A copy of the Victorian Bill is in the 
accompanying booklet, Offshore Constitutional Settlement—Selected 
Statements and Documents 1978-79. 
Vesting in the States of the title to seabed beneath the territorial sea 
The Commonwealth Parliament will pass legislation to vest in each 
State proprietary rights and title in respect of the seabed of the adjacent 
territorial sea. 
This grant of proprietary rights and title will both support the ex-
tension of the powers of the States in the territorial sea and provide an 
assurance to the States that the arrangements relating to the territorial 
sea will have permanency and stability. 
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As in the case of the 'Powers' legislation, the status of the territorial 
sea under international law is to be expressly preserved. Also, it will 
be necessary to except from the grant any seabed owned or used by 
the Commonwealth or by a Commonwealth authority for a specific 
Commonwealth purpose at the time of the grant. In addition, the Com-
monwealth legislation will reserve the Commonwealth's right to use 
the seabed for such national' purposes as: 
— defence 
— cables 
— navigational aids 
— quarantine 
Amendment of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 
Consequential amendments will be made to the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act 1973 to ensure that State laws passed under the other legis-
lation will not be invalidated by that Act. 
The area involved 
The above legislation—and also the petroleum and fisheries arrange-
ments referred to below—will be limited to a territorial sea of 3 miles 
breadth, irrespective of whether Australia subsequently moves to a 
territorial sea of 12 miles. 
On the other hand, the baselines from which the territorial sea will 
be measured will be drawn in a way that takes advantage of the inter-
national principles authorising the drawing of 'straight baselines' 
where the coast is deeply indented or fringed by islands, and of closing 
lines where bays are not more than 24 miles wide. Thus 'straight base-
lines' will be used to enclose the waters of Investigator Strait adjacent 
to South Australia. The 'internal waters' on the landward side of these 
lines will be included in the grants made by the legislation. The result 
will be to enlarge the area in which the States will enjoy the benefits 
of the legislation. 
The baselines to be adopted are being prepared in close consultation 
with the States and will be promulgated in due course under the Seas 
and Submerged Lands Act 1973. 
Offshore petroleum arrangements outside the 3 mile territorial sea 
These will be regulated by Commonwealth legislation alone, consisting 
of an amended -Commonwealth Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act. 
Day-to-day administration will continue to be in the hands of the 
'Designated Authority' appointed for the 'adjacent area' of each State—
that is, the State Minister—and State officials. The existing mining code 
Will be retained and existing permits and licences will not be affected. 
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However, the legislation will establish for the first time a statutory 
Joint Authority for each adjacent area consisting of the Commonwealth 
Minister and the State Minister (Commonwealth-Victoria Offshore 
Petroleum Joint Authority, and so on). The Joint Authorities will be 
concerned only with major matters arising under the legislation 
including: 
— determination of the areas to be open for applications for 
permits; • 
— the grant and renewal of exploration permits and production 
licences; 
— approval of instruments creating interests in permits or licences; 
— determination of permit or licence conditions governing the 
level of work or expenditure. 
In the event of disagreement within a Joint Authority the view of 
the Commonwealth Minister is to prevail. 
Having regard to the remoteness of Western Australia and its other 
special circumstances, special conditions were agreed in its case. A copy 
of the agreement is in the accompanying booklet, Offshore Consti-
tutional -Settlement—Selected Statements and Other Documents 1978- 
1979. However, Commonwealth views based on the national interest 
are still to prevail in the Joint Authority, as in the case of other States. 
Summing up, the new arrangements will ensure that: 
— the national interest in offshore petroleum activities can be 
asserted; 
— the valuable role of the States is continued; 
— dislocation of ongoing projects is avoided. 
The present arrangements for the sharing of royalties between the 
States and the Commonwealth will be retained. 
Offshore petroleum arrangements inside the outer limit 
of the 3 mile territorial sea 
This will be regulated by State legislation alone, administered by State 
authorities, in recognition of the fact that local matters within the 
territorial sea are primarily matters for the States. However, the 
common mining code will be retained as far as practicable, and existing 
permits and licences, and appropriate arrangements will be made for 
`transitioning' existing permits to the extent that they fall Within the 
outer limit of the territorial sea. 
Offshore mining for other minerals 
Arrangements for the mining of offshore minerals other than petroleum 
will be the same as for offshore petroleum. 
Commonwealth and State legislation embodying a common mining 
code will be needed to implement the arrangements. Arrangements will 
also be made for sharing royalties. 
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Offshore fisheries 
The arrangements existing to date involve a division of legislative 
responsibilities under which, generally speaking, State laws are applied 
inside 'territorial limits' consisting of the outer limit of the 3 mile 
territorial sea, and Commonwealth laws beyond. These arrangements 
inhibit a flexible functional approach under which responsibilities can 
be adjusted by reference to the requirements of particular fisheries. Fish 
do not respect the jurisdictional lines that man may draw. 
The new arrangements will enable a single fishery to be regulated 
by the one set of laws, Commonwealth or State, as agreed between the 
Commonwealth and the State or States concerned, and they will provide 
for the establishment of Fisheries Joint Authorities: 
— a South-Eastern Fisheries Joint Authority consisting of the Com-
monwealth Minister together with the appropriate Ministers of 
New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania; 
— a Northern Australian Fisheries Joint Authority consisting of the 
Commonwealth Minister together with the appropriate -Ministers 
of Queensland and the Northern Territory; 
— a Western Australian Fisheries Joint Authority consisting of the 
Commonwealth Minister together with the appropriate Minister 
for Western Australia; 
— a Northern Territory Fisheries Joint Authority consisting of the 
Commonwealth Minister and the appropriate Minister of the 
Northern Territory. 
Flexibility is the keynote of the proposed legislation, and the Com-
monwealth will be able to make at any time an arrangement with a 
State or States for the establishment of further Fisheries Joint Authorities. 
There will be Complementary State legislation covering the area 
within the outer limit of the territorial sea. 
In the event of disagreement within a Fisheries Joint Authority, the 
views of the Commonwealth Minister will prevail. 
By agreement of the Governments concerned, a particular fishery 
may be assigned to the management of one of these Joint Authorities. 
Alternatively, it may be assigned to the administration of the Common-
wealth alone or a State alone, if that is agreed. 
These measures, devised in close collaboration between Common-
wealth and State fisheries officers and legal advisers, have a practical 
objective—to provide a sound legal and administrative basis for a 
functional approach under which a particular fishery can be regulated 
by one authority under one set of laws, without regard to jurisdictional 
lines. 
To give possible examples, the very important northern prawn fishery 
could be considered for management by the Northern Australian 
Fisheries Joint Authority; the Western Australia rock lobster fishery for 
management by that State; and the southern bluefin tuna fishery by the 
Commonwealth. 
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Under existing arrangements, foreign fishermen are regulated by 
Commonwealth law. This will continue to be the position. However, 
it has been agreed that the Commonwealth Minister is to be able to 
deem a boat brought to Australia from overseas for a limited period 
to participate in a joint venture under the control of an Australian 
company to be an 'Australian boat' for the purposes of the arrangements. 
Historic shipwrecks 
The Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 as presently drafted does not apply 
in relation to waters adjacent to the coast of any State until a proclama-
tion has been made declaring that the Act so applies. In practice, 
proclamations have only been made where the adjacent State requests 
it. The result to date is that the Act applies to the waters adjacent to 
Western Australia, Queensland and New South Wales, as well as to 
waters adjacent to the Northern Territory. 
Under the offshore settlement agreed to at the Premiers Conference 
the Act is to be amended so that it will expressly provide that it will only 
be applicable, or continue to be applicable, to waters adjacent to a State 
or the Northern Territory with the consent of that State or Territory. 
However, an exception is made for the special case of old Dutch ship-
wrecks lying off the coast of Western Australia. 
These shipwrecks are the subject of a 1972 agreement between the 
Commonwealth and the Netherlands. They are protected at present 
by the Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 and are to continue to remain under 
the Commonwealth Act until satisfactory alternative arrangements 
are made with Western Australia. Western Australia has already pro-
posed discussions for such arrangements. Its State authorities have a 
fine record in taking steps to protect these shipwrecks and the relics 
from them, notwithstanding the legal difficulties illustrated by the case 
of Robinson v. Western Australian Museum (1977) 138 CLR 283. 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 is to continue to apply to 
the whole of the Great Barrier Reef Region as defined in that Act, and 
the rights and title to be vested in the States in respect of the seabed 
of the territorial sea are to be subject to the operation of that Act 
In addition, the Commonwealth and Queensland have agreed to 
establish joint consultative arrangements for the management and 
preservation of the Region, which extends right into low-water mark 
along the Queensland coast and around Queensland islands in the area. 
After consultation in accordance with these new arrangements, the 
Governor-General has since proclaimed the Capricornia Section as the 
first area to be declared to be part of the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park (Commonwealth of Australia Gazette of 21 October 1979). 
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Other marine parks 
The general division of responsibility is that parks or reserves within 
the outer limit of the territorial sea would be established under State 
legislation and parks or reserves beyond would be established by Com-
monwealth legislation with management responsibilities determined 
after consultation between the State concerned and the Commonwealth. 
Where an area prOposed as a marine park or reserve lies across the 
boundary of the territorial sea, the State concerned would establish 
that portion within the outer limit of the territorial sea under State 
legislation and the Commonwealth would legislate for that portion sea-
wards of the outer limit of the territorial sea. Such arrangements would 
be subject to agreement between the State concerned and the Common-
wealth on policy, planning and management for the whole area. 
The only departure envisaged from this general division of responsi-
bilities is where the Commonwealth and the State concerned agree that 
a proposed park within the territorial sea has international significance 
but where the State does not wish to legislate itself. In that event, the 
Commonwealth would legislate. 
The need for consultation between the States and the Common-
wealth in the establishment of marine parks and reserves has been 
recognised. 
Crimes at sea 
The purpose of the agreed scheme of complementary Commonwealth–
State legislation is to ensure that an appropriate body of Australian 
criminal laws—either State or Territory—is applicable to ships and to 
activities in offshore areas coming under Australian jurisdiction. 
The legislation, much of which has already been passed, will deal 
•with a situation that has required attention for some time. 
• Under the scheme State legislation will deal with offences in the 
territorial sea and offences committed on voyages between two ports in 
one State, or that began and ended at the same port in a State. The 
Commonwealth legislation deals with other cases, but in doing so it 
applies the criminal laws of a State or Territory with which the ship is 
connected by registration or otherwise. This should facilitate law enforce-
ment and resolve, in a way that fits in with the federal system, the 
uncertainties and doubts that have existed. 
The scheme will not affect the application of existing - specific federal 
criminal offences, which will continue to be dealt with, as now, under 
the special Commonwealth legislation in question, for example the 
Customs Act. However, the application of State criminal laws under 
the scheme will help law enforcement generally on matters such as drug 
offences. 
The Commonwealth legislation involved—the Crimes at Sea Act 
1979—came into force on 1 November 1979, the date of the establish-
ment of the Australian 200 nautical mile fishing zone. It applies to 
offences committed 'on Australian ships which are on overseas, inter-
state or Territory voyages. The Act also applies to offences on Australian 
ships in foreign ports, offences by Australian citizens on foreign ships 
where they are not members of the crew, and offences in offshore areas 
outside the territorial sea in relation to matters within Australian 
jurisdiction. 
In certain limited cases the Act can also be applied to offences 
committed on foreign ships. Tire consent of the Commonwealth Attorney-
General is required and is only to be given if the consent of the foreign 
State is obtained. This special jurisdiction would only be resorted to 
where necessary to ensure that serious criminal offences did not go 
unpunished for lack of an applicable law. 
The scheme contains innovative provisions for the removal of pro-
ceedings from a Court in one part of Australia to a Court in another 
part of Australia where that would be expedient to avoid hardship on 
the accused or to promote a speedy trial. 
Agreement on shipping and navigation 
The broad terms of the agreement, which deals primarily with the survey 
and issue of certificates to ships, the regulation of ships' crews, and the 
number and qualifications-of those on board are: 
— The States will be responsible for trading vessels except those 
proceeding on an interstate or an overseas voyage. For this 
purpose, 'trading vessels' are vessels, other than those in the 
categories listed below, that carry goods and passengers on a 
commercial basis. This category also includes tugs, barges, 
dredges and other marine service vessels. 
— The Commonwealth will be responsible for trading vessels on 
an interstate or overseas voyage. 
— The States will be responsible for all Australian commercial fishing 
vessels except those going on an overseas voyage. For this pur-
pose a voyage of a Queensland based fishing vessel to Papua 
New Guinea would not be regarded as an overseas voyage. The 
safety standards of foreign fishing vessels in Australian waters 
will be a Commonwealth responsibility. 
— The States will be responsible for all vessels whose operations 
are confined to rivers, lakes and other inland waterways. New 
South Wales will be responsible for all vessels operating on the 
River Murray upstream from the South Australian border. 
— The States will be responsible for pleasure craft and for vessels 
used for pleasure on a hire and drive basis. 
— The Commonwealth will be responsible for the navigation and 
marine aspects of offshore industry mobile units (mainly drilling 
vessels), but Navigation Act requirements may be displaced by 
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directions or conditions of instruments issued under the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) legislation. 
— The Commonwealth will be responsible for offshore industry 
vessels (mainly supply craft), other than those confined to one 
State and its adjacept area. Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 
requirements will be capable of displacing the Commonwealth's 
Navigation Act requirements as in the case of mobile units. The 
procedure for determining whether an offshore industry vessel 
is confined to one State will depend on the owner making a 
declaration as to the intended operations of the vessel over a 
prescribed period. Unless a declaration is made and is accepted 
by the Minister for Transport following consultation with his 
State counterpart, the vessel will be under State law. 
Simultaneously with the negotiation of this agreement the Common-
wealth and States have developed a Uniform Shipping Laws Code 
which was published in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 
28 December 1979. This Code will be used as the basis for uniform 
Commonwealth, State and Northern Territory legislation for the survey 
and manning of commercial vessels, including fishing vessels, and will 
minimise problems that would otherwise occur in the implementation 
of the agreement on shipping and navigation. This is particularly 
necessary as the present laws of the States vary considerably due to 
their separate historical development. 
Increasingly the regulation of shipping and navigation is being 
developed at the international level and considerable importance is 
placed on the need for Australian requirements to reflect the latest 
international standards. This is being done progressively in close con-
sultation with the States. In implementing particular maritime treaties 
it may be desirable to depart from the shipping and navigation arrange-
ments outlined above and the agreement with the States provides for 
this. 
An example is the Convention on the International Regulations for 
the Prevention of Collisions at Sea 1974 which is being ratified by 
Australia following the enactment of the Navigation Amendment Act 
1979. The Act enables State law to apply the international regulations 
to all ships in the territorial sea and internal waters and provides the 
necessary Commonwealth law to apply the international regulations to 
ships outside the 3 mile limit. 
Summing up, the arrangements lay the basis for a complete resolu-
tion of shipping and navigation problems that have existed in Australia 
since federation. 
In a separate development from the shipping and navigation agree-
ment, the Commonwealth is preparing a Shipping Registration Bill to 
replace the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 under which 
ships are registered in Australia as 'British ships'. Internationally Aust-
ralia is obliged to fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to 
ships. Although this is essentially a Commonwealth responsibility the 
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Government has kept in close touch with the States in the Marine and 
Ports Council on this matter. 
Ship-sourced marine pollution 
The initial division of rgponsibilities between the Commonwealth and 
the States in the field of ship-sourced marine pollution came about in 
1960 when the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
of the Sea by Oil, 1954, was accepted by Australia. Effect was given to 
the Convention by the enactment of Commonwealth legislation which 
applied to Australian ships outside the territorial sea, and similar 
legislation passed by the States which applied to all ships within the 
territorial sea. 
Part VITA of the Navigation Act 1912 includes provisions for inter-
vention by Commonwealth authorities in cases of pollution or threatened 
pollution by oil from ships. This Part also imposes civil liability on 
shipowners whose ships carry oil in bulk as cargo. Similar legislation 
exists in some of the States. 
In the interests of co-operative federalism, it has been agreed that 
the arrangements that existed before the High Court decision in the 
Seas and Submerged Lands case in 1975 should be continued. 
It has also been agreed that the Commonwealth should prepare 
legislation which will implement the provisions of the International 
Conventions relating to Intervention on the High Seas in cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties, 1969, and Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
1969. In implementing the latter Convention, a saving clause is to be 
inserted to allow States to legislate to implement certain aspects of the 
Convention if they wish to do so. 
Northern Territory 
Following on the Government's action to bring the Northern Territory 
to the stage of responsible government with effect from 1 July 1978, 
representatives of the Northern Territory Government have participated 
in all offshore discussions. The Northern Territory is to be treated as a 
State for the purposes of the offshore constitutional settlement, and 
the legislation to implement the settlement will reflect this.. 
Jervis Bay Territory 
The Commonwealth Government and the New South Wales Govern-
ment are at an advanced stage of negotiating mutually acceptable 
arrangements. 
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